

# Bringin' Gas & Dialin' 9

A SEVEN SCORE ADDICTION  
TO THE NATIONAL PASTIME  
VOL II (1950-2014)



CENTERFIELDERS  
DYNASTIES  
SPORTSWRITERS  
FREE AGENCY  
STOLEN BASES  
STEROIDS  
FANTASY BASEBALL



## Jason T. Powers

Deep Center Field Press

# BRINGIN' GAS & DIALIN' 9: A SEVEN SCORE ADDICTION TO THE NATIONAL PASTIME Vol II. (1950-2014)

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*Jason T. Powers*

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**IKE ERA (1950 –1963)**

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## Preface

In the spring of 2020, 151 years since the profession of baseball was uniquely formed into a continuously operating league, the 2020 season halted due to an international pandemic. This stoppage came about as the response to a coronavirus triggered economic and social life changes hitherto never felt in the modern world. The break from the normal rites of spring training and opening days at the cusp of spring, made all aware of the frailty of such traditions in our American society. The avenues pursued in the absence of sport, structured on “new normal” policies, made this author think, “Are the measures more damaging than the disease itself?”

One should be free to ask those questions. They serve to sharpen our abilities to reason, to assess, and even confirm what others are saying about visible results and personal stories regarding everything, medical and non-medical. It triggered this fan again to write once again, but not about baseball.<sup>1</sup>

This book project, regarding baseball history, started in late 2005. It followed another sports-related disruptive event, held in Congress that spring, regarding the usage of steroids in baseball.<sup>2</sup> At that moment, the author was seeking to conclusively determine the origins and impacts on baseball’s *Power Surge II*. ***Power Surge I*** was triggered by baseball’s modification, type, winding and cleanliness, as Babe Ruth came into his near mythical stature in the game. (The Spanish Flu of 1918 had its baseball causalities from umpires<sup>3</sup> to sportswriters to the players.<sup>3</sup> The 1918 season was impacted by World War I and resulted in the only September World Series. As it turns out, that flu was bacterial in nature and was not specifically, or only, tied to Spain.)

The span of time since one started researching, compiling statistics, player stories and one’s novel ideas saw the game move quickly into the *big data era*. Now, it is quite incredible what is measured from statistical mapping to player physics captured nearly all in *real time*. Like the genetic code broken in 1998, which has scientists designing down to the inherited traits of a person (CRISPR)<sup>4</sup>, baseball is able to quantify and qualitatively assess players in ways that would boggle a manager’s mind in 1980; and considered witchcraft, to a bench leader, like a John McGraw, in 1900.

The goal, for this ***incomplete and very lightly edited manuscript***, is to finish a journey started before the *iPhone*, before *Facebook* made \$10,000,000<sup>5</sup>, or the Chicago Cubs finally won a World Series. To close out one’s duty to this most enjoyed game. Like a player’s career, which sees its rises and falls, struggles, losses, and reassessment of roles, these two connected volumes were always meant to serve as one’s humble



addition to the history of baseball. As an outsider, a mere citizen that held ordinary jobs, one provided their insights through leveraging the vast time, personal efforts and resources others provided in their concentrated and bookish efforts. These will be cited and thanked often. (The bibliography in this volume will match Volume I.)

The author went back to playing this beautiful sport in 2015. Since then, adult baseball leagues provided one an “active” approach to the sport. Nothing more old-time baseball than playing as a lefty catcher, or a 5’6” first sacker. That love of play never wanes, just repurposes itself, to be on those beautiful fields, yet again.

Baseball, football and basketball are genetic to the United States of America. They were in the minds daily for fans both young and old. While seen as entertainment, and frivolous, teamwork and life skills build up from acquiring baseball fundamentals, often to the betterment of the person who apply baseball lessons into lifetime relationships.

Unfortunately, the sport moved beyond its founding and principles as well, with ever-changing rules, and financial and political agendas clearly visible. One example was a *Tencent* broadcast deal in China, formulated in 2018, and re-upped.<sup>6,7</sup> Another was the MLB relocation of an All-star game out of Georgia as a protest against reaffirming sane election laws after a heated 2020 election cycle.<sup>8</sup> The political outcomes in Georgia, in 2020, should not have impacted a baseball game’s location. But they did.

MLB has changed its values, primarily driven towards a political agenda tied to ESG scores and subversion of its once reaffirming life-as-a-sport values. These traditional values were clearer after Jackie Robinson came into the sport, some seven years before *Brown v. Board of Education* was decided, than they are in the year 2022.


The future of sport will include more technology and focus on finances over fun.<sup>9</sup> At some point, the awe and wonder will lessen with the real-time player biometrics and artificial intelligence run off massive datasets. The Astros incorporated technology *illegally*, by rule, in the sport in 2017.<sup>10</sup> That is partially why this volume closes out abruptly. The story from here on needs a different method, more day-to-day following, and abilities that exceed this author’s bandwidth and other newly-found interests.

This is about *having a final catch*. One will still take the field, on the weekend with guys that remember well the classic game, from a different era, that will never return again in my life. On August 2, 2022, Vin Scully passed away at 94. He was the epitome, the heartbeat, the soul of the National Pastime.<sup>11</sup> And now, it is time to *Bring the Final Gas*.

## Ike Era (1950 –1963)

- ◆ Television influences the shape of Major Leagues and Minor Leagues
- ◆ Shifting Franchises
- ◆ Expansion into The West
- ◆ Expanded Schedule to 162 games
- ◆ Astroturf and Domes become a reality


# IKE ERA: Expansion & The Golden ERA



**Willie Mays**

Bobby Thomson: Shot Heard 'round the World

Don Larsen: Perfect Game in 5<sup>th</sup> game of 1956 WS




**Best MLB Players:** Willie Mays, Mickey Mantle, Hank Aaron, Ernie Banks, Harmon Killebrew, Eddie Mathews, Duke Snider, Frank Robinson, Richie Ashburn, Warren Spahn, Robin Roberts, Early Wynn, Whitey Ford, Bob Lemon

From *The Boys of Summer* by New York sportswriter and renowned author Roger Kahn:

"...The year 1952 casts a disturbing, well remembered shadow. It was then that the American electorate disdained the troubling eloquence of Adlai Stevenson for Dwight Eisenhower and what Stevenson called green fairways of indifference. That very baseball season Eisenhower outran Robert A. Taft for the Republican nomination and, hands clasped above his bald, broad dome, mounted his irresistible campaign for the Presidency. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy rose in Washington and King Farouk fell in Egypt. Although the Korean War killed 120 Americans a week, times were comfortable at home. A four-door Packard with Thunderbolt-8 engine sold for \$2,613 and, according to advertisements, more than 53 percent of all Packard manufactured since 1899 still ran...It was a time of transition, which few recognized, and glutting national self-satisfaction. Students and scholars were silent. Only a few people distinguished the tidal discontent beginning to sweep into black America."



McCarthyism. The 'Say Hey' Kid. *Brown v. Board of Education*. Black & white television broadcasts. 'I like Ike.' The nuclear-powered submarine *Nautilus*. *West Side Story*. *Sputnik*. *A Raisin in the Sun*. *From Here to Eternity*. The continued integration of baseball. These things circled in the minds of Americans during a decade that saw growth and expansion to the West Coast. Home technology improved and expanded with a booming housing market, while people began to watch ballgames more regularly on TV. Baseball owners saw falling profits due to inner city decay, old ballparks lacking amenities, and neighborhoods losing populations due to crime and the flight to the suburbs (James, 241). (Pictured above: 1950s Housing developments in the suburbs were a measure of the growth of personal prosperity. Courtesy of Ian Duke.)



**(Pictured above:** Rosa Parks at the start of racial desegregation on buses, schools, and other public places. Martin Luther King Jr. talking in the background. Courtesy of the National Archives.)

During the 1950s, societal schisms created over four score years changed rapidly through the *Civil Rights* movement. It started constitutionally at the back of a bus with Rosa Parks standing up by sitting down for her inalienable rights. A boycott ensued; and in December 1956, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed bus segregation unconstitutional in *Browder v. Gayle*. But the seeds of change appeared earlier, in military service and sports, when Truman desegregated the armed forces in 1948 after Jackie broke barriers in 1947. The television boom soon showed a country evolving quickly, too quickly for some.

Even with inclusionary changes, baseball's spring training and season travel schedules sparked clashes as black athletes received hostile rejections and endured racial slurs in using amenities. Many Dixieland locales refused any service to those of color as backlashes and violence loomed on the horizon for many minorities taking up the rights cause.

Internationally, the U.S.S.R., considered the only serious threat to the American way of life, launched the first man-made satellite in 1957. The space race was triggered; and innovation and progress came through the birth of *NASA* as the United States sought to catch up to this Russian feat. The divide grew greater from our recent allies of WWII; while our determination to prevent the spread of Communism into various spots on

the globe (the *Cuban Missile Crisis*) assured onerous tasks, becoming another linchpin to social upheaval seen in the conflict yet to be fully engaged: Vietnam.

President John F. Kennedy assumed the mantle of curtailing the Iron Curtain's march across the globe in 1961, and found his adversary, Nikita Kruschchev, was poised to intimidate the United States into warfare, proxy or otherwise, once again. Berlin heard Kennedy's reassuring words: "Ich bin ein Berliner." But the Wall went up. And Checkpoint Charlie, a place of lasting intrigue and late night meetings, fostered misgivings, as these nations plotted and plodded through a two score long Cold War (Smyser 2009).

The further growth of television introduced us to Uncle Miltie, the *Texaco Star Theatre*, *Ed Sullivan*, and talking horses, *Mr. Ed* and *Francis*. Cultural stereotypes played out blissfully – like *The Lone Ranger's* Tonto – but a closer examination of deeper contexts became possible as television provided an instant medium unlike any that had come before it. It was the 1960 Presidential campaign between Senator John F. Kennedy (whose father attempted three times to buy MLB teams) and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon (seen at Yankee games after *Watergate* and whose owner was convicted of illegal contributions to Nixon's campaign) that cued television to its greater role in society. Kennedy's youthful appearance on television was cited as the deciding factor, whereas, radio audiences thought Nixon won on the merits. The nation's course was partly determined by a box, and a tube, soon derisively called: "the idiot box."



Culturally, the birth of *Rock and Roll* took place in various forms. Whether it was Billy Haley & the Comets, Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Jerry Lee Lewis, Johnny Cash, or Motown, the world of music was never the same again. The developers of the beat (4/4-time signatures) and the chords (3 or 4 at most), added lyrics that expressed more

than just simple love and happiness themes. The blues and jazz influences came in more complex pieces, with driving rhythm sections, and spontaneity in the bridges and during live performances. Barry Gordy established *Hitsville USA*, and soon, no teenager was hip without knowing the latest 'joints' playing on the growing FM radio dial.

(**Pictured:** Elvis Presley was just another soldier even as the 'King of Rock and Roll. Courtesy Fitch Hollister, Wikipedia.)

Iconic *Toots Shor*, located at 51 West 51<sup>st</sup> Street, New York City, was the most envied saloon in all of America. Nearly every famous ballplayer, gangster, Broadway/Hollywood mover and shaker, politician, or Supreme Court judge that came through the city that never sleeps had a night out at Toots. The sleazy characters, such as godfather Frank Costello, did an Italian *salute* to U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren while another big Frank, Sinatra, was drinking with Dino Martin. Meanwhile, Joe D. (DiMaggio) holed up in a back corner listening to his favorite sportswriter/chauffeur Jimmy Cannon.

Toots, when not calling his sports clientele "crumb-bums" for every loss that the Yankees had – which were not that many come October – pressed the flesh with future commander-in-chiefs, and grouched at the notion his place was on the map because of its sterling menu. When Louis B. Mayer flew in, and had to wait for a table, he cracked on Toots' food, to which Toots replied, "It will be better than some of your crummy pictures I stood in line to see (Barra, Yogi Berra: *The Eternal Yankee* 2009, 187-189)." Before there was a *Spago*, or *TMZ*, seeing celebrities and the powerful out mingling meant only one place in America. **(See LBJ Era: Drugs & Baseball Culture)**


In baseball, the Boston Braves owners (Lou and Charles Perini) moved to Milwaukee from Boston following their apathetic 1952 attendance of only 281,278 (Lahman 1995-2012). In ensuing years, Milwaukee hosted 1.8 to 2.2 million eager fans to their games. Walter O'Malley and Horace Stoneham jetted their New York teams out to left coast in 1958, following the model of the Braves franchise. (Two of the very best teams of the 1950s could not make it in the largest media and population market in America.) By the end of this era, four more 'expansion' teams donned uniforms in Los Angeles (1961), Minnesota (1961), Houston (1962), and New York (1962.) **(See LBJ Era: Stadiums)**

## Have Dinger, Will Miss?

At the outset of the Ike Era, one particular change mentioned sporadically was the 'redefinition' of the baseball strike zone. First in 1950 and then in 1963 (Reichler 1988, 2871-72), the zone was modified to continue the hitter's benefit, then contorted to the pitcher's advantage. It is assumed that the strike zone was (in the years following WWII) left even more to the umpires' discretion (than it already is) and that umpires were arbitrarily shrinking it to the benefit of hitters, as seen by the drastic increase in home runs and walks relative to the 1930s and early 1940s from 1946 -1949 seasons. Obviously, some complaints by pitchers might of led to this 'redefining.' (And better hitting players came back to a dearth of top line pitching.)

Nonetheless, hitters became even more aggressive, striking out more, walking relatively the same amount of times but cranking out the long balls in bushels. Stolen bases nearly disappeared from the arsenals of players, as seen by Dom DiMaggio American League-leading 15 swipes in 1950 (Reichler 1988, 402). The offensive strategies shifted even more away from contact, walks, and stolen bases to just swinging for the fences, station-to-station base running, with good pitching, hopefully. Teams better at walking (Dodgers) dominated.

## Diagram. Strike Zone Definition from 1950 to 1968.




But it was not quite clear cut as great feats of one era can be minor notes to another. A comparison between the 1950s players and the 1990s can be summed up in this quote from *Heartbreakers: Baseball's Most Agonizing Defeats*:

“...It was a time when skinny shortstops didn’t hit 20 home runs a year. The ball wasn’t juiced up, and a pitcher could actually manipulate the cover to raise the seams and get a better grip for throwing a curve...there were no muscle-toning and exercise rooms adjoining clubhouses or nearby special indoor areas for batting practice...Branch Rickey, squeezed the dollar with a death grip. Greedy agents hadn’t discovered how easy it was to siphon money out of the game...Today players are bigger and faster than they once were. They have the benefit of vastly improved equipment, including batting gloves, specialized sunglasses, and elaborate protective gear for catchers.” (Kuenster 2001, 6-7)

Yet, Ernie Banks, Mr. Cub, reset the standard of the typical skinny and agile shortstops to power-laden, middle-of-the-order sluggers who retained their glove traits. It took another thirty years for this to be the ‘standard’ reality seen in shortstops. Cal Ripken, Nomar Garciaparra, Alex Rodriguez, and Derek Jeter became assured pop at the hardest position on the diamond.

**Graph.** Strikeout Kings? (100 Ks/160 Ks in a season: 1963 – 2013)






The further redefinition in 1963 to include area above the armpits to the shoulders and to the bottom of the knees was a primary reason the pitchers of the 1960s were dominating. Add to that, the practice of keeping mounds at or above the legally regulated 15" in height (as stated in the Complete Official Rules (1961) (Turkin and Thompson 1970, 656). One then understands why hitters starting losing more battles from 1963 through 1968. Dave Nicholson became the first 160-strikeout king in 1963. Since then, 130 players climbed to that plateau, a strikeout per game through 2013. The Bush era, in only eight seasons (2006-2013), has 66 occurrences of the 160-K men; more than prior four eras of 56 seasons.)

The pitching dominance did not happen *immediately* – but evolved – because, like other rule changes, subject to umpires, pitchers fine-tuned, and batters countered back, game to game. (As they did back in the *Grant Era*.) But since 1952, neither league has average more walks per team than strikeouts. (**See Graph. 4.0.1.** below.) As the decades wore on, walks remained (relatively) constant, but strikeouts rose, and then exploded in the late 1960s. They came back down, thereafter, as the mound was lowered, but more teams meant more opportunities for guys to be a golden sombrero wearer (4 Ks in a game).

In more recent seasons, strikeouts remained high while walking is more 'a natural talent' than a honed skill taught by the farm systems of MLB. (Exceptions obviously occur.) A new crop of 'stars' tend to swing very freely for the fences, strikeout ratios of 6.0 to home runs are not unusual, as long as thirty dingers hit the boards per season. (Ask new record holder (223) for strikeouts, 3B Mark Reynolds, about this phenomenon. Mark has eclipsed 200 Ks thrice. Or more sadly: Drew Stubbs amassed 205 walks to the dugouts in sadness versus on 15 happy trails around the bases, a horrific ratio of 13.67. The record holder, among 160Ks, is Austin Jackson at 42.5 with 170 strikeouts and 4 dingers.)

**Graph: Strikeouts to Walks 1937 to 1977  
(Adjusted for Season Length)**



Don Malcolm in the *Big Bad Baseball Annual 2000* remarks, “one gets the sense that the impact of the strike zone change on hit and walk prevention during the initial transition year (1963) was roughly equal in scope. However, when we examine H9 [hits per nine innings] and BB9 [walks per nine innings] differentials for 1962-63, we see that the BB9 difference is more than twice that for H9 (12% to 5%).” In Don’s article he studies QMAX, a matrix analysis for starting pitchers hit and walk prevention per start, finding that finesse pitchers improved a great deal, matching power pitchers, who are normally noted for having poorer control usually. In the long-term, power pitchers benefit more so due to hit prevention over the finesse pitchers’ walk prevention (Malcolm, et al. 2000).

Hitters though, swung hard, no matter who tossed the pill up there. Legit sluggers Reggie Jackson, Adam Dunn, Cecil Fielder, Ryan Howard, Mike Schmidt, and Gorman Thomas are joined now by Austin Jackson, Jack Cust, and Mark Bellhorn as K masters. The contact game has disappeared. Dingers will travel; and get you paid more.

## Doctor Field Good

In *Diamonds*, groundskeeping legend Emil Bossard's prodigious ability to doctor the ball diamond, to 'build up' foul lines, and craft a mound is well recorded: "When the American League decided to standardize all eight pitching mounds in 1946, a group of veteran hurlers were consulted about the best model. They simply said, 'Copy Cleveland's.' (Gershman 1993, 147) " Again reflecting the adaptability involved in shaping a field to cater to a particular team or style of play – or to identify the best place to pitch at or hit at based on the field setup.

As discussed in FDR era, Emil's ability was passed down through Gene to Roger Bossard, who is called 'The Sodfather' as the Chicago White Sox chief groundskeeper. In November 2007, Roger removed the "crown" on the cross-town rivals' ballpark, Wrigley Field. This quirk field management functioned as a drainage tool for nearly a century. Roger worked on Fenway's infield that went through similar transformation, making it a 21<sup>st</sup> century ballpark. So respected is Roger, a Purdue grad, that a bobble-head promo day at U.S. Cellular took place in June 2011. The Bossards are the Field Good men. Representative of a plethora of creative blue collar rake and tarp guys that make these diamonds shine from March to November through all types of weather conditions.

## Centerfield: Statistics and Stories from the Golden Era

The 1950s were a defining era with a slew of talented center fielders. Willie Mays became the standard to which all others were measured against. Bobby Thomson was heard around the world. Richie Ashburn was Pete Rose (before Pete) was (eventually) for the Phillies. Duke Snider was the 3<sup>rd</sup> best CF in New York, but considered 1<sup>st</sup> anywhere else. And with the departure of all-time great Joe DiMaggio, the mantle was passed on to one...

In 1951, Willie Mays and Mickey Mantle came to New York from humble southern roots. Their youth not ravaged by war, but gifted through stateside love of youthful freedoms and wide-eyed baseball ambitions. Fifteen years earlier, Joe DiMaggio moved into the vast Yankee outfield where the Babe just left it, in immortality, thus, connecting together 60 seasons of baseball (1914-1975) with just four men. In just that three score, the game grew from dusty towns and farms to glitzy stadiums and Astro turf and domes. The spotlight shined brightly; brightest of all in New York as Mantle, Berra, and Ford forged a baseball dynasty.

While the greatness of Mays, Mantle, and Joltin' Joe formed the basis of highest regard, there were other centerfielders baptized during this period. From 1950-1963, seventeen centerfielders of considerable talent (either offensively, defensively, or both) patrolled the outfields of the classic, remodeled, and temporary ballparks of the day. Where the DiMaggio brothers, Andy Pafko, or Bobby Thomson declined (or retired) in the early 1950s, Larry Doby, Willie Mays, Duke Snider, and Mantle supplanted (and exceeded) the memorable talents and games of their ball hawking predecessors.

Mickey Mantle put together years no other centerfielder (or switch hitter) had begun to envision. Three times he won the MVP award (back to back in 1956 & 57), the Triple Crown in 1956, while appearing in 11 World Series during this era, 10 times as a starting centerfielder. During the World Series, Mantle slugged .505 with 16 home runs and was on the winning side 8 times. A lot run production and winning came out of a rural mining district (Mantle and Gluck 1985) in Commerce, Oklahoma, population 2,645, in 2000.

Mantle's New York counterparts in the National League, Mays and Snider, consistently tore the cliché cover off the ball to the cheers and acclaim of fans in the stands. At the beat writer's desk, where this trio grew into baseball deities, almost from the very start of their careers, the paper related all but the unpolished truth. Owners and baseball people held sway on what you read.

As this long passage by Pulitzer Prize-winning writer Richard Ben Cramer in *Joe DiMaggio: The Hero's Life* reflects on this rookie's first day on the job being blown out of proportion and the writer's duties (and perks thereof) of keeping star players' activities on a heroic level:

“After Joe's first day of spring training, the gray and eminent *Herald Tribune* informed New York: ‘Rookie Outfielder Blasts Three Homers in Debut’...and only in the body of the story did one learn, that was at batting practice – scrimmage games hadn't even begun.

IN A SENSE, the writers didn't have any choice. Not if they wanted to keep their jobs. And that was the best job on any newspaper. Baseball writers had status, visibility, more freedom than any other reporter, more travel, more good times and more money...And the quickest way to lose it all was to run afoul of the fellows in the business – not the newspaper business, but the baseball business.

Everyone knew stories of writers who annoyed the club management or players, and that was the last you ever saw of them...Club owners thought nothing of complaining to the editors, and their complaints carried weight. It was the ball clubs...that paid for the writers' train fares, their hotel rooms, their food and drink. Why shouldn't the teams have the sort of writers they wanted?

But it wasn't really threat that kept the hero machine humming; the club was a traveling fraternity. The men at spring training – or on their special railroad cars, heading north – were your buddies, your meal-mates, the first guys you talked to at breakfast about some story in the paper...Sure, you were there to cover the club, but when the club did well, you did well...If two or three writers were drinking in the ante room of Babe Ruth's suite, while [he] was disporting in the bedroom with a succession of female fans...well, of course their feature stories on the great Bambino were bound to mention his vast appetites...

It was Ruth who set the standard for the press, as he did so much for the modern game...

And so, when [New York sportswriter Dan] Daniel anointed this West Coast rookie as successor Ruth, and the hero machine kicked into action, it didn't merely send a call, 'All Hands on Deck!' It also sent a message, 'Handle with Care.'" (Cramer 2000, 81-82)


Such stuff carried over into the 1950s. At the very least in regard to off-the-field escapades and the various mutterings of unhappiness with the goings on with money, as players tended to focus on normally. Exceptions exist.

Heroes were not to be gussied up and painted too human. Instead, the towering blasts, the attractive women, the ailments overcome, the ballgames won were to be played up as 100% All-American. With the recent evil winds of communism blowing more persistent, the sportswriter made ball heroes a safe and secure medicine to counteract ailments of confidence. And paychecks continued to get signed, for ballplayer and sportswriter alike.

**Table. CF Offensive Statistics & WAR rankings (Baseball Ref & Fangraphs)**

Birth	Full Name	Games	CF G	% CF	AB	OBP	SLG	BA	Hits	Walks	2B	HR	Runs	RBI	SB
1931	Willie Mays	2992	2827	<b>94.5%</b>	10,881	<b>0.385</b>	<b>0.557</b>	<b>0.302</b>	<b>3,283</b>	<b>1464</b>	<b>523</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>2062</b>	<b>1903</b>	<b>338</b>
1940	Willie Davis	2429	2237	<b>92.1%</b>	9,174	0.311	0.412	0.279	<b>2,561</b>	418	<b>395</b>	182	<b>1217</b>	<b>1053</b>	<b>398</b>
1927	Richie Ashburn	2189	1995	<b>91.1%</b>	8,365	<b>0.394</b>	0.382	<b>0.308</b>	<b>2,574</b>	<b>1198</b>	<b>317</b>	29	<b>1322</b>	586	<b>234</b>
1931	Mickey Mantle	2401	1745	72.7%	8,102	<b>0.422</b>	<b>0.557</b>	0.298	<b>2,415</b>	<b>1733</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>536</b>	<b>1677</b>	<b>1509</b>	<b>153</b>
1938	Curt Flood	1759	1693	<b>96.2%</b>	6,357	0.339	0.389	0.293	1,861	444	271	85	851	636	88
1938	Vada Pinson	2469	1676	67.9%	9,645	0.326	0.442	0.286	<b>2,757</b>	574	<b>485</b>	256	<b>1366</b>	<b>1170</b>	<b>305</b>
1914	Joe DiMaggio	1736	1638	<b>94.4%</b>	6,821	<b>0.395</b>	<b>0.579</b>	<b>0.325</b>	<b>2,214</b>	790	<b>389</b>	<b>361</b>	<b>1390</b>	<b>1537</b>	30
1926	Duke Snider	2143	1590	74.2%	7,161	<b>0.380</b>	<b>0.540</b>	0.295	<b>2,116</b>	971	<b>358</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>1259</b>	<b>1333</b>	99
1929	Bill Bruton	1610	1550	<b>96.3%</b>	6,056	0.328	0.393	0.273	1,651	482	241	94	937	545	<b>207</b>
1931	Bill Virdon	1583	1504	<b>95.0%</b>	5,980	0.317	0.379	0.267	1,596	442	237	91	735	502	47
1917	Dom DiMaggio	1399	1338	<b>95.6%</b>	5,640	<b>0.380</b>	0.419	0.298	1,680	750	<b>308</b>	87	<b>1046</b>	618	<b>100</b>
1923	Larry Doby	1533	1329	86.7%	5,348	<b>0.384</b>	<b>0.490</b>	0.283	1,515	871	243	253	960	970	47
1929	Jim Piersall	1734	1214	70.0%	5,890	0.332	0.386	0.272	1,604	524	256	104	811	591	<b>115</b>
1934	Jim Landis	1346	1132	84.1%	4,288	0.338	0.375	0.247	1,061	588	169	93	625	467	<b>139</b>
1923	Bobby Thomson	1779	982	55.2%	6,305	0.330	0.462	0.270	1,705	559	267	264	903	<b>1026</b>	38
1928	Gus Bell	1741	811	46.6%	6,478	0.330	0.445	0.281	1,823	470	<b>311</b>	206	865	942	30
1921	Andy Pafko	1852	803	43.4%	6,292	0.344	0.449	0.285	1,796	561	264	213	844	976	38


Rank	Player	bWAR	fWAR	dWAR	Rank	Player	bWAR	fWAR	dWAR
1	Willie Mays	156.1	149.9	6.2	10	Andy Pafko	36.7	34.8	1.9
2	Mickey Mantle	109.7	112.3	(2.6)	11	Bobby Thomson	33.1	31.3	1.8
3	Joe DiMaggio	78.3	83.1	(4.8)	12	Dom DiMaggio	31.8	34.6	(2.8)
4	Duke Snider	66.5	63.5	3.0	13	Jim Piersall	28.4	28.1	0.3
5	Richie Ashburn	63.4	57.4	6.0	14	Bill Bruton	26.1	22.3	3.8
6	Willie Davis	60.7	53.7	7.0	15	Jim Landis	20.5	21.5	(1.0)
7	Vada Pinson	54.2	47.3	6.9	16	Bill Virdon	19.5	16.2	3.3
8	Larry Doby	49.4	51.1	(1.7)	17	Gus Bell	15.2	11.9	3.3
9	Curt Flood	41.8	35.9	5.9					



**Mickey Mantle with the fans:** Shows an award. Mantle was a crowd pleaser for his feats and carried the Yankees to wins and World Series throughout his career. (Courtesy of John Shanahan – his brother, Kevin, is holding the award.)

**Richie Ashburn (1927-1997)** was passed over for the Hall of Fame until 1995 (due to lack of power statistics, WAR 104<sup>th</sup> all-time (Baseball-Reference 2013), but he defined what a leadoff batter was in the #1 Philly uniform. Richie's tenacious play, reckless abandon, and ultimate toughness in a town wanton of that grit, encouraged teammates and garnered praise during less successful seasons that usually beset the Phillies after 1950. A five-time All Star over his career (with Mays, Snider, Bell, and Pinson sometimes making it in his stead in the National League), Ashburn racked up more seasons with 400 putouts (See Table 4.1.2.) than any other centerfielder in baseball history.

Richie Ashburn's greatness on defense, lifetime .308 BA, and .394 OBP certainly could have been honored sooner by the National Baseball Hall of Fame. In reflection, this author rates him the 5<sup>th</sup> best centerfielder of this group (behind Mays, Mantle, Joe DiMaggio, and Duke Snider) if only due to his defense being at the top amongst all centerfielders in MLB History in as much as putouts, assist records, and fielding percentage do reflect his total ability.



Bill James: “[Ashburn] has the best defensive statistics of any outfielder ever to play major league baseball (Kaplan 1989, 22).” On the last day of 1950 season, Ashburn made a game saving throw to home to cut down the potential winning run of Cal Abrams in the 9<sup>th</sup> inning. Duke Snider, fellow centerfielder, had singled to Ashburn but it went for naught. In the 10<sup>th</sup> inning, George Sisler's son, Dick, hit a homer that sent the Phillies to the World Series (Kaplan 1989, 22).

Ashburn was a foul ball wizard to such an extent that he likely cost the National League \$4,000 in baseballs (at \$2 per ball, per year). So difficult a man to put a baseball by that Giants owner Horace Stoneham remarked, “Look at that little devil take money right out my pocket,” after 13 consecutive foul balls in one at bat (Kaplan 1989, 22). He once played 730 games in a row and ended his career as a .300 hitter in his last full season, one of only a handful to accomplish the feat while hitting 7 home runs, twice his usual total for any other year. **(Left: Richie Ashburn, a pesky hitter that fouled off pitch after pitch to the irritation of a hi-ball drinking opposing owner. Wikipedia Commons – 1953 Bowman Card (Public Domain))**



**Table.** Centerfield Records for Most Years with 400 Putouts

<i>Centerfielders</i>	400 PO Seasons	<i>Putouts</i>	<i>Total Assists</i>
<b>Richie Ashburn</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6089</b>	<b>178</b>
<b>Willie Mays</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7095</b>	<b>198</b>
Max Carey	<b>6</b>	<b>6363</b>	<b>339</b>
Brett Butler	5	5341	123
Lloyd Waner	5	4860	159
Chet Lemon	5	4993	115
Kirby Puckett	5	4392	142
Dwayne Murphy	4	3579	80
Garry Maddox	4	4774	107
Andre Dawson	4	5153	157
Sam West	4	4622	155
<b>Dom DiMaggio</b>	<b>4</b>	3859	147
Taylor Douthit	4	3500	76
Sam Chapman	4	3754	118

**Notables:** Joe DiMaggio (3), Bill Virdon (3), Gus Bell (2), Willie Davis (2), Jim Piersall (2), Vada Pinson (2), Bill Bruton (2), Jim Landis (1), Bobby Thomson (1), Curt Flood (1)

## The Measure of a Centerfielder

To further this point of view, an analysis of why this holds merit comes from examination against the standard which all centerfielders in the post racial-integration era are measured: **Willie Mays**.

The fairness of this analysis comes from certain measurements:

1. **Utilizing 1951-1957 Records.** Both players were in the same home ballparks each season; were both at the prime or near prime of their defensive abilities; each had *roughly* the same players flanking them during the time.
2. **Pitching Staffs** were very close in ERA (3.71 NY to 3.74 Philly) and gave up close to the same amount of Home Runs (977 NY to 948 Philly.)
3. **Adjustments were made for higher percentage of balls hit to outfield.** The Phillies did use the fly ball out more than New York. New York though turned significantly more double plays from both the outfield and infield. Phillies had mediocre corner OF defense (Del Ennis, Johnny Wyrostek, Rip Repulski and Elmer Valo amongst the group) whereas, Monte Irvin, Don Mueller, and Bobby Thomson patrolled around Willie Mays. This does help Richie's totals, by corralling out of zone plays, but his high fielding % reflects he made catches consistently even under a likely lack of support from his corner comrades. Even as Mays was considered much more daring, he did not amass the same number of catches from just poaching his counterparts' chances.

Table. Outfield Statistics and Pitcher Strikeouts 1951-1957

Analysis of Outfields of Two Teams with Great CFers								
Year	TC by OF		PO by OF		SO by Pitchers		% of PO (minus SO) by OF	
	Phillies	Giants	Phillies	Giants	Phillies	Giants	Phillies	Giants
1951	1265	1166	1188	1103	570	625	33.17%	30.55%
1952	1164	1066	1082	993	609	655	30.49%	28.72%
1953	1167	1087	1091	1012	637	647	31.44%	29.35%
1954	1212	1135	1135	1064	570	692	32.20%	30.59%
1955	1125	1079	1052	1006	657	721	30.84%	29.27%
1956	1141	1036	1080	960	750	765	31.94%	28.50%
1957	1229	1047	1151	986	858	701	34.41%	28.23%
<b>Totals</b>	8303	7616	7779	7124	4651	4806		

Philadelphia did have an imbalance of outfield putouts made during this span of time. The benefit was most egregious in 1951 and 1957. However, the true measure of one players' contribution to a team's defense comes from the percentage of outs he is responsible for. And adjustments can be made for obtaining more opportunities than other outfields, or centerfielders.

Willie Mays lost two prime seasons (1952 & 1953) to serving his country during the Korean conflict. It is not hard to imagine what could have been the final totals of Mays if not for losing this time (over 700 home runs for certain.) But the fairest defensive comparison of these men can be seen from 1954 to 1957 when both played over 150 games and compiled staggering numbers of chances and putouts.

Table. Total Chance Comparison Ashburn and Mays

Individual Comparison of the Ashburn and Mays								
Year	Total Chances		% of OF TC		Adjusted TC/G		% of Team Outs	
	Ashburn	Mays	Ashburn	Mays	Ashburn	Mays	Ashburn	Mays
1951	566	376	44.74%	32.25%	3.53	3.24	15.02%	9.78%
1952	465	118	39.95%	11.07%	2.89	3.63	12.06%	3.15%
1953	523	0	44.82%	0.00%	3.24	0.00	14.29%	0.00%
1954	505	477	41.67%	42.03%	3.20	3.27	13.70%	12.88%
1955	407	446	36.18%	41.33%	2.85	3.00	11.35%	11.84%
1956	526	444	46.10%	42.86%	3.26	3.07	14.88%	12.32%
1957	534	450	43.45%	42.98%	3.17	3.26	15.01%	12.08%
Total	3526	2311						

To adjust for Ashburn's fly ball pitching staff, the additional total chances were multiplied by his percentage of total outfield chances, halved and then subtracted from his real total chances. And Mays received the same benefit but those chances were added to his totals. This adjustment gives both men the same number of potential opportunities in the outfield based on their teams' ratio of outfield chances.

Table. Adjusted Total Chances

Ashburn's Fly ball difference									
Year	Tm Diff	Extra flies	Adj. Ash	Games	Adj. TC/G	Extra flies	Adj. Mays	Games	Adj. TC/G
1951	99	22.1	543.9	154	3.532	15.96	391.96	121	3.239
1952	98	19.6	445.4	154	2.892	5.42	123.42	34	3.630
1953	80	17.9	505.1	156	3.238				
1954	77	16.0	489.0	153	3.196	16.18	493.18	151	3.266
1955	46	8.3	398.7	140	2.848	9.51	455.51	152	2.997
1956	105	24.2	501.8	154	3.258	22.50	466.50	152	3.069
1957	182	39.5	494.5	156	3.170	39.11	489.11	150	3.261
		Overall	3378	1067	<b>3.166</b>		2420	760	<b>3.184</b>
		4 year	<b>1884</b>	603	<b>3.124</b>		<b>1904</b>	605	<b>3.148</b>

Willie Mays and Richie Ashburn differ by a mere twenty balls and (.024 ball/game average) over a 4-year span. Given the statistical closeness, both playing in spacious ballparks (Connie Mack Stadium was in excess of 445 feet to center and had much greater foul line dimensions than the Polo Grounds) and Richie's mediocre cohorts (who even with his .985 Fielding % could muster only a .9784 % compared to .9793 % for the Giants with Willie's .9813% during this span), Ashburn was nearly identical to Mays in terms of defensive talent and numbers, not offensive prowess.

As Daryl Sconiers states in an Anaheim Angels web blog, "Any centerfielder who posted 500+ TC, behind even the weakest pitching staffs and teams, was a great defensive centerfielder, at least that season. And any player who posted 500 or more TC [Total Chances] in a season behind a strong staff is likely one of the, if not the, best of all-time." Ashburn (5) five times in this time span achieved 500 total chances. Certainly, once, he had to have a strong staff.

TABLE. OUTFIELDERS PO, ASSISTS, FA% AND TEAM PITCHING STATS								
<u>Year</u>	<u>Phillies</u>	<u>Giants</u>	<u>Reds</u>	<u>Pirates</u>	<u>Cubs</u>	<u>Dodgers</u>	<u>Cards</u>	<u>Braves</u>
1951	<b>1188</b>	1103	1125	<b>986</b>	1070	1069	1063	1057
1952	1082	993	1064	952	<b>1101</b>	976	<b>943</b>	1026
1953	1091	1012	<b>1125</b>	1083	1062	979	<b>966</b>	1036
1954	<b>1135</b>	1064	1077	1073	1035	1015	<b>983</b>	992
1955	<b>1052</b>	1006	1036	1010	1031	<b>944</b>	1000	1048
1956	1080	960	1002	1052	<b>1116</b>	<b>901</b>	950	1055
<u>1957</u>	<u><b>1151</b></u>	<u>986</u>	<u>1143</u>	<u>1120</u>	<u>1006</u>	<u>914</u>	<u>960</u>	<u>1015</u>
<b>Total PO</b>	7,779	7,124	7,572	7,276	7,421	6,798	6,865	7,229
<i>T. Assists</i>	285	266	253	<b>351</b>	281	257	<b>198</b>	254
<b>T. Errors</b>	178	156	148	191	167	126	148	193
<i>OF Fielding %</i>	0.9784	0.9793	0.9814	0.9756	0.9788	<b>0.9825</b>	0.9795	<b>0.9749</b>
<b>Avg. TC/Season</b>	<b>1,177</b>	1,078	<b>1,139</b>	<b>1,117</b>	<b>1,124</b>	1,026	1,030	1,097
<i>TC Per Game</i>	<b>7.65</b>	7.00	7.40	7.25	7.30	<b>6.66</b>	6.69	7.12
<b>% Over 7/G</b>	<b>9.2%</b>	0.0%	5.7%	3.6%	4.3%	<b>-4.8%</b>	-4.4%	1.7%
<i>Comp ERA</i>	3.741	3.709	4.180	<b>4.508</b>	4.208	3.775	4.091	<b>3.493</b>
<b>HR allowed</b>	948	977	1059	1078	966	<b>1087</b>	1027	<b>810</b>
<i>Strikeouts</i>	4651	4806	<b>4142</b>	4223	4739	<b>5481</b>	4887	4713
<b>Total Wins</b>	543	573	525	<b>397</b>	462	<b>665</b>	555	593

## Statistics and Distortion

The table above reflects that the Phillies were not such an anemic pitching staff every year during this span. The Cubs and Reds had staffs that also gave up fly balls. Only the Dodgers and Cardinals were significantly more groundball (and strikeout) laden, but that might be slightly attributed to outfielders' range lacking on high pops that are shallow but caught by their range-plentiful infielders, as Duke Snider said, "[Dodgers] had three shortstops," meaning: guys ranging back to corral pop-ups and soft liners.

St. Louis garnered the least number of assists by a large margin – reflecting either a great respect, or total inability to throw out runners – whereas, the Pirates were far and away the leaders in that category. (The Pirates were led by Bill Virdon, Roberto Clemente, Frank Thomas, Bobby Del Greco, Gus Bell, Cal Abrams and Hal Rice; with Clemente well known for his arm.)

In 1953, Gus Bell played centerfield for the Reds and had 474 Total Chances in 145 Center field games (and 6 RF games). Yet, the Reds managed to win some games even with their high fly ball totals, poor pitching, and high home run allowed totals. The Cubs and Pirates were truly atrocious due to pitching, as their W-L records indicate.

The Braves fielded Bill Bruton and Sam Jethroe who made plenty of errors (double digit totals for both, though Jethroe was experiencing eyesight problems by 1952 (Loverro 2003, 154) and Bruton was young and aggressive.) With both guys obtaining plenty of chances (over 400 total chances four times) in front of first rate pitching from Warren Spahn, Lew Burdette, and Bob Buhl that complimented this aggressive play.

Meanwhile, Ashburn had Del Ennis doing his part to make an abundance of errors until 1957. Then Ennis took his defensive act to St. Louis. But this outfield defense of the National League is only part of the story.

The Dodgers, Giants, and Braves had very good pitching staffs. The Braves led the NL in ERA by a wide margin (nearly a quarter of a run) during this seven-year period. The Dodgers led in most strikeouts garnered by their staff, but also gave up the most home runs. Philly was bunched in a group between the Giants and Dodgers in ERA and gave up the least amount of home runs behind the Braves, but lost out on further appearances in the World Series due to a below-average offense. But as it turns out, the teams with the good pitching won the National League (Brooklyn (4), Giants (2) and Milwaukee (1)) and World Series (each won once) during this time.

Philly led the NL in ERA once in 1952 by a wide margin (3.07 to 3.53) but Ashburn 'worst fielding season' still saw him led the league in putouts (428), assists (23) and double plays (5.) In 1953, Philly ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> behind the Milwaukee Braves in ERA, and Ashburn again led in putouts (496) and assists (18). The Phillies pitching staff continued to stay under a 4.00 ERA in 1954 and Ashburn had his normal numbers (483 and 12). Even during his 1955 'injury' season, his defense was still superb, as he also led the National League in batting average over Willie Mays while walking 105 times.

Lastly, in 1957, Ashburn led all outfielders in both Putouts (502) and Assists (18) on a staff that was still very comparable to the league-leading ERA of the Brooklyn staff with the likes of Drysdale, Newcombe, Podres, Maglie, and Roebuck leading the way. Team strikeouts (891 Brooklyn to 858 Philly), walks (456 Brooklyn to 412 Philly) and complete Games (44 Brooklyn to 54 Philly) reflected a better showing by Philly than is usually mentioned. Philadelphia continued to have an under 4.00 ERA (at 3.80) even with Hall of Famer Robin Roberts losing 22 games at a 4.07 ERA clip.

Any defensive centerfielder conversation without Ashburn included in it is ignoring all statistical information and anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Maybe more importantly, the New York media's concentration on Mays, Mantle, Snider and even, the waning Joe DiMaggio, in his last few seasons (1948-1951), was more the reason Ashburn's skills were diminished in the eyes of baseball experts, then, and possibly, now, even with WAR (Wins Above Replacement) calculations.

This player distortion idea is not new. As Daryl Sconiers suggests, "...the truth is that most opinions about defensive center field are based largely on lore, anecdote, and the regional or team biases of those crafting the tales of talent. Too often, any list of great defensive centerfield includes a majority of players whom the modern fan never saw play (*Defensive Centerfield, Haloblog.com, Oct 15 2004*)." As this fan can attest to, I did not see Richie Ashburn or Willie Mays play. I have seen the highlight reels: the over-the-shoulder signature grab Willie Mays made of the Vic Wertz bomb in the 1954 World Series, a play that etched Willie Mays in the immortality of baseball. In the crucial moment of the 1950 season, Ashburn did make the perfect throw to stop a Dodger from scoring the game winner at the end of the season, thus allowing George Sisler Jr. to hit the home run that put the Phillies in the World Series. So, each had their moments. May's undoubtedly more spoken about due to television and the marquee games that are the World Series. Mays had a longer career, and rightfully gets his due.

~

In *Mind Game* (2005), Ashburn's 8-year stretch in center field (1951-58) is rated amongst the best ever had by center fielders of any era using **WARP 3** (Wins Above Replacement Player) factor. On the list, Willie Mays (1958-1965: **97.2**), Mickey Mantle (1954-1961: **94.1**), Joe DiMaggio (1937-1947: **85.2**), Duke Snider (1949-1956: **74.0**) and Ashburn (**73.3**) reflects the elite level at which these center fielders were playing. Two others of note, Kirby Puckett (70.8) and Ken Griffey Jr. (81.9) are considered the standards of excellence in the last twenty years (Goldman, *Mind Game: How the Boston Red Sox Got Smart Won a World Series and Created a New Blueprint for Winning* 2005, 56). This WARP measurement also has CF Bernie Williams (71.7) considered a top 15 MLB player (16.3) from 1995-2002. (**See:** *Dynasties*)

More Analysis: Mays vs. Ashburn, the base paths

The prior analysis was done in 2008, without information available on each man's ability to control the base paths. *Baseball-reference.com* provides an enormous set of data on each player's career plus the addition of sabermetric measures and information tallied from sites like *Retrosheet.org*. The following was compiled from the former's website. (Baseball Reference, Mays and Ashburn, 2011).

Table. Base Running Kills and Outfield Conversion Rate (1954-1957)

Player	Year	E	A	Held%	Adv	B		PA	BIP%	FBIP%	Field	F20%	Pot Outs	Rt Outs	Conv.
						Kills	Kill%								
Ashburn	1954	8	12	45.6%	88	5	3.0%	5225	84%	35%	701	66%	1536	463	30.1%
Mays	1954	7	12	<b>57.1%</b>	82	4	2.1%	5510	79%	<b>29%</b>	679	63%	1262	428	<b>33.9%</b>
Ashburn	1955	7	10	42.5%	76	8	5.5%	4950	82%	34%	607	65%	1380	395	28.6%
Mays	1955	7	19	48.5%	<b>62</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	4882	80%	<b>30%</b>	519	69%	1172	358	<b>30.6%</b>
Ashburn	1956	9	11	45.6%	<b>113</b>	7	3.3%	5817	81%	33%	<b>788</b>	65%	1555	512	<b>32.9%</b>
Mays	1956	6	14	49.7%	<b>72</b>	5	3.4%	5000	80%	<b>29%</b>	581	63%	1160	366	31.6%
Ashburn	1957	7	17	43.4%	<b>114</b>	8	3.8%	5824	81%	33%	<b>876</b>	58%	1557	508	<b>32.6%</b>
Mays	1957	9	12	<b>51.3%</b>	78	4	2.5%	5127	82%	<b>28%</b>	577	64%	1177	369	31.4%


B Kills = Base Kills	Field = Fielded Balls	Rt Outs = Field*F20%
FBIP = Fly Ball in Play %	F20% = Balls Resulting in Outs %	Conv = Rt Outs/Pot Outs
BIP = Ball in Play%	Pot Outs = PA*BIP*FBIP	



What is fairly clear is that Mays was dominating in cutting down and stopping advancing runners. The advantage is overwhelming there. In 1956 and 1957, runners really took advantage of Ashburn. (Note too, that Richie had arm trouble shortly after the 1950 season. But that's a part of the game.) Mays and Ashburn (**conv.**) rate was a fairer fight, nearly a draw, each winning two seasons. This stat is determined by taking the plate appearances times BIP% times FBIP (fly balls) to determine potential outs. Each man fielded a certain number of chances and converted them into outs (F2O%). (Rt Outs) divided by (Pot Outs) equals conversion – with both men ranging around 30-34% successful converting.

In 1955, Ashburn was injured for the first time (missing 14 games) in his career. Likely as not, his conversion rate went down considerably due to that occurrence. Mays wins the battle of arms, but Ashburn was likely on par in terms of ranging around to get to potential fly ball outs: the primary task of all great outfielders.

**Diagram.** Connie Mack Stadium as Listed in the Baseball Encyclopedia in 1970 (Turkin and Thompson 1970, 62)



CONNIE MACK STADIUM  
Home of:  
Philadelphia Phillies

Pitching & The Wiz Kids

Richie's pitching staff assisted in allowing more fly balls, but someone still has to run and catch them. Sconiers concurs: "An outfielder creates his plays...this makes an outfielder, defensively, only as good as the balls he can get to."


A Philly Staff (from 1948-1961) consisting of

- Robin Roberts
- Ken Heintzleman (L)
- Curt Simmons (L)
- Morrie Martin (L)
- Karl Drews
- Jack & Russ Meyer
- Murry Dickson
- Harvey Haddix (L)
- Don Cardwell
- Bubba Church
- Harry Byrd
- Carl Scheib
- Bob Miller
- Jim Owens
- Steve Ridzik
- Turk Ferrell
- Jim Konstanty

Only 'Rapid' Robin Roberts, a Hall of Famer, Simmons, Haddix, and Jim Konstanty (with his special curve) were consistently decent pitchers in their careers. This reflects that some talent did exist – or was made existent – by Ashburn's defensive ability in center.

The 1950 regular season, Roberts, Simmons, Russ Meyer, Miller, Church, and Konstanty put together mound wizardry with Richie Ashburn in center, Del Ennis in right, and Andy Seminick at the plate only to be swept 4-0 by the New York Yankees in the World Series. The scores in the series: 1-0, 2-1, 3-2 and 5-2. This was the only World Series appearance the Philadelphia Phillies saw until 1980, when they won it all. (Then appeared in the 2008 and 2009 fall classic.) Nevertheless, Richie Ashburn's efforts in Philly were never questioned, and he should be duly considered amongst the best centerfielders in baseball history.

### Strength in Numbers



(Pictured above: **Willie Davis (1940 – 2010)** crashing into the wall at his new digs: Dodger Stadium. Davis amassed 2,561 hits, 182 home runs, 398 stolen bases and over 1,000 runs and runs batted in, mostly in Dodger blue. He was considered, for a time, the fastest player in MLB.)

Daryl Sconiers on Vada Pinson, Curt Flood and Willie Davis: "The crop of centerfielders of the 1960s, including Mays, Willie Davis, Paul Blair, Vada Pinson, and Curt Flood are some of the best of all-time in anyone's eyes...In fact, 1959-1974 no centerfielder managed to post more than 439 TC in a single season, despite the notorious strength of the position in those years..."

More than chances, all these men were respected for their defense in shrinking ballparks, but they innovatively dealt with the quirks of Astroturf and dome play starting in the LBJ Era.



**Vada Pinson (1938– 1995)** amassed nearly 2,800 hits, 250 home runs, and 300 stolen bases in the neutral-to-negative offensive era of the 1960s, yet is conspicuously absent from the Hall of Fame; cohort Curt Flood was not only a deciding force on the field, but later a divisive and recognizable name off the field with his Supreme Court case; Willie Davis offensively and defensively supported the Dodger pitching domination seen in the 1960s by patrolling the then-much-larger Chavez Ravine outfield. All of these men made centerfield a centerpiece of the Reds, Cardinals, and Dodgers organizations and furthered their dominance in obtaining World Series championships immediately; or into the 1960s and 1970s. **(Pictured above: Vada Pinson (left) & Frank Robinson)**

Pinson started out playing youth baseball in Oakland for George Powles, an extremely influential baseball man and father figure that was responsible for the early development of top stars such as Frank Robinson and Curt Flood. But initially, Pinson was a trumpet player that just happened to like baseball. In *A Well-Paid Slave*, Brad Snyder quotes Powles giving Memphis-born Pinson a choice in his teens between, “the trumpet or the bat.”

After a brief call up in 1958, at age twenty, Vinson cemented himself as a starter from 1959 to 1967. He averaged nearly 680 plate appearances a season and ranked favorably with the greats of his day as a 20-20-.300 guy.

**Table.** Comparison of Full-time Centerfielders for Eight Seasons

CF Stats (1959-1967)	AB	BB	Hits	2B	3B	HR	Runs	BA	OBP	SLG	SB	CS
Davis (LA)	303	15.3	85.1	12.7	2.8	7.3	38.9	0.281	0.317	0.431	9.8	4.00
Flood (STL)	519	36.3	153.8	22.9	3.9	7.2	71.6	0.296	0.345	0.412	7.3	5.2
Mantle (NYY)	414	<b>92</b>	119.3	16.1	2.3	29.9	81.1	0.288	<b>0.415</b>	0.566	7.8	1.6
Mays (SFN)	570	70	173	29.4	5.6	<b>38.7</b>	<b>114.1</b>	<b>0.303</b>	0.379	<b>0.597</b>	15	4.2
Pinson (CIN)	<b>638</b>	40.7	<b>191</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>10</b>	20	<b>99.8</b>	<b>0.300</b>	0.343	0.510	<b>22.4</b>	8

### Hall of Fame Absentia

During this time frame, of players that average 100 at-bats (482), Vada Pinson ranks 22<sup>nd</sup> in all of baseball in slugging average. (See table below.) On this list were several HOF omissions, Vada Pinson, Ron Santo, Dick (Richie) Allen, all are accomplished on various merits. That Pinson amassed nearly 3,000 hits and 300 steals, and did it while playing in centerfield the majority of his career, merits more consideration for the Hall of Fame. So talented was Pinson, he once clocked in at 3.3 seconds down the first base line, reflecting his superior athleticism (Erardi and Rhodes, Cincinnati's Crosley Field: The Illustrated History of a Classic Ballpark. , 140). (Mickey Mantle came in at 3.1.)

**(Side Note:** Ron Santo obtained superior numbers for the entire decade; always considered in the same conversation as Ken Boyer and Brooks Robinson on the defensive side, and better, offensively. Ron's induction into the Hall of Fame took place in 2012. Santo *finally* received induction nearly a year to the day from his passing in December 2010. An honor well-deserved, but a bit too late, for the happy-go-lucky Santo to enjoy personally.)

On the flipside, Dick Allen was a versatile, if very below average on defense – playing the corners, left field, and even a handful of games in the middle infield. Allen though made his real living terrorizing pitchers. And terrorize them he did. With a lifetime .534 SLG% and 1.05 Pt/AB Rating on the Fantasy scale (**See Chapter 7 and Appendix**) Dick Allen's career is comparable to Earl Averill (HOF 1975) who played in the offense-friendly 1930s and HOF CF Larry Doby.)

**Table.** Top 30 Players by Slugging Average (1959-1967)

Name	AB	SLG	OBP	BA	R	SB	Hits
<b>Allen, Dick</b>	<b>452</b>	0.600	0.387	0.311	85	9.6	141
<b>Mays, Willie</b>	<b>570</b>	0.597	0.379	0.303	114	15.0	173
<b>Aaron, Hank</b>	<b>599</b>	0.594	0.379	0.316	114	19.4	189
<b>Robinson, Frank</b>	<b>538</b>	0.592	0.400	0.308	104	15.9	166
<b>Mantle, Mickey</b>	<b>414</b>	0.566	0.415	0.288	81	7.8	119
<b>McCovey, Willie</b>	<b>382</b>	0.555	0.369	0.276	64	1.7	105
<b>Killebrew, Harmon</b>	<b>521</b>	0.552	0.379	0.266	91	0.8	139
<b>Williams, Ted</b>	<b>291</b>	0.540	0.415	0.287	44	0.5	84
<b>Cepeda, Orlando</b>	<b>459</b>	0.538	0.361	0.309	72	9.7	142
Nieman, Bob	110	0.531	0.373	0.301	12	0.3	33
Rader, Doug	162	0.531	0.360	0.333	24	0.0	54
<u>Conigliaro, Tony</u>	<b>458</b>	0.531	0.339	0.276	72	2.5	126
Oliva, Tony	407	0.528	0.361	0.312	66	9.2	127
<u>Stargell, Willie</u>	373	0.525	0.339	0.278	49	0.8	104
<u>Kaline, Al</u>	495	0.522	0.387	0.302	86	8.4	150
<b>Clemente, Roberto</b>	<b>572</b>	0.521	0.369	0.327	91	6.3	187
Hart, Jim Ray	<b>467</b>	0.519	0.352	0.289	70	2.8	135
<b>Williams, Billy</b>	<b>490</b>	0.518	0.357	0.291	74	6.0	143
Post, Wally	179	0.517	0.329	0.266	26	0.1	48
Cash, Norm	448	0.515	0.386	0.275	74	4.1	123
Maris, Roger	428	0.514	0.356	0.265	73	1.0	114
<b>Pinson, Vada</b>	<b>638</b>	0.510	0.343	0.300	100	22.4	191
<b>Santo, Ron</b>	<b>563</b>	0.506	0.365	0.285	79	2.9	161
<b>Banks, Ernie</b>	<b>558</b>	0.504	0.326	0.271	73	1.7	151
Howard, Frank	401	0.503	0.336	0.271	52	0.4	109
Stuart, Dick	410	0.502	0.318	0.265	52	0.2	109
<b>Mathews, Eddie</b>	<b>473</b>	0.502	0.372	0.267	80	3.4	127
Allison, Bob	<b>474</b>	0.500	0.364	0.258	79	8.0	122
Adcock, Joe	388	0.498	0.342	0.272	45	1.4	106
<b>Yastrzemski, Carl</b>	<b>576</b>	0.498	0.380	0.298	87	7.4	172

**Bold denotes HOF inductee (as of 2011)**

## Pennant Race: The 1961 Reds & Pinson's Problem

In 1961, with Frank Robinson leading the way (.324-37-124), Pinson's Reds were in the World Series, and chronicled by relief pitcher-turned-writer Jim Brosnan in *Pennant Race*. In one passage, Pinson proved pretty effective with the glove:

"[Starting pitcher Joe] Jay *was* in trouble throughout the game; but he survived only because of three sensational plays in the outfield. The Phillies seemingly weren't strong enough to hit the ball out of the park, and neither Robinson nor Pinson let anything fall safely. Pinson caught one fly ball just as it was dropping over the bleacher screen at the 390-foot mark. That ball *did* get out of the park but it was inside Vada's glove which was on Pinson's right hand." (Brosnan 1962, 68)

Vada Pinson won his only gold glove in that pennant-winning season. (Baseball Reference.com rated 1961 his best season statistically.) Playing part-time outfield for those Reds in 1961 was Gus Bell, who had been a consistent .290 hitter from 1953-59. Bell pinch-hit 3 times in his only World Series appearance. Gus's baseball genes passed on, as he raised steady-hitting, sure-fielding 3B Buddy Bell, who played over 2,000 games at the hot corner.

On that team, early on, was 22-year lefty, Claude Osteen, who was sent down on May 10<sup>th</sup>, to be claimed by the woeful Washington Senators. Osteen made his name as a solid, if unspectacular, workhorse (8 times over 250 inning pitched, 2-time 20-game winner) for Alston's Dodgers in the late 1960s.

The 1961 Reds succumbed to the powerful Yankees 4-1 in the World Series. Pinson faltered badly going 2 for 22 in the series. But talented it was.

Pinson's career was marred by his attack of a sportswriter after a series of negative articles, and therefore, Vada often was considered an immature hot head, and a malcontent. (Think: 1960s.) However, the greater measure of Pinson is his minority support of Curt Flood's lawsuit as author Brad Snyder reflects via a quote made by Pinson on the fight: "Something had to be done and Curt is doing it...Curt's doing it for all of us. But it's too bad all the players don't dig what he's doing...He's convinced the reserve clause is a bad one and he'll fight it to the end, regardless of what happens to him. That's just the way it is." (Snyder, 121)

Vada Pinson died of a stroke and was not found until three days later. He was inducted into the Bay Area Sports Hall of Fame (Snyder, 345). As stated, his career deserves a second look that should earn HOF induction by the veteran's committee. Pinson's 'bad

act' is none the worse in light of numerous revelations in more recent eras. (Roberto Alomar's recent induction despite spitting on an umpire should be used as a guidepost example.)

**Table.** Vada Pinson's Fielding statistics as a full-time Centerfielder

<b>Year</b>	<b>GCF</b>	<b>PO</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>FA%</b>
1959	154	<b>423</b>	<b>11</b>	4	7	0.984
1960	154	<b>401</b>	<b>11</b>	1	8	0.981
1961	153	391	<b>19</b>	4	10	0.976
1962	152	344	<b>13</b>	1	4	0.989
1963	147	357	9	0	8	0.979
1964	156	299	<b>14</b>	1	9	0.972
1965	159	354	9	1	3	0.992
1966	139	344	9	1	13	0.964
1967	157	341	4	1	5	0.986
1968	120	258	7	0	6	0.978





Maybe the most disregarded of the 50s centerfield legends is **Larry Doby (1923-2003)**, the first African–American in the American League. He began his MLB career on July 5, 1947, starting off slowly in his first season as a 2<sup>nd</sup> baseman, but owner Bill Veeck Jr. was undeterred, and switched him to outfield. Larry Doby had been a 2<sup>nd</sup> baseman by trade in the Negro Leagues, but received his formal outfield indoctrination from Hall of Fame CF Tris Speaker, making him over into best overall centerfielder in the American League. During the late 1940s and very early 1950s, Doby supplanted Joe DiMaggio as the best (until ‘The Commerce Comet’) came to the Big Apple. Doby was the first black in the American League to star in the annual mid-summer classic in 1949. (Picture: Courtesy of Negro League Museum, **Larry Doby** – 7-time All-star.)

Playing in Cleveland though, Larry’s talents were largely ignored by the baseball establishment. Yet in looking at his lifetime statistics, he measures up very well to his contemporaries. (5<sup>th</sup> in Slugging behind Mantle, Mays, DiMaggio & Snider.) But initially, *The Sporting News* and some white ballplayers reflected a typical prejudice about Doby’s preparedness for the big leagues, citing that he should go through the minors like white players and that the ‘race issue’ was no longer a dilemma (Lanctot 2004, 314).

“...To show how smart I am, the shortstop was Monte Irvin (Veeck and Linn 1962, 176),” was Bill Veeck’s remembrance of the signing away Larry Doby for \$15,000 (Lanctot 2004, 314) from Effa Manley. This while not signing the Newark Eagles

shortstop at that very same time for \$1,000 because of Monte Irvin's age, who went on to play (and star) for the Giants and Cubs in the 1950s. (An unspoken 'quota' for blacks was in play from various accounts. Veeck in this case just missed out on a good player.)

Doby grew into an outstandingly feared hitter that received more (or slightly less, depending on the source cited) of the same insults, racial bigotry, intimidation tactics, and backhanded compliments that Jackie Robinson garnered in the National League. Doby too, was his own man, and much like Veeck, marched to his own beat. In 1957, Larry punched Art Ditmar of the Yankees, after being thrown at and hit—a consistent theme of intimidation throughout his career, and one that he responded virulently against (Loverro 2003, 80). His first owner, Bill Veeck Jr., moved spring training from Ocala, Florida to Tucson, Arizona in light of the prevalent Jim Crow laws and bigoted feelings to help his star in Doby. Veeck got similar insults from the locals (in both places).

When not taking things personally, Doby's heroics equaled Jackie's according to Veeck: "And when Doby hit a tremendous home run to put us ahead in the fourth game of the World Series [off Johnny Sain], it could be observed that none of the 81,000 people...seemed at all concerned about—or even conscious of—his color (Veeck and Linn 1962, 176)." During that same '48 World Series, the legendary Satchel Paige appeared for one inning, after compiling a 6-1 regular season record for the Indians in beating out Boston in a one-game playoff. With Larry Doby's bat and Satchel Paige's arm, the Indians drew massive crowds, as author Neil Lanctot noted in his detailed account on the Negro leagues, *Negro League Baseball: The Rise and Ruin of a Black Institution*, one August 13<sup>th</sup> night game at Comiskey Park drew 51,013 fans (336).

Doby surmised that black players had to be "twice as good" to earn playing time in The Show away from white players (Lanctot, 380). Not following Jackie Robinson's model of quiet strength outside of baseball at the outset, but a fierce demeanor on the field, Larry Doby adjusted differently. He was considered very sensitive to the unfortunate racism openly existent in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This, to Veeck, was to the detriment of Larry's career. Veeck's final perspective on Larry Doby: "If Larry had come up a little later...he might very well have become one of the greatest of all time (Veeck and Linn 1962, 180)."

He starred in the Negro Leagues for the Newark Eagles, winning World Series titles in both leagues (appearing in championship series in 1946(N), 1948, 1954.) He joins the exclusive company of Mays, Monte Irvin, and Satchel Paige as participators in both

leagues pinnacle event (Loverro, 80). In odd symmetry, Larry Doby was the 2<sup>nd</sup> black MLB field manager for the White Sox in 1978, following Frank Robinson's hiring. Once again, Bill Veeck, White Sox owner, made that a reality.

In Art Rust, Jr.'s work about the Negro Leagues, Larry Doby reflected on Bill Veeck's importance in his life: "You know, Bill Veeck was just as important to me as Branch Rickey was to Jackie Robinson. Veeck told me to curb my temper and to turn the other cheek. The guy really motivated me. There were places my wife, my daughter, and I couldn't go into. Veeck would say, 'If they can't go in, I won't go in.' Veeck was quite a man, a great man. I think of Bill Veeck as my second father (Rust Jr. 1976, 86)."

Aside from baseball, Doby served in World War II in the U.S. Navy. Stationed in the Pacific in a segregated unit – in the same vein Jackie Robinson did his service to the U.S. Army as a 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant. Larry initially set out to become a teacher while growing up New Jersey, but an umpire took notice of Doby in high school, recommending him to the Newark Eagles. At the time, he was a 3-sport star (football, basketball) at Paterson, NJ East Side High. But Larry stayed the course thereafter in baseball (Negro Leagues Museum; Kansas State University 2006).

After his playing career, Doby did front office stints and coached with the White Sox, Indians, and Expos. Later, he worked community relations for the New Jersey Nets of basketball (Hill 2003). Doby received induction to Cooperstown in 1998, once again, years after proper honoring was deserved.



A short story in Jim Bouton's *Ball Four* about **Jimmy Piersall (1929- )**: "Piersall used to get mad as hell and call [Jim] Coates a lot of names, the most gentle of which was thermometer, but it didn't seem to hurt the way he played. I remember a game in

Washington. Piersall was playing center field and Coates was giving him hell from the Yankees bullpen. Piersall was turning away from the game to give it back when somebody hit a long fly ball to left-center and Piersall had to tear after it. All the time he was running he was screaming at Coates, and when he got up to the fence he climbed halfway up it, caught the ball, robbing somebody of a home run, and threw it in. But not for a second did he stop yelling at Coates.” (Bouton 1990, 129)

Piersall was as gifted on defense as he was with a not-so-gentle barb. He grew up in Waterbury, Connecticut, born in 1929, within scouting range of the turfs of Boston and New York. As a multi-sport athlete (basketball), like many others in baseball, he had numerous opportunities floated to him, but eventually signed with the Red Sox, after scout Neil Mahoney told him Boston had one of the best farm systems in baseball (Piersall and Hirshberg 1955, 50). (Scouts: willing to tell you anything to get a signature.)

From the moment Piersall signed, he was on the move. Energetic and overly determined to support his family, Piersall made it to the majors at just 20 years old in 1950, shortly after marrying Mary Teevan, a nurse, in October 1949. His father, a painter, was recovering from a heart attack, and his mother was in and out of Norwich State Hospital, a mental health facility, several times over the prior decade (Piersall and Hirshberg, 73). Piersall’s wife would have a miscarriage in that same year. As these obstacles mounted, to care for his family, play baseball, and work off-season for a comfortable living, Jimmy succumbed to exhaustion, mentally and physically, yet rebound spiritually, later becoming one of the best defensive centerfielders in baseball history.

Piersall’s first official at bat came late in the 1950 season against knuckle ball heaver Gene Bearden, the unsung hero of the 1948 World Series. In nervousness, Jimmy lost his grip and threw the bat over the dugout in his first major league swing. He later base-knocked; getting a single off Bearden.

With that brief cup of coffee in 1950, Piersall bought a house in Waterbury only to worry more and more. After three days in a new house, he forced his new bride, his new baby, and his own family out of the home, and moved to Scranton, Pennsylvania. There he settled down, but only for a time.

Piersall, usually, was very comfortable on the field, as Dominic DiMaggio commented with moral support in 1951 spring training, “Kid, from what I saw of you in Boston last

year and here this spring, you're the best center fielder in the American League right now (Piersall and Hirshberg, 82)."

Piersall though was not a great pull hitter; and as noted before, the Red Sox seemed to thrive with right hand hitters that could pepper 'The Monster.' The result: he did not make the big club for 1951, going back to the minors. Again, the tension mounted. Piersall was racing from one problem to the next, only to find the problem was truly within.

As he tore up the minors again (.342BA, .557SLG in 479ABs), Jimmy looked forward to starting for the big club in 1952. Only problem was he was expected to convert to shortstop via HOF SS Lou Boudreau insistence. (He had no minor league experience at the position from *Baseball Reference*.) As a likely inciting or triggering event, Piersall reached an ultimate breaking point even while his wife stood by him steadfastly. His emotions swung to uncontrollable anger, starting fights with Billy Martin, Satchel Paige, and Mickey McDermott, his own teammate.

His Boston manager Lou Boudreau benched Piersall; only later, sending him back to the outfield. But the antics never stopped – whether likable (rattling Satchel Paige) or a rude distraction (mimicking Dom DiMaggio). Then Jimmy was demoted back to AAA Birmingham. When he played, he did well enough. But, he never rested – always getting into trouble with his emotional outbursts.

After two suspensions in the minors for conduct (one for squirting an umpire with water), he went back to Boston, pleading to stay. General manager Joe Cronin had seen enough. The confusion, and often, violent episodes were too much for Boston. As one sportswriter surmised: "Jimmy Piersall, former Barons outfielder, who practically tore the ball park apart with his mad antics the last time he was here, will never play baseball again. Now a hopeless mental case, he will spend the rest of his life in an institution... (Piersall and Hirshberg, 132)"

After deliberation by management, he was admitted first to Baldpate, then Danvers, and finally taken to Westborough State Hospital to receive electroshock treatments (Armour, Jim Piersall 2013). He spent six weeks receiving psychiatric treatments. Jimmy literally forgot the beginning of the season, where he did, in fact, play shortstop, rather poorly by fielding average and range factor:

Year	G	POS	PO	A	E	TC/G	F%
1952	30	SS	41	75	9	4.17	0.928

Defying critics, Piersall came back to the game and renewed his fearless pursuit of baseball. Lithium, prescribed to many bi-polars, stabilized his life. He still was always “mixing it up” with umpires that led to ejections and garbage being thrown on the field by unruly fans. He did calisthenics in center field during the game. Ran his 100<sup>th</sup> home run around the bases backwards. (Thus causing a revised rule of “touching the bases in order” to be added to Major League baseball.) The bi-polar Jimmy Piersall was gifted with fearlessness in catching deep drives destined for the fences: a unique life force drove him to risk.

Jimmy Piersall went on to 17-year baseball career, winning 2 gold gloves in 1958 and 1961, batting .322 in 1961 season for Cleveland. Jimmy had nine children; worked in baseball in various capacities for over 50 years, not always without incident, but with energy and wit. And fear did strike out with him.



**Dom DiMaggio (1917– 2009)** was often overlooked playing in the Hall of Fame shadow of his big brother Joe DiMaggio and teammate Ted Williams, but consistent numbers, defensive prowess, and the moniker as the “Little Professor” speaks volumes of his ability and usual demeanor. A .298 hitter (.383 OBP), with 10 years of leading off the

Red Sox lineup every day (5,005 PA), his place in the annals of baseball history is secured ([Baseball Reference, 2013](#)).

Dom was born in San Francisco in 1917, the youngest and smallest of the DiMaggio clan. After spending much of his childhood in the shadow of his older brothers, and likened more as a possible lawyer than a ballplayer, Dom joined the San Francisco Seals in 1937.


After hitting above .300 in 1937 and 1939, he was signed by the Boston Red Sox for \$75,000 – substantially more than the Yankees were reported to have signed his brother Joe for; by 1950, Dom was earning \$40,000 per season, less than half his brother's wages of \$100,000 ([Baseball Reference, 2014](#)).

Dom twice put together hit streaks in excess of 26 games, was seven times an AL All-Star, and seven times racked up 100 runs scored (thanks to Teddy Ballgame). He was noted for his unusual fielding stance in the outfield, facing the left field line with his shoulders with the rabid Boston faithful yelling out that Dom played both centerfield and left field (Ted Williams' position).

Aside from the stats, he served faithfully in WWII (losing time as so many others did) and respected throughout the game as a player and a forthright man, eventually going in the plastics business. Much like his brothers, his career was mainly in the FDR Era, however, Boston took three years to replace Dom – with personality and antics plus Jimmy Piersall in 1954.

Dominic DiMaggio was inducted into the Italian American Sports Hall of Fame in 1978. If not for those years lost, Cooperstown might have called. He passed in 2009 due to pneumonia. The professor has gone to teach again.

**Edwin 'Duke' Snider (1926 – 2011)** for 16 seasons (18 total) played for one of the most storied franchises in baseball: the Dodgers. His 11 home runs in World Series play rank 4<sup>th</sup>, behind Mantle, Ruth, and Yogi Berra; his World Series RBI totals rank 7<sup>th</sup> all-time (26). Three times Duke led the league in total bases; finished 3<sup>rd</sup> in the 1953 MVP voting to Roy Campanella (7.1), though by WAR(9.3) Snider likely should have been first. 1955, the result was the same (8.6), a runner up to Roy (at 5.2). Just those numbers alone reflect the greatness of the 'Silver Fox', but as fate would have it, he played in the most competitive town against (and opposite) two of the greatest center fielders and ballplayers in Mantle and Mays. So the greatness was always compared, as *Talkin' Baseball* by Terry Cashman said, "Especially Willie, Mickey and the Duke."



In discussing his teams, Snider noted the talent on his 1952 team was even better than the 1955 Brooklyn World Championship team, the only one in Brooklyn's history. "We had three centerfielders playing outfield, and we had three shortstops playing third base, shortstop and second base. (Naiman 2011)" His teammates: Andy Pafko, Carl Furillo, Jackie Robinson, Pee Wee Reese, Billy Cox with legends 1B Gil Hodges and catcher Roy Campanella added to the illustrious group. Over those next five seasons (1952-1956), the Dodgers won nearly 97 games on average; and 62.7% of all regular season games, second only to the Yankees (at 490).

Among the myriad of players with side gigs during this time, Duke Snider 'delivered the mail' (Leavy 2002, 288) and eventually went into avocado grove ownership (Naiman 2011). Mickey Mantle made similar off-the-field deals to supplement his baseball income in hotel ownership and bad commercials (Mantle and Gluck 1985). These were definitely not the times of money ruling the game, from a players' standpoint. "The dollar signs rule the game of baseball," [Duke Snider] said, (Naiman 2011) speaking of present-day affairs. **(Pictured Above:** The Duke of Flatbush in 1953. *(Wikipedia Commons, Bowman Card)*)

In one story, Duke related how a bet cost him \$200 in fines which he eventually turned into \$400, a large sum in those days. The bet involved throwing a baseball out of the LA Coliseum, the one better known for the 1984 Olympics and numerous USC running backs juking hapless defenders on their path to the Heisman trophies. 3B Don Zimmer initiated the bet, with Duke accepting it, and failing by just inches to throw a ball over



87 rows of seats and the four-foot retaining wall, and in the process, hurting his arm. After getting fined \$200 by Buzzie Bavasi, the GM of the Dodgers, he went on to play the rest of the season, waiting for another chance. After the final game, he attempted the task again, succeeding on the first try and receiving the money from the initial bet. Then Bavasi returned the \$200 fine to him – making him \$400 to the good, as Duke states: “I made \$400 on the deal (Naiman 2011).” What a way to make a buck. (Later, Duke failed to report income made from memorabilia to the IRS.)

The Duke passed in early 2011 at the Valle Vista Convalescent Hospital in Escondido, California at age 84. He had made Cooperstown in 1980. The Duke of Flatbush left the world memories of class and commitment to excellence.

**Andrew ‘Handy Andy’ Pafko (1921 –2013)** grew up in Boyceville, Wisconsin milking cows and played on four historic teams in the annals of professional baseball history. His first taste of a real dynasty was in the minor leagues playing for the perennially powerful Los Angeles Angels in 1943. The Angels, then owned by the Wrigley family with the first ‘Wrigley Field’ built in LA, not Chicago, are considered by historians amongst the greatest minor league teams of all-time (Weiss and Wright 2006).

In that 1943 season, Pafko led the Angels and the Pacific Coast League in hitting (.356), run batting in (118) and total bases (326). In producing the likes of Ted Williams and Joe DiMaggio, the Pacific Coast League was always a stepping-stone to the majors, and great offensive numbers, even during wartime, meant a quick promotion to the majors. Pafko was no different. He came up late 1943 after the 110-45 Angels lost four straight in the Governor’s Cup series to Seattle.

From the first day, Pafko impressed the Cubs with his bat, glove and accurate strong arm. At bat, he utilized an open step-into-the-bucket stance, akin to Mel Ott, only from the right side. His raw five tools were a godsend for the typically struggling Cubs. By fate, Pafko was rejected for military service due to high blood pressure (Weiss and Wright 2006) so he was kept at home, in his prime, while others trekked overseas. In his first game, Pafko got a taste of Wrigley’s woes as 314 fans watched: the all-time park low (Voiss 2013).

By 1945, Pafko held premier centerfielder status in the National League, leading all centerfielders in baseball with 110 RBIs, a solid .298 BA in 140 games. He garnered 4<sup>th</sup> place in MVP voting with teammate Phil Cavaretta winning it. His play, coupled with a veteran pitching staff and Cavaretta, led the Cubs to a lone wartime pennant and 7-

game World Series loss to the Detroit Tigers. Pafko was ineffectual in the series, but he was not the goat.

Pafko career path altered going into the back half of the 1940s. First, he played only half of 1946 season, suffering a freak ankle injury, then a season-ending broken arm. 1947: he married happily, but a kidney infection and trade rumors dominated his playing season. He transitioned to 3<sup>rd</sup> base in 1948, as leadoff man and 3<sup>rd</sup> sacker Stan Hack retired. Pafko garnered all-star honors in his second best season (WAR 6.2) while at the hot corner. The Cubs though fell off the map of contention for the remainder of Pafko's career. By 1950, he post a career best (WAR 6.6) - hitting 36 home runs to finish 2<sup>nd</sup> in National League and in the top 10 for batting average for those with over 400 at-bats.

His reward for a career year: Pafko finally earned a trade to first division Brooklyn Dodgers in June 1951 in an 8-player swap. Pafko hit 18 home runs for the Dodgers and watched the 'Shot Heard Round the World' sail over his head as former centerfield cohort Bobby Thomson ruined the Dodgers season during a three-game playoff. Thomson, Pafko, Snider, and Mays, centerfielders all, were on the field during that play. (Mays was on deck.)

Pafko stayed in Brooklyn to see the Dodgers make in the World Series in 1952, only to pack his bags, then head to Milwaukee to end a career. There, he saw the pitching magic of Warren Spahn, as the Milwaukee Braves won the World Series in 1957. 4 World Series: 77 plate appearances, Pafko never hit a homer.

Pafko passed away on October 8, 2013, residing in a nursing home in Stevensville, Michigan. He was 92.

**Jim Landis (1934 –2017)** fueled the 1959 Go-Go Sox to their first World Series appearance since 1919 against the newly-minted Los Angeles Dodgers, scoring a series high six runs on seven singles. His on-base (.344) belied his batting (.247). But his glove skills earned 5 gold gloves between 1960 and 1964.

Year	G	POS	PO	A	E	TC/G	F%	Award
1960	147	CF	372	13	6	2.66	0.985	Gold Glove
1961	139	CF	389	9	5	2.90	0.988	Gold Glove
1962	144	CF	360	2	2	2.52	0.995	Gold Glove
1963	124	CF	264	6	2	2.19	0.993	Gold Glove
1964	101	CF	183	7	1	1.89	0.995	Gold Glove

In 1965, Landis was traded twice in deals that altered significantly team rosters. First in a 3-way deal involving Cleveland and Kansas City. Tommy John, Rocky Colavito, and Tommy Agee were in the trade mix. Then, in December, swapped for a young Joe Rudi, whose 1972 World Series catch against the left-field wall is among the greatest photographs in baseball history.

The Giants Win the Pennant! The Giants Win the Pennant! The Giants Win the Pennant!

**Bobby Thomson (1923 – 2010)** is the most famous 20<sup>th</sup> century Scottish-born ballplayer, who happened to play in the era of great outfielders. (Pitcher Jim McCormick of the 1880s was born in Glasgow, Scotland, and won 264 decisions.) Thomson's home run hit off Ralph Branca propelled the 1951 Giants into World Series.

In essentially Bobby's career season (.293, 32, 101) as 3<sup>rd</sup> baseman/CF, Thomson came up big while far-from-his-legend Willie Mays stood on deck, Duke Snider played CF for the Dodgers, and the recently traded for LF Andy Pafko watched helplessly as the ball cleared the fence by a matter of a few feet. On the field that day were also the following men: Pee Wee Reese, Jackie Robinson, Roy Campanella, Monte Irvin, and Leo Durocher, all in the Hall of Fame, along with the *Duke* and *Say Hey*. But the moment was Thomson's.

In *Heartbreakers: Baseball's Most Agonizing Defeats* by John Kuenster of *Baseball Digest* acclaim, has this synopsis of the 3-game playoff the Giants and Dodgers had in 1951 shows the importance of Bobby Thomson (and other the greats) in 1951.

**Game 1:** Bobby Thomson and Monte Irvin smacked home runs, to help Jim Hearn, who pitched a 5-hitter, only giving up a home run to Andy Pafko. (3-1 Giants)

**Game 2:** Clem Labine pitched a 6-hitter to shutout the Giants. According to Kuenster, "Dressen could be a punitive character, and he had a grudge against the brash Labine who had lost a critical game to the Phillies on September 21 (Kuenster 2001, 14)." In

Reference to manager Charlie Dressen, who found himself on the outs in Brooklyn soon enough.

**Game 3:** Don Newcombe vs. Sal Maglie. Dodgers led 4-1 into the ninth, but Newcombe faltered against Alvin Dark and Don Mueller, each garnering singles. Then Don retired Irvin on a pop, only to surrender a double to Whitey Lockman. With a 4-2 lead, runners on second and third, the pitching change came down to Ralph Branca or Carl Erskine. Erskine bounced a curve ball in his warmups, so pitching coach Clyde Sukeforth chose instead Branca due to his fastball looking solid in warm ups. Branca pitched two days earlier, giving up a homer to Thomson.

3B Bobby Thomson awaited Branca. He was the best hitter in the second half for the Giants according to Alvin Dark. (Since Thomson hit a homer against the Braves in the last game of the season. And hit a homer off Branca in game one. Soon to make it three homers in four games.) In an announcement that portended impending doom: “Attention, press. World Series credentials for Ebbets Field can be picked up at six o’clock at the Biltmore Hotel (Kuenster 2001, 15).” The words eerily similar to a basketball announcer's jinx of a free throw shooter in saying, “he hasn’t missed a free throw in ...”

Thomson had a good day all ready, going 2 for 3 with a double off a considerably better pitcher in Don Newcombe. His only out was a RBI fly out to center. As Branca pitched ahead 0-1, Thomson drove Branca’s pitch into immortality in the lower deck of the left field stands some five or six rows deep according to left fielder Andy Pafko (Kuenster 2001, 17).



**Bobby Thomson (1948 Bowman Card)**

**Table.** Bobby Thomson's career hitting stats

<b>Team</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>HR</b>	<b>RBI</b>	<b>AB</b>	<b>H</b>	<b>BA</b>
<b>NYG</b>	1946	2	9	54	17	0.315
<b>NYG</b>	1947	29	85	545	154	0.283
<b>NYG</b>	1948	16	63	471	117	0.258
<b>NYG</b>	1949	27	<b>109</b>	641	198	0.309
<b>NYG</b>	1950	25	85	563	142	0.252
<b>NYG</b>	<b>1951</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>518</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>0.293</b>
<b>NYG</b>	1952	24	<b>108</b>	608	164	0.270
<b>NYG</b>	1953	26	<b>106</b>	608	175	0.288
<b>MIL</b>	1954	2	15	99	23	0.232
<b>MIL</b>	1955	12	56	343	88	0.257
<b>MIL</b>	1956	20	74	451	106	0.235
<b>MIL</b>	1957	4	23	148	35	0.246
<b>NYG</b>	1957	8	38	215	52	0.242
<b>CHN</b>	1958	21	82	547	155	0.283
<b>CHN</b>	1959	11	52	374	97	0.259
<b>BOS</b>	1960	5	20	114	30	0.263

Thomson was a humble guy; as Pafko recounted that he asked about 'The Shot' of Thomson, and Thomson responded, "Andy, that's history (Kuenster 2001, 22)."

Branca, only 25, responded so despondently to the homer, he was never the same pitcher again. His career ended by 1956, with only 12 more victories for three teams. Before that, he had won a respectable (and almost elite) 76 games for Brooklyn. But before a new season started, Branca injured his pelvis in a freak accident in 1952, with his trainer provided ill support and advice and little regard to his injury. Another fact about Ralph Branca, in mentioning baseball history: "At the time, only six pitchers had won 21 games at age 21: Lefty Gomez, Bob Feller, Wes Ferrell, Babe Ruth, Christy Mathewson, and me (Kuenster 2001, 24)."

Branca's backstop, ex-Cub Rube Walker, substituted for HOF Roy Campanella due to pulled leg muscle in Game 1 of the playoffs. Willie Mays, on-deck, a rookie hitting against a veteran in a high drama situation. Who knows what may have happened? Would Willie Mays faltered in that situation? Would Branca become a hero, or at least, a better served athlete? One can only conjecture, but the move to pitch around Thomson could have been entertained.

Evidently, even HOF Catcher Yogi Berra, a paying spectator, thought this game was over when he left to beat traffic before the ninth inning (Kuenster 2001, 28).

~

Losing the 1951 World Series to Berra's Yankees 4-2, in which a young Alfredo Manuel Pesano (a.k.a. Billy Martin) scored once, but soon enough don the shoes as the next generation's Durocher, Thomson split time in center field while Willie Mays, 'The Say Hey Kid', went off to serve in the military.

Thomson though was inconsistent, or vacillated, with batting average throughout his career, losing power as time wore on, thus was never able to achieve more than he did on that early October day. As a result, he bounced around after 1953, when Willie Mays firmly entrenched himself in center, and Hank Thompson took over at 3<sup>rd</sup> base, making Thomson expendable.

Thomson's trade on February 1, 1954 (along with Sammy Calderone) to Milwaukee for P Johnny Antonelli, P Don Liddle, Ebba St. Claire, SS/3B Billy Klaus and \$50,000 made the Giants' pennant that season, Antonelli, in particular.

Antonelli won 21, lost 7 with 6 shutouts, in leading the NL in ERA at 2.30. Antonelli won 20 again in 1956. Don Liddle provided 9 wins with a respectable 3.06 ERA as a swingman, pitching out of the bullpen. Liddle ultimately won the final game of the '54 Series (and Antonelli got the save) as the Giants jumped out to a 7-0 lead through 5 innings. The 1954 Indians, with the best pitching in the majors (and some argue, historically, one of the best ever), lost the series in 4 straight.

As cruel fate would have it, Thomson missed out on the 1954 championship of Giants, and also lost out on the championship in 1957, when he was traded back to the Giants mid-season from Milwaukee, who won it that year. So after leaving his worldly mark on the Giants, he never tasted the ultimate reward: as a member of World Series Champion.

Bobby Thomson passed on August 16, 2010 at his island home near Savannah, Georgia. The Giants won the pennant and World Series that year.



**Bill Virdon (1931 – 2021)**, AL Manager of the Year in 1974, was the manager last hired and fired by George Steinbrenner before Alfredo Manuel Pesano took the control of 'The Bronx Zoo.' Before those tumultuous times, a young Virdon signed as a Yankee by top scout Tom Greenwade, only to be traded to the Cardinals for Enos Slaughter. As the 1955 Rookie of the Year, he hit .281 with 17 home runs, but that as the power peak of his career. From 1957-59, he amassed over 400 Putouts flanked by a young Roberto Clemente in right field. In 1959, Virdon led the National League with 5 double plays and 3.0 Chances per game. **(Pictured above:** Managed the Yanks before The Bronx Zoo took shape. Here, honored for the 1960 World Series against the Bronx Bombers. *Wikipedia Commons, 2010 photo by Pennsylvania Penguin.*)

In the 1960 World Series, it was his bad hop grounder that undid SS Tony Kubek, and the Yankees, leading to the miracle home run by glove man extraordinaire, Bill Mazeroski. Showing karmic fate sometimes rears its ugly head even against the Yankees. (Traded man comes back to haunt you.)

Virdon managed in nearly 2,000 games (995-921) starting for the 1<sup>st</sup> place Pirates in 1972, with Clemente in his final season and Willie 'Pops' Stargell bombing homers in Three Rivers. Virdon packed for New York by 1974 when the Machiavellian machinates of Steinbrenner were just getting started.

By 1980, Virdon was in the midst of his longest tenure at the helm in Houston with Nolan Ryan and J.R. Richard gassing the tank for Houston's first playoff run that year.


Sadly, Richard fell to a stroke on July 30, 1980, and the Astros never visited the World Series, losing 3-2 to Philadelphia that season.

Viridon does outfield instruction for the Pirates organization in spring training still. He lives in Springfield, Missouri.

~

Discovered by his future father-in-law, Negro League legend, crack scout, and HOF William 'Judy' Johnson, **Bill Bruton (1925-1995)** brought speed to bear on every part of his game. In his first 3 seasons, Bruton led the National League in stolen bases (26, 34, 25) while playing an aggressive center field. He racked up double-digit assists (15, 14, 17) and errors (9, 7, 14), but played behind the best pitching staff in the National League, Warren Spahn, Lew Burdette, Bob Buhl, Bob Rush, and Carl Willey, and alongside home run legend Hank Aaron.

In 1957 and 1958, Bruton suffered an injury, allowing Felix Mantilla, Bobby Thomson, and Andy Pafko to fill-in during both years. Upon his return in 1958, Bruton picked up where he left off, hitting .280. During the 1958 World Series, he hit .412 (7 for 17) with 1 home run. The Braves lost 4-3; this after just beating the Yankees 4-3 in the 1957 World Series.



Bill Bruton finished out his career with 4 seasons in Detroit, flanked in 1961 by HOF RF Al Kaline and LF Rocky Colavito, during the latter's career year (.290 BA, 45 HR, 140 RBI). Detroit had one of best outfielders in baseball that season (see below). Detroit's fate: won 101 games, only to come up 8 games short of the Yankees. (Maris, Mantle, Howard, Skowron, Berra, Boyer, Kubek, Ford and Stafford had something to do with this. Though the 1961 Yankees were not the best team ever; not even the best Yankee



team despite the 240 home runs. **See:** Dynasties. **Pictured Left:** Bill Bruton – a natural speedy centerfielder.)

### 1961 Outfield WAR Production

Team	LF	WAR	CF	WAR	RF	WAR	4/5th OF	WAR	Total WAR
<b>Yankees</b>	Berra	2.1	Mantle	<b>10.2</b>	Maris	<b>6.9</b>	Cerv/Lopez	0.9	<b>20.1</b>
<b>Tigers</b>	Colavito	<b>7.7</b>	Bruton	2.6	Kaline	<b>8.4</b>	Morton/Maxwell	1.1	<b>19.8</b>
<b>Reds</b>	Post	2.8	Pinson	<b>7.6</b>	Robinson*	<b>7.7</b>	Bell/Lynch	1.3	<b>19.4</b>
<b>Giants</b>	Kuenn	0.8	Mays	<b>8.7</b>	F. Alou	2.9	M. Alou/Cepeda*	4.05	16.45
<b>Braves</b>	Thomas	2.8	H. Aaron*	9.3	Maye	2.4	Spangler/Jones	0.1	14.6

**Note:** Asterisk (\*) players split time at another position (Cepeda -1B)



HOF 3B Eddie Mathews, the teammate of Bill Bruton, Hank Aaron, and Warren Spahn, takes a mighty cut.



**Joe DiMaggio** in the midst before the 1937 All-Star Game (Library of Congress, Bain Collection) Left to right: (Lou Gehrig, Joe Cronin, Bill Dickey, DiMaggio, Charlie Gehringer, Jimmie Foxx, Hank Greenburg)

**Joe DiMaggio (1914-1999):** Appeared in 10 World Series for the Bronx Bombers, starting in all ten as their center fielder, but garnered national attention for his hitting streaks (61 games in the minors and 56 in the majors), his marriages (actresses Marilyn Monroe and Dorothy Arnold) and his ultra-quiet, graceful and yet oddly tense demeanor on the field and off. As a lifetime .325 hitter, .579 slugger with only 8 more strikeouts (369) than home runs (361), Joe DiMaggio was as close to center field perfection as seen in the late 1930s to the beginning of the Korean War.

Richard Ben Cramer in *Joe DiMaggio: The Hero's Life* reflects on the near perfect realm of center field:

“Why wouldn’t he see life from his own point of view, the position in which he spent his most alive moments, that perch with the whole world that mattered before him – that was center field. It was a special place – not just that vastness in the Bronx, but every center field: the largest suzerainty in the game’s realm, it had to be patrolled by a prince. He was a man on the field most unconstrained by others; he had the greatest distances to roam, and the farthest from home. Perhaps that’s why Joe so often was the first to burst from the dugout, running, head down, on a beeline, with other men spraying out behind, as if they’d been pulled, uncorked by the Dago’s force. In center field, he had every twitch of every play in front of him: the bent back of the pitcher, the batter’s swing and the ball-jump, and the crack of the bat...[with him able to make any catch he could rightly obtain with his grace of foot receiving the ball with two hands *easily*]...so he could trot in, ball in his glove, deadpan, confident, controlling, gather teammates ahead of him homeward, a strong shepherd, to the dugout again.” (Cramer 2000, 126)

Joe DiMaggio evoked plenty of imagery because so little was written about the actual man – and his thoughts clearly made aloud. He was not just sometimes quiet; but nearly always reticent, often allowing of others to do all the conjecturing and surmising whether it be about baseball, or his personal life, both endless topics of perusal by New York sportswriters Jimmy Cannon, Red Smith, and Walter Winchell. “Cannon...he idolized DiMaggio, a natural hero of innate grace, raised up (as was Cannon) from poor city streets. This was a patented Cannon story...the poor kid who became a king, the unlettered man who knew more than professors, the eloquence of the city’s silent souls (Cramer 2000, 194).”

Born in Martinez, California in 1914, growing up in San Francisco, son to a Sicilian fisherman along with nine brothers and sisters (with younger Dom and older Vince joining him as center fielders), Joseph Paul was not an ordinary ball-crazed young kid. In fact, he was indifferent to baseball, more interested in tennis as a 14-to-16 year old (Johnson and Stout 1995, 8). A quote too from *The Hero’s Life*: “...Joe had walked away from baseball. If he played anything he played tennis...His attitude on baseball wasn’t too far from his dad’s: there was no money in it – so what was it good for?” (Cramer, 29) His father Giuseppe relied on an intense work ethic – and designed for all his boys to fish – and baseball did not reflect Giuseppe’s stance on getting ahead, which was about having a roof overhead and food on the table.

It was not until his older brother Vince (and various friends from the neighborhood) encouraged him (via money) to come back to play on local semi-pro teams that Joe's baseball career came clearly into being. Joe's schooling had already ended and handing out of newspapers was not a real living, even for those Great Depression times. So tennis went away; and baseball now was love.


By 1932, Joe was a sought-after commodity – for his bat, because his glove was weak as a shortstop, but he had a cannon of an arm (Cramer, 32). His bat got him paid, and noticed: enough that his father lessened pressure on him, in part, because Vince was a San Francisco Seal and brought home \$1,500, and the scouts were watching the “DeMaggio” (Cramer, 34) name.

Joe DiMaggio too made his professional debut on October 1, 1932 as a San Francisco Seal in the highly regarded Pacific Coast League, playing shortstop (Johnson and Stout, 17). He played those final 3 games unpaid, but four years later, he landed on 1936 Yankees squad, batting where Babe Ruth did, and having a rookie year of Hall of Fame proportions – .323BA, 29HR, 125 RBI with a league-leading 22 outfield assists.

But to assist in the legend of DiMaggio as Cramer puts it: “The poor Italian boy, who learned to hit with a broken oar for a bat...His papa wanted him to fish, but DeMaggio only loved baseball...His brother got him a job – his own...In other words, they would give him a story...American melting pot stuff... (Cramer, 34)” Joe DiMaggio lack of words, his business-like approach, uncanny natural skills, effortless learning and improvement was not quite enough of story, so the legend had to be juiced up by the media of the day. A media Joe realized how integral they were in making a player great, a mystery, and often, an object of obsession, of defilement, all in the poetic paragraphs that paid the same (for the writer) whether true, or not.

DiMaggio did make some friends. DiMaggio met his first mentor in 1935 as Francis Joseph “Lefty” O’Doul was made the manager of the San Francisco Seals. O’Doul’s career began first as a Seal, then as a 22-year-old Yankee pitcher in 1919, but after five unsuccessful years of pitching, he switched permanently to outfield play – thoroughly reconstituted five seasons later, in 1928 – as a powerful .350 hitter that William Wrigley, owner of the Los Angeles Angels and Chicago Cubs, drooled over. O’Doul led the 1929 National League in total hits (254); tied for 3<sup>rd</sup> highest total in MLB history behind Ichiro Suzuki and George Sisler. O’Doul is among a very select group of players that have had over 200 hits and batting above .380 more than one season in the majors. (See: Table 4.1.11.)

O'Doul landed in another select group: he got DiMaggio talking. As one Cramer quote reflects: "Joe talked more to Lefty in a week than he'd talked in the prior two years with the Seals. Lefty could make a streetlamp talk. Now, the Seals' clubhouse was full of talk – and laughter...They adored him...suddenly freed of rules. Lefty didn't care what they did at night – just be ready to play. He'd say: 'If you come into a bar and I'm there, don't you dare try to get out without coming over and having one with me.' (O'Doul's own drinking was famously major league. When Lefty wanted to open his own bar, Ty Cobb, the shrewd businessmen, declined to go partners – for the businesslike reason: 'He drinks more than me.')

 (Cramer, 71)

**Lefty O'Doul (1897-1969)** – A long-time friend of the guarded DiMaggio. A character, with character, O'Doul was the toast of San Francisco. When asked about the hitting of Ty Cobb against 1960s pitchers, he surmised that he'd hit .340. The youngster responded, "Then why do you say Cobb was so great," Lefty responded, "Well, you have to take into consideration the man would now be seventy-eight years old!"  
(**Picture:** The Library of Congress, Baines Collection **Quote:** From *The Image of Their Greatness.*)

**Table.** Seasons with 200 or more hits and a .380 Batting Average

Year	Player	AB	H	BA
1911	Ty Cobb	591	248	0.420
1912	Ty Cobb	553	226	0.409
1917	Ty Cobb	588	225	0.383
1922	Ty Cobb	526	211	0.401
1921	Harry Heilmann	602	237	0.394
1923	Harry Heilmann	524	211	0.403
1925	Harry Heilmann	573	225	0.393
1927	Harry Heilmann	505	201	0.398
1929	Babe Herman	569	217	0.381
1930	Babe Herman	614	241	0.393
1921	Rogers Hornsby	592	235	0.397
1922	Rogers Hornsby	623	250	0.401
1924	Rogers Hornsby	536	227	0.424
1925	Rogers Hornsby	504	203	0.403
1929	Rogers Hornsby	602	229	0.380
1911	Joe Jackson	571	233	0.408
1912	Joe Jackson	572	226	0.395
1920	Joe Jackson	570	218	0.382
<b>1929</b>	<b>Lefty O'Doul</b>	<b>638</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>0.398</b>
<b>1930</b>	<b>Lefty O'Doul</b>	<b>528</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>0.383</b>
1925	Al Simmons	654	253	0.387
1930	Al Simmons	554	211	0.381
1931	Al Simmons	513	200	0.390
1920	George Sisler	631	257	0.407
1922	George Sisler	586	246	0.420
1912	Tris Speaker	580	222	0.383
1916	Tris Speaker	546	211	0.386
1920	Tris Speaker	552	214	0.388

Lefty showed DiMaggio around San Francisco – hometown to both men – and educated young Joe on the finer aspects of becoming a true star ballplayer – this after Joe’s hitting in 61 straight in 1933. In 1934, Joe suffered through a prolonged knee injury, keeping him on the left coast. O’Doul was as open and expressive as DiMaggio was closed and impassive. But Joe needed some polish in order to survive the New

York experience. As Cramer reflects, “But if he [Joe] was going to be a big-leaguer, a *New York* big-leaguer...this was a chance to learn at the master’s knee.” (Cramer, 72)

As a helping hand, O’Doul did well. Joe DiMaggio won the 1935 PCL MVP with a .398 average and secured the league championship. Next stop: The Big Apple and another *Lefty* mentor.

### Yankee Stardom

Joe began his Yankee career on a cross-country trip in 1936 with Frank Crosetti and Tony Lazzeri, with Joe unable (sans a license and motivation) to drive. On 3,000 miles of back roads, cow paths, and Route 66 type driving, the three made it to St. Petersburg, Florida, unaware their team soon would be champions, once again.

In the Yankee Clipper’s first season, he hit an exceptional .323 while scoring 132 runs. His star shined so bright that by the All-Star break *Time* magazine placed him on their cover. In game two of the World Series, FDR, the reigning hero of The Great Depression, saluted DiMaggio after an over the shoulder catch 475 feet from home plate. The press turned Joe D into an Italian hero, something that was in short supply with Benito Mussolini preening, Al Capone in prison, and Primo Carnera boxing, futilely (Cramer, 97-102). DiMaggio was none of that. He was living full scale the *Hero’s Life*.

**Table.** Joe DiMaggio’s Season Statistics

Year	G	GCF	AB	BA	Hits	2B	3B	HR	RBI	R	PO	A	E	FA%	WAR
1936	138	55	637	<b>0.323</b>	206	44	15	29	<b>125</b>	<b>132</b>	339	<b>22</b>	8	0.978	4.6
1937	151	150	621	<b>0.346</b>	215	35	15	<b>46</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>413</b>	<b>21</b>	17	0.962	<b>8.2</b>
1938	145	145	599	<b>0.324</b>	194	32	13	<b>32</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>129</b>	366	<b>20</b>	15	0.963	5.4
1939	120	117	462	<b>0.381</b>	176	32	6	<b>30</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>108</b>	328	<b>13</b>	5	0.986	<b>8.1</b>
1940	132	130	508	<b>0.352</b>	179	28	9	<b>31</b>	<b>133</b>	93	359	5	8	0.978	<b>7.3</b>
1941	139	139	541	<b>0.357</b>	193	43	11	<b>30</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>122</b>	385	<b>16</b>	9	0.978	<b>9.1</b>
1942	154	154	610	<b>0.305</b>	186	29	13	21	<b>114</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>10</b>	8	0.981	<b>6.1</b>
1946	132	131	503	0.290	146	20	8	25	95	81	314	<b>15</b>	6	0.982	<b>5.1</b>
1947	141	139	534	<b>0.315</b>	168	31	10	20	97	97	316	2	1	0.997	4.8
1948	153	152	594	<b>0.320</b>	190	26	11	<b>39</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>441</b>	8	13	0.972	<b>7.1</b>
1949	76	76	272	<b>0.346</b>	94	14	6	14	67	58	195	1	3	0.985	4.4
1950	139	137	525	<b>0.301</b>	158	33	10	<b>32</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>114</b>	363	9	9	0.976	<b>5.3</b>
1951	116	113	415	0.263	109	22	4	12	71	72	288	<b>11</b>	3	0.990	2.8

Joe met another chum, pitcher Vernon “Lefty” Gomez, practical jokester and all-around, good-natured person that became Joe’s baseball consigliere and trusted friend. In a play early on in Joe’s career, Gomez wheeled to turn a double play, but threw the ball away into center. When manager Joe McCarthy yelled at Gomez about

what he was thinking, Gomez responded, "Someone shouted 'Throw it to the Dago,' Gomez replied mildly. "Nobody said which Dago (Cramer, 108)." (Up the middle: Tony Lazzeri, Frank Crosetti, and Joe DiMaggio.)

Lefty was Joe's road roomie, nearby neighbor, driver to the Stadium. He provided ultimate fun times, yet was a respectable man-about-town. Lefty brought a life to any party. Joe took on the role of the presence (the game) at all parties. People came for Joe – not to talk to him – but to absorb his 'aura.'

But even Lefty had his limits: "The fact was, the writers had it only half right: Joe did learn from Gomez. But Lefty, in truth, wasn't out on the town as much as they thought. And pretty soon, Joe was getting around to places even Lefty didn't go... (Cramer, 113)" Those places (Polly Adler's ladies of the evening) and buddies (included barkeep Toots Shor, concierge/ticket broker George Solotaire, ex-champion Jim Braddock, and a variety of mid-to-high level mob types and hustlers) introduced Joe to a wide array of experiences and people. And Joe returned the favor by leaving an air of distinction on anyone he met. And those people reveled in it.

Intimately, Joe followed the ballplayer's method act. Lefty Gomez had married a showgirl, June O'Dea, as Joe was destined to marry the ultimate showgirl, after his first marriage failed. Dorothy Arnoldine Olson (Arnold) was on the set of Joe's first acting gig – *Manhattan Merry-Go-Round*. She had trekked like so many Midwestern women that saw movies, did local plays, and soon went to the coasts to find fame, and hopefully, a man of distinction. Joe and Dorothy entered into a ying-and-yang relationship: with Joe, reserved, tactfully appealing, naturally gifted and immensely popular, while Dorothy was outgoing, beautiful, book intelligent, wanton of attention, and an unknown. With Dorothy, Joe grew up – socially only – but the problems with their marriage came quickly. Dorothy's desire to have a career and attention versus Joe's ultra-controlling nature and inability to handle married stardom, and eventually, World War II, and Joe's mandatory participation in it.

As Richard Ben Cramer reflects the problems with Joe in marriage:

"He couldn't see why she wouldn't just be Mrs. Joe DiMaggio, why she had to be the center of attention...Some nights he'd rather just be quiet, with the guys, maybe get a steak with Toots...[or] get some rest. He had to be right the next day. That's what paid the freight.



She never *could* see why she had to give up work. She'd had her own life – and so many friends!...And if she talked, well, a lot of times he didn't want to hear it. If she kept up...he'd walk out and she wouldn't see him that night, maybe nights on end.”  
(Cramer, 156)

Even after the birth of Joseph Paul DiMaggio Jr., the couple grew only more distant and indifferent, though Joe did try to keep his marriage together – in his usual, subtlety controlling ways. By summer 1944, Joe played baseball in Hawaii (Johnson and Stout, 146) for the Army, divorce finalized, though they attempted friendship (and reconciliation for years) for the sake of Joe Junior.

### The Streak and Problems Begin

1941 was a season defined by two events that will undoubtedly stand the test of time: the 56-game hitting streak and a .406 batting average. Joe DiMaggio and Ted Williams were inspiring to a nation on the brink of its greatest fight. DiMaggio continued his damage to the American League, racking up stats rarely equaled since. (Pujols and Trout are best modern comparisons.)

The hit streak was not unfathomable to think of – with the PCL record coming many years prior – but the national media attention, the amazing phenomenon, and later, a contract dispute created unparalleled tension for Joe in his task towards baseball player perfection. The probability of such a feat is considered close to a mathematically impossibility as Stephen Jay Gould writes:

“Ed Purcell, Nobel laureate in Physics...[reflects on] Joe DiMaggio's 56-game hitting streak in 1941. The intuition of baseball aficionados has been validated. Purcell calculated that to make it likely (probability greater than 50 percent) that a run of even 50 games will occur once in the history of baseball up to now [1989], baseball's rosters would have to include either four lifetime .400 hitters or 52 lifetime .350 batters careers of 1,000 games...[Neither of which has happened] He sits on the shoulders of two bearers – mythology and science.”  
(Johnson and Stout, 131-132)

Baseball historians Lawrence Ritter and Donald Honig summed up Joe's ability this way: “Born to play center field, the shy, inscrutable DiMaggio was the flawless player... He ranged in center field with unerring judgment and poetic grace. His arm was powerful and accurate. At the plate he had no weakness, and not even the vast

reaches of Yankee Stadium's left and center fields could neutralize his tremendous right-handed power." (Ritter and Honig 1984, 159)

His lack of a weakness made impossible, possible.

The streak was the impetus behind the #1 song *Joltin' Joe Di Maggio* by Allan Courtney and Ben Homer in 1941. So Joe sat on the shoulders of growing national fame but only moderate fortune – not meeting his expectations or his needs. His 1942 contract dispute was derailed by World War II, attendance woes, and ever-the-advantageous work of septuagenarian Ed Barrow, than his perceived greed after an MVP season and another World Series title.



(**Pictured above:** Joe with his best weapon. Notice that 'DiMaggio' is somewhat separated. Was that intentional? Wikipedia Commons, Courtesy to *The Sporting News*)

As Cramer reflects in *The Hero's Life*:

"THE WAR BEDEVILED DiMaggio...Ed Barrow sent a contract without a raise – not even ten bucks...he'd been named the MVP, player of the year, *sportsman* of the year, named everything except God-incarnate...

But Barrow said, 'Doesn't he know there's a war on?' Why should DiMaggio get a raise on his salary – [\$37,500] – when so many young men [get] one-hundredth the pay? Was DiMaggio so much better, so much more valuable, than those brave boys...?

Of course that was a specious argument – immaterial, underhanded, insulting. It called into question DiMaggio’s patriotism...” (Cramer, 198)

This tactic is partly explained by the Yankees’ inability to put more bodies in the seats, with their regular season attendance hovering around 850-970,000 fans at the Stadium. When the Babe was smacking balls, it had been just north of a million. The post-season play too was over quickly, though 65-70 thousand fans attended the Stadium, for a nice gain. But the lack of a game seven in any series meant extra cash was gone. And nevertheless, Depression-era thinking held sway until 1946; when the boys returned from victory and fans came back.

Joe’s great successes were not creating a substantially bigger pie – and ownership was not sharing it, even if such existed. Even after a national columnist, Bob Considine, suggested Joe worth at \$80,000, but likely to get only half of that, that amount was exactly what Ed Barrow proffered on the second go around. Joe did not budge. But the press, and Barrow, hounded Joe for his holdout and perceived greed. To that end, Joe settled for \$42,000 in 1942, a long way from Babe Ruth’s \$80,000 salary in the late 1920s. ([Baseball Reference](#) has DiMaggio’s salary at \$43,750 for 1942-1947. Brother Dom made \$30,000 in 1947, trebled Dom’s 1942 salary.)

Joe’s 1941 season was barely a memory before his life permanently altered due to war, divorce, injuries, and age. And yet, while the money got a bit better – it was never quite good enough.

### After The War

By November 1946, the Yankees were far from the juggernaut that took apart the American League of the 1930s. Time and war caused plenty of changes – manager Joe McCarthy, pitcher Lefty Gomez, catcher Bill Dickey, 2<sup>nd</sup> baseman Joe Gordon were gone – and the future rested on the ulcer-ridden, problematic heel-and-ankle of Joe DiMaggio. Both Boston and Detroit, 1945 and 1946 World Series representatives, were better teams on paper, and on the field.

The glacier shift in fortunes started first with Joe McCarthy. A string of alcoholic rants and ravings diminished his accomplishments, in many baseball circles, but were enjoyable stories, nonetheless. “McCarthy started riding the White Horse hard. One trip out west, late May, there were games where McCarthy didn’t even show up...as McCarthy stood in the airplane aisle and screamed and abused the problem-child pitcher, [and fellow alcoholic relief ace] Joe Page. ‘You know what I’m gonna do with you, don’t you? I’m gonna send you back down to the minors. How much money d’you

think you'll make there? PEANUTS!'...McCarthy ripped into anyone...including that meddling SOB, [new part owner, president and GM Larry] MacPhail. When they landed, the Skipper went on a Homeric bender, left the club, disappeared, and after three days resigned by telegram. Dickey would be the new manager (Cramer, 221)."

DiMaggio was no fan of MacPhail – “Joe thought he had the bastard redhead figured out (Cramer, 223)” – who attempted a trade to Washington for Mickey Vernon before the 1947 season. Washington decided *el Paso* on the deal; losing a gate attraction, and a declining DiMaggio in terms of long-term production. Lefty Vernon just came off a career season: WAR (5.5). Vernon too was a substantially better slugger in Yankee Stadium (.456) in 609 at-bats versus Griffith Stadium (.415) (Baseball-reference.com 2014). Vernon put up clutch numbers, hitting .311/.418/.438, 2outs, runners in scoring position. These provided likely baseball reasons to trade as DiMaggio’s power was obviously affected by 461 feet to left-center. Griffith Stadium was no friend to lefties. And Vernon would avoid facing the Yankee pitching staff, another benefit, by trade.

**Table.** Mickey Vernon, Joe DiMaggio to Yankee 1<sup>st</sup> basemen comparison (1947-1958)

Player	G	AB	R	H	2B	HR	RBI	BA	PO	A	E	FA
Vernon	<b>1,663</b>	6,045	839	1,718	330	<b>135</b>	932	0.284	13,806	1,051	134	0.991

Player	G	AB	R	H	2B	HR	RBI	BA	PO	A	E	FA%
DiMaggio	625	2,340	451	719	126	<b>117</b>	<b>512</b>	<b>0.307</b>	1,603	31	29	0.983

New York 1B	G	AB	R	H	2B	HR	RBI	BA	PO	A	E	FA%
Collins (50-55)	717	<b>1,903</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>505</b>	72	77	270	0.265	<b>4,063</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>0.990</b>
Henrich (49)	115	411	90	118	20	24	85	0.287	445	28	2	0.996
Kryhoski (49)	54	177	18	52	10	1	27	0.294	363	31	7	0.983
McQuinn (47-48)	238	819	117	232	35	24	121	0.283	1,891	141	13	0.994
Mize (50-53)	203	606	80	162	26	35	121	0.267	1,122	75	6	0.995
Skowron (54-59)	577	<b>1,889</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>574</b>	87	<b>73</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>0.304</b>	<b>3,946</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>0.991</b>

Instead of getting Joe DiMaggio in spring of 1947 (who was spending time shuttling back and forth from John Hopkins in Baltimore due to an infection after a heel surgery at Beth David (Johnson and Stout, 155)), the Senators watched popular, easy-going, two-time Senator manager Bucky Harris (2,159-2,219, 2 WS titles) win the first televised World Series in 1947 as Yankees skipper. But Harris only kept the job warm

for future managerial legend, Casey Stengel, who was less-than-amicable towards the Yankee Clipper.

Conflict was the “word of the day” for Joe. He was fined \$100 (among others) by Leland MacPhail in 1947 for failing to appear in an Armed Forces newsreel. Travel by plane was required – otherwise, players paid their own travel expenses. In the esteemed opinion of Red Smith, “a seal that can play Beethoven’s Fifth on an oboe is more beautiful to L.S. MacPhail than a twenty-game pitcher (156).”

As the 1947 season went forward, Joe healed his heel, hitting a respectable .315. His leadership at the plate and in the locker room assisted the Yankees back to the top. In one stretch of 27 games, Joe pounded the ball at .468 pace while dealing with another nagging injury: a one-throw-per-game arm (158).

The Yankees meanwhile played team baseball, suffering through injuries to their pitching staff (and Joe), yet amassed a double-digit win streak in mid-summer, commanding the league. Tommy Heinrich and George McQuinn each supported Joltin’ Joe at bat, while Joe Page locked down the end of ballgames. And the Yankees eased their way to the AL pennant once again.

Joe won the 1947 AL MVP by one point over Ted Williams (202-201); though tainted by writers’ bets with bookies (estimated at \$500,000) and votes for undeserving candidates (Athletics Eddie Joost posted a .206/.348/.330 line for 2.2 WAR (165)). Reliever Joe Page received 7 1<sup>st</sup> place votes for a 3.8 WAR season, 4<sup>th</sup> in voting. WAR total: 9.9 to 4.8, Teddy Ballgame over DiMaggio. Cleveland’s Lou Boudreau and Joe Gordon also posted better seasons than Joe.

**Table. *Who really deserved the MVP?***

1947 Stats	G	AB	R	H	2B	HR	RBI	BA	OBP	BB	SO	PO	A	E	FA
DiMaggio	139	534	97	168	31	20	97	0.315	0.388	64	32	316	2	1	<b>0.997</b>
Williams	154	528	<b>125</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>0.343</b>	<b>0.497</b>	<b>162</b>	47	<b>347</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	0.975

As a topper, the 1947 World Series TV audience saw the initial clash of two league titans of the next decade of baseball: the Brooklyn Dodgers versus the New York Yankees.

**Table.** Season Wins and Pennants by Brooklyn (NL) and New York (AL)

Year	Brooklyn	LG Win	New York	LG Win
1947	<b>94</b>	<b>Won</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>Won</b>
1948	84	No	<b>94</b>	No
1949	<b>97</b>	<b>Won</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>Won</b>
1950	89	No	<b>98</b>	<b>Won</b>
1951	<b>97</b>	No	<b>98</b>	<b>Won</b>
1952	<b>96</b>	<b>Won</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>Won</b>
1953	<b>105</b>	<b>Won</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>Won</b>
1954	<b>92</b>	No	<b>103</b>	No
1955	<b>98</b>	<b>Won</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>Won</b>
1956	<b>93</b>	<b>Won</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>Won</b>

Each team, loaded with HOF talent, led by managerial legends, and engaged in yearly disputes that were decided in the October. Usually, the Yankees (5-1) took the titles.

DiMaggio participated in two of these contests, not performing up to his personal standards, but hitting home runs in both the 1947 and 1949 series. The 1947 Series saw a classic moment of realism when Joe hit a shot to left in game six, some 415 feet from the plate, and where reserve outfielder Al Gionfriddo made the unlikely grab over a low fence, robbing DiMaggio of a 3-run homer. As DiMaggio trotted into second base, he kicked the ground in disgust. The Yankees lost 8-6, with DiMaggio loud out being the difference in the game. As it was, game seven saw reliever Joe Page carry the day as the Yankees beat Brooklyn 5-2, closing out the series.

Gionfriddo never played in another MLB game. Joe still had 4 years of Yankee glory ahead.

#### Four More Years

After an exciting World Series, Joe received the first of two raises in his salary since 1942. At \$65,000, Joe's salary was topped only by fireballer Bob Feller and the formidable hitting of Ted Williams (Johnson and Stout, 166). In 1948, the dominating Joe returned with a league-leading 39 home runs and 155 RBI to go with his usual .320

plus batting. However, the Cleveland Indians and Boston Red Sox each had exceptional teams with ex-Yankee 2B Joe Gordon assisting Cleveland and Joe's brother, Dom, turning in stellar statistics both offensively (.285, 101 BB, 87 RBI, 127 Runs) and defensively (over 500 putouts, 13 assists) for the Sox. The Yankees posted their lowest win total (94) during the 1947-56, 7-time championship run and did not make the post season to the dismissal of HOF manager Buck Harris and the appointment of Charles Dillon 'Casey' Stengel.

Joe carried the team in the stretch run of 1948 after the legendary Babe Ruth died on August 16, 1948. In twenty-three games after the *Colossus of Clout* passing, Joe hammered 7 home runs in twenty Yankee victories. In mid-September, Joe hit a towering home run in extra innings over his brother crest fallen head to beat Boston to keep a 3-horse race going (DiMaggio: An Illustrated Life, 168-69). But alas, the Yankees ran out of steam as Boston and Cleveland headed for a 1-game playoff.

Joe though was coming to a baseball end. His rash of leg problems (bone spurs, particularly calcium deposits on his heel bone) were slowing him up; causing him to miss more games, increasing friction with new skipper Stengel, who went to platoons and youngsters, and placing doubt in Joe's mind about playing to his expected level. "Do I look okay? (169)" was Joe's question to teammates about his physical abilities reflected on the field. (Joe's insecurity about looking bad often took priority over his overall contributions to winning games, or leadership skills, such as the latter were nearly absent.)

The 1948 season gave Joe a feather, becoming a \$100,000 player in 1949. Joe's praises were sung on October 1, 1949, "Joe DiMaggio Day," that commenced with 70,000 fans, writers and family members looking on. He received over \$50,000 in gifts to his ultimate recognition, and cried publicly. The pennant that day was on the line; and Joe played through a bout of pneumonia. He attempted to play a doubleheader through his recovery, but was pulled in game two in the bottom of the ninth after a Bobby Doerr drive sailed over Joe's faltering steps.

Joe recovered enough to play in the World Series (though lighter) and the Yankees triumphed again against the hated Dodgers. Joe turned in his worst World Series, batting wise, going 2 for 18, with a solo home run in the 1949 Series finale off Jack Banta.

In his last days in baseball, Joe DiMaggio was being torn by conflicts on the field (manager Stengel’s attempts to move Joe to 1<sup>st</sup> base) and off, his ex-wife Dorothy. Stengel saw Joe was no longer a 23-year old graceful centerfielder. Joe lost most of his ability to be the awe-inspiring player, with continued injuries (shoulder) and distractions (reconciling with Dorothy) affecting his regular season play. Most importantly, an Oklahoma youngster showed fleet feet and outdistance Joe’s once mighty swats: Mickey Mantle was just about ready to take over as the Yankee premier attraction. Joe knew it too.

Now a World Series championship manager, Stengel made statements that all but assured Mantle was the real deal, able to do everything Joe could do, and maybe more. Mantle dominated pre-season headlines (203), hitting home runs from both sides, and awing the not-so-easily-awed New York sportswriters. As a result, Mantle’s career is often compared to Joe’s – if only assessing the worth of each to the winning ways of the usually-winning Yankees.

**Table.** The Dynasties of Yankee Outfielders

Yankee Dynasties	Years	League Wins	World Series Titles
Babe Ruth (RF)	1921-1934	7	4
Joe DiMaggio (CF)	1936-1951	11	10
Mickey Mantle (CF)	1952*-1968	11	6
Reggie Jackson (RF)	1976*-1981	4	2

\* Denotes player arrived either a year earlier or a year later

The handwriting was on the wall for the ever proud and prideful Joe DiMaggio. Before the 1951 season started, Joe announced his intention to retire. And before the 1951 World Series, a Brooklyn scouting report by Andy High was reprinted in *Life* (210) that reflected what Joe had known of his diminishing skills:

- Cannot stop quickly and throw hard
- A runner can take an extra base on him
- Can’t run and won’t bunt
- Reflexes are slow; and will not pull a good heater

Even with an ordinary Joe (career lows offensively), the Yankees came back to fight in the fall classic as the upstart New York Giants just broke the Dodgers hearts. The series marqueeed off the arrival of Willie Mays and Mickey Mantle, and the last one for Joe DiMaggio – with all three participating in a career defining play for Mantle. (**Game two:**



Mays hit a pop fly to short right center, with a slowed DiMaggio in center and quick and overly eager Mantle in right. Neither immediately called for the ball, but Joe did, too late to save The Mick from getting his right toe caught on a sprinkler. He blew out his knee; and his awesome speed never was quite again. Mantle just hit 536 regular season home runs and 18 World Series dingers. Again, conjectures to his statistics.)

DiMaggio made up for this Mantle loss by hitting a home run in game 4, as the Yankees tied up the series at 2-2. Game five was a walk over (13-1) and game six turned on a Hank Bauer triple in the sixth inning. And the Yankee Clipper tasted the champagne for the last time as a baseball player.

### Post Yankee Life

Once DiMaggio retired, his legend and popularity only grew in the minds of Yankee fans and star struck persons. DiMaggio added to his myth by marrying the top female star of the time in 1954: Marilyn Monroe. As Creamer reflects, “But with this girl on his arm, Joe was, once again, the Big Guy in the Hero Game...He loved what he was in her eyes – and in the eyes of the world, with her. He was Joe DiMaggio again (Cramer, 331).”

Theirs was a marriage wrought with problems that come from intense media scrutiny (practically the only game in town), Joe’s controlling (if well-meaning with her) nature, Marilyn’s career foibles, and child-like understanding of things. Her spotlight was so bright, and people wanted a piece of that always. Joe, accustomed to that, but wiser to its usage for his longer-term benefit, deplored the way they treated his wife. *His beautiful wife*.

Within a Far East honeymoon, the fractures in the marriage were sown.

Nine months later, they parted ways; only to continually be drawn back to each other, so much so, that shortly before Marilyn’s death, late on August 4, 1962, Joe asked her to marry again. And she said yes. (The wedding was supposed to be on August 8<sup>th</sup>; instead her funeral took place (412-14).)

Between Joe’s divorce from Marilyn, and those eight years, Joe was connected to several Miss Americas of the 1950s: Yolande Betbeze 1951, Lee Meriwether 1955, and Marian McKnight 1957. This feeble way passed as a substitution for Marilyn, as many women, during this time, were reminiscent of Marilyn in looks (378-80) if Joe took an interest. None ever made the final cut of Joe’s version of *The Bachelor* show.

In Joe's later years, he was honored as the 'Greatest Living Player', represented *Mr. Coffee* (something he did from his playing days, drinking plentiful amounts), played golf (when invited and given free stuff) and eventually, did memorabilia business. As Creamer reflected on Joe's memorabilia time, "One strange thing about DiMaggio in business: it drove him nuts if anybody else made money (Cramer, 449)."

His persona is a mixture of excessive necessity to control things, a desire to be perfect in nearly every aspect of life, and exclusivity to highest levels of acclaim. DiMaggio was a human being – as flawed as many are – but also amongst the handful of players ever deemed close to perfect, a winner without equal, and a man who lived amongst stars, and rarely outshined.

'The hero' never knew how not to be that, or develop another state – and as such, Joe fell into a large group of athletes that never quite fit back into society. The athletic life was oddly a prison; one where the walls are constructed from large flying banners, media flashbulbs, and airplanes and buses taking them from one cell to another. The release from the term of playful incarceration did not grant freedom, or the opportunity of learning anew. Instead, the mentality travelled with Joe forever. He never quite perfected how to be an ordinary Joe.

### The Say Hey Kid



“An awful lot of people took advantage of Willie throughout his career, and he resented that’ says Charles Einstein, a prominent Mays’ biographer. ‘He had a raft of problems that he didn’t think were anyone’s business. He went through a divorce, he had financial problems. That probably led to a pretty big wall he built up around himself.’” (Pearlman 2006, 26)

Willie Mays. The name is synonymous with the complete package in center field. HOF power, high batting average, superior defensive speed, amazing glove, great arm, and dazzlingly speed on the bases defined perfection as an outfielder. Atop that foundation, laid a man that was more innocent than conniving; more guileless than duplicitous; and more assured than cocky. In a game filled with roguish characters whose braggart ways turned fans sour and sportswriters' typeset cold, Mays offered a fresh comportment in a time of escalating, weary relations across America. (**Willie Mays** – The effervescent smile of likely the best all-round player ever...until his godson was born – Barry Lamar Bonds. **Left:** Wikipedia, Library of Congress collection donated by *The World Telegram*)

And for twenty seasons, the Giants had little to worry about come spring training time in center field.

**Willie Mays (1931 –)** came out of the Deep South, raised outside the Birmingham, Alabama mill and steel works where the rails pumped the output to the heart of America's pulsating industries. Mays, a precocious and happy-go-lucky child, never dulled or bored with life even as the Great Depression weighed harder on a typical southern black family.

Willie's father, Willie Howard Mays, Sr. or 'Cat', was named for President Taft, yet was as far afield from that namesake as one could be. Cat was a graceful, cheetah-fast athlete, who took that gift into whatever task or activity was at hand (Hirsch 2010, 10), whereas, Taft was the largest, heaviest President of the United States. (And the polarity of their lives went on from there.)

For the junior Mays, family life oft consisted of revolving doors as relatives and friends came and went as their own personal struggles and situations changed from paycheck to paycheck. Willie was supported well enough – even as his father stayed gone due to work – being raised by his aunt Sarah. His mother, Annie Satterwhite, a championship athlete herself, distanced herself from her firstborn son in many ways, and their relationship, though friendly, never grew in scope. She died in 1953 at just thirty-seven in childbirth. Mays talked rarely about his mother, thereafter, as one can only surmise to the emotions and feelings unexplored and unresolved with her abrupt passing (Hirsch 2010, 35-7).

## Birmingham Black Barons

In *Say Hey*, Mays (with prolific sports author Lou Sahadi) reflected upon his early years as being completely filled with prospect of playing baseball. By fifteen, Willie played alongside his father (a genuine supporter of his dream) in an industrial league. so well that his dad knew the time had come to let him try the semi-pro and professional leagues. This while earning, at times, \$100 per month in the mid-1940s (Mays and Lou 1988, 23).

Mays, the baseball prodigy, started out under player-manager **Lorenzo ‘Piper’ Davis (1917-1997)**, an extremely versatile Negro League star of the 1940s (playing against Josh Gibson’s Homestead Grays, and for Winfield Welch’s Harlem Globetrotters (Loverro 2003, 71)) and on the Birmingham Black Barons. Piper Davis managed Mays for three seasons while struggling himself for admittance to the major leagues. After Mays’ talent got noticed in the *Chicago Defender*, scouts came from miles around. Some too myopic to see the future (Yankees), others too cheap (Pirates), and still others, too focused on one outing and racial concerns (Braves) (Hirsch, 57-9). As a result, the Giants caught the baseball break of the half-century.

Willie’s lasting memory of his time as a young star on the Barons is reflected on his first (and only) at-bats versus Satchel Leroy Paige. “He had a knuckleball, a screwball, an assortment of curves – and his hesitation pitch. He’d pump his arm around like a windmill, and bring it over his head, and you expected to see the ball coming down...But nothing happened. He would be almost in his follow-through when all of the sudden the darn ball would appear and you would be swinging way in front of it (Mays and Lou 1988, 27-8).” He went 1 for 4, a double, and three strikeouts. (Likely the prior quote embellishes on Satchel’s repertoire – being a ‘gas man’ with fine control. Satchel though had developed other ‘quirks’ in his pitching by the late 1940s.)

Now signed for \$4,000 (and \$15,000 kicked to the Barons), Mays roomed with Ray Dandridge, both setting the Giant’s Minneapolis farm team ablaze with their bats, and reinforcing the drastic ebbing of the Negro Leagues. Dandridge role as the mentor of the gem of the Giants was a well-understood task: keep him out of trouble and focused on becoming a star ballplayer. Back home, Mays finished out schooling at Fairfield Industrial before heading north. Never brilliant, but never overmatched, he completed up his high school studies taught by a schoolteacher whose daughter became Secretary of State under George W. Bush: Condoleezza Rice. May’s newest teacher, Leo Durocher, broke the status quo everywhere he managed, stuck with Mays through a

horrible start, assisted him on the finer points of big league life. Both men lifted the Giants back to the World Series sooner than expected. These teachers became studied in the legacy of Willie Mays.

### The Rookie of the Year and 1951

When Mays came up from the Minneapolis farm team in 1951 (batting .477 in the minors), he added spark to a lineup and to a pitching staff that needed one badly. Though at first, Willie struggled immensely, going 0 for 12 out of the box. He then tagged legend Warren Spahn for a dinger at the Polo Grounds (Mays and Lou 1988, 70-2) on May 28, 1951 in the first inning ([Baseball Reference](#)). Mays wouldn't get his first multi-hit game until he was batting .040 (1 for 25) in early June. That inauspicious start did not discourage his manager, Leo Durocher, because Willie was a gem, as Leo said: "Willie, you could do all five from the first time I saw you (73)." Leo's patience bore out as 20-year old Mays hit .287 with 19 home runs after that slow start.

The Giants went on a tear at the end of that season: winning 16 straight games in August; and 37 of 44 games, thus tying the hated Dodgers in the regular season. As new Dodger Andy Pafko stated, "Those Dodger-Giants games weren't baseball, they were a civil war (Kuenster 2001, 11)." As discussed, the Giants won the pennant.

### From Youthful Exuberance to Exceedingly High Expectations

Mays's career path nearly paralleled Mickey Mantle's in coming up from the dusty South, becoming an immediate star in the majors (aside from Mays' military service), but the biggest difference between the two: attributed almost solely to their skin color.

Mays dealt with racism daily; he played in the media capital of the United States under the weight of a changing culture; and he had to do everything to win games for the Giants – who did not always have the talent to beat Brooklyn/LA or Milwaukee during the 1950s; whereas Mickey's teams, if need be, borrowed talent from Kansas City, their former farm team. (See: Dynasty section.) One quote from *The Sporting News* reflects the undercurrent of tokenism in adding black ballplayers to rosters: "Perhaps other clubs will soon add Negroes as good luck charms (Hirsch, 141)."

Mays was essentially forced into the armed forces after several attempts to obtain a deferment based on his support of numerous relatives. Rival Mickey Mantle: declared 4F by his local draft board on several occasions due to his left leg's inflammation post-1951 World Series (Hirsch, 144). Nevertheless, Mantle appeared in over 260 baseball games, hitting over .300 with a .500 slugging average in the 1952-53 seasons.

The immense talent of Snider and Mantle in New York also reduced Mays's legend ever so slightly. (Even this particular writer spent time comparing Willie Mays to Richie Ashburn defensively – if only to raise Ashburn's record up in spite of Willie's stellar defensive statistics. Nobody questions Willie's prowess in centerfield, but many overlooked Ashburn's eye-popping statistics, fly ball pitchers, or not.)

There is no telling what Mays' acclaim is if Mantle and Snider had come along a decade later, or sooner, affording Mays the sole, if often harsh, spotlight. Given the intense media scrutiny in New York, and later, San Francisco's less than approving relationship, one can only imagine how much more his greatness is revered under different social constructs.

As book reviewer James Floto includes in his recent look at *Baby Bull: From Hardball to Hard Time and Back*: "It took the fans of Bagdad by the Bay some time to cotton to Willie Mays. 'This is a hell of a town,' wrote one columnist. 'They boo Willie Mays and cheer [Nikita] Khrushchev.' Willie represented New York, the distant rival East Coast." This statement reflects that Mays transfer to the West coast was not a happy one; and that New Yorkers declared Mantle the better player just on the location of his spikes, not statistics alone. (That is to say these two were very close in their best seasons...as both carried their teams.)

Always a topic of contention, salaries, Mays was an elite player scrutinized and vilified almost daily during the season; based on the current weight of his wallet or his current batting average or yard bombs tallied. Announcers dogged him, "There goes another \$80,000 pop-up." The media denigrated attempts to win games if Willie did not follow 'the book' on baseball. Attacks too on his person did happen – as a bottle was tossed through his bay window with racist remarks, only to be sarcastically reported on by the *San Francisco Examiner* in 1959 (Hirsch, 309-12). Not to be outdone, *The Sporting News* reflected in April 1959 Mays maturation and lack of horseplay in the clubhouse as, "The big difference is that Willie is now the star instead of the fondly regarded mascot (Hirsch, 309-13)." This phrasing echoed back to his rookie season, and furthered belittled.

In 1960, as the Giants faltered to a 79-75 record, race landed on the dance card. James Hirsh in a full accounting of Mays' life, *Willie Mays: The Life, The Legend*, speaks to the troubling aspects surrounding the media on the fortunes of the Giants:

“As long as the team was competitive, race was not a public issue, but that ended in 1960. After the season, the publisher of the Sporting News J.G. Taylor Spink, visited San Francisco to conduct an autopsy on what happened to the squad. After his interviews, his story enumerated the problems, which included ‘too many Negroes.’ Spink cited other issues, such as lack of leadership, the players’ resentment of Candlestick, and the bullpen. But according to him, the problem ‘most frequently mentioned as the cause of the Giants’ downfall [was] too many Negro players (327).’”

James Floto continued this theme in accessing May’s difficult playing situations (on the Giants) in speaking about one of his managers. For the 1961 – 1964 seasons, 39-year old Alvin Dark, was the manager and known for his dislike of Negro and Latin ballplayers, providing the San Francisco media with denigrations of his players to the likely detriment of a very talented group of players. The assemblage included Orlando Cepeda, Juan Marichal, Gaylord Perry, Willie McCovey, Jim Ray Hart, and the Alou brothers, the only group of brothers to play together (all at once) in a major league outfield.

The Giants of the 1961 – 1965 seasons won the 3<sup>rd</sup> most games at 461 (behind the Yankees at 485 and Dodgers at 468) but lost the 1962 Series to New York. Meanwhile, New York and Los Angeles won two World Series apiece. Mays hit 40, 49, 38, 47, and 52 home runs during those banner years, leading the National League three times in that category while scoring over 100 runs; knocking the requisite 100 men across the plate. The Dodgers were fierce competition; and the Yankees were the gold standard, if faltering by 1964.

### Father Bonds

When Mays neared the end of a long, illustrious career, Bobby Bonds came up in 1968 with undue comparisons made to the all-time great. Bonds tore up the Western Carolina League after a prestigious all-around athletic career in California where Bobby adored Mays. Willie Mays mentored, advised, taught, and protected the future superstar Bobby Bonds. An example made in *Love Me, Hate Me*: “One day during batting practice a coach was teaching Bobby a new way to hold the bat. Mays went ballistic. ‘Leave him alone!’ he screamed. ‘You’re just screwing him up!’ The coach slunk away.” (Pearlman 2006, 26)

This protection of a Bonds family member was not the last time Willie Mays took on such a role. At the time, Barry Lamar Bonds, just four years old, grew up in the

presence of baseball greatness. And it was no accident that the younger Bonds took #24 when Barry appeared on the 1986 Pirates. In short order, Barry became the real heir to Willie Mays – surpassing his 660 home runs with over 500 stolen bases during a career. But Bond’s media relationships, and steroid investigation, left him easily abandoned, if Mays had desired. However, Mays stood beside Bonds as he broke Hank Aaron’s record. Willie never condemned Barry Bonds publicly for his involvement in the Steroid Era.

This shows a depth to Mays, the man, aside from the tremendous numbers. His loyalty (though we assume misplaced) is a part of what makes him so special in this era of greats patrolling the depths of the outfield.

Willie, as with Joe, was not a perfect human being. Though in baseball, he conceivably was the perfect ballplayer. He though, made the transition beyond baseball better than Joe.

**(Final Note:** During Willie’s career, he hit 22 extra-inning home runs, more than Ruth (16) and Frank Robinson (15.) Undoubtedly, in the *ESPN* age of reporting, Willie Mays’ late game performances would lead the nightly broadcast of *ESPN’s Top Ten* plays – reflecting true ‘clutch’ regular season hitting.)



Yankee Legends in Repose: The Dynastic Yankees were defined by the men above. (Photo Courtesy of Niklas Hellerstedt.)





**Mickey Mantle** stroking his 49<sup>th</sup> home run in 1961. (Art courtesy of Jason Swain)

Dynasties: Cubs, Red Sox, Yankees, A's, Dodgers, Reds and more Yankees

Many obsessed fans dream of their team building a dynasty. To watch their favorite players will a team to multiple World Series, and drown in the champagne yearly in front of millions is forever a fan's hope. It is a general manager's greatest dream, a field manager's bluest heaven, to show up in spring training with a stable of talented and motivated ballplayers that will start a dynastic run, and continue to put the meat in the seats, adding to the owner's bottom line and urging along the development of new talent. (And also adds to the pocketbooks of those said managers.) Ownerships come to appreciate in their golden years the money spent and wins garnered during their short time as the kings of the baseball world. Nothing comes though without the dream.

Typically, all great championship runs have a few key parts in order to make the grade of *dynasty*. A few of these are:

**Ace pitcher(s):** Without good quality on the mound, reliance on the offense can carry you only *so far*. The best teams ever usually have more than one stopper – often a lefty and a righty – which can control any short series against a worthy opponent.

**A quality backstop:** A catcher that can call the game, control the base paths, and produce with the bat is a tough order to fill. Teams with an intellect and producer behind the plate, get further than ones without.

**A premier power hitter:** As baseball became a power fest, having at least one man (and usually two) pounding 3–run homers to win those close games are essential to October winning.

**Consistent personnel:** To win multiple times in five years tends towards the fewest modifications to succeed. Differing personalities clashing – constantly – and changing the mix causes undo upheaval. That will not win usually.

**Bullpen ace(s):** If the man at the end can't close the deal, the manager is left scratching his head for answers to give the media piranhas. They feed quickly on a manager's lack of options. And the gray hairs and brain matter will overload.

**Career Years:** For the ordinary player to suddenly put up numbers unusual in his prior record. Sometimes, it is a matter of finally 'getting it.' (Or not being hurt; or held back by training; or, coming up through the system and showing that final maturation.)

**General/Field Managers of renown:** A man that can mix together all these ingredients, keep playing time satisfied, the ownership content and the media at bay, is usually an authoritarian/psychological expert, often quiet, yet a remarkable presence when asked to be. Mediocre former players (and non-major leaguers) have won more titles as managers than the stars or MVP-caliber players have in history. Some top skippers are analytical, others by-the-pants high fliers, but most brought something unique. (If only an overblown sense of self in contributions to winning games.) Or as Bill James notes: "Of the twenty-five greatest managers of all time, at least eighteen were alcoholics (James, *The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers: From 1870 to Today 1997*, 8)." (This *circa 1996*. Tony LaRussa landed on the fringe of the 25 greatest, and then, not considered an alcoholic. Both are modestly confirmed as of 2014.)

**Bench/Luck:** No winners got to any level without a lucky play or two, lack of major injuries to stars, or calls that changed a key game. Baseball requires much skill, but a .250 hitter is a .300 hitter with just one more bloop or 'seeing-eye' hit per week. And a .300 hitter is a .350 hitter by that same bloop: the modern stat of BABIP ties into that. A move to a bench player – who becomes a hero – is many times the decider of becoming a winner, or dynastic.

To qualify as a dynasty, in the author's opinion, a team excelled for 3-5 years, competed for multiple championships and won at least two world championships. Since the institution of the World Series, quite a few dynasties have existed. These are their bios.

### Chicago Cubs (1906-1910): A Cubs Century Moment to Reflect



*The last winning owner?* (above): **Charles Webb Murphy**, the only Cubs owner to taste final victory in October. (Until 2016.) He borrowed money from former newspaper boss, Charles Phelps Taft, half-brother of the 27<sup>th</sup> President, in acquiring the Cubs in 1906.

Before they were called 'loveable losers', they were the indomitable and formidable Chicago Cubs. Led off the bump by Mordecai 'Three Finger' Brown and in the field by player/manager Frank Chance, the 1906 Cubs still hold the record for most wins in a season (116) against only 36 loses. But as fate had it, their opponent in the 1906 World Series was the Chicago White Sox, known as the 'hitless wonders' for their .230 team batting average. They also won a hard-fought AL pennant race that year. The Cubs meanwhile won by 20 games over McGraw's Giants.


Both squads could pitch – each leading their league in ERA and Runs Allowed – but on paper, the Cubs fielded a stronger squad, while leading the entire Major Leagues in runs scored. What looked over before it started, soon became a rout by the White Sox as Ed Walsh won two games and the White Sox pounced early on Mordecai in the decisive game six. The Cubs first World Series ended in a bitter defeat.

1907 ended in sweet victory. The Cubs ran out to a 107-45 record, winning the regular season by 16 games, and stomped on the Ty Cobb-led Detroit Tigers in five games. The pitching of Orval Overall, Mordecai Brown, Carl Lundgren, Jack 'The Giant Killer' Pfeister and 'Big' Ed Reulbach synced up, as the heartbeat of the Cubs, leading the

league in runs allowed by a dominate 106 runs over the bridesmaid. The staff still holds the MLB record for lowest ERA (1.73), and that will undoubtedly, never be broken.

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>				Offensive Differential		
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1906	Chicago Cubs	<b>116-36</b>	120.0	705	381	20
1907	<b>Chicago Cubs</b>	107-45	106.0	574	390	13
1908	<b>Chicago Cubs</b>	99-55	102.2	624	461	19
1909	Chicago Cubs	104-49	112.5	635	390	20
1910	Chicago Cubs	104-50	103.3	712	499	34
Pitching				Defense		
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1906	1.75	30	10	12	100	190
1907	<b>1.73</b>	32	8	11	110	211
1908	2.14	29	12	20	76	206
1909	1.75	32	11	6	95	244
1910	2.51	25	13	18	110	229

In the field, the 1907 Cubs brought back their lineup back from the 1906: 1B Frank Chance, 2B Johnny Evers, SS Joe Tinker, 3B Harry Steinfeldt, RF Frank 'Wildfire' Schulte, CF Jimmy 'The Human Mosquito' Slagle, RF Jimmy Sheckard, and C Johnny 'Noisy' Kling.



**John McGraw** and **Frank Chance** likely batting around the good ole days.

'Noisy' Kling was the taskmaster behind the mask during the all the Cubs postseason appearances. In 1909, when the Cubs missed the postseason, Kling was not on the squad due to a 'negotiated hiatus' and a \$50,000 investment in a billiards company in Kansas City after Kling won a billiards championship (Anderson and Bogen n.d.). From SABR's biographical project at [bioproj.sabr.org](http://bioproj.sabr.org), Gil Bogen and Dave Anderson reflected on the catching skills of Kling:

"During the Dead Ball Era a strong defensive catcher was a key component of any great team, due to the emphasis on bunting and base stealing. Kling was the dominant defensive catcher during the first ten years of the twentieth century. From 1902 through 1908 he led the National League in fielding percentage four times, putouts six, assists twice, and double plays once. Cub pitcher Ed Reulbach called Kling one of the greatest catchers to ever wear a mask. In June, 1907 he threw out all four Cardinal runners who tried to steal second, and in the World Series he gunned down 7 of 14 Tiger runners, holding base stealing champion Ty Cobb to no stolen bases... His contemporaries, team mates and opponents alike, marveled at his ability to defend, handle pitchers, and take part in the psychological warfare which was baseball in the early twentieth century. Johnny Evers claimed Kling could tell pitchers what their best stuff was during warm-ups. He kept up a steady string of chatter earning him the nickname 'Noisy.' Evers praised Kling for his ability to work umpires on balls and strikes, yet Kling avoided antagonizing the men in blue, even warning them if an unusual play or pitch was coming." (Anderson and Bogen n.d.)

Kling, by Bill James' analysis, ranked as a top-10 defensive catcher all-time with Bench, Carter, and Dickey on the same list (2009 Bill James Gold Mine).

'Wildfire' Schulte, who played for the Cubs for 13 seasons, benefited from the new and 'improved' baseball, hitting 21 home runs in 1911. 'The Human Mosquito' Slagle hung them up after 1908, garnering two World Series triumphs. Jimmy Sheckard came to the Cubs in 1906 and played outfield for the Cubs until 1913. As a speedster with a good eye, Sheckard played with John McGraw in 1899, taking that grit directly to the Cubs. The trio of Tinker to Evers to Chance, overrated defensively, but a constant timepiece in Chicago, was the infield sans Harry Steinfeldt, a disgruntled Queen City utility player.

Harry Steinfeldt became the footnote (Simon 2004) to the history of the Tinker-Evers-Chance poem, but in terms of play, one could argue his presence more than filled out a talented squad. In 1906, hitting .327 for the Cubs and leading the league at 3<sup>rd</sup> base

with a .954 fielding average (very respectable even in the modern game). Steinfeldt improved upon an already solid team when he was traded to the Cubs in March 1906 for Hans Lobert and Jake Weimer.

Frank Chance, a player-manager by twenty-seven, attended college in Irvington, California with hopes of becoming a doctor. He got a yen to tryout for the Cubs in 1898 – made it without minor league honing – and spent the early part of his career as a catcher. This is good training for managerial success: made him the only Cubs manager to win a world series. (Take note Chicago.)

**Chance's backup catcher (1906-1909):** Pat Moran won two pennants as a manager for the Phillies (with pitcher Grover Cleveland Alexander) and the Reds. His 1919 Cincinnati Reds won the most controversial World Series in baseball history. After a good showing again in 1923 (91-63), Moran died a month before the 1924 season in Orlando, Florida.

**Luck:** The 1908 Season saw the 'Controversy of the Century', as Merkle's Boner, eventually clinched the Cubs pennant a fortnight after the fabled play. Fred Merkle was but a 19-year-old first sacker born in Watertown, Wisconsin who had the misfortune of youthful exuberance. He absently forgot to touch second base after a winning hit to center by Al Bridwell in the last of ninth. But the Giants, in the midst of a raucous celebration over their nemesis, were foiled by the Cubs Johnny Evers, who was known to read up on baseball rules – and getting to the ump, Hank O'Day – resulting in the force out at second. This nullified the winning run of Mike McCormick. (Even though Merkle swore he undoubtedly touched second; as the chaotic situation transpired, the ball was touched by both Giants and Cubs after the hit.)

Since Teddy Roosevelt's departure from the White House in 1909, the Cubs' luck soured; and has decidedly flowed the other direction. (The Cubs last World Series attendance was just six months after FDR inhabited the White House in 1945. What the Cubs need is *another Roosevelt* in the Oval Office.)

Philadelphia A's (1910–1914): \$100,000 Infield and The Elephant Men



**‘Colby’ Jack Coombs:** In 1910, he pitched 3 complete game wins in ending the Cubs dynasty and beginning the A’s run of 4 World Series appearances. Later, he coached at Duke University for over twenty seasons, and wrote a baseball standard: *Baseball: Individual Play and Team Strategy* (1938) which was republished several times. (Photo: Bain Collection, Library of Congress.)

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>				<b>Offensive Differential</b>		
<b>Year</b>	<b>Team</b>	<b>Record</b>	<b>Predict</b>	<b>Runs</b>	<b>Op. Runs</b>	<b>HR</b>
1910	Philadelphia Athletics	102-48	108.4	673	441	19
1911	Philadelphia Athletics	101-50	102.2	861	601	35
1912	Philadelphia Athletics	90-62	89.3	779	658	22
1913	Philadelphia Athletics	96-57	98.3	794	592	33
1914	Philadelphia Athletics	99-53	105.4	749	529	29
<b>Pitching</b>		<b>Defense</b>				
<b>Year</b>	<b>ERA</b>	<b>SHO</b>	<b>SV</b>	<b>HRA</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>E</b>
1910	1.79	24	5	8	117	230
1911	3.01	13	13	17	100	228
1912	3.32	11	9	12	115	263
1913	3.19	17	22	24	108	212
1914	2.78	24	17	18	116	213

Jack Coombs, Eddie Plank, and Chief Bender made the trains run for Mack’s juggernaut. Connie Mack knew and molded talent and obtained more than his fair share of it in a 50-year managerial career. Coombs won 31 games in 1910, going a stretch of 46 innings without allowing a run. Bender, Plank, and Cy Morgan added 23, 16, and 18 wins. The AL pennant race of 1910 was over by July’s end.

The 1910 World Series was the unraveling of the Chicago dynasty. No better example came when the Peerless Leader Frank Chance was thrown out of a World Series game, the first ever occurrence (Menho 2006, 37). Only one of the games played in mid-October classic against the Cubs was close, their only win against the Mack attack that scored 35 times against the Cubs 15 tallies. Cornelius Alexander McGillicuddy won his first world series; and formed his first dynasty.

**Catcher:** 1880's catcher Connie Mack made catcher Wally Schang apart of two dynasties (1913-1914 A's) and the beginnings of a third. Catching for the Boston Red Sox in 1918 and Yankees in early 1920s, Schang never stayed long at any particular place, but he made contributions wherever he found work. Mack, before Schang, had two weak hitters in Jack Lapp and Ira Thomas that platooned behind the plate in a lefty/righty hitting setup.

### The \$100,000 Infield

Like their dynasty mates, the Cubs, the A's relied on their infield. Only the A's version legitimately was the better collection of talent in that they won more championships, and also put together great individual numbers.

The '\$100,000 infield' provided the juice for the 1911 A's. 1B Stuffy McInnis, 2B Eddie Collins, SS Jack Barry and 3B Franklin 'Home Run' Baker were integral parts of offense: Collins hit .365, Baker had 11 HRs and 115 RBIs, McInnis hit .321, and Barry chipped in 30 steals.

<b>Dynasties (WAR)</b>	<b>1B</b>	<b>2B</b>	<b>3B</b>	<b>SS</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>A's</b>	17.1	<b>43.7</b>	<b>36</b>	20.3	<b>18.9</b>	<b>136</b>
<b>Cubs</b>	<b>20.3</b>	22.4	19.5	<b>23.2</b>	15.1	100.5

**The Power Hitter:** Frank Baker first represented the feared dinger in the 1911 World Series against the McGraw-Mathewson-Marquard led Giants. In games two and three, Baker took Marquard yard to win game two; and then pounded one off mound legend Christy Mathewson in game three, sending a then 1-0 game to extra innings, won by the A's. Those two shots brought just a taste of the future to light, in Ruth, who was three years from making his Boston debut. Baker pounded out a .308 BA with a .442 slugging percentage during the Taft era which was not an easy task. He was the best overall hot corner man – topping Heinie Groh and Zimmerman and Jimmy Austin in overall performance.



**The Legend:** 2B Eddie Collins is nearly the best in baseball history at the keystone. Only Roger Hornsby, Joe Morgan, and Nap Lajoie consistently rate ahead of Collins in the minds of ball scholars. Collins was a .333 hitter before and after the 'live ball' era. He stole 743 bases. Amassed over 3,300 hits and sparkled in the field with a high fielding average, and good range. He led the league in scoring from 1912 –1914 during the midst of the dynasty.

**Consistency:** 1B Stuffy McInnis was comparable to any in the league. He hit .308 with little power in the *Taft Era*, but fielded better than Hal Chase, or George Sisler, contemporaries that got plenty more ink. While not as gifted as George Sisler with the bat, for the A's, Stuffy fit the bill to Mack's liking. Chance was a bit better on the field when he wanted, off: a corrupt individual.

**The Career Year:** Jack Barry was consistent in the Taft era. His best season linked with peak age (26–27), garnering 85 RBIs in 1913 and hitting .275 in 1914, the last great season of his and the A's run. Good speed, but lacking some range for shortstop, he was a player-manager for the 1917 Boston Red Sox in which Babe Ruth won 24 games with a 2.01 ERA.

### Shoeless Joe Jackson in the Outfield

OF Shoeless Joe Jackson entered the Mack fold in 1908 – but Mack and Jackson crossed purposes: Jackson was newly married, homesick, did not fit the A's bunch or "Rube Waddell" syndrome (Macht 2007, 415). He left the A's via trade on July 25, 1910 for OF Bris 'The Human Eyeball' Lord of Cleveland. Lord put up his best season as a Mack man – hitting .310, slugging .429 in the pre-live ball era in 574 at bats in 1911– but too was gone by 1913, his last season as a major leaguer. For a second time, Cleveland benefited to the tune of a HOF caliber player in Jackson. Jackson did not fit into the A's team – more due to Jackson's youth and raw thinking and ability than Mack's ignorance of talent.

### Elephant in the Room

Even as things were going good, Mack dismantled his dynasty in large part due to competition not seen since the American league was assembled. The Federal League increased contracts to the benefit of players, but its existence (for two seasons) undermined the stability of the professional leagues. Mack, even with a new stadium less than a decade old, tore apart this aging team that was revamped, pitching wise, by 1914.

- Jack Barry dropped on the Red Sox for \$8,000.
- Frank Baker sold to the Yankees for \$37,500.
- Eddie Collins bought by the White Sox for \$50,000.

In 1915, the A's run with Plank, Bender, and Coombs reached the end of the line. Plank (old), Bender (fragile), Coombs (irrelevant in his prior two seasons) left for the Feds. Pitchers Joe Bush, Herb Pennock, and Bob Shawkey were seen as the future, if only for a brief moment, while the A's posted a 43 -109 disastrous-for-anyone record.

Quickly to cash in there, Mack packed Bush and Pennock off to the Red Sox in time to assist in forming their dynasty. Bob Shawkey went to the Yankees for \$18,000 in 1915; soon enough won twenty games for manager Miller Huggins. The A's took a failing grade for the next 11 seasons. **The 1916 A's:** 36 -117 while leading the league with 94 complete games! (July 1916: 2-27 record for the month.)

Now that's patience with pathetic performance.

Boston Red Sox (1912-1918): Who *Knew* it would be another *86 Seasons*?



**Dutch Leonard & Bill Carrigan:** A battery during Boston's heyday in the '10s

Overlap in dynasties is not unusual. One team's demise is another's opportunity to rise. The A's, a dwindling force, gave parts of their store to the Boston Red Sox. The Red Sox grocery list finalized with the addition of a young, incorrigible pitcher: George Herman 'Babe' Ruth.

After winning the inaugural World Series clash in 1903, Bostonians had little to cheer about over the next nine seasons, except when Cy Denton Young took the bump in 1908. They did have a few names present by 1910 that played key roles in the next four championships: Pitcher Smokey Joe Wood, CF Tris Speaker, RF Harry Hooper, 1B Jake Stahl, Catcher Bill Carrigan, LF Duffy Lewis and SS Heinie Wagner (Honus's brother by another mother, lacked offense). But they spun their wheels while Detroit and

Philadelphia were both atop the league during the space between their championships.

In 1912, under player-manager Jake Stahl, they ran away with the title over the second place Washington Senators by 14 games. The short story: Smokey Joe Wood's 34 - 5 record with 1.91 ERA, Tris Speaker's .383 BA, .567 SLG, 53 league-leading doubles, and 10 big flies, also the league best. Duffy Lewis and 3B Larry Gardner combined for 195 RBIs. And two starting pitchers, Buck O'Brien and Hugh Bedient, posted their career years, garnering 20 wins and respectable ERAs.

Facing off against the Giants, weird doings took over. Wood got 3 wins with a ballooned Taft ERA of 3.68, while Christy Mathewson took the collar; and lost two decisions, getting a no-decision due to darkness; in concert with an uncharacteristic five errors leading to four unearned runs, costing, essentially, the Giants the series.

Instead of picking up where the game left off after 11 innings in game two, the Sox and Giants played an eighth game as weird as the second. It took extra innings, Fred Merkle's initial heroics, and a dropped fly ball by Fred Snodgrass that culminated in another Merkle foul play. The Giants murdered the Boston Commons on the series stat line: 31–25 runs and 1.83 ERA to 2.92 ERA. Both sides made plenty of errors – 31 all total – just the Giants had the greater misfortunes; and Boston exploited them to a Giant's death.

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>				Offensive Differential		
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1912	Boston Red Sox	105-47	105.2	799	544	29
1913	Boston Red Sox	79-71	78.1	631	610	17
1914	Boston Red Sox	91-62	90.9	589	510	18
1915	Boston Red Sox	101-50	99.6	669	499	14
1916	Boston Red Sox	91-63	88.6	550	480	14
1917	Boston Red Sox	90-62	94.1	555	454	14
1918	Boston Red Sox	75-51	76.7	474	380	15
Pitching				Defense		
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1912	2.76	18	6	18	88	266
1913	2.94	12	10	6	84	238
1914	2.36	24	8	18	99	242
1915	2.39	19	15	18	95	226
1916	2.48	24	16	10	108	183
1917	2.20	15	7	12	116	183
1918	2.31	26	2	9	89	152

**Fifteen for 1915:** It's very rare to have five, fifteen game winners on one staff. Boston did it in 1915. Babe Ruth, Joe Wood, Dutch Leonard, Ed Shore, and Rube Foster. Boston's patience wore thin with manager Jake Stahl as Carrigan took over by the mid-1913 season. Carrigan proved acceptable as Boston won back-to-back championships under his guidance. The 1916 Bo Sox nearly equal the feat of the mound: coming up one win short as Foster went 14-7. Ruth led the staff that season with a 1.75 ERA in 1916.

### Musical Managers

In seven years, using four managers typically means a terrible team. Losing your best offensive player, Speaker in 1916, and equally the best centerfielder (Cobb – with little statistical difference), will typically ruin chances to go back to the series. Not with Boston.

<u>WAR by Year</u>	<u>1912</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>Total</u>
Ty Cobb	9.2	7.3	5.6	9.5	8.0	11.4	6.6	57.6
Tris Speaker*	10.1	8.3	10.0	7.1	<b>8.6</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>5.6</b>	57.4

The 1915 and 1916 Red Sox got by on mean pitching: leading in shutouts and runs allowed in 1916 along with stellar defense to dominate their opponents. In the World Series, they outdid the likes of Grover Cleveland Alexander, Rube Marquard, Eppa Rixey, and Edward Joseph "Jeff" Pfeffer from the Phillies and Robins (Dodgers). Boston likely benefited from the Federal League's existence as the Phillies and Dodgers made these rare appearances in the post-season; as together they had one more appearance until World War II began.

Manager Carrigan, done playing in the majors, left, and wasn't to manage again in Boston until the word "defeat" was synonymous with the franchise. A's castoff Jack Berry took over in 1917 with a respectable 90-win season in his only campaign, but forced entry into WWI and a change of ownership from Joseph Lannin to theatre/musical man Harry Frazee meant Berry's audition was rejected by the theatre man. (**See:** Franchises.)

Next skipper was a man that converted a potentially successful 250-game winning pitcher to a 700-home run legend: Edward Grant Barrow.

### Ed Barrow (1868 – 1953)

Born a year before professional games began in 1869 in Springfield, Illinois, Barrow utilized a wide array of life experiences to become a crackerjack, opportunistic general manager of everything from hotels to ballparks to a league commissioner. In his early teens, he worked as a roller rink superintendent; landed a newspaper circulation management gig; while developing into a noted pitcher. But in 1886, Barrow came up lame at eighteen with a sore arm. Not to be discouraged, he took his love of baseball back to the paper as a promoter, organizer, and editorial contributor for the Des Moines City League in 1889.

Whatever struck his fancy, held hopes of cash, and was interesting, Barrow did. He tried soap selling; sold hot air balloon jumps; plied a living as an assistant hotel manager in Pittsburgh, rubbing shoulders with Harry “Scorecard” Stevens, and nearly banged fists with top boxer “Gentleman Jim” Corbett. Barrow befriends Connie Mack and worked as a business manager, and signed Zane Grey, author, to play the sport.

Nearing his thirties, Barrow takes over a franchise in Paterson, New Jersey with the timely assistance of soon-to-be Vice-President Garret A. Hobart, who preceded President William McKinley in death in 1899. Hobart efforts to build Olympic Park for Barrow’s franchise – a favorite of ownerships.

Not settling for too long, Barrow moves up to Atlantic League president which gives him opportunities to exploit Corbett’s fame, and attempts night games. He “discovers” Honus Wagner – and tells everyone about it. But Barrow is never very happy; and never afraid to use his fists to express displeasure, or dominance (he once knocked out sportswriter Bill Slocum circa 1930, at age 62), resulting in forced wanderlust and failures as much as the modest successes during this chapter of Barrow’s life.

Baseball stayed always close. He jumped around to the American Association, joined the American League under Ban Johnson, and gained a commissionership of the Eastern League, while dispersing time in the buying in and out of various enterprises, mostly in entertainment field.

But problems for Barrow resulted from large groups of people he had to convince to do something. He could not usually convince as his skills worked better on individuals – veiled threats and mild intimidation as his crude tools – and so, he often fell out with the bullheaded people that populated his usual arenas of operation. As Daniel Levitt reflects, “Barrow saw the world in black and white and was not a man who liked to ask

for favors. (Ed Barrow: *The Bulldog Who Built the Yankees' First Dynasty* 2008, 94)" Obviously smart, but rough around the edges in social circles, Barrow is close, but needs a break.

The break arrived. When Barrow came to the Red Sox in 1918, he was not taking over a team devoid of talent, nor was he a push over to work for as Harry Frazee once called him, "Simon Legree (Levitt, 123)." While the first World War shortened the season significantly (resulting in the only September Classic), the Bostonians had Ruth, Dutch Leonard, Stuffy McInnis (recently acquired) plus Carl Mays, Joe Bush, and Sad Sam Jones stepping in to fill the pitching shoes of Joe Wood, Ed Shore, and Rube Foster. They racked up 26 shutouts; but barely won the league as Cleveland and Washington both had quality teams.

1918 World Series saw Ruth and Mays as the mound heroes, with neither side scoring much in six contests. (Boston: 9 runs, Chicago: 10 Runs.) Neither side went yard. Four of the six games were complete games by both pitchers. After a 3-0 lead, Boston allowed Chicago back in at 3-2, only to see the Cubs give away game six on a two-run error that got the Red Sox a title with Carl Mays going the distance.

But the dynasty ended exactly two months before the November 11<sup>th</sup> armistice in Paris. As the team faltered in 1919, Frazee got itchy to sell his assets – and did – and Barrow went on to bigger and better deals in Ruth's newly built house during the next twenty-five years.

#### New York Giants (1921-1924): McGraw 's Dynasty, A Broadway Hit

**McGraw on Merkle:** Many a manager has had a player cost them through a play. However, McGraw, as tough as he was, had supreme confidence and realized how to handle Merkle. "I wish I had more players like you. Don't pay any attention to those weathercocks. They'll be cheering you the next time you make a good play (Strecker 2004)."

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>				Offensive Differential		
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1921	New York Giants	94-59	97.1	840	637	75
1922	New York Giants	93-61	97.7	852	658	80
1923	New York Giants	95-58	93.7	854	679	85
1924	New York Giants	93-60	98.8	857	641	95
Pitching				Defense		
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1921	3.55	9	18	79	155	187
1922	3.45	7	15	71	145	194
1923	3.90	10	18	82	141	176
1924	3.62	4	21	77	160	186

With thirty years of playing and managing behind him, McGraw long since cemented his legacy as arguably the National League's best manager in the first half-century of its existence. After winning the 1905 World Series, with Christy Mathewson slinging his fadeaway past befuddled batters, McGraw lost four World Series, running into the Philadelphia A's and Boston Red Sox: the prior two dynasties. His teams were consistently well above .500 – even in non-pennant years – and while fiery, controlling, and prone to rub people either one way or another, McGraw enjoyable ensconced himself in New York social life. Quietly charitable, and a stalwart friend to Mathewson off the field too, McGraw just needed the dynasty all managerial legends must achieve to be labeled as masters on the field of battle.

In looking at his childhood and early adult life, one can imagine how he became such a force. Born to poor railroad worker and farmhand in April 1873, John Joseph McGraw Jr. lost his mother and four siblings to diphtheria in 1884-1885. His father was of little help, abusing his son over the one thing he had as a distraction from tragedy: a true addiction to the nascent sport of baseball (Koppett, *The Man in the Dugout: Baseball's Top Managers and How They Got That Way* 1993, 30).

By time John Jr. reached sixteen, the addiction moved him on from a short-term job as a candy butcher (like an airline steward for the railroad) to making money as a raw, but talented pitcher in southwestern New York. Soon, his skills were found lacking on the mound, and he moved to 3<sup>rd</sup> base, where he struggled throwing, but made it his home

on the Baltimore Orioles 1890s teams. He persevered, and worked at his craft; and expected the same from others.

McGraw too was a man of many facets; his on-the-field tactics left him in lesser men's eyes a rogue, a villain. His off-the-field dealings portended loyalty to allies, and icy contempt for enemies. He agitated the opposition; guided tirelessly his team, drilling them in the basics – allowing no insubordination to his rule. His memory was long; but magnanimity was indeed possible (Koppett, 31-32).

Even McGraw evolved into an all-star level player under Ned Hanlon, McGraw wanted more. He went back to school at what became St. Bonaventure University while coaching their baseball team until the National League season commenced. He married, only to see tragedy strike again, losing his wife, Minnie, to a ruptured appendix in 1899. (He remarried happily to Blanche in 1902.)

**1898 & 1899:** John McGraw led the league the walks (112 & 124); runs (143 & 140); in 1899, McGraw led in OBP at a Bonds/Williams like rate of .547, hitting .391. He struck out 21 times that season. He hit exactly 1 home run in 914 at-bats. His WAR (at baseball reference) was 7.1 and 8.0 for both seasons.

**McGraw's Strategy** (Modified from *The Man in the Dugout*, Koppett):

1. Tactics on the field could come along further – a scientific approach a la Frederick W. Taylor. (Taylor published *Scientific Management* in 1911, the initial treatise on Industrial Engineering.)
2. Personal discipline and physical fitness were means to season long superiority.
3. Managerial decisions on everything were not to be ignored; or flagrantly flaunted.
4. Aggression is a necessary asset to perform.
5. Speed kills. If you can't run, you better think quicker than the rest.
6. Every man has his role. Define it for him in the context of his overall ability.
7. This is a war. Play only to win.

While he installed all of these ideas, with absolutism that led to his moniker, "Little Napoleon", McGraw had not produced quite the results he sought. From 1918-1920, the Giants finished second in the standings. The Yankees, sharing the digs of the rebuilt Polo Grounds since the dual Colonels had taken over the franchise, were getting Ruth from the cooling ashes of the Boston dynasty. The New York battleground now involved two legends fighting it out in October: one was pulling the strings; and the other, prone to string out contract talks. Both got what they wanted: as McGraw achieved a dynasty; while Ruth launched the new era of New York Yankee domination that lasted longer than McGraw's entire managerial career. The brashest player did beat Napoleon.



McGraw's main ingredients during the run:

**Young, talented, and abrasive:** HOF 2B Frankie Frisch came from Fordham University a 21-year-old with good versatility and superior wheels as he started at third, second, and shortstop from 1921-24. Batting .341 in his first full campaign in 1921, Frisch swiped a league best 49 bases, scored 121 times, and knocked in 100 runs. In the 1921 World Series he scored a team best 5 runs and stole 3 bases in the best of nine games won 5-3 by the Giants. Embodying many of the best characteristics of McGraw (and also his flaws), and thus, conflict ensued between them. (This resulted in the famous trade to St. Louis for Roger Hornsby, another hardheaded player. Who was in constant conflict with his my-way-or-the-highway boss, Branch Rickey.)

A few quotes by *New York Times* writer Joseph Durso on Frankie Frisch:

“He was a remarkable study in contrasts, a hellcat in a baseball suit but a devotee of classical music and gardening at his home in New Rochelle, New York.” Frisch was not averse to confrontation with umpires and fines with love notes sent to the commissioner: “Dear Ford [Frick]: Here is my check for \$25 to pay for the fine. Please use it for a good cause – like buying your umpires new caps. They now look like Civil War veterans.” Frisch later bemoaned the lack of authoritarian managers, fights, profane language, and fun while calling 1954 an “era of love and kisses, of sciences and psychology (Vecchione 1991, 59-61).” Like many before, *The Fordham Flash* yearned for good ole days and missed the ways of the manager he abhorred often in McGraw.

**Career years:** HOF first sacker George “High Pockets” Kelly was a free swinger (for the Coolidge era). He came into his own at age 26 in 1921, smacking a league best 23 dingers (compared to Ruth's 59) with 122 RBIs while carrying a .308 average. Kelly followed up this campaign with another sparkler in 1922: .328 BA, 107 RBI, 17 home runs and 12 steals. His offensive numbers though were by no means extraordinary for 1<sup>st</sup> baseman (WAR at 3-4.5); but his fielding though, was superb – as only his future replacement Bill Terry matched his Kelly's total chances per game during the era. (11.00 total chances per game and plenty of assists. In 1925, Kelly finished 9<sup>th</sup> in all of baseball in defensive WAR at 1B (.9). 1B is not usually a top defensive position.)

**Superior glove and offense:** SS Dave Bancroft brought a mean glove to New York from Philly, as he had his best offensive seasons under McGraw as the juice ball took off from Bancroft's bat. He hit career bests in doubles (41) and triples (15) in the 1921-1922 while batting around .320. (His career average was .279.) In both championship

seasons, he scored over 115 runs and never came close to this offensive explosion again. Meanwhile, he was the best shortstop (likely) with a 6.20 total chances per game during the Coolidge Era. (Aside from Bancroft, only Dick Bartell topped 6 chances per game.)

**The Irish Pot of Gold:** Traded one year after Bancroft, LF Irish Meusel played on the opposite side of town from his left field brother Bob for six seasons under McGraw. Their overall numbers during Coolidge are nearly identical with brother Bob blessed with more power, and Irish, the better contact hitter. Irish had his best seasons under McGraw reaching his peak at 28 years old in 1921. In 1922, Irish pounded out 204 hits, 132 RBIs, with 100 runs scored and a .331 BA. Both born in California, they would spend their golden years in California, both passing away while still residents of the Golden State.

**Table.** A Tale of Two Brothers in New York (1922-1935)

Left Fielder	Batting Avg.	Slugging %	OBP	TC/Game
Bob Meusel	.306	.486	.355	2.07
Irish Meusel	.310	.476	.350	2.04



**Casey with a platoon bat:** Born to gab, CF Casey Stengel garnered his best season under the guidance of McGraw. In 1922, playing in exactly 77 games and getting 250 at bats, Stengel hit .368 with a .564 slugging percentage with 48 runs and 48 RBIs coming back to New York’s orbit after being banished to Philadelphia. McGraw’s platoon strategy with Stengel later influenced Stengel a fair amount. Casey stayed long enough to get a championship, a meeting with British royalty, King George V, and lived to see another George take over the reins of his former New York dynasty by the 1970s. (**Above:** Casey Stengel in his early days in Brooklyn. Courtesy of the Library of Congress – The Bain Collection.)

NY Giants 1921-1924 Pitching											
Pitcher	Throws	Games	CG	Wins	Losses	SV	SO	BB	K/BB	ERA	IP
Rosy Ryan	R	164	26	<b>48</b>	33	<b>15</b>	227	189	1.20	3.55	636.33
Art Nehf	L	142	56	<b>66</b>	37	6	249	210	1.19	3.71	<b>896.67</b>
Claude Jonnard	R	<b>113</b>	<b>2</b>	14	9	16	136	87	<b>1.56</b>	<b>3.15</b>	285.67
Jesse Barnes	R	91	30	31	18	7	120	95	1.26	3.49	507.33
Hugh McQuillan	R	80	34	35	27	4	148	143	1.03	3.22	508.00
Virgil Barnes	R	79	16	19	13	6	81	87	0.93	3.26	334.00
Phil Douglas	R	64	22	26	14	2	88	90	0.98	3.56	379.33
Jack Bentley	L	59	25	29	13	4	140	123	1.14	4.12	371.00
Jack Scott	R	57	14	24	9	3	116	88	1.32	4.02	299.67
Fred Toney	R	55	22	23	17	3	73	96	0.76	3.75	335.67
Mule Watson	R	39	14	15	9	0	44	45	0.98	3.59	208.00
Slim Sallee	L	37	0	6	4	2	23	14	<b>1.64</b>	3.64	96.33
Red Causey	R	31	1	5	4	1	14	40	0.35	3.06	85.33
Wayland Dean	R	26	6	6	12	0	39	45	0.87	5.01	125.67

McGraw workhorse off the bump during the dynasty was lefty Art Nehf, throwing more than 250 innings more than McGraw’s next best. (Nehf triggered plenty of ground balls as Bancroft and Kelly’s opportunities increased accordingly.) Meanwhile, McGraw employed Claude Jonnard as his workhorse out of the pen – for the time – getting good mileage and saves out of the quality mop-up reliever who was unique and rare for the time frame.

**Platoon Catchers with Pop:** Frank “Pancho” Snyder and Earl “Oil” Smith rounded out the battery for the Giants showing plenty of pop and giving the Giants an advantage in getting offense from a primarily defensive position. While others in the era got by with .270 hitters with gloves, McGraw found two pieces of coal and burnished them to a diamond luster.

<b>Catchers</b>	<b>Hits</b>	<b>AB</b>	<b>Runs</b>	<b>2B</b>	<b>HR</b>	<b>RBI</b>	<b>BA</b>	<b>OBP</b>	<b>SLG</b>
1921	176	538	71	21	18	96	0.327	0.389	0.507
1922	174	552	63	32	14	90	0.315	0.382	0.482

By comparison, HOF Bill Dickey (.316) and HOF Mickey Cochrane (.321) matched these batting averages with comparable on-base and slugging averages in their later dynastic runs. Spud Davis and Gabby Hartnett were offensively comparable backstops to the Snyder/Smith combo at this time.

For McGraw, he platooned the 'lucky forces' aligned with his dogmas: strong offense up the middle with good fielding and strict adherence to his mindset. Sadly, after the 1924 World Series loss, the last great McGraw's maneuver was to outshine Lou Gehrig by retiring from management on the same day (June 3, 1932) that the Iron Horse smacked four home runs. Lou just saw another shadow of a legend swallow up his greatness.

## New York Yankees (1926-1932): Lethal Dynasty I: A Murderer's Row

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>				Offensive Differential		
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1926	New York Yankees	91-63	90.7	847	713	121
1927	New York Yankees	110-44	112.5	975	599	158
1928	New York Yankees	101-53	97.0	894	685	133
1929	New York Yankees	88-66	88.3	899	775	142
1930	New York Yankees	86-68	89.8	1062	898	152
1931	New York Yankees	94-59	102.8	1067	760	155
1932	New York Yankees	107-47	102.5	1002	724	160
Pitching				Defense		
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1926	3.86	4	20	56	117	209
1927	3.2	11	20	42	123	196
1928	3.74	13	21	59	136	199
1929	4.19	12	18	83	152	179
1930	4.88	7	15	93	132	208
1931	4.2	4	17	67	131	167
1932	3.98	11	15	93	124	190

**The 1927 Yankees.** Enough said. They are the benchmark for power and awe on the field. Ruth and Gehrig, along with their cohorts, mashed past everyone in scoring 975 runs to 599 tallies for their opponents. For over seventy-five years, they held the MLB slugging record (.489) but are rarely remembered for (the unheard of today) 103 triples while leading the league with 158 home runs, nearly *three times* as many as their next closest rival. (The A's.)

They won 110 times! – joining a select group to ever amass that many victories.


In terms of the various measures laid out at the beginning of this section these '27 Yankees nearly meet all the criteria for a perfect team:

**Ace pitcher(s):** Righty Waite Hoyt led the league in ERA at 2.63 going 22-7. Urban Shocker was close behind at 2.74 with an 18-6 record. Wilcy Moore posted a better ERA at 2.28 while winning 19 games and closing out 26 games with either a win or a save. (13 apiece.)

**Premier Power hitter(s):** Gehrig amassed 175 RBIs, going yard 47 times, and Ruth set his career mark in dingers at 60 with 164 RBIs. Tony Lazzeri and Bob Meusel each “chipped” in over 100 RBIs.

**Consistent personnel:** Ruth, Gehrig, Lazzeri, Meusel, Mark Koenig, Joe Dugan and Earle Combs all came back for the 1928 season domination. Pitching wise, Waite Hoyt, Herb Pennock, and George Pipgras were the arms employed by Miller Huggins to a “lightening crashes on them” effect.

**Bullpen ace:** Wilcy Moore pitched in 50 games, figuring in 39 decisions in his best season.



(**Above:** Earle B. Combs in 1922. He got on nearly 300 times in front of arguably the most lethal duo of boppers in baseball history. *Wikipedia Commons – Earle Combs Bio.*)

**Career years:** To say Babe Ruth had a career year is not totally inaccurate. As he actually did more damage in 1921 and 1923, statistically speaking. From 1918-1934, Ruth posted WAR above 5.0 each season, aside from 1925 when he played only 98 games.

CF Earle Combs smacked a league-leading 231 hits (and 23 triples), and walked 62 times leading off in front of the bashing duet of The Iron Horse and The Sultan of Swat. He scored 137 runs, third in the league to, you guess it: his terrorizing teammates.

LF Bob Meusel hit a career best .337, batting 5th while swiping 24 bases. (When did he get time to run?)

## Most Stolen Bases from the 5<sup>th</sup> Hole (1916-2013)

Rk	Player	Year	SB	GS	PA	AB	CS	BB	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	TB
1	<a href="#">Ben Chapman</a>	1931	56	130	599	523	22	66	0.319	0.400	0.499	0.899	261
2	<a href="#">Barry Bonds</a>	1990	47	132	554	464	13	81	0.310	0.412	0.580	0.991	269
3	<a href="#">Barry Bonds</a>	1991	43	143	609	491	13	101	0.297	0.412	0.517	0.929	254
4	<a href="#">Enos Cabell</a>	1979	37	152	624	597	18	21	0.271	0.299	0.367	0.666	219
5	<a href="#">Andy Van Slyke</a>	1985	28	90	373	329	4	41	0.274	0.357	0.477	0.834	157
6	<a href="#">Kiki Cuyler</a>	1929	27	78	347	303	0	34	0.363	0.432	0.531	0.964	161
7	<a href="#">Ben Chapman</a>	1933	27	146	650	562	18	74	0.311	0.395	0.438	0.833	246
8	<a href="#">Raul Mondesi</a>	1997	26	109	459	425	12	31	0.332	0.377	0.584	0.960	248
9	<a href="#">Happy Felsch</a>	1917	26	141	586	532		32	0.308	0.353	0.398	0.752	212
10	<a href="#">Gee Walker</a>	1932	25	94	403	384	4	11	0.315	0.339	0.440	0.779	169
11	<a href="#">Jose Cruz</a>	1983	24	122	512	455	14	55	0.312	0.386	0.466	0.851	212
12	<a href="#">Bob Meusel</a>	1927	24	130	578	513	10	43	0.337	0.391	0.511	0.901	262
13	<a href="#">Alfonso Soriano</a>	2005	24	123	534	497	2	27	0.270	0.315	0.523	0.838	260
14	<a href="#">Jose Cruz</a>	1976	23	82	348	310	7	36	0.313	0.383	0.406	0.790	126

1B Lou Gehrig hit a career best 52 doubles with 18 triples in amassing 107 extra-base hits for a career high .765 slugging percentage, which was second only to Ruth at .772 in 1927. (But League MVP.)

**General Manager:** Ed Barrow, made enough moves in 1926 off-season to secure the future of this first incarnation of a Yankee dynasty.

**Field Manager:** Miller Huggins kept the Babe in check enough to string two championships seasons together, securing his Hall of Fame induction in 1964. Just *thirty-five years* after his death.

**Bench/Luck:** The 1927 Pirates as World Series opponents and Connie Mack's batting of the young and country-strong Jimmie Foxx only 130 times that season.

**Lacking:** a top backstop. (Huggins platooned Pat Collins and Johnny Grabowski.)

**A New York Minute:** As quickly as these men of legend and lore rose to the top, they fell back to relative mediocrity. Their pitching staff changed over unsuccessfully; their on-field manager died; and the A's took center stage for a period of three years.

By 1931, Joe McCarthy fled from the Wrigley roost, taking up residence in the haunts of the Empire state, and made most fans forget about Huggins. McCarthy's first title in 1932 had Ruthian implications: it was last call for The Roarin' Twenties top sports icon.

Through all the tummy aches, gluttony, sexual conquests, stolen watches, and bridge playing with the understudy to his glory, Ruth forever changed the landscape of

dynastic baseball. Before Ruth, tactics on the base paths, positioning of fielders, bunting, and hit-and-runs were constantly stressed by the Irish management masters, McGraw and Mack. Ruth nullified those intricacies; as the 1927 Murderer’s Row put games out of reach with 3-run swats and multi-run rallies. With his silent-and-sturdy cohort, Gehrig, the Yankees harnessed five o’clock lighting and striking their perpetually outgunned opponents.

### St. Louis Cardinals (1926-1934): Rickey, Dean & The Gashouse Gang

Though it would seem difficult to qualify as a dynasty in this stretch, as New York and Philadelphia made equal claims to dynastic designs, the Cards won three titles (all in seven games) against Ruth in 1926, Foxx & Co. in 1931, and Detroit’s ‘Mechanical Man’ in 1934. This reign has legends and legacies that baseball fans should not forget.

Rickey got his first championship via the front office, and stayed there; Hornsby won a World Series title as manager – then gambled, and talked himself out of the gig; Dizzy Dean spun stories, threw gas, and spent a bill as freely as Rickey hoarded them. Pepper Martin shook up the record books in the fall. And Leo Durocher landed a home in his second dynasty of the era, making a friend of the penurious Rickey while also shaping his legacy as a snazzy dresser and leader of rough-n-tumble ballplayers on the diamond for over four decades. (With a fair amount of controversy tossed in for good measure.)

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>				Offensive Differential		
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1926	St. Louis Cardinals	89-65	92.4	817	678	90
1927	St. Louis Cardinals	92-61	86.1	754	665	84
1928	St. Louis Cardinals	95-59	95.0	807	636	113
1929	St. Louis Cardinals	78-74	79.4	831	806	100
1930	St. Louis Cardinals	92-62	95.7	1004	784	104
1931	St. Louis Cardinals	101-53	98.2	815	614	60
1932	St. Louis Cardinals	72-82	74.3	684	717	76
1933	St. Louis Cardinals	82-71	86.2	687	609	57
1934	St. Louis Cardinals	95-58	92.0	799	656	104
Pitching			Defense			
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1926	3.67	10	6	76	141	198
1927	3.57	14	11	72	170	213
1928	3.38	4	21	86	134	152
1929	4.66	6	8	101	149	174
1930	4.39	5	21	87	176	183
1931	3.45	17	20	65	169	160
1932	3.97	13	9	76	155	168
1933	3.37	11	16	55	119	160
1934	3.69	15	16	77	141	166



**Meet the HOF Pitching Staff:** During their dynastic run the pitching anchors were Jesse 'Pop' Haines (111 wins), 'Wild Bill' Hallahan (75), Flint 'Shad' Rhem (69), 'Dizzy' Dean (69), 'Wee Willie' Bill Sherdel (67), 'Old Pete' Alexander (55) and Burleigh 'Ol' Stubblebeard' Grimes (32). Altogether, the Cardinals had five HOF pitchers during these years. Clarence Arthur 'Dazzy' Vance pitched in 1933 & 1934 ineffectively, but was elected in 1955 for his Brooklyn exploits from the 1920s.

The Redbirds appeared as the National League entry for the World Series five times over the stretch, winning three classics, plenty to qualify as a dynasty.

**1926 World Series:** Rickey (via Cards' owner Breadon (Heidenry, *The Gashouse Gang: How Dizzy Dean Leo Durocher Branch Rickey Pepper Martin and Their Colorful Come-From-Behind Ball Club Won the World Series and America's Heart During the Great Depression* 2007, 38)) took a drunken, waiver-priced pitcher, Grover Cleveland 'Pete' Alexander, from Chicago in June, and turned him into a legendary story. Coming in on zero rest, after completing game six for the win, Pete struck out Tony Lazzeri with the bags Full of Bombers. (Many think Pete's been on the sauce – very recently – and yet, he closed out the Yanks. Ruth decided to steal a base in the ninth, getting thrown out by a wide margin.)

Grover's heroics cemented the Cardinals first ever championship. Roger Hornsby acquired his only title as a manager – and is gone before Christmas, his present for all his wonderful people skills.

**1928 World Series:** No such luck this time against the Bronx Bombers. Nine homers in a four-game sweep secured a third title for Miller Huggins.

**1930 World Series:** Philadelphia behind pitchers Lefty Grove and George Earnshaw are too much for the Gabby Street-managed Cards. Al Simmons smacked two home runs and bats .364 for the series. Jimmie Foxx assisted in game five with A's pitching shutting out the high-octane Cardinals offense. (Who scored 1,004 runs in the regular season.)

**1931 World Series:** Revenge came with Pepper Martin hitting .500, stealing five bases, and scoring five times in a seven-game rematch. Spitballer Burleigh Grimes and 'Wild Bill' Hallahan get two wins apiece in outdueling Grove, Earnshaw, and ex-Yankee Waite Hoyt.

**1934 World Series:** Soon to be called the *Gashouse Gang*, as brothers Dizzy and Paul Dean split four victories. 2B Frankie Frisch player-managed. 1B Ripper Collins and LF Joe Medwick each had eleven hits. 3B Martin again gets double-digit hits scoring eight times as violence broke out in game seven to Joe Medwick's removal for his own safety. Neither side fielded the ball well as 27 errors were seen in the series. Detroit gets a do over in 1935, taking down the Cubs four games to two, who are foiled once again.

### The Cast of Gashouse Characters

(Paraphrased from bios in *The Gashouse Gang*, Heidenry, 2007.)

Leading off, 3B Pepper Martin was likely a candidate for hyperactivity meds. He jumped from job to job, fishing out golf balls at city links, laying pipe, worked as a grunter at Oklahoma G & E, and did a stint as a football player. He raced midgets obsessively; caught rattlesnakes; and oh, smacked baseballs *pretty fair*. He was hand-to-mouth for long periods of his life before getting hitched to the Rickey star, landing his spot as the devil-may-care guy on the ball field.

Martin often cut loose his rocket arm – throwing bullets into the stands – and so, errors bedeviled this 'wild horse' of the base paths. He gave Frankie Frisch reason to question both, his own, and Martin's sanity. Also, like any good sparkplug, he kickstarted many a rally while maintaining a nearly insane momentum toward victory. He cameoed later on the 1940s Cardinals dynasty.

Two-hole hitter RF Jack Huston Rothrock was the quiet, unassuming, normal guy from Cali. A castoff from the Boston Red Sox after breaking his leg, he put in a yeoman's effort turning in his career season: 11 dingers with .284 BA and scoring 106 runs while playing in all the Cards games.

Leader of men, 2B Frankie Frisch took his mentor's lessons too much to heart, and ran into tactical friction with nearly every Cardinal. His keystone mate Durocher was thought the better tactician, if also, even more hated by his cohorts in crime. The Fordham Flash was 35; and it was his last season of over .300 hitting with full-time play. And he never managed another winner.

Cleanup hitter LF Joseph Michael 'Ducky' Medwick was not quite 23, and all ready, a star with attitude. He fought with the pitchers – the Dean brothers and James Ott 'Tex' Carleton – and got more than he bargained for in Tex. He started out a dual-sport phenom with hedged attentions to play at Notre Dame while playing ball in the minors

under an alias: Michael King. The king of college football, Knute Rockne, died in a plane crash, and so went Medwick's desire for Saturday triumphs. Muscular, obnoxious, and arrogant, and a lone wolf, the talented mister Medwick hit over .300 for 11 straight seasons at the beginning of his career. A doubles machine – leading the league three straight seasons (1936-38) – he bounced around the National league after 1940. (At a time when good players were a godsend.) He won the Triple Crown (leader in batting, RBIs, HRs) in 1937.

Medwick did get along with Frisch and Durocher, likely because of their Eastern origins and perceived class and authority, on a team filled with hillbilly-styled players with no use for rules, or perceived class. (Ducky stuck with what he knew at that early age.)

Fifth man, 1B James Anthony 'Ripper' Collins was a career year man as he first landing in the bigs at age 27 in 1931. In 1934, Ripper topped the National League with 35 jacks with a .615 slugging average. Yet, he was not so sure prior to the season of his place in Midwest. He had worked in the Pennsylvania coalmines prior to smashing his way on to the Gashouse Gang. Ripper wrote short bits for the day's newspapers, was a lover of culture in the Big Apple, and had a penchant for practical jokes. Rickey got his mileage out of Collins through 1936; then traded him for pitcher Lon Warneke.

Sixth and the backstops, Spud Davis and Bill Delancey combined for a pretty decent catcher: 22 dingers, 105 RBIs with a .300 average and 75 walks combined in 600 at bats. (Greater patience than any of the other Cardinal position players.) Davis was from Alabama with antebellum class, but liked Seminole Indian chants to get his hits. (**Had bat, will travel:** a .308 lifetime banger. Davis played until 41 years old and world war ended, always as part-time player.)

Bill Delancey's career consisted of 180 total games, all with the Cards. He again of the career season: .316 BA, 13 homers, .565 SLG. Another southerner, from tobacco country in North Carolina, he brought cussin' to an art form and more *drawl* to a team full of it, literally.

Seventh man, CF Ernie Orsatti on the club since 1927 – part-time always – but with a full time addiction to the finer things and Hollywood. He doubled for stars of silver screen; a fashion maven who shopped Sunset Boulevard; and a first-rate Italian chef on a team where country vittles usually worked. A singles bat, he ended his major league career in 1935. The dapper Italian was the best man for Leo the Lip's second marriage to Grace Dozier at a critical juncture of the 1934 season: September.

Eighth, Leo 'The Lip' Durocher. Billiards shark. Bench jockey. Some said a dirty player, others, smart, full of guile, the man with no qualms about tripping his own mother to win a game, Durocher got by on less-than-moralistic terms; and got ahead threw keen enough observations of what it took to win. As mediocre with a bat as he was a husband and father, he gave the Cardinals the on-the-field brains to win games. (Rickey likely channeled his sinful thoughts through Leo's actual deeds. Because for a guy that lived a teetotaler's life, refused to attend games on Sundays, Rickey sure did keep and acquire strange company a la *The Land of Misfit Toys*.)

### Philadelphia A's (1929-1931): The Real Philadelphia Story

Connie Mack's last hurrah as king of the mountain came through power and pitching. Al Simmons and Lefty Grove were enough star power on any typical World Series team. Jimmy Foxx, an assassin with a bat, and Mickey Cochrane, a master signal caller and offensive nightmare, made this a very lethal group. Lethal enough to silence the likes of Ruth and Gehrig in very good seasons had concurrently.

The overlap of these two great dynasties is by no accident. From 1926-1931, the Yankees and A's played to a 68-64 head-to-head record. Yankees scored more runs (751-658), but Philly ran off 10 straight from August 28, 1929 to May 21, 1930 in their best scoring season. Each team had plenty of star power; each possessed amazing offenses and superb pitching (for the Coolidge era); and racked up comparable records in their best seasons (1926-28 for the Yankees, 1929-31 for the A's.) What the Yankees did have over the A's was a media machine that lauded accolades even in the 'bad seasons.' Philly was not so lucky in that regard – but they did have the gentleman wizard Connie Mack, and the mean fireballer in Lefty Grove.

Grove was a sullen hard ass (Nack 1996) likely to pitch a shutout against any Murderer's Row you could dream up in history. He took much of it personally, blowing up visibly if a game went awry. Water coolers, bats, gloves, and chairs were handy weapons in his hands after a loss. As Jim Kaplin wrote:

“[H]e raged at the absent Simmons for a good 20 minutes. In what was probably an unprecedented display of postgame pique, Grove tried to tear off the clubhouse door, shredding the wooden partition between lockers, banged up the lockers, broke chairs and ripped off his shirt, buttons flying. ‘Threw everything I could get my hands on — bats, balls, shoes, gloves, benches, water buckets, whatever was handy,’ he told author Donald Honig. If Grove couldn't break one record, he might as well break another.” (Kaplan, Lefty Grove 2000)

Giving an inch was not in his makeup. Lefty was a more hostile version of Bob Gibson before Bob had even made it to the crib. The great 1927 Yankees fell to shutout just one time: Grove did it 1-0 on September 3<sup>rd</sup>.

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>				Offensive Differential		
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1929	Philadelphia Athletics	104-46	103.0	901	615	122
1930	Philadelphia Athletics	102-52	94.8	951	751	125
1931	Philadelphia Athletics	107-45	99.8	858	626	118
Pitching				Defense		
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1929	3.44	9	24	73	117	148
1930	4.28	8	21	84	121	145
1931	3.47	12	16	73	151	140

**The Lefty Ace:** Robert Grove statistics: 2.81 ERA led the AL in 1929, 2.54 ERA in 1930 with 28 Wins, 31 wins in 1931. In the ‘happy ball’ era, Grove was as close to domination as it got. (**Moderns:** Pedro Martinez; Greg Maddux.)

**Power tandem, Jimmy and Al:** 1B Jimmy Foxx was an old-fashioned country boy with penchant for showing off his farmer’s tan, and yet, a common decency unlike many other stars of any era. He was a right-handed Ruth, well known for enormous drives. In an at bat versus Yankee Lefty Gomez, he drove a ball to the back row of Yankee Stadium, splintering a seat. Later, when a much older Gomez saw astronauts pick up a white article on the moon in 1969, he responded to his wife: “There’s that ball Jimmy hit off me in New York (Nack 1996).”

Jimmy was race-blind; but never spoke out about what bothered him, choosing unfortunately to stay quiet. In another era, his virtues would be applauded and credited more than most sluggers’ hitting deeds. But playing for the A’s, and later, Boston, meant his brawn and lack of bombast was a bit overshadowed by Yankees’ sluggers. He struggled later in life, nearly broke, but never complained. Luckily, a few Bostonians saw fit to help him out.

Jimmy Foxx best dynasty stats: 37 HR, 156 RBI in 1930. *The Beast* had his best seasons after Connie Mack gave up title chases, 3 times the league MVP.

Aloysius Harry ‘Bucketfoot Al’ Simmons (nee Szymanski) racked up 36 dingers, a .381 BA and scored league leading 152 times in 1930. Next season: 22 homers and .390 batting.

From the moment he came into the league, Al terrorized pitching, going 11 straight seasons over .300, and pounding out year after year of 200-hit, 75-90 extra base hit seasons. He had nearly 3,000 hits in his career, yet then Hall of Fame voters put Al's entry into that illustrious club behind Paul Waner, Mel Ott, and teammate, Foxx who all played games way past their primes too.

**Quality backstop:** Mickey Cochrane was the best catcher in the American League with .330+ BA, great overall skills playing on this dynasty, then leading the 1935 Detroit Tigers to their first World Series championship. (New York's Bill Dickey was not a slouch either, but behind Cochrane in the dynasty years.)

**Table.** The Pitching Trio behind Grove

Pitchers	1929	1930	1931
Rube Walberg	18-11, 3.60	13-12, 4.69	20-12, 3.74
George Earnshaw	24-8, 3.29	22-13, 4.44	21-7, 3.67
<b>Jack Quinn</b> / <i>Roy Mahaffey</i>	<b>11-9, 3.97</b>	<b>9-7, 4.42</b>	<i>15-4, 4.21</i>

### The 'Deprived' Schoolmaster

Connie Mack was a shrewd talent scout and assembled together some lofty players during his eight decades in 'base ball.' He was old-school baseball because he designed and built the school from the dusty field on up to the modernizing ballpark to dynastic championships. But he was also a baseball man alone – not an industrialist or silver-spooned inheritance man – so baseball was his mainline source of income.

His second dynasty – a rare feat for a team aside from the Yankees – faltered due to decisions made during the worst economic time in America's history. (A debate waged about the 2007-2009 Great Recession matching Great Depression impacts. National debt levels are more substantial under the Great Recession. But government has now 'wised up', arresting traumatic losses.)

After failing to win in 1932, Mack sent off LF Al Simmons, CF Mule Haas, and 3B Jimmy Dykes for \$150,000 to the White Sox. Detroit snatched up catcher Mickey Cochrane for \$100,000 after the 1933 season. Soon after, Jimmy Foxx, Lefty Grove, second sacker Max Bishop and pitcher Rube Walberg went to Boston for \$275,000 all total (Bresnahan and Palmer 2006, 72).

During these harsh times, the A's were no longer capable of supporting their hefty payroll (with profit dwindling and Mack's dividends rising) as the following table reflects:


**Table. Profits, Dividends and Payroll in the Early 1930s (Levitt, Ed Barrow, Table 13/14)**

AL Team	1930-1934 Profits	Dividends	AL Team	1933 Payroll
Boston	-\$798,611	\$0	Boston	\$145,896
Chicago	-\$593,432	\$0	Chicago	\$150,000
Cleveland	-\$229,773	\$4,000	Cleveland	\$178,598
Detroit	\$265,563	<b>\$50,000</b>	Detroit	\$138,758
New York	\$176,988	\$0	New York	\$294,982
<b>Philadelphia</b>	<b>\$114,467</b>	<b>\$250,050</b>	<b>Philadelphia</b>	<b>\$166,533</b>
St. Louis	-\$388,604	\$0	St. Louis	\$140,789
Washington	-\$28,288	<b>\$39,300</b>	Washington	\$187,059

Though they made modest profits, due in large part to the one-time player sales (\$525,000), they would have otherwise lost over \$400,000 without those sales. (But who knows how many fans they lost in the process of dismantling?) Another factor: beer sales were disallowed in Philly ballparks until 1961 (The Economics and Politics of Sports Facilities 2000, 16).

Philadelphia also paid out \$250,050 in dividends, five times as much any other team, with Detroit and Washington being the only other substantial dividend payers. (Clark Griffith was similar to Mack in that he got his money from baseball.) Paying such a dividend, extracting money out of the baseball operations, generally reflects a weakened personal financial situation, fearful times, and/or a need or greed to make happy unruly shareholders that demand their fair share now. But as Levitt surmises succinctly: "Interestingly, Ben Shibe and Connie Mack in Philadelphia paid out a large dividend just prior to pleading poverty and selling off their stars (Levitt 2008, 290)."

Before the Great Depression, the A's team profits were (from 1925-1929) \$809,299 with only a \$150,000 dividend payout. Griffith's Senators doled out \$452,750 during those same five seasons, during Washington's best seasons ever. The Yankee dynasty made \$1,637,996 with zero dividends paid (Levitt 2008, Table 12).



Yankees owner Colonel Jacob Ruppert was already rich and needed more money to bathe in like a happy duck needs more water in his lake. But as a baseball operator, Ruppert spent this money on obtainment of more talent via Ed Barrow's burgeoning farm and scouting system. And through even bad investments, Ruppert & Co. obtained enough players – Lefty Gomez, Red Ruffing, Frank Crosetti and others – to continue their dynasty building.

Mack, however, was done.

Philadelphia purchased Simmons, Bishop, Cochrane, and Grove for \$206,500 during the 1920s, with Grove being the first \$100,000 player purchase from Dunn's Baltimore Orioles. With the other players lost (Foxx), Mack did make money on these deals (significantly appreciating his investment made) but then, did not get back any talent to replace them; and never returned to the World Series as its headmaster.




As Gary Gillette, co-editor of *2005 ESPN Baseball Encyclopedia* and SABR Business of Baseball co-chair reinforces:

“...Mack also destroyed American League baseball in Philadelphia. After he broke apart his second dynasty, the A’s finished last or next to last for roughly two decades. It was a cynical attempt to make money without taking any risk. In my view, Mack took advantage of the fans in Philadelphia...The problem with Mack was he never made an effort to rebuild. His philosophy was that the best team an owner could have was a team that contended for most of the year and then finish second or below...That kind of cynical manipulation of both your team and your fans is reprehensible.” (Bresnahan and Palmer 2006, 73)

Bill James reflected too that after 1938, Mack should have sold the Philadelphia A’s. Mack, then 76, was a product of the *Victorian Age*, and with nothing to prove. ‘The Tall Tactician’ was in the Hall of Fame, and played professionally when batters still called for a ‘high’ or ‘low’ pitch, phones were still a novel luxury, and former President Ulysses S. Grant had just died just twenty years after the Civil War. Soon-to-be WWII Prime Minister Winston Spencer Churchill was only twelve when Mack played in the National League. Both men made their lasting marks during the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The Yankees meanwhile were destined to be a mega dynasty as no one else quite had their resources: the fan base (due to population), the profits (from the marquee players), or the player scouting & farm development (Paul Krichell and George Weiss), all together, to interrupt their next three decades of consistent attendance at the fall classic with schoolboys DiMaggio, Mantle, Berra, Ford, and Larsen cleaning the chalkboards at their massive schoolhouse, Yankee Stadium.

Mack’s lessons had been taught and learned – and no one else will ‘teach’ in as many games as the ‘Tactician’ did.



### A Few Good Men: A's Salaries (red denotes salary paid by another team)

Player	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
Al Simmons	\$ 6,000	11,000	13,000	15,000	15,000	25,000	33,333	33,333	33,333	25,000
George Earnshaw				5,462	7,500	12,000	15,000	15,000	7,500	7,500
Jimmie Foxx	\$ 2,000	2,500	3,000	5,000	7,500	16,666	16,667	16,667	16,667	17,500
Jimmy Dykes	\$ 7,000	8,000	8,000	10,000	10,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	8,000	
Lefty Grove	\$ 6,500	6,500	8,000	9,000	12,000	12,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	45,000
Max Bishop	\$ 6,000	6,500	7,500	7,500	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	5,000	7,000
Mickey Cochrane	\$ 4,500	8,000	9,000	10,000	12,000	16,000	18,667	18,667	18,667	20,000
Mule Haas				3,500	6,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	6,000	6,500
Rube Walberg	\$ 4,000	5,000	6,000	7,500	8,000	12,000	10,000	10,000	6,000	7,000
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>\$ 36,000</b>	<b>47,500</b>	<b>54,500</b>	<b>72,962</b>	<b>88,000</b>	<b>123,666</b>	<b>143,667</b>	<b>143,667</b>	<b>121,167</b>	<b>135,500</b>

Source: (1925-34 Philadelphia Athletics: Batting, Pitching, & Fielding Statistics 2013)

## New York Yankees (1936-64): Lethal Dynasty II, III and IV

For the mid-20<sup>th</sup> Century, October baseball meant the Yankees, and whoever tried to emulate or defeat them. Their player's names were synonymous in America, love them or hate them, and preeminent sportswriters made lasting legends out of an Oklahoma fella and an iconic life out of a San Francisco wharf dweller. Their teammates were called Scooter, Yogi, Twinkletoes, King Kong, Spec, Whitey, Superchief, Junk Man, and Old Reliable. Nobody that played them "thought junk," in attempting to dethrone the Bombers from their lofty perch as the best team and longest lasting dynasty in baseball history.

From 1936 -1964, the Yankees participated in twenty-two World Series, winning sixteen times. No other team, or town, has won that many World Series in the remaining 112 seasons of professional baseball. (With the Yankees winning an additional eleven titles in those remaining years, closely matched only by the St. Louis Cardinals (11) as of 2014.)

But why are there three unique dynasties, and not just two, or even, one?

The easiest answer to this question is personnel, ownership, management, and league dynamic changes. In 1946, the Yankees were transferred to Del Webb and Dan Topping, as Colonel Ruppert's estate was finally settled. 1947 brought several new important faces: catcher Yogi Berra, pitcher Allie Reynolds, and reliever Joe Page, to name a selected few. While in 1943, catcher Bill Dickey still hung on. Soon, he packed off to war. SS Frank Crosetti had his job. Joe Gordon wore Yankee pinstripes. But Gordon was drafted in 1944. Spud Chandler won two games in 18 innings in 1943 World Series. In 1947, he was the lone pitching carry over, but tossed only two innings in middle relief in the fall classic.

**Table.** The Yankees 3 Dynasties Breakdown

Year	Wins	WS	Year	Wins	WS	Year	Wins	WS
1936	102	Won	1947	97	Won	1956	97	Won
1937	102	Won	1949	97	Won	1957	98	Loss
1938	99	Won	1950	98	Won	1958	92	Won
1939	106	Won	1951	98	Won	1960	97	Loss
1941	101	Won	1952	95	Won	1961	109	Won
1942	103	Loss	1953	99	Won	1962	96	Won
1943	98	Won	1955	96	Loss	1963	104	Loss
						1964	99	Loss
<b>Avg.</b>	<i>101.6</i>	<b>6</b>	<b>Avg.</b>	<i>97.1</i>	<b>6</b>	<b>Avg.</b>	<i>99</i>	<b>4</b>

Joe DiMaggio ended his career after the 1951 World Series. Mantle took Joe's place – and succeeded beyond anyone's expectations – and the Yankees continued their dynastic ways with plenty of thirty something pitchers hanging on in 1950–1953. But in 1955, after years of playing the Brooklyn nemesis, the Yankees lost a classic seven game series. It marked a breakthrough for the Dodgers; soon to leave the city that never sleeps. But it interrupted seven consecutive series wins by their usual October rivals: the Yankees.

Don Larsen's perfect game in the Game 5 of 1956 World Series set a bittersweet tone in the final chapter of the dynasty: using great pitching to win, with Mantle, Skowron, Berra, and Maris providing the pop. Johnny Kucks shutout the Dodgers in a 1956 game seven blow out, restarting the winning ways. It was his first (and last) start in the postseason.

Whitey Ford's 32-inning shutout streak in 1961 and tenth postseason win in 1962 resulted in the last back-to-back titles. Even as the last nine seasons saw continued excellence, the cracks, and age of dynasty, were evident. The 1960 Yankees fell prey to glove man extraordinaire Bill Mazeroski in a classic closeout: a game-seven, bottom-of-the-ninth, walk-off homer. In 1963, the Yanks were swept for only the second time ever in the series. CBS bought the Yankees in August 1964, just prior to the final appearance of the Yankees in October. They lost to Bob Gibson's Cardinals and ended the glory days.

The Yankees were moribund throughout the rest of the 1960s – unlike the rest of America – as conflicts rose all around, the Yankees were irrelevant. After a decade as doormat, the Bronx dwellers introduced us to their new owner, George Steinbrenner. He brought money, and mayhem, with him, wherever he went in his life.

So, what is the best version of this killing machine? Which team, statistically, or personnel wise, was the most dominating?

~

It is easy to say that the 1936 -1943 was obviously the best. They won more games yearly and their World Series were over quickly (and painlessly) for their opponents. Statistically, they racked up the highest run differentials.

The middle incarnation matched on WS titles against superior league rivals (Cleveland) and National League opponents (Dodgers). The integration of baseball came late to New York, and their advantages slimmed considerably, but it could be argued they

played better opponents, and still won. (With Yogi Berra as the team leader, perennial league MVP candidate, and winner of the MVP award, three times.)

The final grouping has the least to hang its hat on, but went to all but one World Series. Historic performances – Whitey’s shutout streak, Don Larsen’s perfecto, Maris and Mantle in 1961 seasons – reflected memorable teams (as TV helped), and times, if not actually better teams. In the regular season, they surpassed the middle chapter by two wins. (Though 1961- & 1963-win totals were against *Expansion era* ball clubs. 1961: 51-21 versus Minnesota, Los Angeles, Kansas City and Washington; 1963: 50-21.)

### 1936 –1943 Yankees: Lethal Dynasty II: The Making of Legends

When Babe Ruth left after 2 decades of terrorizing pitchers with bombs that no one matched in lore, the Yankees’ Ed Barrow must of felt there could be no else that would take on the pressure of replacing a *Sultan*. As it turned out, going to San Francisco, and signing a fisherman’s son, was the cure to what ailed.

To boot, the guy could play centerfield, a position hard to find the unique combination of power, speed, arm, and defense in one package. Joe DiMaggio walked into the marquee media market and won over the jaded, cigarette and cigar-smoking sportswriters with numbers rarely seen since, out of anyone, until his replacement.

Joe’s legendary teammate, Lou Gehrig, still put fear in the opponents. But no one made the argument that without his yang, Lou was going to see the pitches he did with a healthy and primed Babe Ruth as that yin. (In the Babe’s last couple years, the Yankees did not make the series.)

But the Yankees mystique grew by bounds during Joe D’s career. They had been remembered always as the 1927 Yankees – a team that, while dominating, met challenges quickly after those glory days. The 1932 Yankees were famous for the called shot. Outside of that, a prolonged dynasty was more newspaper vision than a ball field reality.

Not so during Joltin’ Joe’s era.

The truest testament of a dynasty is straight championship wins. It cements the team as able to put away all comers for a period of years, not just a six-month miracle, or lark. The 1936-39 Yankees put away opponents at a 66% rate in a league that was no longer imbalanced by start-up franchises, or a dearth of baseball men to run teams. The four straight championships were a first in the 20<sup>th</sup> century – and something the

1920s Yankees never sniffed at, even with Ed Barrow and Miller Huggins running the show well.

The mainstays of the entire dynasty in hitting:

**Table.** Yankee Players with over 500 AB (1936-1943)

POS	Player	AB	Runs	Hits	BB	2B	3B	HR	GP	OBP	SLG
OF	Joe DiMaggio	3470	765	1170	343	215	73	188	843	<b>0.397</b>	<b>0.604</b>
3B	Red Rolfe	3321	678	975	393	185	50	54	784	0.368	0.428
SS	Frankie Crosetti	3163	572	794	414	137	26	51	705	0.338	0.359
C	Bill Dickey	2745	460	879	383	157	25	115	751	<b>0.403</b>	<b>0.521</b>
2B/1B	Joe Gordon	2694	449	748	380	139	28	112	707	0.367	0.475
OF	Charlie Keller	1961	392	582	403	84	36	101	535	<b>0.417</b>	<b>0.531</b>
OF	George Selkirk	1744	348	500	343	78	23	73	489	<b>0.404</b>	<b>0.483</b>
1B	Lou Gehrig	1724	420	575	364	106	22	115	469	<b>0.450</b>	<b>0.621</b>
OF	Jake Powell	1185	205	336	106	60	10	19	274	0.342	0.399
SS	Phil Rizzuto	1068	144	315	71	44	16	7	272	0.339	0.386
OF	Tommy Henrich	1009	215	276	173	51	12	53	269	<b>0.380</b>	<b>0.505</b>
2B/SS	Tony Lazzeri	983	138	263	168	50	9	28	273	0.374	0.422
P	Red Ruffing	646	67	169	57	25	2	13	170	0.321	0.367
OF	Myril Hoag	629	76	183	58	33	11	3	169	0.351	0.393
3B	Billy Johnson	592	70	166	53	24	6	5	155	0.340	0.367
1B	Nick Etten	583	78	158	76	35	5	14	154	0.355	0.420
1B	Buddy Hassett	538	80	153	32	16	6	5	132	0.325	0.364
1B	Babe Dahlgren	531	71	125	57	18	6	15	144	0.310	0.377
1B	Johnny Sturm	524	58	125	37	17	3	3	124	0.289	0.300
	<b>Mainstays</b>	29110	5286	8492	3911	1474	369	974	7419	<b>0.376</b>	<b>0.468</b>

The Yanks had an exceptional offensive unit – led by Clipper’s 3,470 AB with a .604 SLG average. It did not hurt to have Bill Dickey, Frank Crosetti, Joe Gordon, and Phil Rizzuto providing the consistent middle-of-the-field presence – and outstanding offense in the case of Bill Dickey and Gordon. (Gordon might be ‘average’ for a Yankee, ‘special’ compared to other 2B in the *FDR Era*.)

Lou Gehrig was irreplaceable; after his .450/.621 numbers he was a victim of ALS, and left too soon this Earth. The Yankees tried out the kitchen sink at the first. Four men wilted badly at the Iron Man’s position. (**Example:** Pitcher Red Ruffing was no worse offensively than those replacements.)

Meanwhile, the Yankees had solid outfielders Keller, Selkirk, and Henrich providing the punch at a .500+ SLG. 3B Red Rolfe was by offense measure, below the Yankee standards. However, defensively he was amongst the best; and their best 3<sup>rd</sup> sacker until Craig Nettles, some 30 years later.

## Marse Joe (1887 – 1978)

Never a big-league player, Joe McCarthy rambled around the minor leagues for over a decade from 1907-1920. He was a utility player; the stereotypical gritty ballplayer that crops up in every generation. As Joe Williams wrote in *The Sporting News* in 1939 when McCarthy was in his 14th season as a major-league manager:

“More than half of McCarthy’s baseball life was spent in the brambles of mediocrity. He was the confirmed and perpetual busher [in the minor leagues]. He played the tank towns, rode the day coaches, had a gustatory acquaintance with all the greasy-spoon restaurants. He played second base and was an adroit fielder. He hit well enough, especially in the clutches, with men on base. But he was slow. The broken kneecap had left an enduring mark. ‘If it wasn’t for that knee, we’d recommend you,’ the scouts always said.” (McMurray 2008)

As a youth, Joe had broken his kneecap in Germantown, PA. Being the times, arthroscopic surgery was not close to innovated yet. (1930s before that happened.) But Joe worked with what he had, attending Niagara University to play baseball starting in the fall of 1905. Before coming close to graduating (he never even attended high school), finances forced him to a minor league career starting in Wilmington (Tri-State League) in 1907.

By 1920, in approaching his mid-30s, a wisecrack about his play after a rundown triggered his retirement, and started likely the best managerial career of all-time. (The knowing when-it-is-over reality hit.) His minor league stint as the boss of the Louisville Colonels produced two pennants and the defeat of Jack Dunn’s powerful Orioles club in 1921. After losing a rematch in 1925, Joe was offered the reins in Chicago, resurrecting the laughingstock of a club to near greatness alongside William Wrigley and Veeck.

Connie Mack influenced manager Joe McCarthy while growing up in Philadelphia. Joe practiced restraint, was measured in responses, but still fairly intense compared to his hero. Joe was a hands-on-the-situation guy – did not wait for the situation to magically fix itself. Saw ahead the necessity to fix any weakness. (Weaknesses that were very rare under a McCarthy-managed team.) However, McCarthy was outmaneuvered by his boyhood idol – Mack – in the 1929 World Series. Three years later, after being let go by the Cubs unceremoniously, he got sweet revenge as Yankee skipper of his first World Series championship against those same Cubs.

## Joe's Strategy

McCarthy did very little platooning of players. If you played a position well, you kept at it. Those with less than 500 AB were the utility guys – and they would be the jacks-of-all-trades, the subs, and the one-year trials.

From editor Bill Nowlin's *Spahn, Sain, and Teddy Ballgame: Boston's (almost) Perfect Baseball Summer of 1948*:

“‘[Joe] was a stocky 5-foot-8-inch Philadelphian with a strong Irish face, an inexpressive manner, a conservative outlook -- the master of the noncommittal reply and the devotee of the ‘set’ lineup. He had neither the quiet desperation of Miller Huggins who preceded him as the Yankee empire builder, nor the loud flamboyance of Casey Stengel.’ As [Joseph] Durso recalled, Joe DiMaggio said, ‘Never a day went by that you didn’t learn something from McCarthy.’” (McMurray 2008)

**Exceptions:** Jake Powell in 1936 played center field (42 games). DiMaggio (55) and just traded away Ben Chapman (36) shared time in vast expanse of the Stadium. But that ended quickly as Joe led the league in assists (22) and put up his gaudy rookie numbers: .323/29/125. 1937 saw Selkirk, Henrich, Powell, and Hoag get between 200-365 AB as the corner outfielders. The power guys (Selkirk and Henrich) replaced Powell and Hoag as the mainstays. All though were productive around DiMaggio's aura.

As Bill James surmised of McCarthy, “he got more distance out of ‘second chance’ players and problem players than anyone else in baseball history.” (The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers: From 1870 to Today , 92) (**See:** Franchises: Chicago Cubs) McCarthy took on plenty of project pitchers; divvied up the work clearly between starters and relievers; brought over Pat Malone from Chicago, and Johnny Murphy as his relief ace, in a time without that position clearly defined, aside from a few ‘one off’ years seen in the Taft era.

With Paul Krichell's scouting, Ruppert's money, Barrow's dealing and Weiss's farm system, Joe McCarthy could be envisioned as having it too easy. (Called a push-button manager by opposing numbers.) Yet, James sees him differently:

1. Tolerant of men's flaws – if you could play, and listened to instructions, he ignored the rest
2. Communicated through silence and private talks
3. Saw talent in underachievers
4. Age was only a number, not a barrier to playing



A fable oft told by legend John McGraw had centerfielder Hack Wilson let go through clerical foul up. But likely, the reason was simple: McGraw did not see Wilson's talent. McCarthy did, and put the Cubs well in the black for decade. (Even after Joe's firing.) Wilson liked McCarthy, too – and his instincts to allow a good hitter to swing – and that kept Wilson satiated and productive. But James suggests it was more elementary: McCarthy's rules were simple and enforced.

– From *The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers: From 1870 to Today*.

### Passable Pitching

If the Yankees were not near lethal with just DiMaggio, Gehrig, and company under McCarthy, they had three solid, if not, spectacular pitchers that sealed the deal. In 1936, Lefty Gomez, Red Ruffing, Monte Pearson, Johnny Broaca, and Bump Hadley were primary starters. Hadley at 32 was the oldest; Gomez, Pearson, and Broaca were at their primes, 27-28 years of age. Along with 34-year old vet Pat Malone, six Yankees hurlers won at least 12 games with relief ace Johnny Murphy kicking in another nine. Of this group, Gomez had the highest ERA at 4.39, but with Yankee run support he garnered a 13-7 record. Gomez, Pearson, Hadley, and Murphy walked more guys than they struck out. Red Ruffing's ratio was 102 K-90 BB in 271 innings.

On the surface, McCarthy's staff looked very much alike – similar ERAs, K-BB ratios, won-loss percentages – and reflects how they won: by pure offensive dominance. But this was a landmark staff as James notes it was the first staff where pitchers were divided between starters and relievers. It may additionally reflect that until it really mattered, that most guys held back their absolute best. No need to stress yourself when the juggernaut put 6-8 runs together and gave a comfortable margin of error. The late 1930s offenses scored bushels better than the 1960s, so 4 runs were not an unusual amount to give up, but not conducive to a long career as a slab ace.

Lefty Gomez and Red Ruffing, the lefty-righty combo aces put up better numbers in 1937: Gomez at 21-11, 2.33 ERA, 194/93 K-BB and 278 IP; Ruffing 20-7, 2.98 ERA, 131-68 K-BB and 256 IP. They completed 47 of 65 games as the only pitchers McCarthy trusted completely to finish what they started.

Ruffing won 82 games from 1936-1939, with twenty wins in all four seasons. He was the legit ace of the staff. Others, like Spud Chandler, who debut on May 6, 1937 as 30-year old rookie, first got to twenty wins in 1943 with a 1.64 ERA. Tiny Bonham, another

past-his-prime rookie, achieved 21 victories in 1942 with a 2.27 ERA. Those were the only Yankees to top the twenty-win plateau behind this dynasty.

Johnny Murphy was McCarthy's most trusted pen guy and closer – racking up 10, 11, 19, 9, 15, 11 and 8 saves during the 1937-1943 seasons. He appeared about 35 times per season averaging around two innings per appearance. His best year was likely 1941: 15 saves, 8-3 record with a 1.98 ERA.

Project pitchers dominated the staff behind Ruffing, Gomez, and Murphy: over-the-hill career minor leaguers with various shortcomings, personal and pitching wise littered the staff. The older but acceptable fill-ins: Donald Atley, Marv Breuer, Steve Sundra, and lefty Marius Russo all were successful as part of the dynasty. For teams so dominate – the pitching staff produced so few names in the annals of premier pitching. McCarthy never used more than 14 arms to get through a season. Most years, he tried 1-2 new guys and carried over the rest. It worked.

### Runs, Runs and More Runs

McCarthy's key luxury was six bats that represented a dangerous offensive machine: plus OBP averages, plus slugging. So it is no unusual feat the Yankee machine produced more runs than any team in baseball by more than 600 runs.

**Table.** Team Scoring during Joe's Dynasty

1936-1943		League Runs Scored and Allowed					
LG	Team	Runs	Op Runs	Differential	Wins	Losses	Runs/W-L
AL	NYA	7094	5019	2075	799	427	5.58
AL	BOS	6449	5861	588	658	560	6.00
AL	DET	6362	5876	486	653	579	6.57
NL	SLN	6003	5126	877	723	503	3.99
AL	CLE	5959	5653	306	657	572	3.60
AL	WS1	5874	6331	-457	575	646	6.44
AL	SLA	5855	7030	-1175	492	731	4.92
AL	CHA	5648	5616	32	624	593	1.03
NL	BRO	5645	5265	380	655	568	4.37
NL	PIT	5634	5377	257	629	591	6.76
NL	CHN	5573	5132	441	640	589	8.65
NL	NY1	5445	5223	222	633	584	4.53
AL	PHA	5312	7167	-1855	437	787	5.30
NL	CIN	5282	4876	406	660	565	4.27
NL	BSN	4538	5270	-732	544	672	5.72
NL	PHI	4513	6364	-1851	404	816	4.49
						Avg.	5.14

The differential is amazing. No team is within 1,200 runs of the Yankees. Meanwhile, if you lived in Philadelphia, you had two options: Watch the other team pound on your pitching staff, or watch the other team shutout your lethargic offense, and still score plenty. Either way, you were going to lose 100 games a season back when you played only 154 times.

Meanwhile, Boston was the second-best offense that had their nemesis well ahead of them. Adding just a bit more pitching might have helped. (And not Lefty Grove at the back end of his career.)

### We Are The Yankees, Understand

McCarthy's Yankees in October were unmatched in history. From 1932-1941, they went 24-4 in the post season, demolishing opponents. If you only look at the 1936-1943 Yankees, they still get to a 25-9 dominating record. They beat you literally with a ball bat. No one came to the stadium thinking they could outscore this Yankee dynasty. Yankee pitching was not a real factor. Round up a dozen of the usual suspects in the pitching wars of the post-*Tommy gun* era, and the Yankees still put up several championships.

The Yankee pinstripes, like the suit, came to represent power, prestige, and pummeling of the opponent. You paid dearly to play against the real murderer's row of baseball history, McCarthy's Yanks.

### 1947-1955 Yankees: Lethal Dynasty III: Stengel's Crack Platoon

By the time the war ended, the Yankees were a shell of a team. Their opponents got a brief reprieve from a long sentence of finishing second, or worse. The Browns, Tigers, and Red Sox made the best of three years – only finding the other St. Louis was an impediment to titles. (1945 Tigers aside.)

The Yankees changed owners; managers; flipped the roster; and went heavy on media exposure from radio to television, after resisting this strategy only a decade prior. They got back Joe DiMaggio from a quirky military service. (Many pros played ball like him, others, like new teammate, St. Louis's Hill dweller Yogi Berra, actually saw the enemy up close and personal at Omaha Beach, D-Day, and never forgot the experience.)

For two years, manager Bucky Harris got some delight again of 90-win seasons and a talented roster. The player-manager of the Senator's pinnacle seasons, 1924-25, Harris

was a placeholder for the man who massaged the press, and manipulated player lineups like Mozart did musical notes: Casey Stengel.

Stengel, a solid player in his day, first managed in the bigs at age 45 for the 1934 Dodgers. The Dodgers were atrocious. They were belittled and besmirched by the powerful Giants; led by player-manager Bill Terry, who first made wisecracks about the Bums. Whether the fire was lit, or not, Terry's Giants fell to second even as Carl Hubbell put a 2.30 ERA, 21-win, eight save campaign together. The Gashouse Cards made their name resonate as Stengel's Bums beat the loudmouth Giants during the last days of the season.

For all the genius, Stengel's brashness eked out one MLB season above .500 before coming to the Yankees in 1949 at nearly sixty years of age. When most men were looking for Social Security (only a decade old), Casey was heading for his Hall of Fame career as the most quotable manager the Yanks ever had. He brought a firm, dogged, and enjoyable belief in platooning, lineup switches (Mickey Mantle played seven games at shortstop), and tinkering with players' emotions through the media hounds of New York. (Which was likely as bad as it is in the 21<sup>st</sup> century media-be-instant environment. What else did people have available: TV was not as widespread in homes in the early 1950s.)

**More Strategy:** Stengel's group of hitters hit-and-run much more than average, while never stealing much, but sacrificing with one out, often. They perennially led the league in double plays while hitting into double plays at lower rates despite anything resembling a set keystone combo. He yanked starting pitchers quickly, and never relied too much on a set rotation for anything. Catcher Yogi Berra was as set as any player really got – being a 3-time AL MVP (1951, 1954, and 1955) surely helped.

Casey though could not just walk into the Yankee job without huge amounts of trepidation about his methodologies. The Yankee mystique now existed, embodied in Joe DiMaggio's entire persona, and Casey was, well, a man with little reputation of winning, aside from his minor league managing. (Milwaukee Brewers and Oakland Oaks of the 1940s were successful stops.)

Taking over for Harris, with all the essential talent there, meant Casey's first season was measured against those prior results. But the team responded well; the dynasty continued; and his control was cemented by (and in) that success.

**Table.** Yankee Players with over 500 AB (1947-1955)

POS	Player	AB	Hits	BB	2B	3B	HR	Runs	GP	OBP	SLG
SS	Phil Rizzuto	3454	963	439	154	43	21	562	966	0.360	0.367
C	Yogi Berra	3430	992	310	144	24	170	569	867	0.348	<b>0.494</b>
OF	Hank Bauer	2546	750	279	112	28	80	441	710	0.364	0.455
3B/2B	Gil McDougald	2031	575	238	76	24	48	298	664	0.358	0.415
OF	Gene Woodling	1968	572	325	93	35	48	328	569	<b>0.391</b>	0.447
OF	Mickey Mantle	1868	556	310	97	26	94	381	493	<b>0.398</b>	<b>0.528</b>
OF	Joe DiMaggio	1746	529	260	100	30	78	341	465	<b>0.393</b>	<b>0.529</b>
1B/OF	Joe Collins	1560	412	223	52	19	65	280	518	0.356	0.447
2B/SS	Jerry Coleman	1427	385	172	56	13	11	183	389	0.348	0.350
OF	Irv Noren	1260	314	137	57	11	24	176	294	0.323	0.369
3B/1B	Billy Johnson	1150	308	134	46	13	24	159	313	0.344	0.393
3B	Bobby Brown	1083	300	145	39	9	17	159	285	0.362	0.377
2B/SS	Billy Martin	1078	284	76	40	11	19	122	293	0.312	0.374
OF/1B	Tommy Henrich	961	276	157	55	16	40	199	193	<b>0.387</b>	<b>0.503</b>
1B	Johnny Mize	893	236	96	40	1	45	103	314	0.336	0.462
2B	Snuffy Stirnweiss	728	187	118	26	10	5	131	199	0.361	0.341
OF	Johnny Lindell	687	182	67	28	7	17	99	183	0.330	0.400
OF	Cliff Mapes	660	163	105	27	9	19	116	210	0.350	0.402
1B	George McQuinn	517	157	78	24	3	13	84	142	<b>0.395</b>	0.437
3B	Andy Carey	510	131	44	19	11	7	73	135	0.316	0.378
	<b>Mainstays</b>	<b>29557</b>	<b>8272</b>	<b>3713</b>	<b>1285</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>845</b>	<b>4804</b>	<b>7783</b>	<b>0.360</b>	<b>0.432</b>

Unlike McCarthy, Stengel did have less room for error on offense. He still had the major luxuries of Berra and Mantle at defensive positions again. (Mantle as good as he was early on, was a monster in the last installment.) Rizzuto was adequate at shortstop; Bauer, McDougald, and Woodling were around the average. But this offense was never that close to the 1939 Yankees.

Knowing this, Stengel likely never let complacency set in – for himself, or others – and justified everything under the guise of knowing it was working. His players could count on nothing completely. Rest a superstar for three days, start a virtual nobody in the World Series, play Yogi in left field, hit catcher Elston Howard leadoff – unpredictably Stengel.

Casey was the original box of chocolates Forrest Gump talked about. You never knew what you were going to get – which may have assisted his players in not thinking they had it made, or in trying to figure out what the man was really thinking, or saying. Players still had to work off-seasons to make a livable wage.

As Leonard Koppett reinforces in *The Man in The Dugout* about winning under Stengel, “The most important feature of this achievement, from a managerial point of view,

was the ability to keep winning without letting complacency sap the drive of long-term regulars and to handle personnel turnover without loss of efficiency (Koppett, 153).” He noted that of 37 Yankee players in 1949, only Berra, was around in 1960.

### Fluid Pitching Roles

Like his offense, Casey had unpredictable roles for his bump boys. The number of starters ran out to the mound were limited by their stamina, and Casey’s age. As the championships fell into place for five straight years – better than Huggins or McCarthy – Stengel looked the genius, and got more and more creative therein.

The 1949 Yankees team had 36 saves – next closest in AL was 19 – and that same meager total led the NL with lefty Joe Page racking up the majority of the Yankee closeouts. Casey, new to the squad, was fairly standard (for the time) in his handling of the staff until 1951. From there on, the usage of seven regulars to start games was not unusual; a few more got a couple of bites at the big apple; while Ford became Casey’s true money pitcher after his return from the Korean conflict. And the bullpen was anyone who was not tired.

**Table.** Starting Pitching Staff: Casey Fluid Moves Made Sound by Jim Turner

Year	Allie Reynolds	Ed Lopat	Vic Raschi	Tommy Byrne	Whitey Ford	Spec Shea	Bill Berens	Spud Chandler	Johnny Sain	Bob Grim	Bob Turley	Bobo Newsom	Harry Byrd	Jim McDonald	Tom Morgan	Johnny Knucks	Don Larsen	Total Starts
1947*	30					23	23	16				15						107
1948*	31	31	31			22												115
1949	31	30	37	30														<b>128</b>
1950	29	32	32	31	12													<b>136</b>
1951	26	31	34	3		11										16		121
1952	29	19	31						16							12		107
1953	15	24	26		30				19					18				<b>132</b>
1954	18	23		5	28					20			21	10	17			<b>142</b>
1955		12		22	33						34					13	13	127
<b>Starts</b>	209	202	191	91	103	56	23	16	35	20	34	15	21	28	45	13	13	

\* Bucky Harris was manager

New pitching coach Jim Turner, a former player under Casey in Boston, handled this creative usage scheme. Turner was a ground ball pitcher – but his new role – was to

keep the staff completely under his charge: handling complaints; divvying up the work; training schedules, etc. His expertise at pitching – and Dickey’s coaching of Berra – meant the Yankees put up pitching numbers nearly tops in the American League. (1952: 3.14 ERA. 1953: 3.20 ERA. 1955: 3.23. **All led the league.** Other years, usually second behind Cleveland with their dominant staff.)

### The Evolution of Allie

An example of Casey’s manipulation (that worked well) is Allie Reynolds.

Allie Reynolds	G	GS	SV	IP	W	L	ERA	WHIP	HR
1947	34	30	2	241.6	19	8	3.20	1.37	23
1948	39	31	3	236.3	16	7	3.77	1.49	17
1949	35	31	1	213.6	17	6	4.00	1.51	15
1950	35	29	2	240.6	16	12	3.74	1.47	12
1951	40	26	7	221	17	8	<b>3.05</b>	<b>1.23</b>	12
1952	35	29	<b>6</b>	244.3	20	8	<b>2.06*</b>	<b>1.19</b>	10
1953	41	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	145	13	7	<b>3.41</b>	<b>1.39</b>	9
1954	36	<b>18</b>	7	157.3	13	4	<b>3.32</b>	<b>1.26</b>	13

Even as Allie got older, thirty-five in 1950, Casey turned Reynolds into a very valuable and flexible bridge. Allie’s numbers improved; he got into as many games; he won close to the same amount of games; and this meant that Casey moved around other starters whose stuff was garbage against the likes of Cleveland (Doby, Rosen, Avila), Chicago (Minoso, Fox), or for spite, Boston (Williams). Also, he extended a reliable pitcher’s career by a couple seasons through judicious usage. In 1952, Allie led the AL in ERA, strikeouts and shutouts to go along with saves in every appearance aside from starting. That’s production, folks.

Bill James confirms this design of Stengel’s pitching staff:

“...because of the way that Casey manipulated his pitching staff. Casey liked to pitch certain pitchers against certain teams. In the years 1953 –1960, Whitey Ford had 40 decisions against the Chicago White Sox (23-17), but only 15 decisions against Detroit (8-7). The Tigers had a right-hand hitting lineup led by Al Kaline, Harvey Kuenn...and weren’t a particularly good team. Casey preferred to go after them with somebody like Larsen, Turley, Kucks, and save Ford for Chicago. The White Sox and Indians were by far the best ‘other’ teams in the American League over those years...

Larsen, on the other hand, never beat the Cleveland Indians in his five years as a Yankee; he was 0-4 against them. He was just 4-4 against the White Sox. He was 12-3

against Baltimore, the team from which he had been acquired, and [that] accounted for more than 70% of his wins against just three teams: Baltimore, Boston and Kansas City.” (The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers: From 1870 to Today , 192)

**Table.** Casey’s Classic Closers (Saves)

1949 – <b>Joe Page (27)</b>	1953 – Tom Gorman
1950 – Joe Page, Tom Ferrick	1954 – <b>Johnny Sain (22)</b> , Tom Gorman, Jim Konstanty
1951 – Joe Ostrowski	1955 – Jim Konstanty (11), Tom Morgan (10)
1952 – Bobby Hogue	

**Bold – led league**

Meanwhile, Casey searched for the ‘classic’ closer of the *Ike Era* – Hoyt Wilhelm, Ellis Kinder, Joe Black and Jim Konstanty – as Joe Page had his career-ending problems in 1951. Instead, he got by with *Taft Era* thinking (no designated difference between starters and relievers, aside from Ford, who still had 5-6 relief appearances until 1960). Ford’s usage changed with Casey’s last turn at bat as Yankees skipper. But in 1954, Sain’s complete conversion to a closer went fairly well. Though at 37, he was on his last legs. Sain was one of many ex-Yankees soon to take a blues trip to Kansas City in the late 1950s.

#### 1956-1964 Yankees: Lethal Dynasty IV: The Last Chapter?

After their loss to the Brooklynites, the Yankees went back to work as the yearly American League pennant winner. (Aside from the Go-Go Sox of 1959.) The roster turned over considerably. Elston Howard joined as their first African-American player in 1955, a very, very good catcher, who started out in left field. Yogi was still the top catcher; but became a never-a-dull moment, adequate left fielder. Stengel was contorting everyone now, but Mantle. Versatility 101 was a Casey Stengel prerequisite course.

#### Kansas City Here We Come, Right Back Where We Started From

Charles Dillon Stengel was born in Kansas City in 1890 to Irish-German immigrants. His youth was filled with sport: baseball and basketball titles. In 1910, Casey landed in the American Association for the Kansas City Blues. Before long, with his talent obvious, a late-season call up in 1912 to the Brooklyn Superbas was in order. He started out a house afire – hitting nearly .500 in his first week – with nine RBIS with a tremendous homer, considered a titanic shot. He played poker with the boys; and earned his nickname from his “K.C.” beginnings converted to “Casey (Bishop n.d.).” Some 40 years later, Kansas City felt like home sweet home again for the Yankees.



By 1955, the old pitching guard (Reynolds, Lopat, and Raschi) approached 40 years old, and so, who would be the next batch of 15-25 game starters to surround Ford with? The solution came through trade talent acquired, continuing the dynasty, at the just-moved-to-Kansas City A's expense in the late 1950s. The Yankees farm system, while formidable enough, was not generating any more superstars: Mantle, Ford, Berra, and Howard were the homegrown fellas, but that was the end of the line. (2B Bobby Richardson and SS Tony Kubek came up – but they were just solid, lunchbox types.)

The Yankees had their long-established connection to the Kansas City area, running the minor league Kansas City Blues. So too, with the move of the Philadelphia A's, barely after Connie Mack's death, came the gross exploitation of a formidable opponent of twenty-five years prior.

The new A's owner, financier Arnold Johnson, bought Yankee Stadium for \$6.5 million (Kahn, *October Men: Reggie Jackson, George Steinbrenner, Billy Martin, and the Yankees' Miraculous Finish in 1978*, 60), and intertwined deeply with Yankee owner, Del Webb. The Phoenix, Arizona contractor, real estate mogul, and gaming impresario, Webb built *The Flamingo* for Bugsy Siegel, soon partnered up with Meyer Lansky (58), and received induction to the Las Vegas gaming HOF in 2000. Webb was corporate, politically-connected, and icy to scribes: 43 board seats, 14 country club memberships, and once described by Senator Barry Goldwater's retail owning brother as a, "ignorant son of a bitch who built a million-dollar business with a hammer and a nail and a case of whiskey thoughtfully distributed in Washington (57-58)."

Webb (in AZ) and Topping (in NYC) weaved the two franchises' fortunes together. Johnson hired away ex-Yankee business manager Parke Carroll to the Kansas City Blues and installed pro-Yankee director of player personnel, George Selkirk. Carroll was an ex-sportswriter for a defunct Kansas City paper who became general manager of these fledgling A's in 1958. Selkirk was ex-Yankee outfielder during McCarthy's dynasty. (No conflicts of interest – Yankees Win!)

With the key business players cooperating, this tried-n-true tactic began its work on November 18, 1954 with an 18-player deal made with Baltimore in two parts. As the Yankees (gulp!) acquired Don Larsen, Bob Turley, Billy Hunter, Mike Blyzka, Darrel Johnson, and Jim Fridley. Baltimore got 12 guys. But Yankees were just beginning to turn the trick. Larsen pitched the series perfecta, and stayed until December 1959 when a Kansas City deal for record-breaker Roger Maris took form. Turley, again, stayed until 1962. Shortstop Billy Hunter was moved to Kansas City in another massive

11-player deal. This after a bit role: 330 at-bats had as a Yankee in 1955-56. Additional deals were triggered; and the Yankees continued their winning ways almost solely through the moves made with a doormat-by-purpose franchise.

### Kansas City Deals with Yankees

**February – June 1957:** The Yankee sent Hunter with Tom Morgan, Mickey McDermott, Milt Graff and Irv Noren for A's Art Ditmar, Bobby Shantz, Jack McMahan, Wayne Belardi, Curt Roberts, and Clete Boyer.

**June 15, 1957:** The Yankees higher ups used a late-night incident as cover to jettison Billy Martin to Kansas City with Ralph Terry, Woodie Held, and Bob Martyn. In exchange, Ryne Duren, Jim Pisoni, Milt Graff, and Harry Simpson came to the Bronx.

**June 15, 1958:** Virgil Trucks and Duke Maas trucked over to the stadium via the "KC" pipeline.

**May 26, 1959:** Ralph Terry (comes back!) and Hector Lopez heads over for Johnny Kucks, Tom Sturdivant, and Jerry Lumpe. (Terry was still only 23, and Lopez had super utility skills and pop in the bat. Lumpe was actually superior to Bobby Richardson, offensively and defensively, but two years older.)

**May 19, 1960:** Acquired back 34-yr old Bob Cerv after he hit .285 with 20 homers for Kansas City. (He had been sent to KC for cash in 1956.)

**Table.** Percentage of Traded–for Pitchers in Yankee Rotation

Year	Whitey Ford	Bob Turley*	Don Larsen*	Johnny Knucks/ Grba/EH	Tom Sturdivant/ Jim Coates	Art Ditmar*	Bobby Shantz*	Duke Maas*	Ralph Terry*	Total Starts	Balt/KC Pitchers%
1956	30	21	20	31	17					119	34.45%
1957	17	23	20	23	28	11	21			143	52.45%
1958	29	31	19	15	10	13	13	13		143	62.24%
1959	29	22	18	6	4	25	21	16		141	72.34%
1960	29	24		9	18	28		23		131	57.25%
1961	39	12			11			27		89	N/A
1962	37				6			39		82	N/A
1963	37							37		74	N/A
1964	36							14		50	N/A
<b>Starts</b>	283	133	77	69	55	77	34	34	156	918	

\* Denotes Baltimore or Kansas City Pitcher before Trade

N/A: Casey Stengel no longer manager

By the 1960 season, the Yankees roster had fourteen Kansas City A’s on their championship – caliber ball club. Maris hit 39 home runs; 35 more came from Cerv, Lopez, Hadley, and Boyer. Most importantly, aside from Whitey Ford, the Yankees got most of their pitching from 1957-1960 seasons via trades made with Baltimore and Kansas City, perennial losers in this pre-draft era.

By 1961, while the Yankees continued to field a worthy winner, the “KC” train derailed for good. Owner Arnold Johnson died in early 1960. The A’s were sold to Charlie O. Finley, whom seemed crazy; but strangely knew how to build his own dynasty and stopped the overt fleecing. To show his thoughts, Finley bought and pointed a bus towards New York, then burned it. Finley fired Carroll, hired Frank “Trader” Lane, fired him after a year, and so on, as the merry-go-round spun with Finley. Finley got rid of scouting and farming directors in the late 1960s, running the team pretty much on its cheapest dime.

For the Yankees, the amateur draft, new competition for fans in the Mets’ creation, and itchy ownership (wanting to get out with more bucks than they put in) set ablaze

to the bridge to the past successes. And ended the most dominate run in all major professional sports. Yankees' fans lose, finally.

Casey Stengel got the kiss off after the 1960 World Series, receiving his paid into pension plan of \$158,747.25, and a meager \$1,252.75 extra from Topping and Webb. His brusque sendoff – “due to his advanced age” – led though to a sarcastic Casey letting the boom fall on the internal problems with the Yankees: they had cut instruction, second guessed personnel decisions, and axed his crack pitching coach, Jim Turner (Barra, *Yogi Berra: The Eternal Yankee* 2009, 76). Beyond that, George Weiss was kept on as a figurehead GM. Never much liked even when he was in greater control of baseball operations.

Stengel gets the further lasting memory as the skipper of the Amazin' Mets, who, for their part, did everything to keep New York entertained, not through winning, but in losing. The 1963 New York Mets managed by Casey Stengel used his best starting pitcher, Carl Willey, a Braves washout, to beat the Yankees in relief, during an exhibition that caused a two-hour traffic jam as 50,000 people came to see the game. (Curt Smith, *The Storytellers*.)

Yet, while entertaining as Casey was to New York writers, he did not definitively put more meat in the seats as Bill James concluded in a study on the manager's fan appeal. (From: *Baseball Managers*, James.)

### The Best 'Team' Award Goes To...

The best version of the dynasty was certainly managed by Joe McCarthy. Dominate and done without all the contorting and exploitation of the other teams to a usual end, McCarthy proved he not only dominated, but he had won at his other stops too. As Jeff Angus describes the lessons of Joe's leadership:

“Joe McCarthy managed for 24 seasons and never had a losing season. Never. Each team improved big-time in his first year: The Cubs by 14 wins, the Yankees by eight, the Red Sox by 12. How did he do it? By examining the environment, relentlessly seeking out and unceasingly fixing current weaknesses, giving people previously considered failures a chance to succeed in a different environment, delegating responsibility and experimenting.

With the power-needy Cubs, he picked up outfielder Hack Wilson, a reputed alcoholic dumped by the Giants. In five years Wilson played for McCarthy, he led the NL in homers four times...And McCarthy experimented; he was one of the first managers to use dedicated relief pitchers when other managers used failed or day-off starters to pick up for tapped-out starters.

Importantly, whatever environment McCarthy was in, he adapted to it. He didn't bring a one-size-fits-all plan and try to force it..." (Management by Baseball: The Official Rules of Winning Management in Any Field 2006, 36-37)

Stengel had the fortunes of acquiring a great stock of HOF-caliber players at the turn of the *Ike Era*. His fortunes also ran well on the ability to piece-meal an offense while flipping around his pitching to suit the opponents. He did greatly benefit though from a too eager Kansas City traitor to competition to the prolonging of this dynastic run. His days with McGraw paid off in his handling of the Yankees vets, difficult birds (Martin), and the right hitter for key moments.

In 1960 World Series, Stengel's money man, Ford, got only two starts instead of a logical three starts. The Pirates caught that break, and that of a groundball, which assisted in ending Stengel's road as the winner of seven championships, tying McCarthy. (37-26 in World Series play compared to 30-13 during McCarthy's run.)

After Stengel, Ralph Houk grabbed the reins and won 109 games with the 1961 Yankees. Houk pushed hard on his front-line talent (Ford, Mantle, Maris, Skowron, Richardson, and Kubek), getting the results the Yankees owners and fans demanded. 1962 proved to be the last victory celebration as Houk kept to his game plan: Terry threw 299 innings, Ford 258 innings while Bobby Richardson, Tom Tresh, Clete Boyer, and Roger Maris logged plenty of plate appearances. In getting back to the 1963 series, Houk moved on, getting kicked upstairs, with Yogi Berra taking old and tired Yankees to their swan song.

In a season filled with intrigue, the Cardinals looked to drop manager Johnny Keane, the Phillies dropped the ball, and the Yankees went media conglomerate (CBS). The Yankees played the Cards in October, lost in seven games while hitting 10 home runs. Keane landed a job with the loser of the series; Yogi left to manage again (in the 1970s) another 7-game world series, coming up one game short. (This after winning 10 championships as a player; you can't have all the luck. But Yogi tried, and succeeded, more than most.)

Table. Yankee Players with over 500 AB (1956-1964)

POS	Player	AB	Hits	BB	2B	3B	HR	Runs	GP	OBP	SLG
2B/3B	Bobby Richardson	3610	969	172	129	26	19	440	914	0.302	0.334
CF/RF	Mickey Mantle	3581	1143	885	152	27	302	859	1034	<b>0.454</b>	<b>0.630</b>
C/LF/1B	Elston Howard	3322	968	229	139	34	115	407	734	0.337	0.458
1B/3B	Bill Skowron	2963	854	218	131	27	131	395	779	0.337	<b>0.483</b>
SS/CF/LF	Tony Kubek	2901	797	147	132	17	38	383	623	0.310	0.371
C/LF/RF	Yogi Berra	2569	692	269	99	8	131	380	488	0.339	<b>0.467</b>
3B/SS	Clete Boyer	2530	613	206	93	15	63	302	661	0.299	0.366
RF/CF	Roger Maris	2504	679	348	94	15	182	461	668	0.360	<b>0.539</b>
LF/RF	Hector Lopez	1704	444	162	62	16	42	226	489	0.325	0.390
LF/CF/SS	Tom Tresh	1675	449	223	79	15	61	260	333	0.354	0.442
SS/2B/3B	Gil McDougald	1480	418	186	57	13	40	235	232	0.363	0.420
RF/LF	Hank Bauer	1470	375	133	62	22	56	228	404	0.317	0.441
1B/CF/RF	Joe Pepitone	1193	311	47	28	6	55	150	298	0.289	0.433
3B	Andy Carey	984	253	94	43	11	25	123	311	0.322	0.399
C/LF/RF	Johnny Blanchard	868	221	105	29	1	57	111	140	0.335	<b>0.487</b>
LF	Norm Siebern	622	171	85	20	9	18	106	178	0.362	0.423
P	Whitey Ford	586	94	62	11	0	1	53	272	0.241	0.184
SS/3B/2B	Phil Linz	554	142	58	30	3	7	85	77	0.327	0.359
LF	Bob Cerv	547	143	78	27	8	19	80	101	0.354	0.444
OF	Enos Slaughter	513	143	71	19	6	9	75	175	0.366	0.392
	<b>Mainstays</b>	36723	10022	3856	1463	287	1390	5439	9027	<b>0.342</b>	<b>0.442</b>

**Note:** The offense of the final dynasty reflects some real weakness. Richardson, Kubek, Boyer, Pepitone all had miserable OBP, even compared to the middle division of the Yankees. Mantle though was every bit the legend – greater than Gehrig, or DiMaggio, in this last dynastic run.

**Some of Casey Stengel’s Best Lines:**

- "They say some of my stars drink whiskey. But I have found that the ones who drink milkshakes don’t win many ballgames."
- "Now there’s three things you can do in a baseball game: You can win or you can lose or it can rain."
- "Good pitching will stop good hitting and vice-versa."
- "He (Lyndon B. Johnson) wanted to see poverty, so he came to see my team [1964 Mets]."

– From the *Baseball Database*

St. Louis Cardinals (1942-1946): (See Vol 1. FDR ERA – Dynasty in Dire Times)

Los Angeles Dodgers (1959-1966): The Sporadic Dynasty

Walter Alston put together a great formula: have the best left-handed pitcher in the game in Koufax to go with an intimidating righty in Drysdale, add lightning speed in Wills, defense in Willie Davis and Johnny Roseboro, power in Frank Howard and Tommy Davis and shut-the-door relief in Ron Perranoski. The formula was nothing without Koufax, who got the task of whoever was the #1 pitcher on the other squad in key games: a mix of Juan Marichal, Bob Gibson, Warren Spahn, Dock Ellsworth, or Jim Maloney in the early 1960s.

The quiet, ego-neutral, but physically-intimidating Alston was a dutiful employee who knew his set of skills, mastered them in teaching minor leaguers for the Cardinals and Dodgers before getting his chance as Dodger skipper. Raised in Ohio, he caught the eye of Frank Rickey, Branch's brother, as a first baseman. Alston batting skills were superb for the minor leagues – leading various mid-level minor leagues in dingers. However, he never panned into a big leaguer. In his off-season, Alston taught school – a perfect occupation for managers – and as he grew older, he player-managed for the Cardinals. He started his baseball post doctorate in Portsmouth, VA in 1940 at only 29 years old.

After an injury in 1944, he was let go as a player. Branch Rickey came a calling and offered a minor league manager job in Trenton, New Jersey. By 1946, Alston was firmly ensconced in the Dodgers integration movement, working with Roy Campanella and Don Newcombe in Nashua, New Hampshire. (Both future NL MVPs.)

With twenty-five teams in the Dodger chain, Alston hit all the significant stops: Montreal, Pueblo, and St. Paul were added to the resume, with success in record and development the norm; and quiet respect earned. Rickey, though Alston's mentor, was bought out by Walter O'Malley. As Leonard Koppett reflects, "O'Malley was smart enough to use his authority to leave baseball decisions to the experts he was paying...Fresco Thompson had been Rickey's director of the farm system. He became...director of baseball operations. Buzzie Bavasi...moved up as O'Malley's front office chief, negotiating contracts with players...All the way down the system, the scouts and minor-league managers were kept in place or moved around: Alex Campanis, Clay Bryant, Andy High, Greg Mulleavy... (The Man in the Dugout: Baseball's Top Managers and How They Got That Way 1993, 226-227)"

Because of demeanor, knowledge, and commitment to the Dodger way, Alston had the respect of his owner immediately upon his hire. His superiors in title were also

convinced of his fitness, and thus, when results came – the 1955 Brooklyn title – it took little logic to keep him in charge. But in taking over in 1954, he ran into problems with veterans, who, were long removed from his managerial familiarity in the minors. (Especially Jackie Robinson, Duke Snider, and any player who started before 1948 on the Dodgers, noticed of Alston's rise. Vets acquired clubhouse power from prolonged stays with the team.)

### Pitching with a Purpose, After 1960

From 1956 to 1959, the team transitioned from war and integration stars to bonus babies honed at Vero Beach, Florida's *Dodgertown* while looking west to a whole new ballgame in a quirky monster, the L.A. Coliseum. A temporary home, the stadium set attendance records in baseball – even in 2008! – that are unlikely to be broken. In their second season, they amazed the National League in quick jump from near last in 1958 to top dogs for 1959.

The 1959 title was unexpected – and set a happy relationship a flutter in Hollywood – so while Alston was no more verbal after title two, he already exceeded Los Angelean's hopes from year one.

Alston's best weapon in 1959 was the underachievement of the Milwaukee club. Milwaukee scored 724 runs allowing only 623; meanwhile, the Dodgers scored 705 while allowing 670. Milwaukee predicted record should have been around 91-63, with the Dodgers at only 81 victories. The actual records were 88 wins for the Dodgers and 86 for Milwaukee.

The Braves Eddie Mathews whacked a league-leading 46 dingers; Spahn and Burdette tied for the league lead in wins at 21 apiece; Hank Aaron led in batting at .355 while banging out 39 round trippers; and catcher Doc Crandall and 1B Joe Adcock together hit more home runs than their Dodger counterparts, Gil Hodges and Johnny Roseboro.

Rarely does a team have the best power-average guys, three good pitchers (Buhl was at 15 wins and 2.86 ERA) and plenty of offense at defensive positions in Crandall and SS Johnny Logan (.291 BA with 13 home runs) and lose out to an average ball club. But it happened in '59.

**Biggest Dodger weapons in 1959:** striking out batters, a good bullpen, and defensive fielding average, improved by strikeouts. Don Drysdale, Johnny Podres, and Roger Craig led them in wins. Koufax was a work in progress. Larry Sherry became the toast of the town – winning two games and saved two in the World Series. They sacrificed



more than twice every three games – and throughout this era – leading the league at 100 in 1959. They led league in stolen bases at 84 swipes.

But this was a luck championship; given, they caught the White Sox in the series, the only time the Yankees did not play in the last installment of their three-decade dynasty. Bill James on the 1959 Dodgers: “They were, in my opinion, the weakest World Championship team of all time.” (The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers: From 1870 to Today , 225)

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>				Offensive Differential		
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1959	Los Angeles Dodgers	88-68	82.0	705	670	148
1960	Los Angeles Dodgers	82-72	85.4	662	593	126
1961	Los Angeles Dodgers	89-65	81.1	735	697	157
1962	Los Angeles Dodgers	102-63	97.9	842	697	140
1963	Los Angeles Dodgers	99-63	93.8	640	550	110
1964	Los Angeles Dodgers	80-82	87.8	614	572	79
1965	Los Angeles Dodgers	97-65	93.4	608	521	78
1966	Los Angeles Dodgers	95-67	98.0	606	490	108
Pitching				Defense		
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1959	3.79	14	26	157	154	114
1960	3.4	13	20	154	142	124
1961	4.04	10	35	167	162	136
1962	3.62	8	46	115	144	191
1963	2.85	24	29	111	129	158
1964	2.95	19	27	88	126	170
1965	2.81	23	34	127	135	134
1966	2.62	20	35	84	128	133

After the luck, the titles in 1963 and 1965 were hard earned via the arms race with San Francisco and St. Louis. Each team had one legit ace: Juan Marichal, for the Giants, Bob Gibson for the Cards. After them, musical chairs on the Cards and Giants rotations reflected at least one reason why they did not go further in unseating the Dodger dynasty.

**Table.** Pitching Staffs for Top National League Teams (1963-1966)

Year	Team	Don Drysdale	Sandy Koufax	Johnny Podres	Claude Osteen	Bob Miller/Sutton	Moeller/Ortega	Juan Marichal	Jack Sanford	Ron Herbel	Gaylord Perry	Billy O'Dell/Shaw	Bobby Bolin	Bob Hendley	Bob Gibson	Curt Simmons	Ray Sadecki	Craig/AJ Jackson	Broglie/Purkey	Ray Washburn	Bries/Jaster	Tracy Stallard
1963	LAD	42	40	34		23																
1964	LAD	40	28				49															
1965	LAD	42	41	22	40																	
1966	LAD	40	41		38	35																
1963	SFG							40	42		33											
1964	SFG							33	17	22	19		23	29								
1965	SFG							37	16	21	26	33										
1966	SFG							36		18	35		34			19						
1963	SLC														33	32	28	35				
1964	SLC														36	34	32	19				
1965	SLC														36	32	28		17	16		26
1966	SLC														35			30		26	38	

Red Team denotes World Series. Player (one season).  
Italics (combined starts of pitchers)

The Dodgers over these four seasons had ten pitchers start 35 times in a season. Meanwhile, the Cards and Giants combined had only seven. The only season the Dodgers failed to appear in October, Koufax started in less than 30 games, and nearly a third of their games fell into the hands of Joe Moeller and Phil Ortega, with their plus 4.00 ERAs. They were stopgaps until Claude Osteen and Don Sutton took the pill in 1965 and 1966. That season saw a fall off from relievers Ron Perranoski and Larry Miller, and the offense, never a dominator, was third from last place in scoring, ahead of only Houston and the Mets. (New York outslugged the Dodgers that year. Alston tried to run his way out of an offensive funk, leading the league by 51 steal margin. Steals don't equal results.)

During these last four years, 1963 –1966, Sandy Koufax threw 1,193 innings, and like Lefty Grove, set the pace for the Dodgers, especially in October. His right-handed counterpart kept pace, in Drysdale, making the Dodgers the class of the pre-Vietnam protest era. But it all came to an end with a 4-0 sweep by the 1966 Orioles, and Koufax, called it quits.

### St. Louis Cardinals (1964-1968): Integrated, Motivated, and Underrated

While the Dodgers and Giants dominated the National league since 1947 (in large part due to their quick moves to an integrated ball team), the Cardinals changed ownership from a tax evader to a beer persuader. After first thinking money could buy off his opponents, in acquiring their talent, Gussie Busch figured out he needed a more practical approach. It took to 1964 to get the pieces in place – a decade after he took the financial reins – as this is the norm for success.

Bringing together emerging black stars, Bob Gibson, Lou Brock, Curt Flood, and Bill White with white cohorts Tim McCarver, Dick Groat, and Ken Boyer proved a great formula for 1964 under manager Johnny Keane.

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>		Offensive Differential				
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1964	St. Louis Cardinals	93-69	88.5	715	652	109
1965	St. Louis Cardinals	80-81	84.9	707	674	109
1966	St. Louis Cardinals	83-79	80.2	571	577	108
1967	St. Louis Cardinals	101-60	98.0	695	557	115
1968	St. Louis Cardinals	97-65	97.9	583	472	73
Pitching			Defense			
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1964	3.43	10	38	133	147	172
1965	3.77	11	35	166	152	130
1966	3.11	19	32	130	166	145
1967	3.05	17	45	97	127	140
1968	2.49	30	32	82	135	140

Nevertheless, even while closing out the Yankees dynasty in seven games, they regressed considerably over the next two seasons. In 1967, they added former Giant, the *Baby Bull*, Orlando Cepeda, who hit a career high .325 with respectable power after coming back from an injury-plagued 1965 season. Roger Maris, in his last big league stop, chipped in, bringing a winning spirit, if not his 1961 numbers. Most importantly, the Cardinals overhauled their pitching staff from 1964.

With the retirement of Koufax, Bob Gibson and Juan Marichal were the elite of the National League gunslingers on the mound. Gibson though had new competition coming on his own staff: Steve Carlton broke in 1965, but didn't amass many innings until 1967, actually tying for second in wins for the Cards, and finishing third in the NL in strikeouts per nine innings.

### 1964 Pitching Staff

Pitcher	G	GS	W	SV	IP
<b>Bob Gibson</b>	40	36	19	1	287.3
Curt Simmons	34	34	18	0	244.0
Ray Sadecki	37	32	20	1	220.0
Roger Craig	39	19	7	5	166.0
Ernie Broglio	11	11	3	0	69.3
<b>Ray Washburn</b>	15	10	3	2	60.0
Mike Cuellar	32	7	5	4	72.0
Gordie Richardson	19	6	4	1	47.0
Glen Hobbie	13	5	1	1	44.3
Ron Taylor	63	2	8	7	101.3
Bob Humphreys	28	0	2	2	42.7
Barney Schultz	30	0	1	14	49.3

### 1967 Pitching Staff

Pitcher	G	GS	W	SV	IP
Steve Carlton	30	28	14	1	193.0
Dick Hughes	37	27	16	3	222.3
<b>Ray Washburn</b>	27	27	10	0	186.3
<b>Bob Gibson</b>	24	24	13	0	175.3
Larry Jaster	34	23	9	3	152.3
Nelson Briles	49	14	14	6	155.3
Al Jackson	38	11	9	1	107.0
Jim Cosman	10	5	1	0	31.3
Jack Lamabe	23	1	3	4	47.7
Joe Hoerner	57	0	4	15	66.0
Ron Willis	65	0	6	10	81.0
Hal Woodeshick	36	0	2	2	41.7

While many teams are allegedly built on “camaraderie,” this one likely had to live up to the bill. As Bob Gibson states in *Stranger to the Game*, “There were stars on the 1967 Cardinals, but no star mentalities. If a player was caught looking at the stat sheet, for instance, we fined him on the spot (Gibson and Wheeler, *Stranger to the Game* 1994, 132).” (This likely aggrandized their unity.) The pitching staff went from a five-man show in 1964, to an all-hands shared responsibility. They led the league in saves with 45, while no one had close to a majority of saves. They were second in total shutouts (17) and team ERA (3.05).

This team mustered enough offensive firepower for the times - finishing second in slugging in a down era – while other teams with name sluggers were hurt by a lack of complimentary players, or *down seasons from stars*. (Atlanta: Aaron & Torre, Chicago: Banks & Santo, Houston: Wynn & Staub, Pittsburgh: Clemente & Stargell, San Fran: Mays & McCovey.)

### Oakland A's (1972-1974): Only A Jackass Could Screw It Up

In 1973, *You're So Vain* by Carly Simon topped the charts while *All in the Family's* egocentric, bigoted Archie Bunker dominated the tube. Baseball creatively matched this cultural icons with A's owner Charlie O. Finley known for his penny-pinching, self-

aggrandizing ways; thus drawing the ire and spite of his 'meathead' players that put together the only three-peat outside of a Bronx borough.

Finley took over the "triple-A" Kansas City A's from the departed Arnold Johnson. Charlie, a Chicago millionaire insurance salesman and promoter of anything that still moved or made a buck, brought a scheming, business acumen to the game. As Roger Kahn noted, "[Finley] was a caustic, foxy man..." (October Men: Reggie Jackson, George Steinbrenner, Billy Martin, and the Yankees' Miraculous Finish in 1978, 83) The crafty Finley wasted no time to changing the A's outward appearance: uniforms to gaudy Kelly green, Fort Knox gold and wedding gown white; dropped the long-time elephant logo; changed cleat colors to white; and he was only getting started with his modifications.

The A's went over 40 years as a team without a logical or stable farm system. From 1931 to 1945, the A's retained only 2-3 farm teams under foot; whereas, the Yankees had at least 8 or 9, and usually, 12-15 teams funneling bodies up, or out, to acquire talent. From 1946-1960, the Yankees consistently held double figure franchises, including the AAA Kansas City Blues until 1954. Meanwhile, the A's right after WWII dipped their toes into adding minor league teams, double figures by 1947 (Sports Reference, LLC. 2014). But as the minors' fates were sealed by television growth, attendance declines, and restructuring deals that benefited the majors more, the A's trimmed again like a small market, undercapitalized team does. And their franchise move in the mid-1950s only acerbated this situation, going along with the Yankee fleecing of the franchise described above in the Yankees dynasty.

The 1960s balanced out the minor leagues, at a price, as stockpiling quantity of players was no longer viable. Finley invested his own money (and took whatever write-offs/depreciation expenses that came from that) to build a team nearly from scratch. So too, the Yankees were now losers. They did not function dynastically – more corporate CBS, less baseball men – and the A's and others had a decade to roll them up. And roll them up they did.

## KC/Oakland Draft Picks of Note Between 1965 and 1969

Year	RD	Pick	Player	Draft POS	School
1965	1	1	<b>Rick Monday*</b>	OF	Arizona State University
1965	6	119	<i>Sal Bando</i>	3B	Arizona State University
1965	20	399	<i>Gene Tenace</i>	SS	Valley HS (Lucasville, OH)
1966	1	2	<i>Reggie Jackson</i>	OF	Arizona State University
1967	2	27	<i>Vida Blue</i>	P	DeSoto HS (Mansfield, LA)
1967	7	132	<b>Darrell Evans</b>	3B	Pasadena City College
1968	1	1	George Hendrick	OF	Fremont HS (Los Angeles, CA)
1969	6	127	<b>Jim Sundberg</b>	C	Galesburg HS (IL)

**Others of note acquired prior to 1965 Draft:** 2B Bert Campaneris, closer Rollie Fingers, SP Catfish Hunter, and SP Blue Moon Odom contributed mightily to Finley's A's. CF Rick Monday garnered SP Ken Holtzman in a blockbuster trade that set this dynasty, pitching wise.

Finley wasted little time in upsetting the baseball apple cart by firing most of baseball staff; canning managers with clockwork regularity; and getting by with meager office staffing. The A's did quickly amass talent with Finley basically running the front office shortly after the 1965 draft – no standard GM in place (GrindMedia, LLC. 2014) – and by 1971, the A's were a deadly machine.

In 1967, after just years prior before burning a faux lease to show loyalty (done as a publicity stunt), Finley finally escaped from Kansas City, bolting town after a 62-99 finish. Finley had zero intentions of staying in the rust-n-ready city after he once threatened to move his games to a "cow pasture." He had help in that the commissioner's office was in flux and political games abounded in the last days before the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of professional sports.

**Finley Field Promotions:** A mechanical rabbit that popped up to provide new baseballs. Sheep grazed on the hillside behind the right-field fence. Copying Larry MacPhail's ideas of 1939, the promotion of a yellow baseball was a foul ball. Introduced us to "Charlie O" – the mule. "Designated runners," Allan Lewis and Herb Washington, were added to the club. Handle bar mustaches required.

**Finley Annoyances:** Phoning up the manager constantly – Steinbrenner, anyone? Baited the Yankees into approving the Oakland move of Kansas City A's. Caused the threat of anti-trust revocation by U.S. Senator Stuart Symington (from Kansas) that in turn led to a cascade of teams added by 1969. This included an unprepared, poorly

financed Seattle Pilots. (The appropriately named crash-n-burn franchise.) And the Montreal Expos in *Parc Jarry* that was not ready for prime-time baseball. Catfish Hunter became the first free agent in a century. Owners infuriated. Commissioner Kuhn v. Finley: Who was more annoying for baseball? Who was doing more for the best interests of the game?

### Charlie O's Manager(s): No Bull Williams and Bible Smart Alvin

Manager Dick Williams was a hard-nosed fella from St. Louis; born in 1929 to an abusive family; and yet knew Branch Rickey via the knothole gang outside Sportsman's Park. His dad died of a heart attack, leaving but a lasting vestige of "how to do it his way, or else" attitude on the young Williams. Dick spent time in the Dodger organization, getting to bench jockey during the 1952 World Series – for which the league reprimanded him.

Young and eager, Dick fell to the hardest luck: an injury ruined his chance at a good career. He managed to bounce around for a dozen years thereafter, and learned and developed into quite a utility man while rubbing minds with Paul Richards and Charlie Dressen. Both were highly intelligent, knowing it full well to their ultimate demises in the game. (Manager Bobby Bragan was his first mentor – the most important initially to his playing career and sly strategic opportunities: like warming up a lefty in the pen, sending the other team the message to bat a righty pinch-hitter, then springing a right-hander out the pen (Angus, Dick Williams 2013).)

Dick went on to Boston and saw a disaster of an operation. As a washed-up player, Williams moved into player-cum-coach role, taking a hit on his pay, but garnering a lucky break: a managerial position opened in Toronto. He succeeded quickly where others there had failed.

Williams lobbied to new general manager Dick O'Connell for the Boston head position under Yawkey's happy-if-drunk program. Williams turned them around with military efficiency, winning in 1967 the American League pennant. In seven games, Boston lost the series. Boston started again its once-a-decade run to then unattainable glory.

But Dick did not get along well with others, really, anywhere – and was fired by Yawkey, who let it get personal – but in baseball, getting results leads to other opportunities. Williams never had a problem obtaining another shot.

Exacting standards can be a bear on players – especially as the 1960s and 1970s were about expanding your mind, freedom, and doing it your way – whereas, Williams,

never projected any real warmth to anything that undermined his own goals: winning his way. Leonard Koppett in an essay after Dick Williams' final stop in Seattle:

“As a person, he has always been unfailingly alert, smart and competitive, strong-minded to the point of stubbornness and abrasive in manner even though he could be charming when he wanted to be. But charm was never the goal; winning was. And few baseball men have produced winners in as varied circumstances under unfavorable conditions as he did. Unfavorable circumstances, however, seemed to be his fate, and more often than not he couldn't overcome them.”

Williams came to Finley with exactly the type of personality he wanted: someone that could get a rise out of people, shake up a lineup, play loose, maneuver pitching and hitting, and: just win baby. Williams took over with players that held win-first, fight-later attitudes; and an owner that wanted to win, cheaply, causing players to pick their poison. They generally fought for Dick.

The adventures of clubhouse fights, media meddling, and Finley's loose and broad interpretations of contract law aside, Williams mold a talented squad and all the acumen to defeat the 95-wins-a-year Earl Weaver-led Orioles. He had leaders on the field: Reggie Jackson, the very vocal and brash one; Sal Bando, the quiet intensity humming underneath; and Catfish Hunter, the clown on the field, tell-it-like-it-is, breaker-of-free agency off it.

After an exciting face-off with the 1971 Orioles, where Weaver had a bit more pitching, Finley and Williams added Chicago Cub LHP Ken Holtzman to their team of pirates. It paid dividends on the field in Holtzman's best seasons for a winner, and with Rollie Fingers moved to the bullpen – soon the best money closer in baseball – Williams (pitching coach Bill Posedel) figured out Fingers. (Emotions and thinking are oft at loggerheads in baseball, especially in the 9<sup>th</sup> inning placement of pitchers.)

But the stressful environs got to Williams, enough to consider the Yankees, and another head case owner in Steinbrenner. Finley's insistence on a pinch-hitter for 2<sup>nd</sup> baseman Dick Green left Williams a shortened bench and headaches caused by the micromanager Finley. In the 1973 World Series, 2<sup>nd</sup> baseman Mike Andrews made some costly errors, leading Finley to the ruse of player replacement, faux injury style. Williams, put in a no-win situation – producing a signed affidavit to the media – left Oakland after beating the New York Mets for Oakland's second title.



Finley held Williams to contract and just replaced him with Alvin Dark who managed the last year of the dynasty. Williams sped off to Montreal via California then back to So Cal.

Williams won in both leagues; took Boston, Oakland, and San Diego to the promise land. (Very close on Montreal.) Two of the three were perpetually in the fog before Williams' arrival. Oakland turned its 40 days (years) in the desert of mediocrity into a run of three straight championships.

With an autobiography titled *No More Mr. Nice Guy* one surmises that Williams channeled the idea of, "if you think this task (or my methods) are tough, wait until I really get good and mad."

– *The Man in the Dugout*, Leonard Koppett

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>		Offensive Differential				
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1972	Oakland Athletics	93-62	98.6	604	457	134
1973	Oakland Athletics	94-68	97.7	758	615	147
1974	Oakland Athletics	90-72	98.8	689	551	132
Pitching			Defense			
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1972	2.58	23	43	96	146	130
1973	3.29	16	41	143	170	137
1974	2.95	12	28	90	154	141

### Alvin Dark

Alvin Dark was a conundrum wrapped in a mystery. Not because he was hard to surmise as being very self-interested, always seen to be in control; often manipulative beyond the point of counter productivity in his early managing; and too smarmy to higher ups to the undermining of his direct bosses. But because he turned late to the Gospel of the Lord, Dark actually became a less respectable and understandable person. (You may hate tactics and ploys; but you can respect the results and single-mindedness *sans God*. **NOTE 2022 REVISION:** Which is not to say God was the issue. Insertion of *Biblical* teachings for good or manipulations is always the question at bar. And one does not know what Alvin Dark's mindset *actually was*.)

A Finley retreat, he took Finley's abuses from the start; lost his players for long spells; preached the gospel to the media (oh, boy) and basically damned the owner's soul to hell. (Kuhn et. al. wanted that outcome too.)

But Dark, like short-stint Yankee skipper Bucky Harris, did inherit a talented roster – not undoing the cause of winning a title. Dark’s experience, both successes and failures, long career in great organizations, as Koppett noted, qualified Dark as, “a play doctor (1993, 275).” One that cannot build up a Broadway hit from scratch, or acquire the talent before rehearsals, or even make script adjustments to produce ‘magic’, but one that can hold together a crew to the direction it was most likely going in – without falling apart, or a still birth on its opening night.

For baseball thoughts, Dark saw angles on the field; maximized players in negative situations; tactics to get decent results; and pitching staff maneuvering. It was all the other stuff – the parts that required his mouth and interviews and personal beliefs – that got him in hot water, taking his legs out from under him. It made others wonder about him. A magical mystery tour it often was not.

#### Cincinnati Reds (1970-1976): The Big Red Machine vs. The ‘27 Bronx Bombers

As the National League turned 100, the team that started it all (professionally), completed the trick of dynastic ways. It became the first National League team to repeat as champions since McGraw’s Giants of the 1920s. The Reds are often considered the best lineup in baseball history, exceeding the glory of the 1927 Yankees.

And they do have a few things in common:

1. They both lost multiple World Series and/or league championships prior to their consecutive titles
2. They both had the two/three best players in their respective leagues
3. Both had good bullpens
4. Both had mediocre second basemen turned managers by 35 years of age (Huggins, Anderson)
5. Both started toward dynastic runs after coming to a new ballpark
6. Huge changes in the game had/would transpired. (Ruth, as discussed. Free agency in 1976.)
7. Controversial, legendary players with all-time records to break, or broken. (Ruth by Aaron, then Bonds, and Rose taking down Cobb’s hit record.)
8. Both cities closest to the origins of baseball’s landmark events

An interesting analysis was done using Bill James’ *Win Shares* method. While the methodology behind this analysis is fairly long, and complex, the essence is that each player’s contribution can be broken down into *parts of a win*. For each team win, three shares are generated. Players receive shares based on their percentage of at-bats

(plate appearances), fielding chances, innings pitched, and their overall results from those measures. (Note: This was done before Wins Above Replacement supplanted this method.) In doing a review of his friend's book – Rob Neyer's *Baseball Dynasty* – James put together a win shares listing for various dynastic teams. Many are discussed in this section, and are included in *Final Dynastic Ratings*.

<i>Dynasty Statistics</i>		Offensive Differential				
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Op. Runs	HR
1970	Cincinnati Reds	102-60	91.4	775	681	191
1971	Cincinnati Reds	79-83	81.7	586	581	138
1972	Cincinnati Reds	95-59	95.0	707	557	124
1973	Cincinnati Reds	99-63	95.2	741	621	137
1974	Cincinnati Reds	98-64	98.1	776	631	135
1975	Cincinnati Reds	108-54	109.0	840	586	124
1976	Cincinnati Reds	102-60	104.8	857	633	141
Pitching			Defense			
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1970	3.69	15	60	118	173	151
1971	3.35	11	38	112	174	103
1972	3.21	15	60	129	143	110
1973	3.40	17	43	135	162	115
1974	3.41	11	27	126	151	134
1975	3.37	8	50	112	173	102
1976	3.51	12	45	100	157	102

For simplicity's sake, assume that each team consists of eight regulars, two aces, three remaining starters, a key middle relief man and closer. Fifteen men to acquire, for example, 100 wins (300-win shares.) So each man should average 20-win shares, all things being equal. (Bench is ignored *again* for simplicity.)

Our teams are close in this comparison being that both won over 100 games.

Position	James' Win Shares		Fangraphs WAR Values	
	1927 Yanks	1975 Reds	1927 Yanks	1975 Reds
Ace #1 Right	23	15	4.5	3.2
Ace #2 Left	17	15	3.3	2.7
Other Starters	39	28	8.9	1.6
Middle Relief	16	28	0.6	1.3
Closer	24	13	2	1.7
Catcher	12	30	2.6	6.8
1st Base	44	19	12.5	3.6
2nd Base	24	44	6.3	11
3rd Base	7	31	0.5	5.3
Shortstop	15	19	2.1	4.1
LF	21	21	4.2	5.2
CF	31	16	6.8	3.8
RF	45	18	13	2.5
Bench WS	12	27	0.6	1.8
<i>Total Wins/WAR</i>	110	108	67.9	54.6
<i>Win Shares</i>	330	324		

**Starters:** Big edge to Yanks.

**Bullpens:** Fairly equal. **Infield:** Reds, no contest. **Outfield:** Yanks, again, no contest.

**Batting Lineups:** Reds have 2B Morgan as impressive as 1B Gehrig. 3B Rose an equal for CF Earle Combs. C Bench is the best (likely) of all dynastic backstops. RF Ruth though has no equal aside from a 1961 CF Mickey Mantle.

The Reds though have balance – eight men contributed to the wins – making it a machine that rarely goes out of sync.

Though what is amazing is that while it is lauded as the best starting lineup in baseball history – it only played in 88 total games together over their two-year run (Erardi and Rhodes, *The Big Red Machine* 1997). 1953 or 1955 Dodgers are compelling, but won only one championship.

**Totals for the regulars:** 199-win shares for 1927 Yankees to 198 for the 1975 Reds.

## The Making of the Perfect Team from All Dynasties

With the measures of James, and the initial premises laid out for a dynasty, the best team based on the parts of the equation needed to win multiple championships would be:

- *Starters*: Mordecai Brown, right-hand starter, Robert 'Lefty' Grove, left-hand starter
- *Bullpen Ace*: Wilcy Moore, 1927
- *Catcher*: Johnny Bench
- *Power hitters*: Al Simmons (LF), Mickey Mantle (CF), Babe Ruth (RF)
- *Consistent Personnel*: 1927-28 Yankees or 1975-1976 Reds
- *Career Years*: Lou Gehrig, 1927
- *Manager*: Joe McCarthy, 1936-1939

## New York Yankees (1977-1981): Lethal Dynasty V: A New Beginning, or Martin, Jackson, and The Bronx Zoo

Leonard Koppett on Billy Martin: "His public persona as a troublemaker was not entirely unearned, but the price he often paid was disproportionately severe because of other people's purposes. He had his faults, but he was ultimately more victim than culprit (1993, 275)."

Another manager from hard luck (father skipped out) and humble beginnings in sight of San Francisco's cultural hub, Alfred Manuel Martin, Jr. had only one hope: to become a baseball player. He liked other sports; but baseball was the dream. Born shortly before the Great Depression (1928), Martin came to the Oakland Oaks, managed then by Stengel, through the then-logical Idaho and Phoenix minor league stints in the mid-1940s. Martin's battling mentality, and never afraid to say or do what he thought, usually with a crafty intellect, was an on-the-field talent that Stengel loved.

Martin's career peaked in 1953, hitting .500 in the World Series with 12 hits. Instead of having even more success in the upcoming seasons, he got a hitch in the Army, went through a divorce, and the requisite alimony. He was traded away to the netherworld of Kansas City – after a birthday party for him and Yogi went south, and he took blame unwarranted – and bounced on and off planes, buses and rail lines without likely knowing exactly who he was playing for the remainder of his career. (Detroit, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and Minnesota were those destinations. Back waters all.)

Dynasty Statistics						
Offensive Differential						
Year	Team	Record	Predict	Runs	Opp Runs	HR
1976	New York Yankees	97-62	98.1	730	575	120
1977	New York Yankees	100-62	100.4	831	651	184
1978	New York Yankees	100-63	100.2	735	582	125
1979	New York Yankees	89-71	87.0	734	672	150
1980	New York Yankees	103-59	98.1	820	662	189
1981	New York Yankees	59-48	64.3	421	343	100
Pitching				Defense		
Year	ERA	SHO	SV	HRA	DP	E
1976	3.19	15	37	97	141	126
1977	3.61	16	34	139	151	132
1978	3.18	16	36	111	134	113
1979	3.83	10	37	123	183	122
1980	3.58	15	50	102	160	138
1981	2.90	13	30	64	100	72

Adding injury to insult, in getting hit by a pitch, he was gifted with a broken jaw. Martin healed, only to be hurt once again as he was involved in a brawl with Jim Brewer of the lowly Cubs. But they (the Cubs and Brewer) sued; and he settled.

After the dust of a career settled, Martin took a job as a scout for the Minnesota Twins. He quickly adjusted his mindset from player to evaluating players. The Twins made him a 3<sup>rd</sup> base coach by 1965. The Twins win the American League pennant. From base coaching, he headed to Denver, turning a 7-22 ball club around and bringing them home with a 58-28 spurt (Koppett, *The Man in the Dugout: Baseball's Top Managers and How They Got That Way*, 283). Much wiser, just a bit more mature (or manipulative), but by no means calm, he took the lessons of a lost decade in the baseball doldrums onto his next career: a managerial gun for hire.

### The Miracle Worker Martin

Teams	Year Before Martin	1 <sup>st</sup> Season with Martin	Impact
1969 Minnesota Twins	79-83	97-65, 1 <sup>st</sup> AL West	+18
1971 Detroit Tigers	79-83	91 -71, 2 <sup>nd</sup> AL East	+12
1974 Texas Rangers	57-105	84-76, 2 <sup>nd</sup> AL West	+27
1975 New York Yankees*	83-77* (30-26)	97-62, 1 <sup>st</sup> AL East, AL Pennant	+14
1980 Oakland A's	54-108	83-79, 2 <sup>nd</sup> AL West	+29

(\*Denotes he took over mid-year)

During this time, with his spirit never completely broken, even at his lowest ebbs, Martin always felt the urge to prove himself a better man than the one's signing his checks. In his movements, throughout the 1970s, he certainly proved able to right broken clubs, if nothing else. (Not all his doing, but results were there.)

After an improbable run with the Twins, an old nemesis (Howard Fox) derailed his future fortunes in the land of 10,000 lakes after just one season. (Twins lose; as they became nearly irrelevant until 1987.)

Meanwhile, Martin moved fast, took an older Tiger club back to playoffs against a better team, the 1972 A's, losing in 5 games. However, this time, a feud over baseball direction: trades, player evaluations, and farm development left Martin no graceful exit. Seven days passed.

The Texas Rangers, never going anywhere without doing it with a moseying jaunt, hired Martin. The owner, Bob Short, gave Martin ultimate player control authority. Then, Short sold the team and the promise to Brad Corbett. Even after a valiant effort to derail Oakland with much better talent in 1974, Martin was gone again due to team control issues with his new owner mid-season. Only eleven days passed until the Yankees called mid-1975 season.

### Acquire Reggie! Reggie! Reggie!

Martin took over the once-proud-and-let-you-know-it franchise. After a decade as the league patsy, watching Earl Weaver's Orioles dominating pitching and Dick Williams's A's brawling their way to the top three times, Steinbrenner's Yankees brought back heyday legends – Martin, Yogi, Howard, and Ford – to handle a team built through player shopping spree by Steinbrenner, and the broken shackles of the reserve clause.

Catfish Hunter became the first free agent on New Years' Eve 1974, and was the Yanks' ace in 1975. With Munson behind the plate (.318, 12, 102) and Graig Nettles at 3<sup>rd</sup> base and Chris Chambliss at 1<sup>st</sup> base, the Yanks were not completely devoid of talent at that moment. However, more was to come through the purse and trade.

**Reginald Martinez Jackson (1946- ):** The main slugger behind two 1970s dynasties, his megawatt personality conflicted often with his transformer-driven manager, Martin. Neither man had anything on their check writer, Steinbrenner. Jackson led the American League in home runs four times, and strikeouts, five times. His World Series heroics in 1977, hitting five legendary shots, including three in consecutive at-bats and pitches, cemented his legacy as *Mr. October*. His 563 round trippers were 6<sup>th</sup> all-time at his retirement in 1988. **Pictured Below:** Reggie completing his powerful swing. (Courtesy of Amy Borden)



### Major Deals of *The Bronx Zoo* (Reichler 1988, Trade Section):

1. March 22, 1972: Acquired RP Sparky Lyle from Boston Red Sox.
2. November 27, 1972: Acquired 3B Graig Nettles from Cleveland.
3. April 27, 1974: Acquired 1B Chris Chambliss and SP Dick Tidrow and RP Cecil Upshaw from Cleveland.
4. November 22, 1975: SP Pat Dobson was jettisoned for *OF Oscar Gamble*.
5. December 11, 1975: OF Bobby Bonds was traded to California for CF Mickey Rivers and SP Ed Figueroa.
6. December 11, 1975: 2B Willie Randolph, SP *Kent Brett* and SP *Doc Ellis* for SP Doc Medich.
7. May 18, 1976: Traded for DH Carlos May giving back the White Sox SP *Ken Brett* and Rich Coggins.
8. June 15, 1976: Massive 10-player deal to acquire *SP Ken Holtzman*, SP Doyle Alexander, Grant Jackson, Ellie Hendricks and Jimmy Freeman from Baltimore for SP Rudy May, SP Tippy Martinez, SP Scott McGregor, C Rick Dempsey and Dave Pagan.
9. November 18, 1976: Acquired SP Don Gullett through Free Agency.
10. November 19, 1976: Acquired OF Reggie Jackson through Free Agency.
11. January 20, 1977: Dealt OF Elliott Maddox and Rick Bladt to Baltimore for OF Paul Blair.
12. April 5, 1977: Traded for SS Bucky Dent sending White Sox *OF Oscar Gamble*, P LaMarr Hoyt, and \$200,000.
13. April 27, 1977: SP Mike Torrez acquired from Oakland dealing away *SP Dock Ellis*, *SP Ken Holtzman* and minor leaguer Bill Van Bommell.

The shakeup of the league through player movement ultimately benefited those willing to pay the dollars to have said talent. Steinbrenner was definitely in his element – and



hardly could be faulted for making these moves when Gabe Paul and Billy Martin insisted, or even when they didn't, a bigger problem.

But talent and genius behind the wheel doesn't mean it will run smoothly. Before long, Martin – Steinbrenner – Jackson quarreled and connived like a *Peyton Place/Gossip Girl* episode, becoming a triangle of power and control games. Martin was naturally bound to lose again; did so time after time in his baseball career. Reggie, the media and baseball megastar, hit dongs whenever it was called for – earning *Mr. October* honors. Yet, Jackson reveled in plentiful “ego” moments. It was that sort of time. Martin got his lone championship before calling both men out: “One's a born liar; the other, convicted (Martin and Golenbock 1980, 175).” George, owning the team, outlasted both, of course.

In 1978, the Yankees pulled off a miracle – unlike all their other years, they were 14 games to the rear of Boston – joining the ranks of the 1914 Boston Braves, 1951 New York Giants, 1964 St. Louis Cardinals, and 1969 New York Mets as teams down by significant margins, only to streak into the World Series.

SS Bucky Dent was a Billy Martin clone in that while his talent was never enormous, he scrapped by, becoming a name beloved (and also despised) up and down the Northeastern coast of America, dependent on fandom.

#### Toronto Blue Jays (1992-1993): The Best Team Canadian Money Could Buy

The best paid team of their time. The first ‘foreign’ dynasty. Quickly forgotten after the strike and the revival of the Yankees. (**See: Clinton Era: Business of Baseball.**)

#### New York Yankees (1996-2003): Lethal Dynasty VI: The Monsters of October

In the age of too many badly made Hollywood trilogies, and horror movies, chapter eight, the Yankees come back (again) to life as a dynasty after fifteen seasons dormant since *Lethal Dynasty V*. The supporting cast members are all new; eager to leave their marks; but also more pampered (and rich) than any of their predecessors ever were. But one star has carried over from the last picture show, bringing along a Trump-sized ego, a burgeoning penchant for lasting real estate maneuvers, and tantrums/loys that pushed out nearly every surviving star from *Lethal Dynasty II, III, IV, and V*.

#### George, George of the Concrete Jungle

Baseball has characters. People that for whatever reason came into the sport due to an abiding love to play it, to manage the player, or to own the stadiums and contracts of those players. The striving for perfection on the field becomes a compulsion that

creates greatness that is defined in championship totals. Such an internal focus on oneself and playing skills can result in an inevitable price: being seen as self-absorbed and selfish, forgetting it is only a game in the end. In some though, insanity maybe long existent, and just needs a game such as baseball to bring out the best, and very worst, of those inherit traits.

George Steinbrenner was such a character.

Born to a family immersed in the shipping business, with Prussian-Irish blood and iron-fisted tactics, George Steinbrenner III had the genetic and environmental coding to become a controlling, manipulative, arrogant, and jealous narcissistic-perfectionist. Just add the money and the time.

George started out entrepreneurial early, raising chickens and selling eggs from his 1<sup>st</sup> angel investor, father Henry. The egg route grew, the George Company, glimmered fondly in Steinbrenner's mind, as Kahn wrote, "he can describe the differences between a Buff Wine Dot, a Plymouth Rock, and a guinea hen (2003, 72)." His patriarch's desire for achievement was passed down. (George sold the company to his sisters.)

At 13, Steinbrenner joined Walter O'Malley at Culver Military Academy. While O'Malley took to the law before baseball, George spent time in education gravitating towards sports endeavors, coaching, and ownership. George ran track, played end on the football team; later, at Williams College, he chose the same pursuits while majoring in English Lit – Thomas Hardy and Shakespeare struck resonating enough cords (Kahn 2003, 73).

He rarely excelled in sports, but picked apart others' efforts, creating tension. "George showed contempt for those on the track team who were slipshod about practicing...George, who had no sense of humor about anyone for whom things came so easily, would retort... (Golenbock, George: The Poor Little Rich Boy Who Built The Yankee Empire, 31)" while also trying to fit in with those same slackers. Slackers saw him as a spoiled, rich, untalented ass kisser, yet allowed him into their set, begrudgingly. Steinbrenner consistently attempted to ingratiate older crowds, feeling success was gained through higher class mimicking.

George's underlying passion ran towards the mental aspects of operating and managing players in football, track, basketball, and much later, baseball. He contemplated trades for 1940s Cleveland Indians, being his hometown; attempted to

fix track runners technique in the blocks; sat on the editorial board at the school newspaper for closeness to star athletes, creating conflict; then, massaged a résumé to garner both Northwestern and Purdue football coaching jobs. All of these efforts did not land him the higher acclaim he sought.

So, after a brief stint with dad in shipping, he bought the Cleveland Pipers, attempted to take it to the NBA – but, as always, he was a hard man to work for, or deal with, in many aspects. (As the NBA deal fell through for various reasons, cash and coaching misfiring(s), were at the head of that failure.) But George would do anything to get ahead to a better deal, if only to prove his worthiness to his dominating and successful father Henry. He always thought better of his skills than those around him – and received backlash for his self-aggrandizing. (Like putting himself down as a captain of the Williams College football team (Golenbock, George: The Poor Little Rich Boy Who Built The Yankee Empire, 38).) Yet, it worked.

Steinbrenner wanted to be the total social package, image-is-everything, all-that-matters-is-winning-the-contest – no matter how small the reward was for achievement – to his early classmates, and then, future social acquaintances. He would always get what he wanted, one way or another, as many left in the wake of his empire building have said. Roger Kahn modestly remembered an early encounter with George, describing him as “husky, bluff, intense, and charming (2003, 71).” It was fitting that the New York Yankees (in the media capital of the world), and long removed from the glory days of the 1950s, found their new owner was to reprise the winning ways, but in getting the talented players, coaches and execs, drove nearly insane the very talents he acquired.

Never a dull day with *George of the Concrete Jungle*.

#### **A short laundry list of George maneuvers during *Lethal Dynasty V & VI*:**

- Hired and fired Billy Martin five times
- Played head games with Reggie Jackson and Dave Winfield, attempted to destroy Winfield’s charitable foundation as retaliation for a poorly constructed contract (George put in an inflation kicker (a clause) negotiated during a time of high inflation in the early 1980s.)
- Interfered with managers, constantly – in game – while taking no blame for mistakes in personnel acquisition, like having three first basemen signed one year
- Planted stories in the NYC media – to coerce players and managers
- Chased off Yogi Berra, Lou Piniella, and other Yankee greats and managers between Billy Martin tenures

- After his two-year suspension, he fired off Gene Michael and his scouting staff that brought together top talent that led to their last five World Series titles (through 2013)
- Walked a tightrope between questionable morals and prison-worthy behavior
- Instilled a divide-and-conquer mentality into the entire organization (Verducci and Torre, *The Yankee Years* 2009, 124)
- Never met a high-priced free agent he couldn't afford
- Never met a rookie he could not get rid of on a lark
- Critic of everyone, usually, and a creditor of no one, without caveats

While this all could be seen as a master recipe for disaster, the madness in king George found ways (money helps) to pick up the pieces and get the Yankees over the hump. His flaws aside, the Yankees put plenty of money into baseball – as its top (and usually only) luxury tax contributor – and thus, buys up the expensive free agents, every season, especially when they do not win a World Series. (**Luxury Tax/Competitive Balance Tax:** Used as “industry development (Fangraphs, Luxury Tax)” for teams that go above a maximum payroll levels set by MLB CBA. The Yankees consistently outspent their rivals by \$50-75 million per year during the luxury tax era. Luxury Tax never stopped Steinbrenner from busting the cap level.)

No player on the “free” market with above average skills is safe from a Steinbrenner-inspired contract. In late 2008, after a string of very expensive flops, the sons of Steinbrenner (Hal and Hank) followed in George’s steps in acquiring \$423.5 million in contracts for pitchers C.C. Sabathia and A.J. Burnett and 1B Mark Texiera. And just like *Lethal Dynasty V*, the Yankees put themselves back on top of the American League and the Majors by winning the 2009 World Series with Japan’s Hideki Matsui as the MVP of the series. (Matsui was not tendered a contract, thereafter.)

In 2013-2014 offseason, the Yankees redid the spending trick: signing over \$500 million in contracts to acquire free agents at top dollar. By comparison, the Chicago Cubs signed less than \$20 million in new contracts as of February 2, 2014.

George would indeed be proud, until the losses came even once.

### **A Lasting, Priceless Memory**

George’s monument to his six (and now, seven) World Series opened in 2009: **Yankee Stadium II**. At \$1.5 Billion, this house is unlikely to be foreclosed upon anytime soon.

- The Debt service: \$962 Million (Golenbock 2009, 335).
- Ticket prices: \$2,500 *per seat* behind home plate with catering.

- The man *who won* seven World Series: priceless to a fault, perfection of baseball insanity.

(**Note:** The prior psychoanalysis and personal history is mostly paraphrased from Peter Golenbock's *George: The Poor Little Rich Boy Who Built The Yankee Empire*, John Wiley & Sons, 2009.)

### **Why The Yankees Win All The Time (Nearly)**

The Yankee mojo comes back with the winners of four titles in five seasons. The 1998 team is likely the best Yankee team in 59 years. The late 1990s installment of the dynasty has the once mediocre manager, Joe Torre, hailed as a genius. Sound familiar? (Gene Michael likely knows the truth. Nothing against Joe, though. He was a very good player, and survived George; that it is worthy of recognition.)

So what got the Yankees good again?

### **Minor League Crops turned into Major Talents**

Jeter, Williams, Posada, and Rivera all came from the farm system. With key offensive talent coming up the middle – shortstop, centerfield, catcher, and a closer – it set into stone a team with ample contributions in places hard to get top talent. At short, Jeter's flaws on defense are made up for by consistent offense, and post-season heroics. Williams, as discussed in the centerfielders section, provides good punch and decent prowess in his prime on defense. Posada – never to be mistaken for Munson, Dickey, or Berra – still is a top-5 catcher in the majors for his time. The Yankees hit the heavenly trifecta on offense, as all three took plenty of at-bats during the 1996-2001 cycle.

Table. Yankees AB by Key Personnel (Consistency)

Player	Total AB	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Age (2001)
<b>Jeter</b>	3,696	582	654	626	627	593	614	27
<b>Martinez</b>	3,467	595	594	531	589	569	589	34
<b>O'Neill</b>	3,374	546	553	602	597	566	510	38
<b>Williams</b>	3,227	551	509	499	591	537	540	33
<b>Knoblauch</b>	2,127			603	603	400	521	33
<b>Brosius</b>	1,901			530	473	470	428	35
<b>Posada</b>	1,726			358	379	505	484	30
Boggs	854	501	353					
Girardi	820	422	398					
Soriano	574						574	25
Davis	476				476			
Curtis	456			456				
Duncan	400	400						
Justice	381						381	35
Fielder	361		361					
Sierra	360	360						
Hayes	353		353					

### “This One Goes Past Eleven”

Mariano Rivera has proven to be the best closer in baseball in key situations during pennant chases and World Series games in the last forty years. Tom Verducci in *The Yankee Years*: “Rivera had twelve six-out+ saves in the post season – rest of baseball only had eleven. Rivera obtained at least four outs in 79 percent of postseason saves, more than triple the incidence of such heavy lifting by all other closers combined (25 percent).” During a time when no other guys can go past 4 outs, Rivera brings out his cut fastball, and slices up opponents with the only noise coming from rabid Yankee fans when he’s done. When then all-time saves leader Trevor Hoffman had AC/DC’s *Hells Bells* playing on his entry (2009), Doctor Rivera gives *Spinal Taps* to the batters: unusual fear, lasting pain, and lights out until next season. (Mario is tops now in saves at 652 and 56.6 *bWAR* from the bullpen role. He retired after the 2013. Cooperstown in 2019?)

### Randomness Be Damned

Yankees proved immune to vagaries of playoff math. That, good teams, as playoff teams all are, generally, cannot consistently win multiple short series to gain the title, year after year. While the Yankees did it between 1996-2000, after that, wildcard

teams in Florida, Boston, and St. Louis won between 2003 -2006. Several other usually mediocre lights made dramatic or first World Series appearances thereafter to the Yankees consternation. (Colorado and Tampa Bay.)

### **Steroids, Schmeriods**

While many will contend the Yankees had juicers on their championship ball clubs – Roger Clemens, Andy Pettitte, and Chuck Knoblauch – it is difficult to assign such a hugely debatable chunk of Yankee success to this. No one can adequately define or determine the percent improvement, or a percent usage by all MLB players over the Steroid Era. (From 5-50% of MLB players depending on “the source” of information.) So, it is only conjecture and this author’s feelings that make this worth a mention.

### Boston Red Sox (2003-2008): Theo Takes Two, Here’s Looking at You, Kid

**Luck:** It took only 86 years to shake off *The Bambino Curse*. CF Dave Roberts added to the trade that would execute the stolen base to keep the Sox alive in 2004 ALCS. (**See: Reagan Era: Franchises.**)

And, Finally, One Failed Dynasty...

### Baltimore Orioles (1969 – 1980): Dream Weaver

Many have taken a second-place finish over and over in fierce competition and grown into a winner in the eyes of many Americans. The Cubs of the 1930s were a failed dynasty – taking a golden sombrero (0 for 4, four strikeouts) in securing post-*Prohibition* champagne – but are remarkable for their colorful and continued struggles to this very day. The Brooklyn Dodgers got drubbed out onto their gritty streets in 1941, 1947, 1949, 1952, and 1953 before getting sweetest revenge on their Bronx rivals in 1955. Others in major sports took the collar (Vikings, Broncos, Bills), but still had qualities, management, and personnel that make them dynastic in all but the sweet hangovers after getting that final out.

A mastery of management, motivation and arguing, Earl Sidney Weaver, led the Baltimore Orioles of the LBJ and early Reagan era. His teams were always in the hunt – from 1969 to 1980, they never finished below .500 or 3<sup>rd</sup> in the division, aside from 1978 (90-71) – and had the main characteristics of the other dynasties mentioned.

### 1. Ace Pitching (1969-1980)

Table. Number of 20-game winners (WS appearance in red)

Year	1969	1970	1971	1973	1977	1979	1980
20-Wins	2	3	4	1	1	1	2
Team Wins	109	108	101	97	97	102	100

### 2. Consistent Personnel (1969-1971)

Pitchers Jim Palmer, Mike Cuellar and Dave McNally and Paul Richert.

RF Frank Robinson, CF Paul Blair, LF Don Buford, 3B Brooks Robinson, SS Mark Belanger, 2B Davey Johnson, 1B Boog Powell, C Elrod Hendricks and Andy Etchebarren.

### 3. Power Hitters (1969-1980)

Earl 's team never had an outrageous power guy. Frank Robinson's numbers peak in 1966 his first season in the Oriole's fold. But he usually had 4-6 guys that hit 15-35 dingers, making his lineups balanced for the 3-run vapor trail to the seats that he preferred over any sacrifice bunt strategy used by Alston, et. al.

Year	1969	1970	1971	1973	1977	1979	1980
15-HRs	4	6	5	1	4	5	4
Avg. of Best	29.5	21.8	21.4	22	24.5	24	21.75



(Above: A powerful 1B, Boog Powell now sells his sandwiches to the Camden Yards crowd. Courtesy of Sharon Chapman.)



**4. Career Year:** Pat Dobson came over from the 1969 San Diego Padres after a decent campaign for a fledgling franchise at 14-15 with 3.76 ERA. He was 28 years old in 1970; and reaped benefits to the tune of a 20-8, 2.90 ERA sparkling year under the tutelage of Orioles system as the 4<sup>th</sup> man in the 20-game winner group. **The next year:** Pat leads the league in losses, with a better ERA! (Dobson, Davey Johnson, and catcher Johnny Oates were traded on November 30, 1972 to Atlanta.)

## 5. Dual Bullpen Aces

Table. Top BP guys with over 50 innings

Year	Throws	Name	ERA	IP	SV
1969	L	Pete Richert	2.20	57.3	12
1969	R	Eddie Watt	1.65	71.0	16
1970	L	Pete Richert	1.98	54.7	13
1970	R	Eddie Watt	3.25	55.3	12
1973	L	Grant Jackson	1.90	80.3	9
1973	R	Bob Reynolds	1.95	111.0	9
1974	L	Grant Jackson	2.57	66.7	12
1974	R	Bob Reynolds	2.73	69.3	7
1976	R	Dyar Miller	2.94	88.7	7
1977	L	Tippy Martinez	2.70	50.0	9
1978	L	Tippy Martinez	4.83	69.0	5
1978	R	Don Stanhouse	2.89	74.7	24
1979	R	Don Stanhouse	2.85	72.7	21
1980	L	Tippy Martinez	3.01	80.7	10
1980	R	Tim Stoddard	2.51	86.0	26

While the Orioles loved starters that went long into the game, Weaver had zero qualms about using multiple guys to get the game in the win column. He also seemed a proponent of have two guys (one lefty, one righty) that could get final outs at crunch time. More importantly, they had to be able to do it well.

The Orioles won only one championship in 1970 over their soon-to-be dynastic opponent, The Big Red Machine.

But the Weaver group had the talent and dreams to be the team to beat in the 1970s.

It just didn't happen.

The dream weaver could not wish away the A's, the Yankees, their managers, or their crazy owners. But the Orioles get a mentioned in the annals of dynasties for their top-end winning for a decade. A conciliation prize they surely would rather not take.

### Final Dynastic Ratings

No	Baseball Dynasties	Aces	Backstop	Power	Personnel	Bullpen	Career YR	Managers	Luck*	Total	WS Titles
1	New York Yankees (1936-1943)	7	10	10	8	8	9	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>6</b>
2	New York Yankees (1926-1932)	9	5	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	9	9	<b>72</b>	3
3	Cincinnati Reds (1970-1976)	5	<b>10</b>	8	<b>10</b>	10	10	9	9	71	2
4	New York Yankees (1947-1955)	8	<b>10</b>	9	9	9	9	9	7	70	6
5	Philadelphia A's (1929-1931)	<b>10</b>	9	9	9	8	8	10	7	70	2
6	New York Yankees (1956-1964)	9	10	10	6	10	<b>10</b>	7	7	69	4
7	<b>Baltimore Orioles (1969-1980)</b>	10	3	7	8	9	9	<b>10</b>	9	65	<b>1</b>
8	New York Yankees (1996-2003)	8	6	8	10	<b>10</b>	8	9	5	64	4
9	Cubs (1906-1910)	<b>10</b>	9	9	10	2	10	10	3	63	2
10	Boston Red Sox (2003-2008)	9	7	<b>10</b>	8	8	9	8	3	62	2
11	Philadelphia A's (1910-1914)	10	5	8	9	7	8	10	4	61	3
12	Oakland A's (1972 -1974)	8	3	6	9	10	9	9	7	61	3
13	New York Yankees (1977-1981)	7	8	8	8	8	6	10	5	60	2
14	Los Angeles Dodgers (1959-1966)	<b>10</b>	6	3	8	10	10	10	2	59	3
15	St. Louis Cardinals (1941-1946)	9	7	7	9	7	9	9	2	59	3
16	St. Louis Cardinals (1964-1968)	10	5	6	6	6	9	7	7	56	2
17	Toronto Blue Jays (1991-1994)	8	4	8	10	9	7	6	3	55	2
18	New York Giants (1921-1924)	5	6	7	7	5	8	10	6	54	2
19	Boston Red Sox (1912-1918)	8	4	8	8	3	9	7	4	51	4
20	St. Louis Cardinals (1926-1934)	10	5	7	7	5	9	5	3	51	3

\*Luck (the more needed equals lower score) = 5 is average, 1 is absurd

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**Bold indicates BEST of Group (ties are possible)**

- **Best Starting Pitching:** A's (Grove), Cubs (Brown), Dodgers (Koufax)
- **Best Catcher:** (Reds) Bench or (Yankees) Berra
- **Best Power:** Gehrig & Ruth, 2003 Red Sox topped the 1927 Yankees in slugging with Manny Ramirez in the mix
- **Best Personnel:** 1975 Reds or 1927 Yankees
- **Best Bullpen Ace:** Mariano Rivera or Wilcy Moore (Yankees)
- **Best Career Years:** Mickey Mantle/Roger Maris in 1961. Gehrig, Ruth and Combs in 1927
- **Best Managers:** Joe McCarthy or Earl Weaver
- **Least need for luck:** Late 1930s Yankees needed no luck. They destroyed their opponents.

## Broadcasters & Sportswriters: The Men Who Spoke and Wrote about the Game

Each game starts with the call of the broadcaster, who must maintain the aura of impartiality (usually) while giving the men on the field both flavor and grit in all things baseball. Some days this is little work; the plays of the day keep the game watchers on the edge – others – it takes a versed talent to move a molasses-filled, three-hour and forty-five-minute walk-a-thon to a better beat. These men behind the mike can make mortals, immortal, in the eyes of their youngest and oldest fans, and ordinary plays into catastrophic events that have lasted through the ever-changing prism which we view the game.

Broadcasting the game via radio goes back to the early Ruthian power surge. On August 5, 1921, radio “on-air” was born in Pittsburgh at KDKA (C. Smith, *The Storytellers. From Mel Allen to Bob Costas: Sixty Years of Baseball Tales From the Broadcast Booth* 1995, ix), with more than a few famous ‘masters of the mike’ shaping the pennant chases and World Series heroics of the ‘masters of the mound’ and ‘purveyors of power’ since. (Russ Hodges calling Bobby Thomson’s home run on October 3, 1951, for example.)

In those early halcyon days, with re-creations coming from the likes of Ronald Reagan in Iowa, the game was the reason for the season. The technology kept people glued to the audio box – which made advertisers cash registers ring – and so, an intimate and personal connection developed between the audience, the announcer, and the sports teams. In boroughs of growing cities, and within the daily grind of shopkeepers, bustling open markets and school kids on the hooky, radios were always set to an afternoon game. Usually faked via teletype, these transcendent ‘radio’ images painted ballplayers as impervious at the plate and dogmatic on the mound, and the legends and legacies grew in boy’s and men’s minds at the urging of the mike men.

When the night games came to be, and the games dragged into normal bedtimes in September, the youth took their Philco radios to bed – keeping them just loud enough to hear their team finally win. (And low enough to satiate a mother’s next morning desires.) Boy’s dreams were sweeter; and the school conversations swirled around the greatness of Mantle, the fire of Durocher, the outfield speed of Mays, and bullets thrown by Feller and Roberts. The announcers had deified these men – and the boys of summer were always the heroes of the school-time in fall.

As television glowed in more households, the shift from radio hammed-up special effects to real-time television drama saw new men take over for the radio pioneers,

gradually. Both mediums have lasted, as fans choose their tastes from a platter of competent and compelling men. Without the voices, as these men proved, the game would have lost an essence that cannot be duplicated through casual viewing or the examination of a box score.

Curt Smith, baseball broadcasting historian and former speechwriter for President George H.W. Bush, is the energy behind any discussion about broadcasting. His various titles, *The Storytellers*, *Of Mikes and Men*, *Voices of Summer*, and *Voices of The Game* are required reading to understand the many facets of the men that crafted stories, rooted for the home team, critiqued bad teams (and good alike), injected jockdom and intellectual repartee into ball games from the Louisiana bayou to Canadian haunts. And took millions along on joyrides down the Route 66 of baseball history. (Therefore, much of what follows is *his* research – and is to *his* credit. Unless otherwise stated, or footnoted, the following is *paraphrased* out of his exacting research.)

### Bios, Firsts, Categories, and Characters of Broadcasting

Radio was the *original* Internet. In 1925, only ten percent of America had Marconi's invention, but by 1933, sixty-three percent had followed the early adopters' lead. FDR's "fireside chats" were amongst the first of the "must listen to" programs alongside professional baseball. Each grew in stature and legend due to radio's reach.

But these pioneers of broadcast were treading in uncharted waters, trying out much on the fly – like talking between pitches and giving statistics – and learning the importance of keeping the fans aware of what transpired in the background. (If not heard via the telephonic lines used to transmit the game live back to broadcast station.) As a result, pioneers and firsts in many areas are only natural to have come from men long forgotten by any generation born after 1950. But they did their work; and changed the landscape of media forever.

Harold Arlin did his 1<sup>st</sup> broadcast for KDKA in Pittsburgh in 1921, after his matriculation from Jayhawk land. He broadcasted for only four years – but was able to silence Babe Ruth for once. (Quite a feat.) He'd live to see TV and the Space Shuttle disaster in 1986, and made the Hall of Fame through the founding of play-by-play.

Graham McNamee did his first World Series on radio as a color man for Bill McGeehan's play-by-play in 1923, replacing venerated sportswriter Grantland Rice who did the first World Series in 1921. McNamee was "bodacious" and played it up to the hilt – in his day, without verified baseball knowledge. His star rose as he

broadcasted twelve World Series (1923 -1934) for Westinghouse and NBC, but his profile irked sportswriters, and the commish, Landis. Landis began picking “the voices” of the World Series, and McNamee quit, and said his final, “Good night, all, and good-bye.”

While the kinks were still there, Hal Totten was dropped into the fire by William Wrigley to broadcast an entire baseball season for the Cubs in 1924 at WMAQ. He soon had company on the air as Bob Elston carried the Cubs on WGN while WJKS and WBBM had their equal time. As an airwave saturation by-product, fans came in droves around the Midwest as the Cubs ‘got good’ again under manager Joe McCarthy by 1929. Totten announced the 1<sup>st</sup> All-Star game, unknowingly upstaging McNamee as they switched positions as hometown hero took over the play-by-play from the colorful icon.

Pat Flanagan knew how to take the show on the road, or rather, bring the road to the show. He first broadcasted the road games via re-creations – telegraphy employed simple Morse code signals – with SC3 20 meaning, “strike three called, two down!” Flanagan was your original chatty Cathy able to motor at an average of 240 words a minute. Which came in handy when the wire went down; making up what was happening, like *War of the Worlds* – that was a baseball innovation.

From *Voices of Summer*, President Ronald Reagan:

“Fouls don’t make the box score, so for seven minutes I had Billy Jurgens set a record.” Pitcher Dizzy Dean used the resin bag, mopped his brow, tied a shoe. Rain neared. A fight began. “None of this happened, but at home it seemed real.” When the wire revived, “Jurgens popped out on the first pitch.”

Flanagan too imbued plenty of boys with such an improvisation bug, as every ball fanatic pretends to make an amazing catch, throw out a runner, and swat home runs deep into the bleachers of their imagination. And a few turn that talent into a reality, and lasting glory.

Bob Elson got a “get of The Navy free” card issued by Franklin Roosevelt. Problem was, he had to go back. But the man was good at the interview. Fellow mike master Jack Brickhouse adored the man (Elson) who parlayed good pipes, persona, and popularity into shilling for bands, political heavies, Chicago’s best hotels, and interviewing Connie Mack in 1930, and later on, DiMaggio, Mantle, and Monroe. (That Monroe.) Elston made the on-air, on-the-field interview his personal contribution to the sport. From

there, he spent nearly 40 seasons with a mike ready for anyone in baseball – particularly on the south side of Chicago. His biggest snub: left out the 1959 White Sox World Series appearance.

The late sixties replaced Elston's bubbly persona with friction against hippie types. Even Nixon, on the baseball centennial noted, "I knew Bob back when the Sox had a good team." His style grew tired, but he could make an athlete tell you what you wanted to hear. (And sometimes, what you didn't.)

By the time the worst of the Great Depression was over, the Cincinnati Reds were bankrupt. Powell Crosley came to their rescue. Crosley hired two men that represented the innovative and evocative spirit of baseball in the FDR Era: Larry MacPhail and Red Barber. MacPhail took the Reds into uncharted Major League waters with nighttime baseball. Barber's southern-accented, graceful voice brought the Reds notice, fans again, but as soon as MacPhail packed off for Brooklyn, so too went the Red Barber of Seville.

In just five seasons, Barber announced the first night game, Johnny Vander Meer's first no-no, and then, the encore unparalleled, at Ebbets' first nocturnal game. Barber made the inaugural TV broadcast in late August 1939, just days before WWII would change America and the world. Red sold directly on the broadcasts Ivory Soap, Mobil Gas, and Wheaties. Such American staples have not changed much in three score and ten. His boss, MacPhail, hired in Leo Durocher to take *Dem Bums* up a notch. It worked – as Brooklyn stopped being doormats and won enough to lose to the Yankees in October 1941. (Some feats are worth celebrating.)

Such history seemed to happen around Red and Mac.

Barber added to the vast lexicon of baseball: "catbird seat", "pulpit", "tearin' up the pea patch", "sun garden", "suck-egg mule." His voice went into college football, NFL title tilts, and the mid-summer classic. Red again was party to history – this time as Jackie Robinson made his inaugural after sixty years of unwritten ostracism. Barber from a time and place *with racial barriers*, made peace, and later, befriended Robinson.

Red honed his replacement's pipes: legendary Vin Scully. But as Red grew in stature, so did his desire for compensation. New Bum owner O'Malley was not so inclined – offering a trade of announcers to Dan Topping's Yankees – but the liquored up deal fell through. Raindrops kept falling on the head of the Barber of Seville.

Soon though, Red was off to the Bronx by the broadcast force of nature. Less evocative, more curmudgeonly and less effective compared to *TWIB* future host, Mel Allen, Red lasted another decade during the fall of the Yankee Empire. As time rolled, Red's role came to a halt in 1966. 413 Yankee fans total shared in Red Barber's last season woes.

Red lasted to see *Seville Row* and the Hall of Fame and spent over a decade on *NPR* giving history lessons to kids, grow ups, and Brooklyn mourners. He sojourned in 1992 at 84.

While Red Barber had the first of many historical moments, outfielder Jack Graney became a new way to get "inside baseball" into broadcasts in 1932. His long career as a fly-chaser, and facing of Babe Ruth, when still a great pitcher, gave him an insight, stories, and original lexicality that other announcers had to learn with time: like "bazooka shots" and "sad iron."

A rough rider in the booth and on the mound, but with a virgin's class, Canadian Graney gave up pitching for an outfielder's mitt after Nap Lajoie took a bean ball upstairs in a display of Graney's fire-balling ability for the Cleveland Naps. Though considered mediocre with the bat (.250), Jack must be considered a sabermetric-minded soul, walking over 90 times in 3 seasons, twice the league leader, while standing in at only 5 feet 9 inches.

After ball, the *Roarin' Twenties* saw Graney speculate, and better still, he sold used cars. But the Indians lured him back – "Glad" to be back in a new park: Municipal Stadium. The cavern was filled with his voice for 21 years. Bob Feller, Lou Boudreau, Luke Easter, Larry Doby, Bobby Avila, Al Rosen, Jim Hegan, Ken Keitner, Mike Garcia, Bob Lemon, Early Wynn, Al Lopez, and Bill Veeck. The good ole days for the Tribe spanned his run at the mike. Graney lived to 92 years old, married for 61 years, and more, to baseball's glory: from Ruth's slabwork to Jackson's trifecta perfecta in the 1977 World Series.

Rosey Rowswell sounds like a vacuum cleaner salesman from Walla Walla, or a 1960s ad exec, but he was fast-talking, original homer for the Pirates. He brought enough excitement to an otherwise lacking product (1936 -1954) to be memorable for his home run calls: "Get upstairs, Aunt Minnie, and raise the window. Here she [baseball] comes!" The Pirates rarely got FOBs – Full of Bucs – but Rosey put that in the sexy lexi of baseball. (Barber had his Brooklynese version.)

Rowswell pomp knew no bounds. (He trampled Bing Crosby, part-owner of the Bucs, while calling a Ralph Kiner clout into Schenley Park.) But Rosey somehow just passed the excitement on to curse-happy legend Bob Prince – his protégé, to wit, the FOBs, dipsy doodles, and “putting the lamb chops on the stove” cooked on after Rowswell’s coronary in 1955. His voice was a *Ripley’s Believe It or Not* racer: 400 words per minute as the 1<sup>st</sup> poetic voice of the Pirates.

Byrum Saam called games in Philadelphia, home to inordinate losing for most of his 38 seasons. 4,395 losses and the one season a Philly team goes to the October classic, he’s not their announcer, the 1950 Wiz Kids. He malaproped his way through a few of the 7,600 games called – “to all the guys scoring in bed” – but was a smile in a city of un-brotherly love of winning games. He is the original rooter for the losing side.

### **Other men of origination:**

- ❑ Dave Van Horne as the 1<sup>st</sup> voice of Montreal Expos on April 14, 1969. Called Bill Stoneman’s no-no after only nine games in the booth. Olympic Stadium was “Oh, Canada’s” worst design, mimicking all 1970s cookie cutters parks.
- ❑ Dave Niehaus. (1<sup>st</sup> Seattle announcer)
- ❑ Bob Wolff. (Washington Senators voice 1947-1960: Never dwelt far from last place.)
- ❑ Lindsey Nelson – 1<sup>st</sup> Voice of the *Amazing* Mets (1962-1979)
- ❑ Gene Elston – 1<sup>st</sup> Houston Voice 1962-1986
- ❑ Tom Cheek, the original voice of Toronto, worked with HOF pitcher Early Wynn. Got the catbird seat of baseball’s first hotel nudity scene at the record-setting Skydome. *How 'bout that!*

### Bright Lights, Big City

Every fan knows the big-time talent heads to or is pulled to the big cities. New York. Los Angeles. Chicago. Detroit even. As the radio gave way to the television star, baseball grew on the box via more voices. While radio allowed wordsmiths to wrangle ear-heavy people, television made for dramatic sights and parsimonious words. Some mastered both; and legends grew in the bright lights and big cities.

Born Melvin Allen Israel in Birmingham, Alabama on Valentine’s Day 1913, the voice of the New York Yankees came to baseball a lawyer and left a legend no one with ears forgets. He got Russian blood from the parents, southern style from Alabama, and a prodigy’s education at Bear Bryant’s stomping grounds as a lawyer *cum laude* by twenty-three.





Mel worked a stint as a speech instructor down South, but soon landed an audition in New York after being heard as the Voice of the Tide in the mid-1930s: Baseball's luck, college football's loss. He interrupted the *Kate Smith Hour* for the *Hindenburg* tragedy and rode sports like the Kentucky Derby and 1939 All-star game. Mel Allen needed no wishin' upon star like "Jiminy Cricket," to be as big as Disney.

Allen retired the law practice that paid a clerk's wages of \$10 bucks per week for radio at \$95 per and growing. Mathematics easy. **Mel Allen (above):** *The Voice of MLB Baseball* and this author's youth. (Courtesy of Wikipedia)

After a gaff by Arch McDonald's assistant – "ovary" for "Ivory" soap – Mel grabbed the mike for the Yanks in 1939. McDonald went to last place in Washington. Happy days were indeed here as the Yankees were finishing one dynastic run, and to soon start up another, as the boys came home from 'over there', part two. (Mel went to the Army for three years.)

By 1946, the voice was at the mike in October, broadcasting eighteen straight World Series on radio and on TV. He warmed every broadcast with superior knowledge and smooth as silk transitions and kind and sharp questions to his drinking pal, Casey Stengel.

Mel Allen on Casey Stengel and drinking: "They didn't tell me this was a blue town.' Casey liked to have a couple after a ball game, or four or six or eight." (Blue laws restricted drinking and other things.)

One night, a bleacher scene from *Sixteen Candles*, Mel dropped this doozy: "He's kissing her on the strikes, and she's kissing him on the balls." Oh my word.

His vocal rival came to town – Barber – and the comparisons grew. **Barber**: critical praise. **Allen**: All-American favorite. **Barber**: professional, fair, singular, and Biblical. **Allen**: panache, pleasing to fans, legions of admirers, and partook of nightcaps with baseball's elite.

Neither man survived the 1960s as Yankees. Allen lost his voice for a spell. Red forgot his place. Both did resurrect, and did well. The hall of fame called them. Allen pursued a little enterprise called *This Week in Baseball* in 1977. It still runs in 2013 with the Voice always there, remembered, and rejoiced. *How 'bout that, Mel.*

From a New York's Bronx tale, Vin Scully acquired the baseball broadcasting bug before bombers hit their mark at Pearl Harbor. He did youth jobs: milk, mail, cutlery and haberdashery cleaning. He made his dash from Fordham prep to university, shoved off into the Navy, shagged flies in center at the ball yard, but was obsessed with radio's beguile. (150 letters sent out to stations to get a job.)

Soon, he did Harvard-Yale, then premier Saturday football, before doing Dodgers-Giants clash of the titans. But by twenty-two, the recent man of letters got his only needed break: 1950 – 2014 voice of the Dodgers, traveling coast to coast.

Scully's voice soothed like a sonnet. He transferred out of Brooklyn to LA and transistor radios tuned to Scully's vast poetic repertoire in the city of angels. If in Brooklyn you could walk down a street and never lose track of the game. Then, after O'Malley's move, leaving LA's Dodger Stadium (after seven innings) you heard Scully on every car radio from Ventura to San Bernardino. The Van Nuys was Vin Scully's expressway to a fan's heart.

Seats were offered by the harbormaster, Scully: "Pull up a chair." And you did. Glad to be here. Whether Koufax, Valenzuela, or Kershaw pitching after dusk, Scully painted Rembrandts night after memorable night. Perfect pitching, painted corners, and Scully's precision.

Tragedy struck baseball's Shakespeare: wife Joan to an accidental overdose. He mourned as an Irish Catholic. But never gave up. Never surrendered. Never. By the late 1970s, remarried and reinvigorated, he had network TV aghast at his refusal of their money and desires. Fans got him in All-Star games and playoffs. *Loved him.*

At the mid-term of Reagan's first administration, Scully pulled in millions to (and for) NBC's *Game of the Week*. (This fan's first exposure: Best I'd ever heard.) The Big 80s

had high drama for its highest bard of broadcast: 1986 Mets – Red Sox game six, Buckner’s folly; 1988 Dodger’s Kirk Gibson v. The Eck, pinch-hit HR for the ages. “In the year of the implausible, the impossible has happened!” (1988 Dodgers beat the steroid lads from Oaktown: Canseco and McGwire.)

The Hall of Fame inducted in 1982, back when software meant 5-inch floppy and 600 kilobytes. Now, while Scully is still spinning sweet stories of baseball, west coast tech dynamo Google and 600 gigabytes are a too quickly passing norm under Moore’s Law. *Can Vin get inducted again?*

Like vintage wine, antique cars, a Picasso, or a Mantle rookie, Vin Scully is the glorious rhythmic past of baseball: A three score tradition of unparalleled excellence, *for those keeping score.* ([Vin Scully](#) passed away while editing this volume. August 2, 2022.)

**LA ‘Side Kick’ Story:** Jerry Doggett spent eighteen years in the minors, broadcasting; then another thirty teamed with mike maestro Vin Scully. He worked on the original Liberty’s *Game of the Day* broadcast at the birth of televised baseball.

While the Big Apple is filled with legends of all sorts, and LA stars of screen, John Beasley Brickhouse televised more than 5,000 games, talked solo to seven Presidents, and aired live at Churchill’s departure to Valhalla. Jack was the *WGN* legend to kids and elders alike. His home run call – *Hey! Hey!* – was the best of the Cubs’ moments in the dark days of 1947-1966. He called both sides of town and gave and put his heart into everything. When *WGN* broke the mold in television in 1947 – airing both teams – Jack was just getting started in a career of overwork and kudos cross the nation. Career highlights: Ernie Banks 500<sup>th</sup> homer. The voice as Willie Mays robbed Vic Wertz’s 440+ foot bomb in ‘54 Series. *Hey! Hey!* and *Holy Mackerel!*

Vincent Lloyd (nee Skaff) voiced the Cubs for over three decades (1954 -1986). “Holy Mackerel,” is a great phrase for that amount time to spend wishing the Cubs would win. Thirty seasons it took before they found the playoffs. Lloyd got President Kennedy to do the first TV interview of the commander-in-chief at a game. Kennedy: “I feel it important that we get, ah, not be a nation of just spectators, even though that’s what we are today, but also a nation of participants – particularly to make it possible for young men and women to participate actively in physical effort.” Lloyd then asked Kennedy about first lady, Jackie: “She’s home doing the wash.” (*The Feminine Mystique* soon to be required reading.)

Big City Honorable Mentions: Ross Porter (Los Angeles) & Ernie Harwell (Detroit)

## Categories of Broadcasters

While voices of broadcast glory are many and varied and forever a master mix of baseball's best moments, for brevity, these groupings are relevant to understanding the broadcast game.

### A Pro's Pro

### Notes

<b>Bob Costas</b>	The Boy Wonder – romantic and erudite.
<b>Dick Enberg</b>	Phi Beta Kappa at Indiana University Graduate School. <i>Oh my!</i>
<b>Al Michaels</b>	Voice of the Reds before the championships in the 1970s, ABC's best baseball voice in the 1970-1980s. <i>Do you believe in miracles? Yes!</i>
<b>Curt Gowdy</b>	Boston Red Sox, NBC GOTW, Ted Williams' fishing partner.

### All In The Family

<b>Harry, Skip and Chip Carey</b>	Harry: <i>Homer</i> for whomever he rooted or criticized. 1 <sup>st</sup> three-generational broadcast. <i>It might be... it could be... it is!!!</i>
<b>Jack and Joe Buck</b>	Jack took over for Caray. Never looked back. Joe is FOX sports.
<b>Harry and Todd Kalas</b>	Harry: <i>It's outa here!</i> Departed in 2009.
<b>Marty and Thom Brennaman</b>	Marty, Voice of The Big Red Machine.

### Have Voice, Will Travel

<b>Joe Angel</b>	Bilingual voice of the Marlins, Giants, and Tampa Bay.
<b>DeWayne Staats</b>	Tampa, Chicago, Houston.
<b>Milo Hamilton</b>	Chicago, Houston, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, St. Louis
<b>Jon Miller</b>	Texas, Boston, San Francisco, and ESPN. Was on the call at Cal Ripkin's 2131 consecutive game where Cal hit HR while President Clinton partook.
<b>Gary Thome</b>	New York, Chicago, ESPN. U.S. Supreme Ct. lawyer.
<b>Al Helfer</b>	Worked with Red Barber.
<b>Russ Hodges</b>	<i>Shot heard round the world:</i> October 3, 1951. Moved to San Fran with team.

### Ex-Jock Turned Shock Jock

POS	A Few Players Behind the Microphone
<b>P</b>	Waite Hoyt, Joe Nuxhall, Dizzy Dean, Jim Kaat, Don Drysdale, Steve Stone, Rick Sutcliffe, Tom Seaver, Jim Palmer, Don Sutton, Sandy Koufax, Ernie Johnson
<b>2B</b>	Joe Morgan, Jerry Coleman, Dave Campbell, Frankie Frisch
<b>SS</b>	Tony Kubek, Pee Wee Reese, Phil Rizzuto, Lou Boudreau, Leo Durocher
<b>C</b>	Joe Garagiola, Bob Uecker, Tim McCarver, Bob Brenley, Gabby Street
<b>1B/3B/OF</b>	Richie Ashburn, Ralph Kiner, Bill White, George Kell, Ken Harrelson, Ken Singleton, Earl Gillespie, Lou Piniella, Jimmy Piersall

## Two Memorable Broadcast Characters

Jay Hanna (Jerome) “Dizzy” Dean’s comic “genius” shined – whether he was asked to do it, or not. Wordsmiths be “dag gummit” by the Ozarkian Dean, who parlayed his playful twisting of the King’s English into a longer career with words than with throwing fastballs. (“Ain’t braggin’ if you can do it.”)

He called Joe Stalin: Joseph Stallion. Made “slud” a better version of sliding. Forget names with ski, Dizzy would rather chop up a cow and eat it. He was a hick from the sticks and that’s it. No apology. (Syntax: “Are those jokers up in Washington putting a tax on that, too?”)

After gas-housing through the 1930s, Dean got into broadcasting biz during the war. St. Louis had their man throwing out lines to Middle America (who were more connected to broadcasts than their eastern, urbane counterparts), but those educated were appalled by the Dean’s approach. Unfit to teach youth how to talk properly. Yet, popularity trumped the three *R*’s: readin’, writin’ and ‘rithmetic. (Dean’s favorite was math, especially in salary squabbles.)

In the hometown World Series of 1944, Dean was purposely left off the radio broadcast (Heidenry and Topel, *The Boys Who Were Left Behind: The 1944 World Series St. Louis Browns and the Legendary St. Louis Cardinals* 2006, 66) and off the signage above the scoreboard touting his work. Commissioner Landis, who did not appear at the games, and passed away shortly thereafter, nixed Dean’s dialect as unsuitable for a national audience.

After a short stay in the Big Apple as a voice for the Yankees, but home to *The New Yorker* magazine and authors Cheever, Salinger, and Bellow, Dean went back to St. Louis and to friendly mugs of *Falstaff* beer. (They both had their obvious promoter for their brands.) Dean’s popularity rose thereafter to network’s exacting standards: as there were none quite yet.

Dean did broadcasts throughout the golden age of the Ike Era: Mutual, ABC, and CBS, all done. He made any broadcast lively – stealing the show from a anemic Cubs-Pirates tilt, no problem – as ABC was fighting for network recognition in 1953. Dean’s broadcast legend grew on CBS – comedy: “testicle fortitude” by a pitcher – made him the toast of the town, for fans, nightmares and sponsorship worries for the executives and investors. He once chased off a stalking corporate ad man with the cross-promotion of their competitor. Dean’s act and actions grew increasingly annoying as

television became like a teenager maturing into a financially-minded adult. Dean would never grow up; or change shtick. He was from a different era and mindset. And liked it that way.

Howard Cosell, the indomitable, the loquacious, the “there you have it, folks” ABC’s broadcast giant of the 1970s started out with Little League baseball in the 1950s. With brooklyn breeding, New York University English major (with pedigree), Cosell was an Army WWII vet, Wall Street man, a lawyer, and Jewish. This elite persona, superfluous and complex descriptions of sports high drama and his ability to land big solo interviews (Ali) made him antithetical to Dean’s broadcast obvious imperfections. Yet, at these two extremes, they both excelled in a sports commentary staid during much of late 1950s through early 1970s. Yankees losing awfully, the NFL a more exciting product to watch, and baseball in protracted labor disputes/strikes, dismaying and chasing away fans, were a few causes for the decline in the pastime’s actual popularity. (The growth of sports overall contributed— more options, less need to be just a baseball fan.)

Cosell was never overly enamored, nor friendly to the baseball broadcast booth. He was long a touchstone of controversy – often in decrying the facets many loved while blowing full gale about personal vendettas and miscellany – thus, memorable, if for nothing else, his caricature painted by him, for him, and by many, after him. (He passed in April 1995.) TV though was made for Cosell’s pontifications – but baseball was not made for television, or Cosell’s critiques, which were many. “Slow. Boring. Antiquated. A dying breed,” could have come from Cosell in his sunnier looks at the hometown nine. Yet again, people came for the polarizing (and unflinchingly so) Cosell, quite akin to Dean’s jocularly.

He appealed to a different crowd – post-Watergate – jaded fans wanted to know the story behind the story, and Cosell was there. (Curt Smith reflected a ratings war between ABC and NBC from 1976 to 1986 were a wash across Monday Night, post-season and All-Star games. ABC’s Roone Arledge of *Wide World of Sports* and *Monday Night Football* fame never came to baseball’s favor, keeping Cosell on broadcasts often with a ‘care less’ attitude.)

For Cosell, *telling it like it is*, was not an addiction to baseball’s benefit, but to another product: *Cosell, LLC*. Cosell on Cosell: “Arrogant, pompous, obnoxious, vain, cruel, verbose, a showoff.” His show added to the baseball story – made to for conflict and

consternations – and yet, Cosell made memorable enough those who watched *ABC's Monday Night Baseball* and *MNF*.

### Curt Smith's Top Broadcasters (from *Voices of Summer*, Carrol & Graf)

RK	Broadcaster	Additional Notes
1	Vin Scully	Call absentia on Aaron's 715 <sup>th</sup> HR. <i>Sic Transit Gloria</i> . Will be calling games in Heaven. "Pull up a chair (and a halo) everybody..."
2	Mel Allen	Dynasty. Yankees. 1950s. Saturday afternoons in the 1980s. Roll, Mell
3	Ernie Harwell	Paperboy for <i>Gone with the Wind's</i> Mitchell. Wordsmith & WWII correspondent for <i>Leatherneck</i> . Traded for a catcher. Detroit's big ONE.
4	Jack Buck	Read poem after 9/11. Called: Gibson's 3,000 K. McGwire's 62 <sup>nd</sup> HR in 1998. Parkinson's. Cancer took St. Louis's most esteemed voice.
5	Red Barber	Southern gent. Experimental TV's first announcer. Brooklyn's block party.
6	Harry Caray	Had an affair with the owner's daughter-in-law and Budweiser. The beer lasted. Orphan that became the toast of Chicago's Rush Street. <i>Holy Cow!</i>
7	Bob Prince	Was arrested for vagrancy. Called Clemente's 3000 hit. Cursed A LOT.
8	Jack Brickhouse	Rub shoulders with Presidents, did barn dances, and sat with Pope Paul VI.
9	Dizzy Dean	"Pod-nuh" to everyone. Was the Rube Waddell of early TV.
10	Lindsey Nelson	Hung from a gondola in Astrodome. Amazing Mets! Loud jackets.
11	Curt Gowdy	Called Teddy Williams last HR. Did all major sports well. Awards galore.
12	Bob Uecker	Mr. Baseball. "Must be in the front row." The Rodney Dangerfield of baseball and hit .400 <i>against Sandy Koufax</i> . (Not true, stat heads. But it would make for funny story.)
13	Chuck Thompson	Baltimore's 1 <sup>st</sup> voice. Did the Giants-Colts NFL title game in 1957.
14	Jon Miller	Baltimore owner Peter Angelos fired him. Pairs with Joe Morgan now.
15	Joe Gargiola	Grew up friends w/Yogi Berra in St. Louis. Thought to be better than Yogi.
16	Bob Elson	Interview with Yankee Jake Powell in 1938. Powell ruins his own rep.
17	Tim McCarver	1960s Cardinals Catcher. Led the league in triples (13). Inside baseball.
18	Bob Costas	Idolizes Mantle. Did a successful late night talk show in 1990s.

### Modern Baseball Broadcasting (1980 – 2014)

By the 1980s, televised games were plentiful and filled with replay, slow-mo (for determining missed umpire calls) and camera angles of all sorts, but most especially, the centerfield shot. No MLB team was without a pair of announcers, usually one set for radio and one for local TV broadcasts as local cable operators were getting organized and could buy this staple of summer programming. (The *MSG Network* bought 10 years of Yankees for \$500 million in 1990.)

Cable's *ESPN* first broke into the market for sports during the 1980s. Taking the highlights of baseball and other pro sports and building around them various minor sports programming that eventually led them to the promised land of revenue deals and live broadcasting of MLB, NFL, and the NBA. This meant that ABC, CBS, and NBC no longer continued to split sports packages just amongst themselves. (Disney acquired ABC/ESPN; all parked under the mouse's roof of entertainment firms from movies to theme parks.)

Announcers, for their part, found more money and exposure, as Harry Caray was again a Budweiser skill master, coast to coast, on WGN. The Cubs had their best decade in a half a century and television only broaden their appeal, thanks to the Tribune Company. Not to be outdone, Ted Turner (with the population ideas) had Murph's Turf (after CF Dale Murphy) and Chief Knock-a-Homa behind left field to make the Braves, "America's Team", as the promo heralded on TBS. One ATL announcer: Harry's son, Skip, who was beamed up to 60 million plus homes for 130 games a season, meant nearly 10 billion potential watchers existed. More than Ted actually wanted.

The networks were not to be outdone completely. NBC grabbed top-cat Vin Scully, complementing him with nuts-and-bolts Italian Joe Garagiola. Took youthful yarn spinner Bob Costas and matched him with critical, no-holds-bar Tony Kubeck. Meanwhile, ABC had exuberant Al Michaels, self-deprecating humor man Bob Uecker, master manager Earl Weaver, dull Don Drysdale, and Mr. Know-It-All Cosell doing their last run. CBS took a hiatus during the Reagan broadcast era in baseball. NBC was the eventual winner by 1985 -1986 as ratings, and ABC's departure, meant its sole reign as the network giant for *a spell*, as Dizzy Dean would likely have interjected into the conversation. NBC finally gave in to their half-century connection to ball calls, after 1989, leaving Vin Scully to shut off the lights, and put the tarp on the field.

Since then, the changes have been very little in the booth operation. The announcers and their tools are tied to tech changes (like HDTV, text messaging, and twittering), but the television broadcast is fairly routine. Sabermetrics has crept in, depending on the team's application of it. But most mike men have tuned intimately their voice, found their niche, and found their broadcast homes are just subject to the whims of management, ratings, and the fans. But the classic voices give the charm, quirky information, legends, laughs, and the score to all those games played. They are forever tied to baseball's lasting appeal.

The most memorable games are coupled with the poetic tones and painted words of the best. And sometimes, *we cannot believe what we just saw!* But the announcer has engrained it into our minds forever. And "Go crazy!" is a commandment to a delirious fan. *We'll see you again, tomorrow night!* And the next season.

(Final Paragraph Note: Jack Buck's *modified* calls during the 1988 World Series, 1985 NLCS, and 1991 World Series, respectively.)



## Famous Sportswriters

While the broadcasters painted the story in the language of the moment, the sportswriters of yesteryear used flowery remarks, forceful assertions, and player foibles to draw on the canvases of daily print, *the fish wrappers*, which were loaded with sport. Sports editors and staffs came into being by the late 1870s, with Charles R. Wright of the *Syracuse Courier* and Francis C. Richter of the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* taking on the task of shaping an edition and molding writers into professionals (Orodenker 1996, ix). Into the 1890s, most newspapers equipped themselves to handle the sports of the day: baseball, boxing, college football, horse racing, and any local sporting event. Through the turn of the century, sporting venues grew in popularity and the writers were noticeable as their place in society grew. Newspapers, for their part, came to their likely zenith in the 1920s with multi-talented sportswriters stealing much of the column inches from the various troubles and politics of the day. In just a matter of 30 years, sport sections had gone from barely a notice to nearly one-fifth of paper's content (Frommer 2008, 5). Papers printed the final scores 'above the fold', selling plenty of copy through the front-page and colossal font size headlines for sport, and society alike.

The top writers plied their trade in the New York jungle of newspapers with a "gee-whiz" approach to their 'ball friends', as many were close cohorts, drinking pals, and poker patsies to their sport subjects. A few practitioners: Heywood Broun, Paul Gallico, and Grantland Rice were rarely, or consistently, critical of their ball-playing meal tickets. Yet, one can gather even in this most lenient approach to these ballplayers, they were doing it out of a respect (to their 'profession', and to both players and writers), and for the still growing up then *National Pastime*.

The tearing down of the athlete, the "aw, nuts" approach, though done, was not a primary goal – unless "being scooped" forced it. Selling more newspapers, get the dope and scoop their cohorts lacked, and building a reputation were the ultimate agenda, in any order sports writers could achieve them. Ring Lardner and Westbrook Pegler were the class of this nuts approach (but drastically different writers) at their pinnacle of newspaper dominance. Yet, this styling and hostile subjectivity lacked something in the sports moment: proximity (Orodenker 1996, x).

By the 1940s, the goalposts and box-scoring changed from the deadline-worried editors to, "we need a quote from the star of the team, or of the game," reflecting a necessity to buttress the old standby pieces of the day with a seemingly substantive

quip from someone who actually played, or managed towards victory, or better yet for journalistic epics: created woe and defeat. And we have never *heard* the end of this method – the misquote – or, the mad and irrational man reflecting too soon on the trials of the game just played. Later on in the 1940s and even more stressed: The Who, What, When, Where, and Why–On–The–Button (Orodenker 1996, xi) school of “real journalism” – made its rounds into the pantheon of sports scribblers. The result: the best journalists were not always best writers; and the best writers, typically, were not the best ‘facts’ men.

Columnists, those that were cut loose from the daily beat to chatter more freely, grew in force. Chicago and New York produced a bevy of men associated with *In the Wake of the News* or *Sports of the Times*. Hugh Edmund Keough, Ring Lardner, Red Smith, Arthur Daley, and John Keiran were accomplished in columns and poetic musings, so they got national audiences and appeal. Even at that, they produced stinky and clunky writing – at least to sensibilities of a Cheever or Bellow or Vidal – yet, the staple of the paper, the sports section, was less if the columnist did not put on his cleats and kick the dirt of the plate and swing at the nearest ball club in the zip code.

Into the 1950s, the long-established code of freelance articles and ghostwriting by the scribes received more good news: *Sports Illustrated* was dusted off, and made a real magazine, changing the writing market – and providing an outlet for investigative pieces, and too, the literary. Other sports developed too; so baseball and sports writing, first, the solo 7-month marriage and saga, now shared print space for 10 months out of the year. (June and July being baseball’s aria.) The scribes became versed in all avenues of sports conflict, both a blessing, and a curse. Writers were slightly weaned off the pleasures of travelling with the team by Pullman, getting their expense accounts buttressed by the paper or the team. Yet, the professionalism grew – at least, *in theory*.

Enter the 1960s. *New Journalism* took hold. The narrative styles of Gay Talese and Jimmy Breslin were open-ended critiques, not biting, more novella-like, more humanizing, more in search of, not definitive this, or declarative that. And its counter pose was “chipmunk” writing which grew around the satirical, the humorous, the farce, the peeling an athlete down to his flawed core, like onions to be sautéed, and served to a hot-for-drama public (Orodenker 1996, xiv). The tell-all biography came to the fore: Jim Bouton’s *Ball Four* set a bar –like Bannister’s 4-minute mile – that has been broken time and time again.

Now, nothing surprises. But the critical sports writing man can write more and more eulogies about how it once was a better landscape, a purer this, a grander that. The men who came to life as great influencers of American sport peeled the cover off the grand spectacles of our times – the ballgames of America – and often, made them worthy of remembrance.

These too are their short bios.

### Grantland Rice (1880 – 1954)

As Charles Fountain, author of *Sportswriter: The Life and Times of Grantland Rice*, remarked on the newspaper business:

“A newspaper is a demanding mistress, consuming the passion, the energy, the spirit of her minions. She is a voracious and dispassion harridan, caring only that her needs are satisfied, and demanding satisfaction anew each morning – no time for anything until the mistress is serviced, and as soon as the task is completed it is time to begin it again; tomorrow is just a blur of whirling twenty-four-hour cycles stretching out to infinity.” (Fountain 1993, 90)

In his day, Grantland Rice was as prolific as anyone else that mastered words for a living, writing about 3,500 words per day, every day, for over a half-century. His 67 million words all total would, at 350 words per page and 400 pages per book, create 478 tomes of poetry and prose across all sport and societal scenarios (Fountain 1993, 4). Hall of Fame production from a well-rounded and well-received master of the lyric and ‘the lead’ that, to be even, he did not evolve much at all in his writing, or on humanity. (See: Race Relations in 1930s.)

Rice started out unlike most modern sportswriters, as a multi-sport talent at Vanderbilt University at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. His talent though was not to lead to baseball/football immortality, thanks to his male family members (Fountain 1993, 153), but did direct him to a job the *Nashville Daily News*. Where, through trial and error, he quickly moved on to greater *Tennessean* writing horizons.

In these early days, anyone that maintained flavor and sounded like they knew the game, could go far in the field. Rice exceeded on both accounts; as he understood sports well, and versified and personified the deeds of athletes. He was highly sought after as within a decade he moved to New York in 1911, and the *Daily Mail*, where Franklin P. Adams of *Tinker to Evers to Chance* fame and Rube L. Goldberg of crazy

contraptions celebrity were making their rent. (*Daily Mail* guest writers: Sinclair Lewis, Eugene O’Neil, and E.B. White.)

Rice added to baseball lexicon like many of the day, using “crack slabmen” or “port side hurler” or “salary wing” to make for a lively copy in the mold of plenty of practitioners, good and bad, himself included. But likely, Rice’s masterpiece of a lead occurred in a Rockne-led Notre Dame-Army football tussle in 1924:

“Outlined against a blue-gray October sky, the Four Horsemen rode again. In dramatic lore they are known as Famine, Pestilence, Destruction and Death. These are only their aliases. Their real names are Stuhldreher, Miller, Crowley and Layden. They formed the crest of the South Bend cyclone...” (Fountain 1993, 27)

For the rest of his sports writing brethren, who covered the same game, they got upstaged by pictures too with the four Notre Dame backs on top of horses with footballs. And to this day, fans of sport recognize ‘The Four Horseman of the Apocalypse’ though rarely know the man that created the imagery first on the page. (Except for those at pricey journalism schools or in 2022: propaganda pushers.)

In his life, Rice wrote about Ruth, without pretense, making the big fella more human, and less vulgar, and *not telling* a ‘factual’ lie. He covered boxing – with Jack Dempsey starting out as a disliked figure – only to become his cohort. Rice made a name in golf circles – as a player and a writer – playing scratch golf and covering Bobby Jones. Rice went *over there* to Europe; and traveled through the Argonne forest – working the artillery lines, not just pecking out stories in the mud. He came close to severe injury, getting the luck of mud absorbing an incoming round (Fountain, 150). (**Side Note:** Dempsey’s best man at his wedding was future federal judge John Sirica, who came to fame as the man sentencing the burglars in the Watergate scandal (Berkow, *Full Swing: Hits Runs and Errors in a Writer's Life* 2006, 7).)

Because of his “purple prose”, Rice has garnered a fair share of mockery and derision from journalists and teachers far, far removed from the first score of the 20<sup>th</sup> century where common people were struggling for anything cheery after the 12-14 hours of work-a-day life. Such lines from *Alumnus Football*, where Rice wrote his most remembered, usually satirized and mocked, but ideally, telling of a truth: “Not that you won or lost – but how you played the Game.” (Fountain, 94-95) This may have modestly instilled a bit of hope in the disheartened persons want for a better life. Who, in seeing others not playing by the rules, but winning nevertheless, still had to fight on;

improving on their own efforts to win out, someday hence, if ever. (Not everyone is a cynic.)

Rice's fame grew from his connection to the glory days of sport. He made little pretense (though critics bemoan he did (Ellington 2004)) of being a first-rate writer in the vein of Poe, Faulkner, Joyce, or name-your-master in their niche of writing endeavors. He did create daily, those 3,500 words – and as all writers know, some is hackneyed – so his longevity and sports world likeability rated him worthy here. His place comes not from disgorging critiques on his usage of the inverted pyramid style, or strict journalistic adherence. Rather, he made his lasting place in the pantheon by force of volume and proximity to his favorite athletes. And most of all: he knew how to play the writing game.

### Ring Lardner (1885 –1933)

Famous satirist and American language master Ring Lardner in *One Hit, One Error, One Left* from *The Saturday Evening Post* in April 1932:

“Then there is an infielder Tommy Thompson but sometimes call him Fresco and I thought it was because he come from Frisco but Stengel says his hole name is Al Fresco and his folks give him the name because he was born out doors like restraints where they got tables under a tree and 1 of the boys was asking if they call Wilson Hack because he was born in a hack but Stengel says it was 2 of them and they had to sell them to a junk dealer.”

Ringgold Wilmer Lardner spoke baseball in the country rhythms that existed in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, yet was a thoroughly modern sort. Short stories like *You Know Me Al* put Ring at the pinnacle of writers with the fictional character Jack Keefe, a bush leaguer, whose crudeness and immaturity and meanness reflected correctly on the greater portions of baseball talent. Unlike other baseball writers of the day, loaded with admiration and idolatry of seemingly perfect players, Lardner humanized and realistically portrayed the scenes – and showed ballplayers being ballplayers – with warts and whisky and women as their bailiwicks and banes. Real players rounded these baseball experiences complete.

In *Alibi Ike* (1915), Ike can never tell the truth about anything, great or small. His baseball talents are superb enough to carry the club against Rube Marquard, but he frustrates in conversation about family, friends, poker, illnesses, and most detrimentally, a beauty that he engages, but then downplays to the fellas to the

breaking of his future vows in front of the lady. The team falters; Ike sulks and shuts up completely; and the only cure: to create an alibi to get him back in good stead with the lady. Ike leaves with his alibi, “scoutin’,” but the manager and team arranged for his trip to the wife-to-be.

Ring Lardner was described by peers as, “solemn, noble, and dignified; long-legged, lean, and consumptive; and enveloped in an odd, caustic sympathy that was frequently mistaken for misanthropy (Orodenker 1996, 203).” At the crossroads of the Victorian and Gilded age, Lardner was born on March 6, 1885 in Niles, Michigan, a short hop from Notre Dame. He grew up in a rather privileged background, which included a heavy diet of books in the family library, classical music appreciation, sports on the grounds (tennis and baseball), and the sense of a purpose-driven life. That said, Ring, after a successful high school career, bounced along the railcars from Niles to Chicago, rejecting school, attending the Armour Institute in Chicago for mechanical engineering, dropping out, then on to meter reading and account collections in Niles until his older brother passed on a lead to a writing job with the *South Bend Times* (Orodenker 1996, 204).

Ring made impressions quickly – knowledge of baseball and people, first-rate – and with meeting Hugh Fullerton, he was led to a bigger opportunity: *Chicago Inter-Ocean*. There, Ring was in his element: as was his Midwestern style of humor and cynical natures translated well to his daily audience. He rubbed shoulders with Charles Dryden, the top dog in the market, and almost instantly, by just twenty-three, was moving up to the *Chicago Tribune*, as Dryden retired and recommended Lardner.

From there, writing on the Chicago Cubs, then the best team in the game, his writing improved, and more opportunities followed – most not to his liking for too long. He did a 3-month sojourn at *The Sporting News*; moved east to the *Boston American*, neither employer gaining much benefit from Lardner. By 1912, Ring was back in the Midwest, writing magazine articles first for *Collier’s*. Back in Chicago, the opportunities abounded. He came to the *Tribune* and took over for Hugh E. Keough, who passed away in 1913. Through “In the Wake of the News,” Lardner became a more personal, more versified, more cogent writer – bringing his life, his family, into the pieces often.

Ring sought to connect the dots; and explored the wide range in humanity, especially man’s dialects and rhythms heard. As such, Ring found his lasting voice via the misfits and the comical bunch of bush leaguers he invented (or copied) from the ballplayer universe he roamed. He too, delved into their psychology, thus adding the depth – and

there on, Lardner's work was adored and desired in places like *The Saturday Evening Post*.

In a bit of self-deprecating humor, Ring summed up his work as such in 1917 in *The Post*:

Jobs – 13. Wins– 8. Losses – 5. Pct. – .616 (Orodenker 1996, 210)

Job #14 was serving as a war correspondent in WWI and renaming the column to “In the Wake of the War.” In June 1919, he left the *Chicago Tribune*, moving on to Job #15. By this time, Lardner was an experienced alcoholic that alternated between the bottle and prolonged dry spells while under deadline pressures, as he wrote seven columns per week. His doubts about his work – unlike his competitors, such as Rice – placed Ring in a crucible of daily pressures that was to be his undoing. He was diagnosed with tuberculosis in 1926.

In his work, Lardner moved into literary and playwright works (something done for years in the background) – *There Are Smiles* (1928), *Elmer the Great* (1928) and *June Moon* (1929) – aside from baseball literature. He did continued to do sports coverage and anecdotes out of Chicago then New York in the late 1920s, and his writing was often compared to the works of Hemingway, Twain, Fitzgerald, and Wolfe. (And many writers were fans and copycats of Ring's style and sounds. Hemingway imitated Lardner during his high school days (Lardner 1992, xii). Neil Simon's alter ego in *Brighton Beach Memoirs* (1984) hoped “to be a writer like Ring Lardner.” (Orodenker 1996, 203))

As primarily a Chicago-based writer, Lardner wrote over 4,500 columns reaching syndication in 115 newspapers at the height of the print era. He is often credited with first observing the throwing of the 1919 World Series – to which he later composed a liquored ditty (another talent): “I'm Forever Blowing Ball Games.” After the series and the growth of live ball era, Lardner is said to have been disaffected from the sport he garnered his most lucrative successes, and that his opinion on the game soured more due to the rise of Ruthian exploits in forsaking the inside game of bunts, running, and managerial genius than the 1919 Black Sox scandal. Chances are Ring saw it was time to try something else too.

Lardner died of a heart attack brought on by a prolonged battle with both alcoholism and tuberculosis. He later received the J.G. Taylor Spink award in 1963. (Induction in the Writer's Wing of the Baseball Hall of Fame.)

## Damon Runyon (1880 – 1946)

Ring had company in the crossover medium of sportswriters. The most noted spoke *Runyonese*: The Lemon Drop Kid and Nathan Detroit. Alfred Damon Runyon born in Manhattan, Kansas put a *panini* panache in the NYC Manhattan borough, starting out under William Randolph Hearst as a foreign correspondent. At his sports & hobbies height, Runyon had plenty of reasons to ‘laugh inside’ as he was the highest paid sportswriter in America. (From *Baseball-Fever.com*: fellow sportswriter Fred Lieb said, “you felt he was laughing at the world, not with it.”)

His father, Alfred Lee, mustered with George Armstrong Custer, he of Last Stand fame. Damon’s mom, Elizabeth, was a descendant of Massachusetts Bay Colony founder John White. Damon, however, saw little of his mother, who passed due tuberculosis at seven; and his father’s drunkenness led little Damon learning life from a Pueblo, Colorado bar stool, pool halls, or a lady of the evening’s street corner. Luckily, this is excellent training for a writer.

By fifteen, Damon, in foregoing the educated track of traditional clapboard schoolhouses of the East, was a reporter and experienced drinker. He wrote his first byline for the *Pueblo Evening Post*. Thereafter, with the blowing up of the *Maine*, Damon sought adventure in the military – a la Winston Churchill. Runyon got his wish, enlisting in Minnesota (age problems) and going to the Philippines. Two books were later inspired by this adventure.

The next six years, 1900-1906, Runyon took often to the rails, sometimes homeless, jobless, or both, but ample stories to add to an already foot-loose, fanciless existence. He went back to reporting when it suited – now a real alcoholic – and found his work getting in the way of his drinking. He got fired twice because of it.

Runyon stabilized enough when he landed at the *Rocky Mountain News* in 1906 that he stayed there for four years, married the society page reporter, Ellen Egan, whom tended towards the drink. His alcoholic behavior subsided by 1913 as responsibilities, money, success, marriage, children on the way (1914 and 1918), and parental similarities weighed on his mind. As a conclusion dawned, drinking faded to oblivion – to be replaced by caffeinated beverages. (Coping addicts do this: substitute one addiction for another.)

The Runyons moved east to New York for Damon’s first big league writing job. His editor, Harry Cashman, dropped what was then a three-name convention, so Alfred



was eliminated. Damon Runyon was born in a byline that most writers then in New York did not have (Orodenker 1996, 296).

Being now a New York writer, meant the Giants were an oft topic, until the Babe came to town. Runyon was attracted to the alcoholics, misfits, derelicts, hustlers, con men, and good-time girls of the day. Luckily, the pennant-minded Giants brought in characters, such as pitchers Arthur “Bugs” Raymond and Charles “Victory” Faust who managed to be perfect foils for Runyon’s early baseball work.

Raymond, a decent-to-surprising righty, took brooms to grasshoppers and swept them off the mound. (A la the Yankees Joba Chamberlain during the 2007 playoffs when a pestilence took root on the field like none envisioned since Rice’s ‘Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse’ references.) Bugs enjoyed drinking beer served up by the fans, so much so, that McGraw sent his paycheck home to his wife against the protestations of Bugs who said, “If she gets the money, let *her* pitch (Orodenker, 296).”

Well, Damon knew a character and paper seller when he saw one. His articles in the spring training on the much-lauded Giants, and their drunk-from-warm-up-to-last-out bullpen oddity got fans in a happy stir about who was this character, both writer and player. William Randolph Hearst found it so amusing and lucrative that he paid Runyon triple his initial salary, to which, Damon surmised, “That was fair of the Chief. He put his finger on exactly what I’m worth. Three times the usual grunt. I better get out and earn it (296).”



Character number two, Victory Faust prophetic vision came via a fortuneteller – that his presence on the field (or team) would win the Giants the pennant. Mr. McGraw and

Runyon had their fun – McGraw let Charlie do vaudeville and pitch in two games in 1911, and to Runyon: “A statistical shark has figured the energy expended by Charles [Faust] in warming up, running in from centerfield every inning, lifting his hat to (Giants’ owner) John T. Brush and winding up after he got in the box, would transport the entire wheat crop of Kansas 600 miles if applied to wagon wheels (Reisler, *Guys, Dolls and Curveballs: Damon Runyon on Baseball* 2005, 22).”

In discussing real legends, Christy Mathewson was too boring and stable for Runyon’s styling, but friendship, was a given. But he adored Ty Cobb – the then thug of *Deadball* and likely, a “collections man” turned “mob king” in an inspired short – and Ruth was ideal for all the particulars of excesses and excitement and extremes of consciousness, but also a hunting companion (Orodenker, 294). John McGraw was a theatre maven, inviting along the future penman of *Guys and Dolls*. (**Above: Arthur “Bugs” Raymond**, an early Runyon character. Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Baines Collection.)

Arnold Rothstein, noted for his gambling empire and the 1919 Chi-town hustlers, was gunned down only hours after betting-friendly Runyon had spoken to baseball’s archenemy. Even as a friend, Runyon wrote honestly, but with the usual flare on Rothstein’s death: “For all the mysterious sinister figure that the dime novel stories of Rothstein would make him, I though him singularly transparent and open, easy to read. He generally expressed his thoughts, anyway...He liked to back his selections among humanity the same as he like to back certain horses...Rothstein did not quit on [them.] (Reisler 2005, 104)”

Neither did Damon. He was a regular at the tracks, particularly Saratoga, Pimlico, and Hialeah. As a frequenter gambler, and owner of thoroughbreds, Runyon would be an outcast in today’s writing clan. However, in his era, he was a crowd necessity. And had the yen to tell all about it. His best pieces often came about as a recounting of his own misfortunes such as “The Handy Guy Name Sande (Orodenker, 300).”

When Runyon move on to grit and crime, that transferred to films like *Lady For A Day* (1933), *Little Miss Marker* (1934), *A Slight Case of Murder* (1938), *Double Indemnity* (1944) and *Guys & Dolls* (1955), he still appeared at the World Series for years, covering them long after his novels were hot and his name got him everywhere. His writing ‘fees’ in the 1930s: \$5,000 for every piece published in *Collier’s*.

Runyon noticed everything in bouncing from town to town amongst the hobos of the turn of the century, to ballplayers’ ticks and titillation, and the Broadway-sized

characters he encountered – in the way of old West stories. He put a depth to everything and everybody – and let you be the judge of what entertained and what taught a lesson about these people – while knowing under it all, he had the last laugh.

### Baseball's First Historian: Lee Allen (1915 – 1969)

Lee Allen, born in the birthplace of professional baseball in 1915, was considered a drifter throughout his life. Working for quirky newspaper outfits, going to the USSR (Gietschier, Lee Allen 1990), dropping out of the Columbia school of Journalism, taking a civilian job in Kodiak, Alaska during WWII, broadcasting with Waite Hoyt for a cup of coffee, but finally found his lifelong niche: seeking out the startling stories of yesterday's baseball heroes as Cooperstown's best known historian (James, *The Politics of Glory: How Baseball's Hall of Fame Really Works* 1994, 143-144). As with many other contributors to the game, their path to greatness was not assured, nor understandable, to the average 9-to-5 factory worker, but Allen left his mark.

Growing up in Cincinnati presented opportunities to watch baseball through its ups and downs. Allen worked around his schooling to plenty of baseball – getting pitch counts for *Cincinnati Enquirer* Jack Ryder's "Notes of the Game", while eating concessionaires' best and earning seventy-five cents a game for telephoning out-of-town scores from the Western Union ticker in the press box to the scoreboard (Gietschier, Lee Allen). Allen was a park rat; his addiction fueled by interest in stories of the players and all things baseball.

After attending Kenyon, alongside Bill Veeck, another free spirit in those college haunts, Allen broke into a Cincinnati Reds organization littered with legends. Gabe Paul was then the traveling secretary; MacPhail and Barber, as discussed, were instrumental to the success of the Reds. Frank "Trader" Lane held various positions up to assistant general manager. While assisting during the 1939-40 Reds glory days, Allen went into a civilian navy job due to high blood pressure in the early days of WWII. When Paul was called to service, Allen replaced him in Cincinnati.

His intimate knowledge of that organization led to *The Cincinnati Reds* (1948), which in turn led to *100 Years of Baseball* (1950) and *The Hot Stove League* (1955) and later, *The National League: The Official History* (1961) and *The American League Story* (1962). Allen made short forays to Herkimer, New York as newspaperman, Wyoming for an intimate dalliance, and back, writing briefly for *The Sporting News*. But his real break came on April 15, 1959 when he was hired to administer the collection of papers and memorabilia that constituted the Hall of Fame in Cooperstown.

As James and Gietschier both point out, Allen came more than prepared. “Allen’s personal library of baseball books, records and memorabilia weighed five thousand pounds at the time he moved to Cooperstown (James 1994, 150).” He took over for the Hall’s first official historian, Ernest J. Lanigan (1873 – 1962), who was nephew and cousin to the most venerable of sports publishers, the Spink family. Like Allen, Ernest was no stay-put-and-work-for-one company type, and both had their fair share of alcoholic ebbs and flows in life. Lanigan, for his part, was a numbers-first guy; Allen was a story collector, and obsessive fan of the sport, in general.

Allen most productive period, and most esteemed work, came near the end of life. He wrote over 133 columns for *The Sporting News*; opened a new baseball research library separate from Cooperstown; and briefly celebrated the centennial of baseball’s firm establishment as the National Pastime. He died of a massive heart attack shortly after giving Edd Roush an award as Cincinnati’s best player in May 1969. Allen earned the moniker as “the walking encyclopedia of baseball” and was instrumental to the birth of *The Baseball Encyclopedia* (1969) and to the many editions that came about thereafter.

### The Baseball Bible: The Spinks

Only a decade after the founding of the National League, Alfred Henry Spink put out *The Sporting News*, a.k.a. “The Bible of Baseball.” His brother, Charles, took over the struggling enterprise in 1895 running it until his death in 1914. Their sports magazine, born in the heartland of St. Louis, Missouri, reached hundreds of thousands of fans, giving them all the statistics (deep down into the local minors at class D), and insights and history of the game America. It had grown into both cult and an obsession – much to their benefit and help.

In 1914, **John George Taylor Spink (1888 – 1962)** took over for his father, and ran the show for nearly a half-century. His savvy editorial direction, and his go-along with the greater establishment of baseball, increased the fortunes of the publication as Spink expanded his print empire across the spectrum. (Yet, J.G. Taylor Spink had a visceral hatred of Judge Landis while he genuflected to Ban Johnson during the 1920s (Lieb 1977, 220).)

Before long, he was known as “Mr. Baseball,” but had ghostwritten many of his bylines and “authored” work. (Fred Lieb, a premiere writer, did it on *Judge Landis and Twenty-Five Years of Baseball*. The same likely applied to *Daguerreotypes*. This author wished

to obtain them both – as it is possible to see who actually wrote them. Style and words tell the truth in authorship.)

Nonetheless, *The Sporting News* became the staple of sports publishing across the spectrum – but it all started with baseball. The J.G. Taylor Spink award is now given to honor the best sports writing as a lifetime achievement along with the Ford C. Frick award for broadcasters. (The latter, ghostwrote a Babe Ruth biography and did this service for many years.) After Spink's death, within 15 years, the final Spink handed over control to *The Times Mirror Company* in 1977. But the Baseball Bible has endured to the present day.

### Frederick G. Lieb (1888 – 1980)

Apart of the 1911 class of great sportswriters, Lieb knew every legend from Mack to Mantle to Morgan during his long tenure as a first-class historian of baseball. As a boy, he ran the daily scores and standings back to Philadelphia paying clients – in the 1890s. By the turn, he attempted playing ball, a lefty at 2<sup>nd</sup> base, knowing his skills were never going to pay for his future. So instead, a Christmas gift, a small printing press, lighted an idea. Thereafter, Lieb turned to writing for a living. He devoured the works of Charles Dryden and Jimmy Isaminger, taking successfully to writing baseball and non-baseball pieces.

By twenty, finding the newspaper business was competitive, but an achievable end. He worked daily as a Norfolk & Western railroad clerk and nightly learning the craft and honing his typing skills. He focused on storytelling, as his pieces then were mysteries, far afield from his baseball love. In 1909, Lieb convinced *Baseball Magazine* to take his biographical sketches of star players, and his career as a paid journalist took off, as he interviewed Eddie Collins of the hometown A's. He, like Ring Lardner, also wrote some baseball fiction in *Short Stories* (Orodenker, 219).

Lieb then took a very short detour into the stocks and finance industry, being hired by Clarence W. Barron. From those quick connections and the company letterhead, Lieb sprung himself from banking notes back to baseball fields. Ernest Lanigan, Lee Allen's future predecessor, left a position at the *New York Press* in 1911 becoming press secretary to Ed Barrow in the International League. Lieb took Lanigan's vacancy, and never left sport, or baseball, again.

Landing in New York at a time when newspapers hummed and the ink stayed in your nose much like the smell of grass does for the ballplayer, Lieb embarked on a career

attending more World Series games, often positioned as the official scorer, and writing first-rate team biographies for the Cardinals, Pirates, Tigers, Red Sox, Orioles, and Phillies. His style was a facts-first, flower-second sort routine. He told you what happened, then, as it suited, he flourished the piece with the garlands of glowing lines that many sportswriters tended toward then, and sometimes, now. Lieb did the latter to memorable affect: “a broad-shouldered Maryland ploughboy” – Jimmy Foxx – “anointed globule” – Burleigh Grimes – “a big blotch on baseball’s escutcheon” – the 1919 Black Sox (Orodenker, 221).

As with Granny Rice, he was never far from the greats – Lieb made his off-season home in St. Petersburg, Florida, the Yankees spring training haunt – so he had the pleasure to carouse with them off the field, if desired. (And do their obits for *The Sporting News*. Not so pleasant.)

His daughter Mary took to the traditional spiritual, the paranormal, *then* the not-so-wacky use of palm reading and Ouija board. It entertained a renowned few – Col. Jacob Ruppert insisted on knowing the fate of the Yankees in 1932 – and she gave results some swore by literally. Connie Mack came to St. Pete to record his voice for posterity; Babe Ruth settled a row over his pitching prowess; Miller Huggins was a close neighbor too. And NL President John Heydler became a golf buddy after retiring from his baseball position. Heydler envisioned the DH in 1930, some forty-three years prior to its institution (Lieb 1977, 227-32).

Lieb was an astute, avid observer of baseball; wrote for over seventy years about the game, publishing *Baseball As I Have Know It* in 1977; and columns for *The Sporting News* until a month before his death in 1980. He never particularly subscribed to either the “gee whiz” or “aw, nuts”, rather reported the game as a fans would behold it. Lieb coined too, the classic moniker: “The House that Ruth Built.” In 1972, Lieb received the J.G. Taylor Spink Award, joining Spink again in the pursuit of baseball reporting beyond the clouds.

### James Westbrook Pegler (1894 – 1969)

Likely the most controversial and conservative voice of his time, traversing from sharp sports writing to political satire and excoriation, Pegler won the Nobel Prize in 1941 for an exposé of union dealings at the height of his career. Yet, by the 1960s, his perceived acidic tone and borderline libelous rants cost him a great deal. His syndicated columns were relegated to very few outlets, assisted by Marshall Hunt, a long-time friend from his days as New York sportswriter. “Peglerizing” his subjects drove nearly every piece

from the 1930s onward. Dominate language, biting and forceful assertions, with acerbic wit, that could make modern conservatives blanch, and envious too, Westbrook worked for the Hearst/Scripps-Howard papers for most of his lauded, if self-destructive career.

Pegler was born and raised in Minneapolis by his journalist father, Arthur James. From early on, the family was closer to destitute than success. His father worked two newspaper jobs, while doing other writing, leading to burn out and a break down for a spell. The cure lay elsewhere. By ten, Arthur and family made way to Chicago and Hearst's *American* newspaper. (One can see his lifelong connections to conservative views were shaped by Pegler's proximity to the ideas from birth.) By his major, Pegler worked for the paper industry in Europe, becoming a headache to the military, so much so, that he joined the Navy towards the end of World War I.

Pegler likely originated the "aw, nuts" philosophy of coverage of sport. He parodied; lambasted; and tied in his political philosophies to his sports coverage. As such, he powered out driven articles, exposing the darker, unsavory, and immoral side of the game, as many craved that viewpoint on ballplayers.

But his sports writing essentially ceased by the mid-1930s to achieve his greater work as a critic of any politically, socially, or religiously controversial. He found hypocrisy and waste in everything government-related; turned viciously on FDR, after just voting for him in 1936; attacked FDR's wife Eleanor, mercilessly, through parodied of her war columns. Pegler castigated baseball and Hollywood; focusing on George Raft, who put up Leo Durocher in his house, while Raft consorted with known mobsters frequently. The linkage to gambling was implied; but Leo continued on as a manager in 1940s.

Westbrook Pegler took his viewpoints out on people rather than confining them to the situation; he made enemies of many groups, Jew and gentile alike; most of all, once defeated legally, he refused to throttle back his rhetoric to his own personal undoing. No one questioned his flair as writer, as he was considered a rare talent in doing analysis with humor and craft. But it was his inability to maintain sane decorum that undid him in his last twenty-five years. But maybe, he had a point to make.

Lastly, Pegler once called President Eisenhower: "a picnic pitcher in a World Series."



**Legends of the Underwood:** Fred Lieb (seated second from left), Damon Runyon (third seated) and Grantland Rice (second from right) left their lasting mark on baseball. Here, they were just relative ‘newbies’ to sports writing in the Big Apple in 1911. Youth on ground: Harry “Scorecard” Steven’s son.

### Matthew ‘Heywood’ Campbell Broun (1888 – 1939)

As a lefty counterpoint to Pegler, Broun brought a Harvard education, a passion for baseball, and a truth to whatever he wrote. He founded and led the American Newspaper Guild – of which Pegler was once a member – while creating fast friendships with Christy Mathewson, and fellow writer, Fred Lieb. In *Twentieth Century Sportswriters*, Western Illinois University teacher and author Bill Knight reflects that, “Heywood was a man of contrasts – gregarious and introspective, brave and fearful, direct and evasive, a celebrity and a champion of the underdog (Orodenker 1996, 33).”

Broun was an imposing man at 6’3”, often close to 300 pounds, yet both gentle and determined in that same physique. While at Harvard, he played basketball until a knee injury put the brakes on athletics. He studied alongside T.S. Eliot and Walter Lippmann; but failed to get on the staff of the *Harvard Crimson*, the premier student newspaper, while working summers for the *New York Morning Telegraph* and *Evening Sun*.



After leaving Harvard without a degree due to his penchant to go “on the lark” or find something else more engaging (Broun failed French too (Orodenker, 32)), he turned to writing for *New York Morning Telegraph* in 1910. In asking for a \$2 raise per day, Heywood was let go. Not deterred, he went on an Asian trip to follow theatrical bents in his personality. After this trip abroad, Broun landed a position at the *New York Tribune* covering both baseball and theatre.

Broun’s first coup labeled first sacker Hal Chase as a cheat, in print; courtesy of Frank Chance (of Cubs’ fame) analysis and first-hand managerial critiques. Broun, was criticized harshly by the Yankees ownership, but Chase was sent off to the White Sox shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, a “gee-whiz” hero-worship technique locked down the benefits of Mathewson and McGraw, as both became friends – and shared common interests and education. (Mathewson and Broun had the college finishing – but all were theatre buffs.)

In 1915, Broun took assignments as a drama critic. **To great ado:** in one day, as he departed the baseball beat, he scored the game, giving an error instead of a hit to a Giants ballplayer while covering a play that evening, roasting too the lead, a Barrymore. (The great aunt of Drew Barrymore. Who starred in *Fever Pitch*, the prophetically-timed story of Boston losing in the playoffs, but the lead winning the girl, Drew Barrymore. Instead of losing, Boston won in 2004, causing the ending to be reshot.) **Next day:** the baseball afflicted sent communications that a ‘drama critic’ knows nothing scoring the sport; and ‘a cheap baseball reporter’ knows little of Ethel Barrymore acting exploits (Orodenker, 34).

So involved did Broun entwine with drama critiques that he was engaged to Lydia Lopokova, a Russian dancer, who subsequently married famed economist John Maynard Keynes. Whose demand-side theories were loosely employed during FDR’s administration escaped from the Depression. But for Broun, the demand for action all started with a rave review of Lydia’s performance.

Like Pegler, Broun found some controversy critiquing. By the time of the United States war entry, Broun attacked General George Pershing’s tactics, maneuvers, and training in much the same way Pegler was a thorn to the military’s operations. (Pegler and Broun were next-door neighbors for a spell.) Heywood wrote two books concerned with the nature of WWI in 1918.

The 1920s puts Broun at the height of his career in starting the Algonquin Round Table in 1919, producing a wide array of pieces. Algonquin Harold Ross (*The New Yorker*) hired Broun to the advisory board of the soon-to-be premier literary and journalism magazine. Broun shifted over to the *New York World* in 1921 joining by Algonquin members Franklin P. Adams and Alexander Woollcott. His liberal leanings were a better fit than at the *Tribune* – as he added levity to sport – while including Biblical references to topics such as left-handedness (36). Broun's output grew during the 1920s to include three collections, three novels, and nonfiction work. Yet, by 1928, after several columns supporting anarchists to be executed, Broun was on the outs at the *World* as his 'lefty' politics conflicted with Ralph Pulitzer's *World and views*.

In the 1930s, Broun landed at Scripps-Howard's Telegram, who, then bought out *The World* in 1931. Pegler ran his columns in the paper where Broun espoused a far different bias, resulting in side-by-side columns of "It Seems To Me" (Broun) and "Fair Enough." Yet, despite this huge political divide, they remained friends and neighbors. Meanwhile, his marriage to Ruth Hale, a socialist writer, drama-filled for years, led to a civil estrangement. Finally it ended, and later, his ex-wife died while in a coma in 1934. He remarried; and changed faiths, to Roman Catholicism. By then, Broun's writing took a backseat to forming the American Newspaper Guild, remaining guild president for the rest of his life.

When not offering columns on literature, drama, politics, the law or social issues, he wrote about baseball and the Babe. In the 1923 World Series: "The Ruth is mighty and shall prevail." Broun's contributions were honored posthumously as he received the 1970 J.G. Taylor Spink Award.

From *Meet the Sportswriters*, Irving Dilliard

*Dictionary of Literary Biography*, Volume 171, Bill Knight

### Walter Wellesley 'Red' Smith (1905 –1982)

From protégé and equally respected Ira Berkow:

"Born Walter Wellesley Smith, he worked for newspapers in Milwaukee, St. Louis and Philadelphia before being hired in 1945 by *The New York Herald Tribune*. He became the most widely syndicated sports columnist of his generation. Smith joined The New York Times in 1971, and won the Pulitzer Prize for Distinguished Commentary in 1976 at age 70. His Pulitzer citation praised his humor and humanitarianism, as well as 'the erudition, the literary quality, the vitality and freshness of viewpoint' of his columns.

On the final day of the 1951 season, the Dodgers needed a victory to tie for the National League pennant. It was the bottom of the 12th inning at Shibe Park and it was getting dark. The Phillies had the bases loaded and two out. Eddie Waitkus smashed a drive toward center field. Jackie Robinson, wrote Smith, ``flings himself headlong at right angles to the flight of the ball, for an instant his body is suspended in midair, then somehow the outstretched glove intercepts the ball inches off the ground. He falls heavily, the crash drives an elbow into his side, he collapses. ... stretched at full length in the insubstantial twilight, the unconquerable doing the impossible.” (Berkow, PERSPECTIVE; The Eloquent Words Of Legendary Writers 2000)

No less an author than Hemingway surmised Smith as: “the most important force in American sports writing.” Fellow beat writer Shirley Povich recalled: “Those, of all persuasions, who had an appreciation for the written word were attracted to him and his facility for using the language. He raised the sports writing trade to a literacy and elegance it had not known before (Burgess III 2014).” Smith took the best of Grantland Rice’s charms, a close friend, and married that to a greater understanding of human nature using fluid words to describe the exploits without cliché.

Attending Notre Dame University in the time of Rockne, covering the St. Louis Cardinals at the Gashouse pinnacle, Red Smith bled the printed word for over 55 years and 10,000 columns. He made a sparkling career out of using a keen intellect, fair reporting, but also seeing opportunities to make life-affirming statements on race and the reserve clause. As in seeing the fight of Curt Flood clearly: “If he wins his suit, everybody else will benefit. The fetters will be eased for all other players present and future. Baseball will gain respectability as an American institution. The only one who has nothing to gain is Curtis Charles Flood (Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave: Curt Flood’s Fight for Free Agency in Professional Sports 2006, 233).”

### Sportswriters on Race Relations in the 1930s

While many of the famed men of the ink were crafters of great prose and flair-filled column inches, they struggled mightily with any change of attitude toward African-Americans. Even as the country saw the greatness of athleticism of Jesse Owens in 1936 Olympics, and Americans were proud of those victories over Hitler’s supremacy doctrine, many famous sportswriters were far from impressed, staying with stereotypes and blatant slurs in describing men of color feats of physicality.

On the negative side of Grantland Rice’s ledger, his perceptions scribbled about African-Americans in sport where as uninspired, patently racist, and Southern-inspired

and insipid as many of his other well-educated colleagues. He referred to Jackie Robinson as 'the nigger' (Fountain 1993, 247), but as Fountain reminded:

"Does this make Rice a bigot?...he was most assuredly a bigot. But in the 1930s so were the rest of the sportswriters. And the newswriters. And the editors and the publishers and the novelists and the poets and the playwrights. So were the athletes and the actors and the fans who came to cheer them. So were the policemen and the shopkeepers...We were all bigots. In the 1930s, progress in race relations was measured by the decrease in the number of blacks who were lynched...Here and there throughout the period there were people who might have noted the hypocrisy in Boston College leaving its only black player at home...[during] the 1941 Sugar Bowl in New Orleans; or the irony of Josh Gibson and Satchel Paige not being in the big leagues. But nobody thought inappropriate was inconsistent with inevitable." (Fountain 1993, 247)

Fountain continues with what William Manchester, Churchill's biographer, called, "generational chauvinism." That looking at the past through a harsh prism of present sensibilities makes as little sense as looking for a hopeful future through repeating the exact same failed decisions as means to a better society. Neither does much to shed light on what was, or what needs to be. "Understanding," is what Charles Fountain enforced.

Rice just was not alone in his sensibilities about color in this age.

These typical ideas on 'other Americans' in 1930s sports writing were tied to an animalistic, instinctual, and slothful behavior. Paul Gallico with the *New York Daily News* used 'jungle animal' analogies to describe Joe Louis 'stalking his prey' in the ring. Another quote from Bill Corum as a *New York Journal American* contributor may be more insulting in its insinuation that blacks listen to jazz, eat fried chicken, and escape anything resembling hard work with a natural ease (Fountain, 249). It is not hard to comment today that those writers were not engaging in 'hard work' in pecking out their sentences. And that jazz was quite innovative, original, and artistic in ways most writers dare only to achieve; but never seem to duplicate twice in their written recordings.

As the generation of sportswriters that covered Ruth, Cobb, Johnson, and Alexander moved out of the game, or passed away, a new breed of sportswriter took over – some with styles all their own – others, as Pegler put it would make: "a horrible mess of it (Fountain, 256)."

### Sports Writing (1960 – 2014)

While the classic writers of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century were both trailblazers and drinking buddies often to the players (and GMs and the owners) of their day, the new breed of journalist eschewed any loyalty to players. By 1960, the old line was nearly gone, enjoying awards for their work, and retiring to type up their memoirs. The new men on the chalk lines of baseball coverage were more caustic, hypercritical, and focused on the warts and war of words amongst players and owners alike. More than anything else, they took a dismissive attitude to the trials of a ballplayer and made confrontation a daily tact. (Though they bristled at notions they still were too chummy with ownerships. But their column inches were filled with sarcasm and chiding over monetary arguments players had with ownerships. It seemed freedom to seek best circumstances for oneself was only good for the ink master, not the ball slinger.)

Examples are too numerous, and exceptions, are, too frequent to suggest otherwise, but the media changed over during the swell of generational clashes, racial tensions, the rise of television (which fueled clashes amongst print/TV reporters) and the fall of a U.S. President during Watergate.

In *Number 1*, Billy Martin and Peter Golenbock, speak of the print piranhas in New York:

“At the same time the press was pitting player against player, player against manager, manager versus management, and they’d go back and forth, back and forth, ask one player what he thought of another player, and then go back to the other player and tell him what the first player said...The New York reporters have a job to do...It’s a game they have going, and they’re experts at it...Henry Hecht of the *New York Post* was the worst at that. He’d go over to the guys who weren’t playing and get stories out of them, trying to give me [Martin] a bad time. He has a job to do, but I wish he’d do it with a little more dignity. I understand he works for Rupert Murdoch, who’s like George [Steinbrenner] in that he keeps his employees nervous all the time...Dick Young was another guy who ripped me bad. Tried to get me fired every chance he could, and then after I was fired, kicked me a few more times.” (Martin and Golenbock 1980, 86-87)

### Richard ‘Dick’ Young (1917-1987)

Dick Young was cut from a cloth similar to Pegler in that his tone and critiques in columns were usually negative, and always controversial. Yet, he was contradictory in his views, switching from an attack on “the Lords of Baseball” to supporting them

fervently against Flood. He once labeled Flood, “Marvin Miller’s puppet,” and sarcastically intoned that any notion of slavery was ludicrous as Flood cut short his travels to Scandinavia to return to the “Plantation Owners’ Association.” (Snyder 2006, 111)

Young battled with Red Smith, akin to Pegler and Broun, only much more direct and fueled by four decades serving in the New York media market. Young was decidedly New York, brash, street-wise, and never shy to point out a flaw. He was born in Bronx, grew up poor, but always eager to improve his life moving around to California, back to New York, and hitchhiking to get to the media Mecca he soon dominated with one of the highest columnist salaries of the day.

He made a lasting enemy of Walter O’Malley as Young decried the move of the Dodgers west. He was critical of rights sought by players in the Vietnam Era while demeaning athletes for their off-the-field behaviors while ignoring the flaws of pre-World War II players.

His tough moral stances did not necessarily translate back to his own personal life, but his work ethic was never at question as he wrote “Young Ideas” seven days a week often, and covered baseball nearly every day for the *New York Daily News* from 1936 to 1981. He received induction into the Hall via the Spink award. And Young’s name stayed among those writers who offered the greatest opinions on the direction of the sport.

### The Best Sports Writing Pieces

While such biting arguments over which player is doing the best or worst to support his team, the game’s direction, or the fan’s feelings are waged vigorously through the sports columns and radio talk shows; or the seemingly endless supply of TV broadcasts on dissection of such players, teams and livelihood of sport. There too has been eloquence expressed about the game.

David Halberstam’s collection of *The Best American Sports Writing of the Century* (1999) presents a few gems, and reflects the evolving shift from ‘gee whiz’ to ‘aw, nuts’ approach that were furthered along by gonzo journalist legend Hunter S. Thompson and the interview approaches of *Playboy*, *Esquire*, and *Harper’s*, starting in the 1960s.

Gay Talese’s exposé of the after-the-glory-days of Joe DiMaggio, *The Silent Season of the A Hero*, represented a landmark piece, showing the Clipper as ordinary, flawed, selfishly human, hostile, humorless man. And yet too, a sadden man as anyone likely

would be after personal greatness, a dynasty past, the love lost and tragedy of Monroe. His disappearance from American consciousness, only to be more eulogized via sappy odes to those golden summers twenty years then gone. Joe wanted it more after the glory, closed his circle (a small one always) to keep himself as an icon – just to be rolled out upon command, for only the money (he liked), and not necessarily the pleasure of doing it. And many regretted he felt that way all the remaining days of his life.

A Tom Verducci's *My Trip to the Show (Part II)* in the writer's anthology called *Inside the Ropes: Sportswriters Get Their Game On (University of Nebraska Press)* presented the hazards of umpiring firsthand. "Embarrassment. Injury. Blunt force trauma. Estate planning. The mind quickly accelerates the possibility and amplitude of catastrophe when you are standing on the infield grass, as I am, 75 feet in front of Boston Red Sox slugger Manny Ramirez while he bats with a runner on first base."

Verducci pursued the Paul Gallico/George Plimpton indoctrination into sport's endeavor: the amateur/novice trying his hand at the expert/the master level of sport. The quips about lazy athletes or crappy ump's are gone; instead, Verducci gets *Umpiring 101* course work (how not to look foolish), and not cause serious calamity, "don't chase the ball," or "stay out of Miguel Tejada's way," becomes engrained in his short stay on the spring training ball fields. The thankless job of umpiring is enforced by the 94% failure rate that keeps trainees from graduating out of umpiring school to the bus-n-lunch-at-McDonald's minors. Or that MLB umpiring jobs open up like Supreme Court slots; and just as many Americans know the names of both august bodies – probably more know the ump's name, "shithead," than Warren, Roberts, Taney, or Marshall.

Chicago's Mike Royko's bitter exercising of demons of the 1986 World Champion New York Mets:

"When I have about 30 to 40 of these wads [pages] I put them in my fireplace under the kindling and light them. They are excellent for getting a fire started. Then I pour myself a drink, lower the lights, sit back, and stare at the crackling flames. And I pretend that I'm looking at Shea Stadium."

Two-time Pulitzer Prize winner John Updike on Ted Williams' final days, his career, hitting in the clutch, and the fights he had (with the media) while being the greatest hitter of his generation, and likely, ever:

“The affair between Boston and Ted Williams has been no summer romance; it has been a marriage, composed of spats, mutual disappointments, and, towards the end, a mellowing hoard of shared memories. It falls in three stages, which may be termed as Youth, Maturity, and Age; or Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis; or Jason, Achilles and Nestor.”

Updike speaks on Williams always coming back for more baseball and abuse from the writers – from a broken collarbone, a shattered elbow, bruises, flu, and ptomaine poisoning – yet enduring it all without the faltering once of a hitter's clock, his bat.

**Paraphrasing Updike:** Meanwhile, tic-tock Williams' bat went – Swiss precision on a ball field filled with hasty mediocrity, the \$20 Timexes, and the day-late, money-tight scribblers-for-hire looking to smash (and trash) Teddy's ballgames, and his Big Ben appeal at the plate. Instead of playing small-ball, Teddy smacked sure doubles against Boudreau's shift, without the wheels to even arrive at first, on time. Yet, he did arrive; soundly ticking off another hit, precisely defeating the mechanisms of man – and so much, much more.

Updike surmises best of all on Williams and his heroic exploits and the media follies in capturing the other worldly essence of The Splendid Splinter:

“Gods do not answer letters.”

### A Few Good Men of Prose

The list of men that wrote in praise of the Herculean efforts of The Babe, Teddy Ballgame, The Mick, Say Hey Willie, Reggie, and The Rocket, is a long and honored one. To include all of them requires a massive volume with thousands of column inches, yet, still omitting good copy for brevity, and their unique flavors muted by the loss of words in that daunting selection of their best works. Thus, no comprehensive list does justice any better, but we tried.

**Table.** Noteworthy Scribes



Hugh Fullerton  
Hugh E. Keough  
Charles Dryden  
Marshall Hunt  
John Keiran  
Abe Kemp

Shirley Povich  
Dan Daniel (nee Markowitz)  
Jimmy Cannon  
Leonard Koppett  
Bert Leston Thayer  
Eugene Field

Peter Gammons  
Tom Boswell  
Roger Angell  
Jim Murray  
Jerome Holtzman  
Ira Berkow

William Morton Burgess III is an expert on the growing legends of the Underwood and the laptop keyboard. Through sites like *The Baseball Database* and *Meet the Sportswriters*, he has compiled biographical information on sportswriters, Negro League players, great players, and families involved in the ownership of most major league franchises. Much of the prior biographical information reflects his compilation of such information.



**Ronald Reagan:** 'The Great Communicator' worked in radio doing Cubs games in Iowa during the mid-1930s. Soon, he was amongst the biggest stars of the silver screen. His amassed media skills transferred well into his final job too. (Courtesy of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.)

# LBJ ERA (1964 – 1977)


- ◆ ERA of Speed and Astroturf
- ◆ Added Franchises
- ◆ Labor Disputes cause strikes
- ◆ Flood v. Kuhn
- ◆ Messersmith/McNally arbitration case
- ◆ Free Agency Begins

# LBJ ERA: Disruption & Rights



Curt Flood

## New Uniform Astroturf Ballparks




**Best MLB Players:** Pete Rose, Joe Morgan, Reggie Jackson, Willie McCovey, Carl Yastrzemski, Willie Stargell, Ron Santo, Henry Aaron, Johnny Bench, Willie Mays, Roberto Clemente, Bobby Bonds, Tom Seaver, Jim Palmer, Bob Gibson, Steve Carlton, Gaylord Perry, Juan Marichal, Sandy Koufax, Fergie Jenkins, Jim Kaat, Denny McLain, Bert Blyleven, Mike Cuellar, Mel Stottlemyre, Jim Perry, Don Sutton, Rollie Fingers, Mike Marshall

Where have you gone, Joe DiMaggio? The nation turns its lonely eyes to you.

Lyric from *Mrs. Robinson* by Paul Simon & Art Garfunkel

This era started out on the brink of lasting upheavals in the political, military, and social landscapes. Vietnam left its imprint on our military history; the Deep South shuddered against the destruction of a backward four century-old policy of holding down African-Americans; and Rock & Roll painted a canvas that both reflected and molded the future ideas of liberals while commenting on the social unrest affecting America. Baseball marched on; but found turmoil on and off the field will include it too, as labor relations, sports media and escalating salaries were the root conflicts.



The year 1968 is a landmark in American history as places, such as hippie-controlled Haight Ashbury; the people, musician Arlo Guthrie's "Alice's Restaurant"; and movements, Civil Rights, all interweaved discordantly into the social landscape of America. A violent year of protests, assassinations, and failing war efforts dominated the TV nightly.

James Earl Ray killed Martin Luther King, Jr. in Memphis on April 4, 1968. Less than five years after King's "I Have a Dream" speech, which sharply defined the struggle for equality in America, King was gone. "Free at Last," the goal of peaceful protests and sit-ins, seemed hollow gestures with his death. Many did not hold to that message. Others did; and honored the man and his sacrifices.

Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated two months later by Sirhan Bishara Sirhan after winning the California primary. The last person Kennedy personally thanked was Los Angeles Dodger pitcher Don Drysdale. RFK's borrowed, if lasting words of hope still ring true today: "Some people see things as they are, and ask why; I see things that never were, and ask why not." **Pictured above:** Pastor Martin Luther King, Jr. with President Lyndon Baines Johnson. His epic journey in the Civil Rights movement shaped the lives of all Americans. Johnson, though supportive, represented the marked failures of a Vietnam War policy and Great Society meddling in the fabric of a hardworking American society. (Yoichi R. Okamoto, White House Photographer.)

Typically straight-laced Ivy League Columbia University turned into a theatre of war. The Democratic National Convention in Chicago warped into a battlefield with National Guard troops sent in after the police and demonstrators fought on live TV. Phrases such as: "Turn on. Tune in. Drop out." or, "Make love. Not war," dominated the ultra-liberal side of the America. The hippies felt led in spirit by the rock & roll artistry of *The Beatles*, Joan Baez, *The Grateful Dead*, *Jefferson Airplane*, Jimi Hendrix, and Bob Dylan. Many were going to San Francisco and *The Whisky A Go-Go*. "The times they are a changing," were the watchwords of this baby boomer generation. Woodstock, a lasting image of the 1960s: mud and music, and yet, a peaceful mayhem took hold for that brief moment. And the 1969 moon shot succeeded.

The Vietnam War defined all in 1968. The presidency, the social fabric, and the economic future all tied to the policies and outcomes 10,000 miles away. Vietnam bogged down into a decade long quagmire – a holding action. Bombing the enemy reached levels triple the amount dropped on Germany in WWII with no end in sight. The eventual result in lives (over 58,000 dead, 300,000 wounded), financial costs (\$200 billion in *then* U.S. dollars) and social conflicts (that play out to this day) kept that American generation forever reminded of the people lost to the struggle. On the return home, vets suffered indignations from fellow Americans; and illnesses, both mental and physical, defined their lives after Vietnam.

No American went unchanged by the toils of war. The Counterculture in contrast to The Greatest Generation, disseminated by the media, showed the conflicting views espoused by both. Chants of "Hey, Hey, LBJ," and "make love, not war," showed one tenor of the counterculture; the other message tied to political dissent groups, SDS and the Weathermen. The Civil Rights movement underscored this tension, evolving into a fifteen round heavyweight title fight. Acclaimed journalist Walter Cronkite possibly

changed the course of war, going to Vietnam to find a far different truth. President Lyndon Johnson later felt that “if he had lost Cronkite,” then he had lost the American people. That revelation led to an eventual draw down of troops, as the United States fought longer in Vietnam than in any other war to that moment. Lyndon Johnson abandoned a run for a 2<sup>nd</sup> term as president, leading to the resurrection of Richard Milhous Nixon.

Nixon’s opponents – Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey and Alabama Governor George C. Wallace – divvied up the disaffected voters. Wallace ran as an independent “segregationist” carrying several states in the South; and Humphrey took up a Democratic platform lacking the vigor of either Kennedy’s, or McCarthy’s stance on Vietnam. (Humphrey got a domed stadium named in his honor, and the Twins won two World Series in the “Home of the Hefty Bag.” Washington’s R.F.K. Stadium memorialized the former U.S. Attorney General in Kennedy.)

Nixon won the 1968 election by a narrow margin (510,000 votes), but a landslide in the Electoral College (301). But Nixon’s presidency reinforced the struggles of the 1960s as the secret bombings in Cambodia generated even more violence and outrage. Four dead at Kent State inspired super group Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young to sing, “4 dead in O-HI-O.”

Later, *The War Powers Act* was signed to curtail presidential power to make war, while the cover-ups of *Watergate* led to the lone resignation of a sitting President. This changed the face of the media operations forever. And everyone wondered then, “Who is Deep Throat?” (Answer: FBI’s Associate Dir. Mark Felt.)

Oil became a resource concern and crisis in the 1970s, as OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) raised prices in step with inflation that was 8.8% in 1973 in the United States. War raged in the Middle East, contributing slightly to the price rises and shortages of gas. (Israel was besieged by Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War.) Nixon installed price controls, but to no economic avail.

NASA landed a man on the moon in July of 1969 with *Apollo 11*, and went on to the *Skylab* era of space adventures by 1973. *Mariner 9* orbited the Martian frontier in 1973. *Pioneer 10* exited our Solar System, the first satellite to do so after a 4-billion-mile-long flight. In 1972, the *Space Shuttle* program, a dream of the 1950s and 1960s, officially launched, and blasted to initial orbit after the turn of the decade.

In sports, the Boston Celtics and UCLA Bruins were the pinnacle of team excellence – with wizards Red Auerbach and John Wooden putting together their own dynasties in the growing world of basketball. In 1973, another “red” set the horseracing standard: Secretariat won the Triple Crown and trekked the Belmont Stakes in world record time that is still unmatched. Arthur Ashe did for tennis what Jackie Robinson did in baseball: proving African-Americans can redefine once closed off areas of sport against the backdrop of the existing American cacophony; And changed that cacophony’s tone through actions and deeds.

The NFL was created out of the merger of two strong leagues. Vincent Lombardi led the Green Bay Packers to wins in Super Bowl I and II. And the game grew into the most watched sporting spectacle in the world – and 30-second commercials that cost more the average American’s home, if it were a ‘McMansion.’ (\$2.75 million, and ever rising as of this writing.)

Baseball entered this period a vastly different game than was to be seen by the end of the LBJ ERA (1977). The balance of power shifted from solely the ownerships and managers, towards the players, who had made the sport great under the changing landscape. Much of this was romanticized in volumes written thereafter about the game’s purity in the 1950s. The Counterculture spilled over into the game, as players changed their hairstyles, facial hair, and uniforms to express their individuality. Ballparks changed in nature, scope, and amenities. The fan base equally modified; more critical, and aware of the monies paid. Sportswriters took note; and critiqued accordingly.

Such changes are depicted in several passages from *Cincinnati and the Big Red Machine* by George Washington University professor Robert Harris Walker. Bob Howsam’s Cincinnati Reds were often contrasted to the Finley-owned Oakland Athletics. The clean-cut image of the Reds, playing on the first all-Astroturf field (Walker 1988, 34), bringing together the ballpark, players, and fans in Midwestern unison versus Finley’s A’s that were shabbily attired in softball-like gaudiness. The A’s, who wore mustaches, argued with the media (and themselves) about any and all amounts of slights (Walker 1988, 43-55). The two dynasties of the 1970s with five straight championships between them (1972-1976) were truly representative of the divergent viewpoints going on throughout America society – one appeared straight-laced, clean cut, and machine-like, the other, wild, boisterous, freedom-loving, and most of all, an ignorer of rules, while ‘fighting the man’ for more freedoms.

**Table.** 1950-1959 Rookies of the Year and MVPs


<b>Year</b>	<b>Award</b>	<b>AL</b>	<b>NL</b>
<b>1950</b>	MVP	Phil Rizzuto	Jim Konstanty
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Walt Dropo</i>	<i>Sam Jethroe</i>
<b>1951</b>	MVP	Yogi Berra	Roy Campanella
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Gil McDougald</i>	<i>Willie Mays</i>
<b>1952</b>	MVP	Bobby Shantz	Hank Sauer
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Harry Byrd</i>	<i>Joe Black</i>
<b>1953</b>	MVP	Al Rosen	Roy Campanella
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Harvey Kuenn</i>	<i>Jim Gilliam</i>
<b>1954</b>	MVP	Yogi Berra	Willie Mays
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Bob Grim</i>	<i>Wally Moon</i>
<b>1955</b>	MVP	Yogi Berra	Roy Campanella
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Herb Score</i>	<i>Bill Virdon</i>
<b>1956</b>	MVP	Mickey Mantle	Don Newcombe
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Luis Aparicio</i>	<i>Frank Robinson</i>
<b>1957</b>	MVP	Mickey Mantle	Hank Aaron
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Tony Kubek</i>	<i>Jack Sanford</i>
<b>1958</b>	MVP	Jackie Jensen	Ernie Banks
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Albie Pearson</i>	<i>Orlando Cepeda</i>
<b>1959</b>	MVP	Nellie Fox	Ernie Banks
	<i>Rookie of the Year</i>	<i>Bob Allison</i>	<i>Willie McCovey</i>

The changes to society in the *LBJ Era* are traceable back onto the field with the talent pouring into baseball from the Negro Leagues demise. With that door cracked open, social climates were challenged in the bastions of overt racism. As with any seismic event, the shudders often left players – who had varying degrees of social activism – to both survive and shape their own paths in a game that was designed for kids, but contorted by economic realities by adults.

That African-American ballplayers dominated the 1950s with nearly every NL MVP award coming to their hands was of no surprise to the purveyors of their talents. Rookies of the Year such as Willie Mays, Frank Robinson, Orlando Cepeda, and Willie McCovey left baseball as legends, with the 1960s reflecting expansion of their talents. A growth in roster diversity, often in spurts, led some to believe skin color “isn’t a big concern” (Menke 1963, 122), even while the Civil Rights era began in earnest, and set off numerous battles in the Deep South. By the latter part of the *LBJ Era*, African-

Americans numbered one in four ball players in the majors – but lacked leadership roles. Only one field manager Frank Robinson (1956 Rookie of the Year) represented a management change.

Black ballplayers made their way through the minors of the Deep South, surviving harsh and racist conditions on their way up to the parent club. They never forgot the words, actions, or critiques of their play while proving ‘they had game.’ Baiting and hazing tactics were excused as just part motivator to play the game better than their hassle-free white counterparts. While mediocre white players ate, slept, and relaxed anywhere, an African-American ballplayer endured obstacles to get rooms. Some people of that era likely opined: “poor treatment builds character.” But, received accolades showed the mettle was inherent; no matter the tactics to keep down and out.



**Sandy Koufax**, *SI* cover man: While often receiving a negative benefit in being lauded on the front cover of *SI*, this March 4, 1963 cover did not hurt Lefty, immediately. Koufax was the force at the helm of the new Dodger Stadium digs. He was the standard for dominance at this point, taking apart lineups in short order. (Picture Released to Public Domain, *Wikipedia Commons*.)



## Pitching Rules

Sandy Koufax, Juan Marichal, Bob Gibson, Denny McClain, Sam McDowell, Bob Veale, Mickey Lolich, Mel Stottlemyre, Chris Short and future U.S. Senator Jim Bunning defined the mid-1960s from the bump. These pitchers dominated, confused, and subdued opposing batters, unlike the power happy 1950s, or in the many years prior. The higher mounds, the expanded strike zone, and the new pitcher-friendly ballparks are greatly responsible for the restrictions to, and stifling of, offenses. But unusual talent was in abundance for these mound aces. Marichal a.k.a. 'The Dominican Dandy' was a six-time 20-game winner in the 1960s – and threw side arm, submarine, over the top, and three-quarters at least four different pitches for strikes (and outs).

Hitters were so paralyzed by these performers, that in 1968, the highest American League batting average (.301, Yastrzemski) was 11 points higher than the 2<sup>nd</sup> place finisher – journeyman 1<sup>st</sup> baseman-outfielder Danny Cater. The last 30-game winner, Denny McClain, marveled while Bob Gibson posted a 1.12 ERA, but lost 9 games! The St. Louis starters (Gibson, Briles, Carlton, Washburn), each had over 200 innings, and all had sub-3.00 Earned Run Averages. Tommy John had a 1.98 ERA, and finished 5<sup>th</sup> in the American League in ERA. The Cleveland Indians employed Luis Tiant, the fun, determined, side-winding, rubber-armed son of a Negro League legend, dominating with a 21-9 record, 1.60 ERA and 264 strikeouts. On the same staff, gasman Sam McDowell went 15-14 with a 1.81 ERA and 283 fans.

The Indians finished 3<sup>rd</sup> under perennially under achieving manager Alvin Dark – who had some of the best talent ever assembled on the Giants of the early 1960s, but later won, as discussed, with the Oakland A's of 1974. (And got fired thereafter.) 1968 as a baseball year reflected the times: stifling oddities and unfortunate results even from superior performances was apt. Unpredictability the norm.

## Ball Three: Sex, Drugs, and the Rocking & Rolling Life

The usage of "greenies", or Amphetamines, is well documented (to have begun in earnest) by numerous publications by the 1960s. Players felt with the extended travel, day-after-night games, and the prolonged season lasting six plus months that "pep pills" provided them with energy to get through the daily grind. As Tom Verducci of *Sports Illustrated* states: "Greenies have been in the game since the 1950s. They are rampant today. [Circa 2005] (Verducci, Speed game: Amphetamines should have been part of new plan 2005)" But the game hid, or rarely addressed this aspect, and only

presently, starting in 2006, is such usage banned from the baseball field and locker rooms. (This as an afterthought to the steroid policy put in place initially in September 2002.)

In a decade nearly defined by the liberation of the mind, body, and spirit, the sexual proclivities of the professional athlete were examined from both inside (Jim Bouton's *Ball Four* and Curt Flood's *The Way It Is*) and outside (reporters' accounts of players' off-the-field activities). As a result, fans, reporters, owners, and the commissioner reacted negatively to the ballplayer's sexual conquests as detrimental to the "Good of the Game." In commissioner Bowie Kuhn's case, he asked players to denounce and retract their books in public (Bouton) and in private (Flood).

In several quotes on the subject of voyeurism, sexual conquests, and females in baseball, Curt Flood presented a facet of what ballplayers were like in the 1960s. "Before discussing the painful of baseball marriages, a word is in order about the grand and glorious pastime known as beaver shooting. Jim Bouton created a stir in 1970 when his book, *Ball Four*, revealed the high incidence of voyeurism among ball players. I leave it to psychologists to decide why ballplayers are peeping toms or, perhaps, why peeping toms are ballplayers... (Carter and Flood 1971, 107-8)" Flood continued on with a breakdown of the best places to engage in this 'pastime within the pastime' in the minor leagues and The Show. "Leaving nothing to chance, they [women] cross and uncross their legs at frequent intervals, presenting athletes with a splendid vista of the promise land...Real buffs prefer the beaver unaware (Carter and Flood 1971, 108)." And this view prevailed on Joe Pepitone: "Pepitone obviously liked being a major-league ballplayer because it was not a disadvantage in meeting beautiful young women (Halberstam, October 1964, 42)."

Within these crass comments laid the crux of what happened to young men with young(er) wives and girlfriends. Often, relationships were found in disarray – not necessarily because of "beaver shooting" – but because of travel, early upbringing flaws, and the uncertainty of living arrangements while being employed in a big league city, wondering if one's job is safe. The daily grind mixed with inept communication, poor relating to a ballplayer's "job", the wandering eye, and fluid financial and living arrangements was no different from any other segment of society, then, and more often, now. Security missing tended toward riskier behaviors. Nomadic ballplayers caused and resulted from these broken relationships, and with more frequency, if one

can make a hazard. Ballplayers rolled with the punches, leaving rocky relationships in their wake.

### Asterisk 61\*

Baseball saw the addition of 8 regular season games in 1961 (to the American League) and then in 1962 (to the National), to the complication of a then-hallowed record: 60 home runs in a season. Because of this change, fans and press alike often vilified Roger Maris for breaking the Babe's 1927 record.

In 1961 (a miracle season following an MVP season in 1960), Roger Maris should have been congratulated and exalted in baseball lore, instead, he was often looked at as not worthy of surpassing the Babe. Bill Veeck stated in *Veeck as in Wreck*, "Maris's run for Ruth's record – abetted by Mantle – was a godsend to the American League. It saved us all from a disastrous year (Veeck and Linn 1962, 123)." (Speaking to financial concerns.) Long before breaking the record, Roger Maris was spotted as an ideal fit for the Yankees. In *The Mick*, a late-night conversation between Mantle and Kansas City manager Harry Craft pointed this out: "The stadium is tailor-made for him [referring to Maris]. My gosh, it's only 296 feet down the right field foul line. With his ability to pull the ball, he'd have a picnic...He could be another Mantle (Mantle and Gluck 1985, 190)."

In *October 1964*, Pulitzer Prize winning author David Halberstam, Maris's pull ability and athleticism is summed up:

"He was a great pull hitter – in fact, Mike Shannon thought he never saw a hitter who was as good at pulling an outside pitch as Roger Maris. A lot of hitters, Shannon thought, could pull the inside pitch, but pulling a ball outside was much harder; it demanded a very good eye and a very, very quick bat and no wasted motion in the swing. Maris was not a particularly big man at six feet tall and 190 pounds, but he was a superb all-around athlete...[considered almost the equal of HOF Al Kaline as a defensive right fielder.] To this day the photos of him swinging are unusually striking, because his entire body is fused so perfectly: shoulders, arms, and legs, leveraged as one piece, nothing wasted." (Halberstam 1994, 160)

As it was, Maris put together back-to-back seasons that until the late 1990s were amongst the best in baseball history.

**Table.** Roger Maris Statistics in 1960 and 1961 (Fangraphs, BB-Ref)

G	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	OBP	SLG	BB	SO	fWAR	rWAR
136	499	141	18	7	39	0.371	0.581	70	65	7.2	7.5
161	590	159	16	4	61*	0.372	0.620	94	67	7.1	6.9

Often though, Maris’s accomplishments in those two seasons, and during a long career in the sport, were diminished by sportswriters, fans, and critics of the game without regard. He struggled with being in the harsh New York limelight that was well-suited for his teammate, Mickey Mantle. As Curt Flood commented in his biography, *The Way It Is*, Maris was far different than portrayed:

“In 1961 he had hit sixty-one home runs for the New York Yankees, breaking Ruth’s record. Instead of being lionized, he was represented to the public as an egocentric grouch. Anyone with the dimmest curiosity or sensitivity might have been able to understand Roger’s frame of mind during that pressure cooker of a year. But those qualities were in short supply, and Rog came off with an almost uniformly bad press. His problem had been one of trying to maintain personal equilibrium – including his powers of athletic concentration – while being hounded by reporters and fans. To rebuff one reporter was enough to launch chain reactions of outrage. To accommodate all fans and reporters was physically and mentally impossible...He could not handle it. He never hit more than thirty-three home runs in any season after 1961. I think he was psychologically incapable of exposing himself to another ride on that particular merry-go-round.” (Carter and Flood 1971, 89)

Halberstam reflected a similar light on the Maris versus Mantle comparison, the obviously more popular home run legend of the Yankees, and their ways of dealing with stardom:

“He was quiet and reserved, far more introverted than Mantle...His had not been an easy childhood; his father worked for the railroad...and he was a hard and unsparing man...He [Roger] had none of Mantle’s exuberance, gregariousness, or, for that matter, his mood swings. In the locker room, he was never the show that Mantle was. Mantle, for all his reservations about the press, his moodiness and his modesty, was always aware of his role in baseball history as the star of the Yankees...Mantle was, thought Jim Bouton, like a long-running Broadway show all his own – funny and tragic, difficult and engaging, but always well-acted...

Maris was completely different. He liked to play baseball, and he was good at it, but he pulled back from the theatrics associated with the game. Most ballplayers thought Maury Allen, a talented sportswriter who covered Maris in those years and knew him exceptionally well, liked to say that they did not care about getting their names in the papers...on television; but Roger Maris...truly felt that way. He liked playing the game, everything else was extraneous...He was a physical man, not a verbal one: he was skilled in the use of body, not the use of words...In that 1961 season [as he was on a record pace to break Ruth record] a reporter asked him: did he think he had a chance to break Ruth's record. His answer was pure Maris: 'How the fuck do I know?'" (Halberstam 1994, 161-162)

Such a blunt honesty, in the newly, visual media-driven world that President John F. Kennedy, boxer extraordinaire Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali), and Alabama and New York Jets quarterback Joe Namath used so expertly in their successes (Halberstam, 164), was not completely understood by hordes of fans, or even media sources, yet. (So instead, the canned phrase approach existed.) Maris was a down-to-earth player in a not-so-down-to-Earth era as the 1960s unfolded into the struggle between old and new values, with war and rights, the conflict stage.

Maris found more comfortable times playing a solid, if understated outfield alongside Curt Flood for the championship Redbird teams of 1967 and 1968, as Flood reflects, "And so they were, including the volatile [Orlando] Cepeda, the impossible Maris, and the impenetrable [Bob] Gibson – three celebrated non-candidates for togetherness. There we were, Latins, blacks, liberal whites and redeemed peckerwoods, the best team in the game and the most exultant...A beautiful little foretaste of what life will be like when Americans finally unshackle themselves (Carter and Flood, 90)."

Roger Maris hit .385 and smacked his last post-season home run in a game five defeat off Jim Lonborg, Boston's best pitcher in 1967, as the Cardinals won their 2<sup>nd</sup> championship of the decade. (Maris played against the Cards in 1964.) Gibson was the 1967 World Series MVP, winning 3 games with a 1.00 ERA. Cepeda contributed two home runs in 1968, in the 7-game thriller, which pitted aces Gibson and Mickey Lolich against each other in the deciding game seven. (Denny McClain, the last 30-game winner, fell apart in game four and collared two series losses.) Maris retired after the 1968 season with 275 home runs, 7 World Series appearances, and 6 home runs in the fall classic: a quiet man survived the noisy life.

### Stadiums: Dodger Stadium and the Houston Astrodome

With the addition of the new Washington Senators, Los Angeles Angels, New York Mets, and Houston Colt .45s (later Astros) in 1961 and 1962, the game expanded to the delight of some, and the consternation of others. During the 1950s, U.S. Senate hearings stepped up to examine the realities facing all professional sports – again revisiting the anti-trust exemption that MLB carved out, amongst other issues, all related to financial concerns and expansion of the game.

These hearings came in close proximity to moves west by two successful teams: the Brooklyn Dodgers and the New York Giants. As the ballparks of both teams were considered inadequate, though charming, a fight began to decide the fate of franchises – and what projects took precedent. “Robert Moses was chief administrator of the Federal Housing Association and battled [Walter] O’Malley over whether a new stadium should be built for the Dodgers. Moses wanted a thoroughfare, the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, and O’Malley wanted a stadium at the corner of Atlantic and Flatbush Avenues where a railroad terminal existed. O’Malley hoped the move would save money for fans on parking that would be applied to concessions (Erskine, Rocks and Snider 2005, 98).” O’Malley lost out; created lasting bitterness amongst a fan base that professed their love of their teams, but attendance at Brooklyn games did not reflect this at the end.

### Brooklyn’s Baseball Days Are Numbered

As the number of households with television between 1950 and 1951 tripled to 10 million (Forever Blue: The True Story of Walter O'Malley, Baseball's Most Controversial Owner, and the Dodgers of Brooklyn and Los Angeles 2009, 128), changes to the family life, economic realities, and TV growth meant Ebbets summertime heroes were to feel a pull west. The Dodgers jetted off to Los Angeles just as Sputnik’s supersonic space flight roared: two, incredulous American nightmares of change just a decade after WWII heroics. The writers and fans in New York bemoaned loudly the loss of the stalwarts of summer while Americans minds twisted on Cold War rhetoric and responses made. Brooklyn and New York soon dimmed the lights on their ball teams. Such changes are bitter; and foretelling.

The new suburban unit family – father, mother, son, and daughter – grew larger and vastly different from the singular Brooklyn fan with their cowbells, heckling, unabashed drunkenness, bitter love of Durocher’s antics, and the old trolley cars that rode to Ebbets Field. The fathers cut their grass out in the ‘burbs, coach their boys in little

leagues, and punched a clock at their new state-of-the-art plants. The mothers got their kids ready for school, while listening to the radio for a new rock & roll song – always attentive to the dangers of such music. Or maybe the TV, if a variety show was on. And the family car was just a whim away from being loaded for a vacation to wherever a father could get lost to the quickest. This was the late 1950s middle class life.

The trapped Brooklynites represented a bygone era of a crowded, if seemingly efficient city: seen as dirty, old, in need of a facelift that no one was quite able, or willing to, justify, the necessity, or the dollars to do it. So, the suburbs called – and baseball harnessed well the televised game for its advertising dollars and messages sent to the fathers to buy products. Meanwhile, Brooklyn lost out as the once bustling New York Naval Shipyard – home to 70,000 workers in WWII – wound down to below 15,000 in the early 1950s. In 1950, Spalding's sporting goods left Brooklyn for Massachusetts. Trommer Brewery sold out to a foe. The top 'independent' lender – George V. McLaughlin Brooklyn Trust – merged, and with that, financing for anything to make money came with more strings and struggles (D'Antonio 2009, 136-137). The *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, once the largest afternoon paper in the country, and boasted of Walt Whitman as a former editor (D'Antonio, 194), stopped the presses for good before Elvis Presley shone on the TV regularly. *The Eagle* was the last (of eight) daily prints to meet their demise in Brooklyn. With jobs lost, inner city culture eroding, and moneymen leaving, the rabid fans turned away – not due to team's fortunes – but out of economic necessities found in other places removed from an endangered species: a Flatbush Avenue trolley. Cars and interstates replaced to powerbroker Robert Moses' overriding support and pleasure.

**MLB (1949-1952) average:** 1,069,345

**Brooklyn (1950-1952):** 1,185,743

**(Pictured below:** Minor Attendance (Kronheim 2013))

Year	Total NAPBL Attendance	# of Teams	Average Att. per Team
1946	32,704,315	314	104,154
1947	37,184,167	388	95,835
1948	38,415,716	438	87,707
1949	39,640,443	448	88,483
1950	32,960,733	442	74,572
1951	26,135,174	365	71,603
1952	24,024,373	334	71,929
1953	21,109,565	288	73,297
1954	18,674,503	264	70,737
1955	18,203,889	243	74,913
1956	16,402,953	217	75,590
1957	14,875,346	200	74,377
1958	12,744,883	171	74,531
1959	11,622,581	152	76,464
1960	10,660,811	152	70,137
1961	9,766,505	147	66,439
1962	9,732,582	134	72,631

Brooklyn's attendance faltered badly (see Graph below) while winning many more games than any previous decade of ownership could ever tout. Instead of doing what Taft Era Red Sox owner/ theatre impresario Harry Frazee did: selling off players (see: Reagan Era) and running a bargain-basement operation for a decade, O'Malley looked for a backdoor – and new backyard – to run his operations, carte blanche. O'Malley first talked to Victor Ford Collins, who co-owned the Hollywood Stars, in November 1950. Collins originally obtained financing from Cecil B. Demille about the aspects of a California location, as the Pacific Coast League clamored for years about inclusion to the bigs, or a *separate* Major League. The Dodgers affiliated with these *Stars* for minor league talent, starting in 1949 (Baseball-reference.com, 2014), and saw operations were supported well. 600,000 people attended games at *Gilmore Field*, which held 13,000 at max capacity (D'Antonio, 130-131).

Yet, even as Brooklyn was the most successful on-the-field NL team in victories, this did not result in attendance well above average. (20-30% is more expected or acceptable for the best teams.) On the left coast, the PCL seasons generally ran much longer than MLB. 180 games was not an unusual season length. Moreover, their recent data was misleading; as the height of minor league attendance peaked in 1949, the first year of Stars-Dodgers affiliation. From 1949 to 1959, minor league attendance cratered from a boom-bust cycle at play. Too many teams, economics at play, and TV stole eyes from the dusty ball fields.



But as air travel had improved, with the Dodgers acquiring first a DC-3, then a Convair 440, from World War I ace and Eastern Airline exec Eddie Rickenbacker, the prospect of coast-to-coast baseball was eminent, and fortuitous, for O'Malley.

Bill Veeck too pleaded to go west as his Browns were pummeled and prodded out of business by AL interests in New York. O'Malley though was a better politician; less of a boat rocker, for other ownerships, compared to Veeck's stunts, promotions, flare, and mouth. (Which in the end analysis, likely all did in Veeck in his prospective relocation to parts west of the Mississippi.)

### O'Malley's New Face Men

O'Malley replaced the now cash-laden Rickey in late 1950 with Emil "Buzzie" Bavasi as VP/general Manager and Lafayette Fresco Thompson as the VP/ minor league director of player development. Bavasi took this position at 34 years of age, but was deeply experienced with over decade devoted to various minor league operations from ticket window to scouting talent to park operations. (He played in four games in the minors, nixed a trade, while only 19, because he had clobbered the pitcher in high school ball (D'Antonio, 129-130).) His was a young man's dream: a talented, disciplined club, a hands-off owner with ambition for better digs, and the ability to craft a team from a solid blueprint of operations. As the future came along, the Dodgers went places while helmed by Bavasi.

O'Malley was tepid about his manager, Chuck Dressen. In Dressen, he had a proficient enough skipper, but when Dressen asked for more money - \$50,000 per year for three years contract - O'Malley balked (D'Antonio, 170). Never one for giving out multi-year deals, O'Malley did not pay out ahead for players or managers alike. He assumed that men under pressure would and should perform better - and so, Dressen fatally overestimated his hand, and his usefulness, even after back-to-back World Series appearances in 1952 and 1953.

The new skipper, Walter Alston, did no such overestimating, even in coming straight from winning the International League in 1953 with the top farm club in Montreal. Alston's legend grew quickly on the fact he never asked (or received) a multi-year contract in his 23 years at the helm. O'Malley got the man who finally broke *Dem Bums* curse, and two years later, LA bound they both went. Dressen, meanwhile, never finished in first place again as a manager in hopping from Washington, to Milwaukee, and finally Detroit, passing away mid-season 1966.

**A short Dressen bio:** Charlie was born in Decatur, Illinois and played quarterback for George Halas on the Decatur Staleys, forerunner of the Chicago Bears. Too short for star playing, he moved to baseball. After a middling third sacker career for the 1920s Reds, MacPhail hired Dressen to be manager of the Reds in 1934. Dressen stayed there until MacPhail left, both moving northeast to Brooklyn. Charlie became Leo Durocher's right hand man and all-around cohort, which with Leo meant action from Broadway gals to the bookies at Belmont. A gabby, insecure sort, Dressen was nevertheless a fairly smart egg, and let it get in the way of common sense about his dealings. He was suspended for hanging around Leo, coached for the Yankees under Bucky Harris, and still had a shot at good managerial fortunes: possibly to make the Yankees his home prior to operating back in Brooklyn. Instead, Dressen blew it all by force of narcissistic beliefs: he thought he accounted more for the wins than his players. Obviously, he didn't. Dressen may have mirrored Stengel – only his mouth ran before results merited the loquaciousness (James, *The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers: From 1870 to Today*, 185-189).

O'Malley then shaved and gently cut Red Barber out, an announcing legend without equal to that point, in favor of twenty-six year old future legend Vin Scully. O'Malley and Barber's conflicting, cutting arguments: O'Malley thought Barber digressed and talked about bad weather that hurt turnstiles; Barber alleged he was asked to direct the camera to empty seats. But it all came down to a *biona*, a beret, that Barber wore on air that ticked off O'Malley, and later, a no confidence vote in regards to money for a World Series broadcast, that sent a Barber and his tools to the Yankees (D'Antonio, 172-73).

Moving the Browns, Flaherty Gets You Everywhere, and Temptation for O'Malley  
As O'Malley put his face men into their respective positions, an opportunity to move west came before the 1953 World Series. Oilman Clint Murchison and 100-company wealthy entrepreneur Sid Richardson offered to purchase the Dodgers, according to newspaper raconteur Vincent X. Flaherty. They bowed out before finalizing bids – due to the inability to move the team to Los Angeles without National League team ownerships' unanimous approval.

As a prequel, the precocious and precariously hopeful Bill Veeck was relieved (of) and by the fight over his moribund St. Louis Browns – as Baltimore and Los Angeles groups offered a bidding war – that included a million dollar on-the-spot check by billionaire Howard Hughes (Golenbock, *The Spirit of St. Louis: A History of The St. Louis Cardinals*

and Browns, 356-57). Hughes was a part of The Los Angeles Citizens Committee for Major League Baseball that included himself, Conrad Hilton, Louis B. Mayer, Reese Taylor (Union Oil) and the stirrer of the pot, Vincent X. Flaherty, then a Hearst columnist for the *Los Angeles Examiner* (D'Antonio, 177). In the end, Baltimore won. (**Note:** The St. Louis Browns came within a day of being the first to head west in 1941. The baseball owners' meeting set for December 8, 1941 was to be the end of the line for the Browns. However, Pearl Harbor disrupted the Browns relocation to Los Angeles (Heidenry and Topel 2006, 26) and lights installation at Wrigley Field. How history could have changed if only for a few days and some contract ink.)

According to Flaherty, LA lost out due to Baltimore lawyering, threatening lawsuits (D'Antonio, 179). But American League owners, especially Dan Topping and Del Webb, desired to put Veeck in a no-win position: twisting in the wind of St. Louis. "Keep him in St. Louis. Will bankrupt him, then move the team (Golenbock 2000, 357)," thus making Veeck more a spectator to the proceedings than controlling his team or fate. After his forced divestiture of \$2.475 million for 79% of the Browns stock, Veeck went to a part ownership with International League's Miami ball club, corralling Satchel Paige and Whitey Herzog plying their trades, until the "Wreck" returned with the "Go-Go" Sox in 1959 (Neyer, Rob Neyer's Big Book of Baseball Legends 2008, 34).

For his part, Vincent X. Flaherty was not your ordinary hunt-and-peck columnist. He was a screenwriter on *PT-109*, the John F. Kennedy biopic that came out only 5 months prior to the President's assassination. He assisted on *Jim Thorpe All-American* – as his brother Edmund Joseph "Pat" Flaherty was instrumental to Vincent's attachment. Brother Pat played football with and for George Halas; gave up two dingers to Babe Ruth in a Baltimore exhibition; and, taught Gary Cooper how to play ball in *The Lou Gehrig Story*. And he acted a bit, too – playing alongside Ronald Reagan in *Knute Rockne of Notre Dame* and "taking the fall" for numerous legends such as Clark Gable, James Cagney, and Spencer Tracy (Hickman 2013).

So, Vincent was by no means a stranger to celebrity, or controversy –as a \$200,000 libel suit was on the docket in 1955 for his knocking down a heavyweight fighter, Lou "Cosmic Punch" Nova, fourteen years after Joe Louis milk-cartoned him in the "bum of the month" tour. Said Vincent X. Flaherty: "The cowardly [appearance of] Nova was like a frightened, screaming child at vaccination time...They lugged his carcass and towed it in abject disgrace toward his corner. He smiled bravely in the safety of his dressing room, wiping out the manliness of every victory he had ever won (Time.com

1955).” Hearst settled for \$35,000 – proving to be likely the best payday ever for the Nova “for fighting.”

Flaherty soon learned, his usefulness was only as lasting as his abilities to obtain what O’Malley needed: in California, that was just introductions, O’Malley handled the rest of the game. The vision was out there for O’Malley: sunshine, eager fans, and a stadium to whatever size and style a man could dream. O’Malley had the support of the upper crust – and that mattered – and the time was coming when Brooklyn lost, almost intentionally.

### Moses Will Not Part the Brooklyn Seas of Land Acquisition

By end of 1955, with a championship won over the “Damn Yankees”, the avenues to acquire land to build a new ballpark should have widened. With smallish Ebbets, too cramped when full, old and dirty, absent adequate parking, and lacking typical amenities that snake charmed the suburban fare back to Brooklyn, funding a stadium should have been a no-brainer. (As slum clearance and property acquisitions were now opened up by a 1954 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Berman v. Parker.) But inventive, urban renewal designs – especially under legendary and powerful city planner Robert Moses’ hand – were decades away from any smooth or savvy approach, as O’Malley realized quickly.

Moses imposed lengthy and governmental approval processes, and did little publicly to buttress O’Malley’s desire for remaining in Brooklyn and building a new field. One crack by Mr. Moses to O’Malley: “I think you’ll have to *demonstrate* your ability to come up with four million dollars (D’Antonio, 212).” The newly formed Brooklyn Sport Center Authority gave little support or direction, while Moses’ critiques scared off potential appointees to the commission – aware of the clout the man wielded in New York on other projects and designs. Initial studies reflected that New York stood to lose \$5 million in annual tax revenues in the process of condemning properties and taking control of them for the insertion of a new ballpark, an expanded open market, new railroad terminal, and new housing developments (215). But those revenue losses were already happening. As time wore on, the committee accomplished nothing and failed in its ultimate mission: sports and renewal in Brooklyn.

### Bedazzled and Bejeweled: The Call to Chavez Ravine

After the 1956 season, O’Malley headed west in search of answers. He had just sold Ebbets Field for \$3 million in cash, assuring the place’s destruction. He talked to P.K. Wrigley about switching minor league teams – with the Los Angeles Angels becoming

Dodgers' property. He schmoozed frequently with the advertisers and marketers in Los Angeles. And the man on the newsbeat in Flaherty pointed O'Malley to an ideal location: Chavez Ravine.

Serviced by four different freeways and two boulevards running abreast of nearly 1,000 acres of sandy hills, it became the jewel of O'Malley's future as his time ran out in Brooklyn despite upping the ante on a proposed government-owned stadium to \$500,000 of rent per season, the highest in the bigs. He raised additionally \$5 million (instead of \$4 million) to support an initial bond issue. But Robert Moses, working through an intermediary now, asked for additional \$1.5 million more. O'Malley's choice was clear: *Go West*, old man.

Los Angeles held out a welcome mat; Brooklyn kicked dirt in the face. LA had sun, fun, and more stars than nearly any night sky; Brooklyn had doom, gloom, and the Yankees' stars shining in the press for the public. The mindset of Los Angeles was adoration, anticipation, and glorification of the once *Bums* of the East; the heartstrings of Brooklyn faded under the stresses of suburban growth, urban decimation, and political double-talk and dealings.

### (Inept?) Power Players

Vice-President Nixon, a Californian and baseball nut, called the ball on St. Patrick's Day 1957 in putting the Dodgers firmly in Los Angeles during a talk to a young priest. (Giving or taking confessions not being either man's forte one can assume.) Yet, while Nixon made such proclamations, O'Malley was technically forbidden to make such a statement, until after the season ended. (Though Horace Stoneham provided zero ambiguity about his team's future, announcing on August 19<sup>th</sup> a San Francisco deal.)

New York's mayor Robert Wagner and future Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller summoned O'Malley to a conference for a make-shift, last-ditch, politically-motivated overture to keep the Dodgers in Brooklyn. The proposal called for Rockefeller to put up several million dollars; get the city on the hook for \$8 million, who would then sell the stadium to Rockefeller; who, then in turn, would lease back the stadium to the Dodgers, or have them buy it back from a real magnate (if in name only) of industry. But Robert Moses, per usual, had the protection of another archaic development commission that nixed it before even a vote. "This Dodger business reminds me of the jitterbug jive (D'Antonio, 248-49)." At one point, Moses held seats of power on twelve city and state posts. That Rockefeller was the eventual undoing of that, speaks to the


power both men wielded (The Imperial Rockefeller: A Biography of Nelson A. Rockefeller, 227).

### Shea's Rebellion and Build-Me-A-Park Threats

As these moves were made, and the teams lost in the New York market soon made a successful name in their new west coast locations, fans and public leaders in New York were outraged. Mayor Robert Wagner appointed William A. Shea (Mead, *The Explosive Sixties: Baseball's Decade of Expansion* 1989, 65), another lawyer, to bring baseball back to New York's National League. Shea's tactics were inspired; since he hired the one man many baseball magnates feared most likely in creating a 3<sup>rd</sup> league: Branch Rickey.

The Continental League was more a concept than a reality. The impetus of putting teams in New York, Dallas, Toronto, Denver, Atlanta, Buffalo, Houston and Minneapolis was not fully ready for implementation – at least not to all eight markets. However, the ploy worked; and New York received the benefits in 1962, and sterile Shea Stadium was born. (Later, it housed the Yankees in the early 1970s while the 'House that Ruth Built' got a facelift, and a makeover, to right-handed hitter's delight. The biggest complaint: Shea Stadium was in airport traffic circles during games. Watching games on TV brought this annoying feature to full throttle, as jet engines roared every so often, leaving announcers speechless.)

**Figure.** Layout of Yankee Stadium before the Renovation: 1938 - 1973 (Turkin and Thompson 1970, 59)



**Yankees sold to CBS in August 1964:** New Yorker Dan Topping and Arizona builder Del Webb sell the Yankees for \$11.2 million in an 80% stake. (\$14.0 million total.) The Yankees were making \$3.8 million in broadcast rights, *Game of the Week* money with local radio and television. (No data on money off concessions and ticket sales.) When the team was bought, in 1945 from Col. Ruppert's estate, the price was \$2.8 million. A return on investment of 8.85% without discounting. Plus, they sold the land for some coin. Too bad for CBS that Topping and Webb left the team talent barren; ignored talent procurement from 1960 to the final sale; and, the draft soon to come. Thus, CBS bought just a shell of a franchise, coming to bitter crossroads after their 1964 World Series defeat.

Jim Vail opines at length in *Play It Again: Baseball Experts on What Might Have Been* (2006) on what the addition of a third major league would and would not have changed. His main points:

- Sociologically and economically significant as it connected to Hollywood public relations – movement West was demographically driven and influenced MLB positively

- Transcontinental MLB – meant needed air travel, increased revenues from broadcast rights as West Coast games offered another avenue, a game, at a different time

- The Continental League formation was circumvented by MLB later expansion during 1961-62 – to keep the CL from large media markets (Minneapolis (Twins), Los Angeles Angels, and New York Mets)

- Post season play would require a wildcard if a 3<sup>rd</sup> major league was added – thus introducing “wild card” to the baseball lexicon 30 years early

- Certain markets were bypassed – Buffalo, and possibly, Oakland. But overall, the landscape of teams would be essentially the same (Bresnahan and Palmer, 109-114)

- Branch Rickey influence expands exponentially in baseball's development

**Table.** A Bizarre and Fictional Present Day 3-League Format?

<b>National League</b>	<b>American League</b>	<b>Continental League</b>
Arizona	Baltimore	Atlanta (Braves)
Chicago	Boston	<i>Buffalo (Bisons)</i>
Cincinnati	Chicago	Dallas (Rangers)
Los Angeles	Cleveland	Denver (Rockies)
Milwaukee	Detroit	Houston (Astros)
Philadelphia	Kansas City A's	Miami (Marlins)
Pittsburgh	Los Angeles	Minneapolis (Twins)
San Francisco	New York	Oakland ( <i>Royals</i> )
St. Louis	Tampa Bay	Seattle (Mariners)
San Diego	Washington	Toronto (Blue Jays)

Meanwhile, Commissioner Ford Frick dueled against another baseball luminary: Bill Veeck. On the heels (while actually ahead) of the Walter O'Malley move of the Dodgers to Los Angeles, Bill Veeck chomped at the bit to move the White Sox out west. As Andrew Zimbalist wrote, "Veeck, with his maverick ideas for eliminating the reserve clause, revenue sharing among teams, and innovative team marketing, was a thorn in Frick's side. Frick did not want Veeck to be the first owner to benefit from a team relocation (A. S. Zimbalist 2006, 65-66)." After selling of the Browns, Veeck landed the White Sox ownership in 1959. The prior move of O'Malley's Dodgers to Los Angeles should have enabled Frick to abide his "open territory" policy (A. S. Zimbalist, 65-66). It did not.


Frick though allowed Calvin Griffith (Clark Griffith's progeny), to move the Washington Senators to Minneapolis in 1961. (As discussed, Griffith's franchise was immediately replaced by another Senator team that languished at the bottom of league, even under the managerial helm of Ted Williams; and soon after, relocated that franchise to Arlington, Texas by 1970.)

These merry-go-round moves dizzied the heads of fans but added a new weapon to the arsenal of ownerships, the "build me a stadium" edict to their city. Other heavily populated areas fought to obtain franchises, utilizing the lure of erecting new, subsidized stadiums to entice a struggling team to leave their current area. This strategy ultimately pitted ownerships vs. cities/politicians with lawyers garnering the



immediate benefits of the clash. Usually though, the owners received their wish: a new stadium in the original town with public monies applied to the building of a behemoth stadium. (The White Sox in the late 1980s were ensconced in a 'stadium or leave' deal that resulted in Tropicana Field (1991) being constructed 6 years prior to the (Devil) Rays occupation. The Sox opened their new stadium in 1991; with corporate names attached to Sox Park since its inception. Of the new line stadiums, *The Cell* is a dated design; only slightly less sterile than many of the cookie cutters of the 1960s, LBJ Era builds.)

### The Making of Dodger-land



Out west, the building of Dodger Stadium was not without distresses. When the Dodgers first moved to LA, the Coliseum, used in the 1932 Olympic Games, housed the Dodgers. With extremely quirky dimensions (Wally Moon's homers to left field), and a vast and largely unusable seating capacity (binoculars to watch the action), the Coliseum was never thought the permanent solution; and so, controversy ensued. **(Pictured above: The Coliseum (Ballparks of Baseball 2014))**

With O'Malley picking Chavez Ravine to build the new stadium, overlooking a soon smoggy downtown Los Angeles, referendums, and a long ago nixed housing development reared an ugly head. A referendum was needed to approve the acquisition of the land to build. To kick off this idea, on June 1, 1958, the Dodgers aired a live, five-hour Dodgerthon on LA's KTTV. Utilizing Hollywood star power to sell, with actor, future governor, and President Ronald Reagan, comedians George Burns, Jerry Lewis, Dean Martin, Debbie Reynolds, and baseball's own Jackie Robinson showing

support for the stadium, the public was sold. As a result, the referendum for a stadium build passed in record fashion then for voting on any California proposal (Shyer 2013, 4).

Soon after, the local taxpayers filed a lawsuit that made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court that contended that O'Malley received favoritism in selecting Chavez Ravine, in not following a "public purpose" clause. The lawsuit ended in favor of O'Malley. At the same time, the Arechigas family 'squatted' the area while they actually owned 11 properties in the city (Mead 1989, 48).

O'Malley opened Dodger Stadium in April 1962, the first privately financed ballpark since 'The House that Ruth Built', costing \$23 million. With an audacious plan to possibly seat 85,000 in a sextuple-tiered stadium, Walter O'Malley saw large crowds flock immediately to the gates of this diamond jewel of the west coast. (Dodger Stadium opened with a pared back 56,000 seating capacity.)

Brent Shyer reflected in *The Biography of Walter O'Malley*: "As President of the Brooklyn and Los Angeles Dodgers, one of baseball's most enduring and beloved teams, he inscribed his reputation as an astute owner. In his pioneering move of the Brooklyn Dodgers to the West Coast, he advanced the nationwide growth and success of the sport (Shyer 2013, 4)."

The advancement 'west' placed O'Malley amongst the most influential sports figures of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but much of that is opportune timing, the poor attendance and decline in Brooklyn in the 1950s, and the Dodgers then profound and early stance on the issue of race. But O'Malley should not be just glorified as the man that moved the Dodgers. He was a keenly adept political and power user. He required loyalty – and found reasons to not always uphold that back – and also let others know where he stood, nearly always in private. He also played the fence; but did it with a charm, a disengagement, from the typical caricature of the "I get what I want" baseball owner. He was later the voice other owners turned to – and made observations and drew conclusions that were carried out, such as supporting Bowie Kuhn's insertion as commissioner. (Which was not necessarily a successful hire, HOF induction in 2008 of both is fortuitous for Kuhn. O'Malley's is justly deserved.)

O'Malley's LA gambit work out beautifully – just the old fans got hurt. That's all. That's all it ever really is: the old versus the new.




**LA's Dodger Stadium – The Crown Jewel of West Coast baseball. (Joseph De Leon)**

Dodger Stadium through to the present day hosted some of the largest crowds; annually broke attendance records with Sandy Koufax, Don Drysdale, Tommy John, Don Sutton, Burton Hooton, Mike Welch, Fernando Valenzuela, Orel Hershiser, Mike Marshall, Clayton Kershaw and Zach Grienke on the bump. With a vast foul territory, spacious power alleys, and nighttime favoritism of pitchers, it is a hurler's haven; allowing the Dodgers to remain atop the National League solidly as an elite organization during the *LBJ* and *Reagan* eras.

As Graph 5.1.1. reflects (below), the Dodgers set three attendance records from 1962-1990, while going on different runs of success behind some of the arms mentioned above. The Brooklyn Dodgers put together four pennants from 1952-56 with position players Jackie Robinson, Duke Snider, Carl Furillo, Pee Wee Reese, Gil Hodges and Roy Campanella, and pitchers Don Newcombe, Carl Erskine, Clem Labine, Johnny Podres, and Joe Black. But their attendance fell off dramatically from late 1940s. In a similar vein to the Boston Red Sox of the late 1910s, even with pennants, the people did not come. (**See:** Franchises.) But unlike Harry Frazee, who sold Ruth and plenty of pitching, the Dodgers did not sell their players – they just relocated, rebuilt, and reinforced their winning ways.

Graph. Dodger Attendance from 1940-1990



### Ballparks Galore: Sterile, Multipurpose, and One Ostentatious Design

During the 1960s, eleven new ballparks were built with almost identical dimensions and a symmetrical layout akin to Dodger Stadium's, starting with the horrendous Candlestick Park in 1960. (Known as a wind tunnel experiment gone wrong). In Jim Brosnan's *Pennant Race*, a very apt description of this wind tunnel:

“Candlestick Park is the grossest error in the history of major league baseball. Designed, at the corner table in Lefty O'Doul's, a Frisco saloon, by two politicians and an itinerant ditchdigger, the ball park slants toward the bay – in fact, it *slides* toward the bay and before long will be under water, which is the best place for it.” (Brosnan 1962, 188)

The 'Stick' presented a rolling fog at dusk; bitter, cold nights and winds which blew players around like candy wrappers. And forget pop-ups: a major league infielder in foul ground was more likely to get a hot, liberal date in the stands than a conservative

baseball in flight. Leaning hard left, or right, was all a ballplayer did in catching a San Fran pop-up at night.



**Candlestick Park** a.k.a. ‘The Stick’– The Park that *Satan* Built (Courtesy of **Salim Virji**)

Those horrors aside, Candlestick Park incarnated better as a football haunt – where Joe Montana, Dwight Clark, Ronnie Lott, Jerry Rice, John Taylor, and Steve Young won four Super Bowl titles from 1982 to 1995. The Giants meanwhile played 40 years in The Stick, amassing a 3,259 –3,083 regular season record while appearing in two World Series, before moving into Pac Bell Park, soon to be called SBC Park, then AT &T Park, all in a matter of just six years.

The 60s decade saw the erection of stadiums in Minneapolis, Los Angeles (twice), Atlanta, St. Louis, Oakland, San Diego, New York, Montreal, and Houston. With the one in Houston known as the 8<sup>th</sup> wonder of the World. The times, and ballparks, they were a *changing* fast.

## Houston, We Have An Indoor Problem

The concept of an indoor stadium was inspired by the design of *The Colosseum* in ancient Rome, and the mind of Roy Hofheinz, a lawyer, judge, and politico (Mead, *The Explosive Sixties: Baseball's Decade of Expansion*, 80). This \$35 million dome came out of necessity since Houston's Colt Stadium played as a searing oven, at best; at worst, an angry mosquito colony in mid-summer. That park, a single-level, stove-top ballpark, made dangerous Texas summers. One time the oppressive heat sent over 70 people and an umpire to seek medical assistance during a June 1962 twin bill. Ballplayers took salt tablets and regularly lost 10-15 pounds during sweltering home stands. Even the National League changed the rules, allowing Sunday night games (now the norm for two teams in the *ESPN* world) to assist players, umps and fans in actually surviving a game.

With these torrid Houston summers, Hofheinz's vision found immediate support with the locals since the attendance tripled (2,151,470) over the usual crowds in the first season in the dome, even with a 9<sup>th</sup> place finish. With the local weather conditions fixed, the real problems for ballplayers came out of managing the ballparks other field-related quirks. First, the daylight that diffused through semi-transparent tiles in ceiling made it an adventure for outfielders to pick up any fly ball, or line drive. Potentially dangerous, fielders were equipped with shades until the problem was rectified and baseballs were colored orange, yellow, and cerise by the approval of MLB (Mead, 84). As Curt Flood, a perennial gold glove center fielder sarcastically noted, "it is worth your life to try to catch a pop fly there...to remedy this, some genius ordered that the roof be tinted. The chosen color was most attractive – the exact color of a baseball. A pop fly remained invisible through much of its flight – white on white (Carter and Flood 1971, 55)."

Next issue: the grass. It died. The answer came in the form of Monsanto Chemical Company and their homegrown alternative: Artificial turf. After testing, the surface gained acceptability before the 1966 season. The Astros, named in honor of the government-run Aeronautical group (NASA) famous workers (astronauts), were now the technical marvels of Major Leagues: playing in air-conditioned indoor facilities, on AstroTurf; deploying a huge shooting scoreboard and ornate skyboxes served up Japanese cuisine. (The road teams complained about the air conditioning being on only when the home team batted.) Judge Hofheinz's Astrodome added many more high-end creature comforts: a plush apartment in right field, a bowling alley, magnetic bar, and a wedding chapel, to name a few.

This 1<sup>st</sup> Astroturf surface – with multipurpose stadium complexes becoming the staple of the 1970s and 1980s baseball (and football) – was almost as resilient as rubber. The “carpet” grew hotter than Death Valley (120°) on a 95-degree day, and left any fielder exhausted after a long day fighting on the surface. Slow guys looked like stones on a parking lot, baked to their positions. All ballplayers’ legs took a beating – those blessed with speed advantaged it until unusually high incidents of ACL/MCL tears ended their careers. The surface tended to warped and buckled, providing disastrous results for several players, particularly in NFL games. (Chicago Bear Wendell Davis blew out both his knees, victimized by Veteran’s Stadium unforgiving turf.)

The surrounding amenities certainly gained more importance than the safety of playing surfaces: foul line seams, drainage, wall configuration, padding on walls, and overheads at future domes. Entertaining fans and bigwigs meant the care and research into the surface’s effects on player performance were minimized, if done at all. Upgrades to box seating and parking and packages for the corporate sponsors were paramount to the team’s success, even if the players were disadvantaged on these new fields. Even once bugs were seen, they were repeated elsewhere. (Minnesota’s Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome had a similar ceiling problem, and used a large ‘baggy’ that covered the right field wall. Engineers take note in your future design endeavors.)

It was this new ballpark reality that was imitated by future architects at the behest of ownerships’ desires to increase revenues through luxuries offered to the high-priced clientele. The revenue streams, as managed before, were not all baseball-related since marketing, advertising, and televising games has long since taken over as the most changeable, and most hidden and complex. It has become a common practice too to separate the bleacher bum fans from the box seat patrons and the glass-enclosed corporate heads to further delineate the classes that attend a baseball game. Upon review, the game has successfully incorporated plenty of amenities to all its parks – with the Astrodome (Harris County Domed Stadium) triggering this ultra-modernization of facilities. (The 2<sup>nd</sup> generation of dome stadiums uses complex retractable roofs, allowing for differing playing conditions, and to impress the visitors, the bourgeoisie and proletariat alike.)



**The Houston Astrodome – The 8<sup>th</sup> Wonder of the World *with age*.**

**(Courtesy of Jeff Flowers)**




**Le Stade Olympique de Montreal (Olympic Stadium) – Built for the 1976 Olympics and the Montreal Expos. (Courtesy of Alain Carpenter)**





**Riverfront Stadium – The Dominating Home of the Big Red Machine of the 1970s**



**Three Rivers Stadium – *We Are Family* Pirates & *The Steel Curtain* (Paul M Walsh)**

## Miracle Mets, Part Two: Change the Schedule, Change the Balance

By 1969, more teams meant more schedule changes as Montreal and San Diego entered the National League. From 1910-1960, teams played 22 games apiece against their opponents. (154 game schedule.) From 1961 –1968, teams scheduled 18 games per 9 teams for 162-game regular season. But with the advent of the playoff system, and 2 more teams per league, bringing the total to 24, an unbalanced schedule formed in 1969.

**Table.** Schedule Changes during the 1960s and 1970s

Different Schedules	One Division: (8 teams)	2 Divisions: (6 teams)	2 Divisions: 7 teams (AL)
154 games (1910-60)	22 games x 7 teams	N/A	N/A
162 games (1961-68)	18 games x 9 teams	N/A	N/A
162 games (1969-76), AL (1977)	N/A	18 x 5 division, 12 x6 non-division	20 x 6 division, 6 x 7 non-division

As with any change, in teams played, some teams benefited from divisional rivalries, and others, from not playing league opponents in the other division. The strength of teams in one division played a factor to who went on in post-season play, whereas before 1960, every team faced the same opponents equally in league.

**The Mets Example:** 1973 saw the New York Mets win the NL East with 82 wins, whereas the Cubs finished 5<sup>th</sup> at 77 victories. The Mets mounted a huge second half comeback to finish 2 games above .500. Cincinnati and Los Angeles won more than 95 games in the NL West. As luck (or timely skill) had it, the Mets appeared (and lost) in the 1973 World Series against the Oakland A's, winners of 94 games in a 7-game series. Tug McGraw's, "You gotta believe!!!" nearly got them a 2<sup>nd</sup> title.

These Miracle Mets were better known for losing in their first seasons. Build to lose – since the rest of the league kept them from young or talented prospects in the expansion draft – the Mets put up triple-digit losses under Casey Stengel for three seasons, while he cranked out the wisecracks. On a trip to Mexico City, where the Mets won the series, a journalist asked if the altitude affected his players' performance. Stengel: "The altitude bothers my players at the Polo Grounds, and that's below sea level (Koppett, *The Rise and Fall of the Press Box* 2003, 259)."

Yet, those early Mets outdrew the typically, never-a-loser Yankees, employing former Yankee brain trust members: Stengel and Weiss. Johnny Murphy and Gil Hodges, New

York-versed team builders, guided the Mets to the top of the ladder in 1969, exactly five score removed from the first professional baseball forays. The championship rested in the place where it all started.

### Drugs & Baseball Culture: Jim Bouton's Ball Four

In 1970, Jim Bouton wrote his seminal work, *Ball Four*. Much was made of his outing of the beyond-the-games antics, unfair salaries negotiated under the reserve clause, and the ownership's deceitful manipulations of players. Bouton ironically remembers all-time great Pete Rose hollering at him while on the mound, "Fuck you, Shakespeare (Bouton 1990, ix)." The recounting of ballplayers taking 'pep pills', amongst a host of other disliked actions, only precursor the Steroid Era's actions of ballplayers.

**Table.** Jim Bouton's Major League Pitching Statistics

Year	LG	Team	G	GS	W	L	ERA	IP	CG	SHO	SV	SO	B
1962	AL	Yankee	36	16	7	7	3.99	133.00	3	1	2	71	59
1963	AL	Yankee	40	30	21	7	2.53	249.33	12	6	1	148	87
1964	AL	Yankee	38	37	18	13	3.02	271.33	11	4	0	125	60
1965	AL	Yankee	30	25	4	15	4.82	151.33	2	0	0	97	60
1966	AL	Yankee	24	19	3	8	2.69	120.33	3	0	1	65	38
1967	AL	Yankee	17	1	1	0	4.67	44.33	0	0	0	31	18
1968	AL	Yankee	12	3	1	1	3.68	44.00	1	0	0	24	9
1969	AL	Pilots	57	1	2	1	3.91	92.00	0	0	1	68	38
1969	NL	Astros	16	1	0	2	4.11	30.67	1	0	1	32	12
1970	NL	Astros	29	6	4	6	5.40	73.33	1	0	0	49	33
1978	NL	Braves	5	5	1	3	4.97	29.00	0	0	0	10	21

Certainly, Bouton could expound on the game. Playing on the pennant-winning Yankees, winning 20 games in a season, and sticking around for a decade lent credence to his knowledge of the entire sport. He adapted on the field (using a knuckleball later in his career) and survived off it. (Even after *Ball Four*, Bouton pursued a baseball comeback, assisted by Bill Veeck and Ted Turner, both mavericks in their own respective ways. *Ball Four* turned into a same-name failed sitcom in 1976.)

While commenting on drugs use to get over aches and pains, Bouton states, "I've tried a lot of other things through the years – like butazolidin, which is what they give to horses...novocaine, cortisone, and xylocaine. Baseball players will take anything (Bouton 1990, 45)." 'Greenies' are a topic of discussion, in one passage, Bouton, Don Mincher, and Matty Pattin talked about a teammates recent delivery of dextroamphetamine: "Minch, how many major-league ballplayers do you think take

greenies?' I asked. 'Half? More?' 'Hell, a lot more than half,' he said. 'Just about the whole Baltimore team takes them (Bouton 1990, 211-212).'"

These revelations made teetered on the drug precipice of the LBJ era. The usage/abuse by ballplayers was overlooked or ignored, prior to 1970. With the passage of comprehensive drug classification (schedule) and enforcement acts (DEA) by federal law late in 1970, the war on drugs began. During the 1980s, the criminal trials and media outing of various players as pervasive (and sometimes recovering) abusers of substances placed a lasting stain on the reputation of baseball. Whereas, in the 1960s, portions of society (artists and athletes especially), accepted, and considered such usage, safe. (Heroin was "safe" in 1950s medical opinions, used often for "coughs.")

Later though, players such as Lonnie Smith, Dave Parker, Darrell Porter, Paul Molitor, Mickey Mantle, Doc Ellis, Steve Howe, Doc Gooden, Tim Lincecum, Darrell Strawberry, and Dennis Eckersley, all had various levels of addiction problems. And they were not alone. Those "outed" first were media-hounded, and remembered too much by average fans for these problems, ignoring much of the "fast life" existence going back to the Babe's days, and before. (1880s players had alcoholic ways.) Some addictions too, like Mantle's, resulted in an early death due to liver failure from alcohol usage.

In *Ball Four*, sportswriters of the day received a fair amount of criticism back. Jim Ogle, outspoken New York sportswriter and definite critic of who won the games for the Yankees, garnered note. When Jim Bouton was sent down to the minors, Ogle implied the reasons were related to character more than any performance shortcomings. As Bouton recalled, "...there were some terrible things about me he [Ogle] couldn't even talk about. This left it up to public imagination. What was I? Rapist, murderer, a dope peddler? Jim Ogle wouldn't say (Bouton 1990, 90)." On the flipside, Bouton was friends with a few cheeky sports scribes such as Maury Allen, Leonard Shecter, and Stan Isaacs. (Halberstam, October 1964, 43)

Racism is a prevalent issue as this passage reflected: "It's not hard to understand why he's resented, though. They feel he doesn't belong in the big leagues with his way of umpiring. [Earlier stated as flashy and showboating.] Besides, he's a Negro and they believe he's there just because of that (Bouton 1990, 146)." This is in reference to Emmett Ashford, MLB umpire, who, according to Bouton, hustled and put effort into the undervalued art of baseball umpiring. Institutional racism went far beyond one's umpiring ability. As of 1970, no African Americans were managers of MLB team, even

two decades removed from Jackie's entrance into the game. Umpires, black or white, were just as far behind in regards to garnering equal respect and footing.

The weight of being the highly visible ballplayer, producing well on the field, yet receiving little opportunity to coach, manage, or own a percentage of a Major League franchise was easily interpreted as bias based on color alone. As Alex Belth's book *Stepping Up* reflects, Bob Gibson, MVP of the 1967 World Series, received only \$2,500 for his speaking engagements, whereas, Boston's Carl Yastrzemski reported upwards of ten times as much, in his losing effort. Even in triumph, black ballplayers were short changed on their abilities.

In the 1968 Olympics, two American track stars (Tommie Smith and John Carlos) utilized the podium to stand against unfairness and the events of the LBJ era – to their despising by many in the press, and mostly, white America. The times here were not a changing as fast as some liked. And it drew notice.

Bouton, likely, felt that tide– and thus, wrote *Ball Four*.

Long before Jose Canseco told of the hidden system of owners, sportswriters, managers, scouts, agents, and ballplayers dismissing (or ignoring) steroid usage, Bouton spoke volumes about the hidden game, and did it with an entertaining style. But even Bouton had competition on that front in the words and deeds of Curtis Charles Flood.



**Fighting Change at the Doorway:** Alabama Governor George Wallace fighting for his *then* cause: to exclude African-Americans from entry into the University of Alabama. He lost this fight, the 1968 presidential election, and soon, a victim of violence. At his

1963 inauguration speech: “Segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever!” By the end of the *LBJ Era*, he recanted this position on segregation. (Photo: Courtesy of Warren K. Leffler, Library of Congress.)

### Free Agency: Curt Flood & the U.S. Supreme Court

His major league career started with a lone at-bat in 1956, did not achieve a regular role until 1962, yet **Curt Flood (1938 –1997)** greatest prominence came through his individual fight for free agency in the National Pastime in the 1970s.

Growing up in Oakland in late 1940s and early 1950s, Flood first assisted, as a batboy, then played on American Legion ball teams managed by George Powles. Flood garnered time alongside major league greats Frank Robinson and Vada Pinson, teammates both; and thereafter, landed in Cincinnati with them. This trio of stars dominated youth baseball of the area and era, as the Bill Erwin’s Oakland American Legion Post #337 won back-to-back Junior National Championships in 1949-50. (Robert E. Bentley Post #50 in Cincinnati, OH, coincidentally, was the other youth powerhouse of the 1940s and 1950s, winning titles in 1944, 1947, 1952, 1957 and 1958.)

These men achieved greatness: baseball legacies for notable feats. Frank Robinson became the only player to win the MVP award in both leagues (1961 and 1966); and 1<sup>st</sup> African American manager in 1975 at Cleveland. Vada Pinson, alongside Frank in Cincinnati, combined speed, power and batting average as a superb player. Flood, considered the top defensive centerfielder of the 1960s, won seven consecutive gold gloves from 1963-1969, surpassing Willie Mays (defensively) in setting a mark of 399 chances without an error in 1966. Darren Lewis holds the centerfield record for consecutive chances and games without an error, set in the 1991-94. Lewis never amassed enough chances in one season.

**Table.** Errorless CF Seasons (Over 300 Putouts – Lahman Database, 2014)

Season	Player	PO	A	Season	Player	PO	A
2010	Franklin Gutierrez	413	2	2000	Bernie Williams	353	2
1966	Curt Flood	394	5	2005	Vernon Wells	351	12
1996	Darryl Hamilton	388	2	2008	Torii Hunter	350	4
2011	Jacoby Ellsbury	388	6	2012	Curtis Granderson	346	3
2013	Denard Span	379	5	1993	Darren Lewis	346	4
2006	Juan Pierre	379	5	1970	Mickey Stanley	328	3
1991	Brett Butler	372	8	1994	Lance Johnson	316	2
1993	Brett Butler	367	6	2013	Coco Crisp	307	2
2010	Vernon Wells	354	5	1968	Mickey Stanley	301	7

Flood, the youngest of six children, made his way out of a typical 40's ghetto with the support of hard-working parents and encouragement and efforts of his siblings, especially his brother Carl, who had his misfortunes with the "rule of law" later in his life. Curt through this background found solace in baseball, and painting, utilizing his intelligence and ability in both endeavors.

Starting at Herbert Hoover Junior High, Flood met art teacher Jim Chambers, who fostered his talent, becoming a life-long friend. Chambers introduced him to Marian and Johnny Jorgenson, shapers of Flood in the 1960s. Flood remarked about Chambers' mentoring: "He aroused in me the sensibilities that finally enable a painter to illuminate life instead of merely illustrating it. He accepted my blackness without fuss. More precisely, he appreciated blackness as a central attribute (Carter and Flood 1971, 27)."

Outside of school requirements, Flood spent his days playing baseball, much like other youths that acquired the love of the game. Between the Powles' Legion teams and sunup-to-sundown pursuit of the baseball, his abilities were noticed; enhanced by these years of practice. Flood was scouted, but found a bit too small (5'7", 140 lbs. as a teenager) for many suitors. However, scout Bobby Mattick of the Reds, regarded his innate power and baseball instincts highly, enough so that after receiving his diploma from high school, Flood trekked off to Tampa, Florida for spring training in 1956 with a \$4,000 salary for making the team.

Flood experienced the profound racial bigotry of the Deep South, as compared to a more tolerant, if nuanced, racial categorization of northern California. From the start, introduction to "colored" water fountains, separate living quarters from white players, verbal abuses and ostracism from team functions like eating, conversing after the game and restroom breaks, Flood reshaped his belief of the expectations of a black ballplayer; and did so successfully. Through his first season for the High Point Carolina League club, or as Curt identified it, the "peckerwood league (Carter and Flood, 39)", he smashed 29 home runs, batted .340, drove in 128 runs in 154 games as an 18-year old. Yet even as he tore up the league, his own teammates used "black nigger (40)" in describing a youth outside the park, who went after a baseball in pre-game. Flood admonished his teammate clearly; and never talked to him again.

After this excellent season, his general manager, Gabe Paul, who gained greater acclaim as the leader *in theory* of the mid-1970s Yankees, offered the same salary for 1957 in class A Sally League (Southern Atlantic League), the highest minor league.

Flood had no real choice but to accept the offer. He hit .299 to more of the same types of abuses, though as he put it, “not always as blatant (44).”

During the time, position conversion was discussed – first to 3<sup>rd</sup> base for Don Hoak, then 2<sup>nd</sup> base for Johnny Temple – though made irrelevant as Flood garnered trade to St. Louis with John Taylor. Marty Kutya, Willard Schmidt, and Ted Wieand went to St. Louis. Kutya never pitched in Cincinnati; middle reliever Schmidt put in two decent years for the Reds; and Wieand, pitched 6 innings total, giving up 3 jacks and walking five batters. (Wieand won over 100 minor league contests.)

All done because his hometown friend, Vada Pinson, was being added to the Reds’ outfield. The Reds shipped off a promising twenty-year old, likely not wanting “an all-black outfield (47)”, yet Flood received a \$5,000 contract from the Cardinals, a 25% raise. As Brad Snyder’s *A Well-Paid Slave* adds, “In exchange for Flood and outfielder Joe Taylor, the Reds acquired three Cardinals pitchers whom sportswriter Jim Murray later described as ‘a flock of nobodies’...” (Snyder, *A Well-Paid Slave: Curt Flood’s Fight for Free Agency in Professional Sports*, 51) and further supported, “...Cincinnati was not ready for an all-black outfield (51).” Cincinnati’s brain trust of Gabe Paul, manager Birdie Tebbetts, and scout Bobby Mattick contended that Flood showed a hitch in his swing and/or was too small to make it to the bigs (52). Cardinals amassed 35.9 fWAR (41.8 rWAR) in giving up 3 pitchers (2 rWAR): A huge win and glaring mistake by Paul.

**(Gabe Paul (1910-1998)** left the Reds in the 1961 season just as the Reds went against the 61’ Yankees for the championship. Paul built the Reds back to relevancy during the 1950s scouting out black and Cuban ballplayers. A very brief stint with the Houston Colt 45s/ clashing with owner Roy Hofheinz, Paul spent the next decade in Cleveland as part-owner, general manager/president before linking to the Steinbrenner partnership of buying the Yankees from CBS in 1973. There, he was largely responsible, as discussed, for the addition of a slew of players: 3B Graig Nettles, 1B Chris Chambliss, P Dick Tidrow, and OF Oscar Gamble from the Indians; LF Lou Piniella from the Royals; CF Mickey Rivers and P Ed Figueroa from the Angels; 2B Willie Randolph, P Ken Brett, and P Dock Ellis from the Pirates; and SS Bucky Dent from the White Sox. He signed P Catfish Hunter and RF Reggie Jackson as free agents in building ‘The Bronx Zoo.’ He left the Yankees in 1978, heading back to Cleveland as president until 1985.)

In hindsight, the fact Flood did not sue (against the trade) was likely due to youthful ignorance and understandable fear; his desire to play in the majors required allegiance, not consternation and frustration; a positive anger must have grown when tossed



aside by the only organization he knew. That just strengthened his resolve to get better as a ballplayer. However, his next organization was not yet a bastion of color blindness.

His move to St. Louis in 1958 came again with a significant period of adjustment. He landed in the south again; a city long on racial bias, as a border state, and with a new manager, Solly Hemus, who replaced Fred Hutchinson, who had wanted Flood to play centerfield regularly. (Hutchinson quarreled frequently with Frank "Trader" Lane and Gussie Busch in St. Louis. "Hutch", a star pitcher in Detroit, took over in Cincinnati from 1959-1964, succumbing to lung cancer in 1964.)

Player-manager Hemus spelled out a part-time role for Flood immediately. He held back Bob Gibson, thinking, or behaving as though both were uneducated and inferior. Meanwhile, the Cardinals were at the back of the National League. Hemus thus ignored and avoided Flood, experimenting with various players in centerfield, including fellow African-American Bill White. The future NL President White slick fielding at first base (seven gold gloves) and solid bat (.286 lifetime) did not mesh in center because of obvious slow-footedness. So Gino Cimoli, Carl Warwick, Don Taussig, and Don Landrum found days a plenty patrolling Sportsman's Park center field haunts.

The touchstone incident came when Hemus started a bench-clearing brawl with black pitcher, Pittsburgh's Bennie Daniels, after he threw a 'message pitch.' The next offering resulted in Hemus throwing his bat at Daniels. Hemus calling Daniels a "black bastard" triggered this one-upmanship, happening several innings earlier. Hemus told his players what exactly provoked the response by Daniels (Snyder 2006, 53-54). From that point on, black players under Hemus, knew why the lineups were structured poorly while getting short ropes for any mistakes they made. (The latter being the more important, long-term.)

Hemus later wrote an "oops I screwed up on you" letter to Flood after the media attached a goat label for a 1968 World Series play. Flood misplayed a Jim Northrup drive on a soggy turf, and the media pounced. Hemus previously thought of Flood: "I never thought you'd make it in the National League." Flood fumed on both occasions (Carter and Flood, 72-73), not forgiving the man. Author Mark Armour, at the SABR 43 conference (August 2013), reflected that Hemus cannot be seen firmly as a racist, but more convincingly, is just a very bad manager. Quoting Cecilia Tan's two divergent perspectives on Hemus:

“One is the optimist’s view: that Hemus had his eyes opened to the wrongness of racism and the way it blinded him to the worth of men around him, and he then tried to make amends. (Looks to me like Hemus didn’t value the worth of his white players either...) The pessimist’s view is that Hemus had his eyes opened to the fact that accusations of racism had left a black mark on his name and he tried to erase that stigma—regardless of whether he had a change of heart *or whether he actually had any racist leanings*. The truth is probably strictly neither, because life is not a story, and history is not fiction.” (Tan 2013)

### Social Consciousness and Stardom

After Hemus was fired from his first and last MLB field management role in July 1961, Flood gained the favor of salty coach Johnny Keane quickly. Flood grew assured; was important to team success; and saw Keane was a different man, cut from a religious cloth (Snyder, 54). Keane showed ability to acknowledge Flood’s struggles, while respecting Flood’s demeanor and intellect. Flood said evenly of Keane: “A gentle person with a competent grasp of the game but no special prowess (Carter and Flood, 65).” Flood took the regular centerfielder slot for the remainder of the decade in St. Louis. Meanwhile, the competent Keane, managed to essentially get fired, rehired, and quit all during the course of 1964 World Series march. Johnny went on to the faltering Yankees in 1965. There, Keane was axed in 1966; replaced by Ralph Houk only to pass away in 1967. Keane invested in Flood as a man; and assisted his growth into a very good ballplayer: those are a manager’s duties.

Off the field, Flood met people that shaped his ideas and attitudes during this time. In 1961, Flood, along with Bill White, ran into the most influential sports figure since Jackie Robinson (and certainly the most visible, until Michael Jordan) in Cassius Clay, soon, Muhammad Ali. Ali, a gold medal winner in 1960, brought a polarizing bravado to his professional career. For twenty years, he was the face of heavyweight boxing, win or lose. At that point, Clay, White and Flood were attending a Nation of Islam meeting in Florida, but were turned off by its overriding message that night. So they left.

In Ali’s case, defining fights were just over the horizon. He kept going to meetings and joined the Nation of Islam officially in 1964, after winning the heavyweight championship. He changed his name to Ali, discarding his “slave name.” He fought outside the ring. Branded a coward, traitor and ultimately, a felon, as he refused to fight in the Vietnam War. To quote Ali: “No Vietcong ever called me nigger.” It took a

Supreme Court ruling in favor of Ali to overturn a five-year prison sentence handed down by the lower courts.

In February of 1962, Flood attended an NAACP rally in Jackson, Mississippi with Jackie Robinson, and another boxing great, Archie Moore. Flood's attendance there was a beginning of a larger awakening to the bigger picture of Civil Rights. Flood that year met up again with his art teacher, Jim Chambers, who introduced him to John and Marion Jorgenson, a couple in the Bay Area. In this meeting, Curt became intrigued and stirred in his convictions by a progressive couple that was not like typical fans (Belth and McCarver, *Stepping Up: The Story of Curt Flood and His Fight for Baseball Players' Rights* 2006, 70). With the Civil Rights era a backdrop, their relationship deepened into a business partnership around engravings, and an enduring friendship in legal matters (Belth and McCarver 2006, 91) that was essential in Flood's upcoming fight. (John Jorgenson was killed in 1966 by a black teenager (Carter and Flood, 122).)

As much as Flood matured into a socially conscience man, he struggled with the everyday problems of a married twenty-something in the 1960s. His marriage to Beverly Collins, a rare African-American model, in 1958 was strained by the predicaments of travel, children, and cross purposes. As Flood's career took him over the road seven months or more per year, his adopted children, Gary and Debbie, were left in mother's care nearly always. Beverly and Curt felt the tension alike: as any number of concerns, most prominently, Gary's heart was defective, causing seizures, kept the young couple from growing together.

More problematic were their living arrangements. After the 1964 championship season, they rented a home in Alamo, California, a suburb of Oakland. The owner's boyfriend made a threat, resulting in a restraining order to be issued. Flood's large family, five children and wife, scarcely set up house before other altercations and intimidations resulted in his marriage ending (Belth and McCarver 2006, 91-94).

Flood in 1965 put up his best "traditional stat" season. While his marriage lay in shambles, he peaked (at 27-28 years old) as a professional ballplayer. He hit .310, with 191 hits, 30 doubles, 11 home runs, 90 runs and a team/career-best 51 walks. Flood missed 11 games due to a leg injury with little ado (96). He received the J.G. Taylor Spink award as St. Louis Baseball Man of the Year, beating out teammates Brock and Gibson. He earned his 3<sup>rd</sup> straight Gold Glove. Yet, this performance earned him just \$35,000 in 1965 (95). The 1966 season saw Flood garnered only a \$10,000 raise, while

many movie star performers earned upwards of \$1,000,000 per movie (98). (Elizabeth Taylor landed that payday haul for *Cleopatra*, times seven.)

The Cardinals were in makeover mode as newly minted GM Bob Howsam took over for 1964 Executive of the Year, Bing Devine. Devine lost his job mid-1964, as relations with Johnny Keane and the Cardinals ownership went south. (Branch Rickey, Leo Durocher, and Harry Caray were substantially in the mix of this confusion caused, ultimately, by owner Gussie Busch.) With their improbable championship, overtaking the Phillies in the last week of the regular season, the Cardinals were ready to resign Keane. Keane balked and left. Branch Rickey was fired. Howsam took over operations. And former 2nd baseman extraordinaire Red Schoendienst hired to manage the team. The team suffered injuries in 1965; never quite got on track, finishing 80-81; fell 16 games back of the Dodgers.

With those Dodgers in mind, St. Louis opened Busch Stadium, a state-of-the-art, if sterile-looking complex. With large power alleys, and unyielding heat on the playing surface, it still appealed to the Redbird faithful. The Astroturf baked in 95° July heat, the temperature reached 120° at field level. The necessity to have extremely fast outfielders with great conditioning (like Brock and Flood) meant the team attempted to move away from slow, just banging-out-home runs-for-runs offenses.

In 1967, the Cardinals achieved immediate success after opening Busch Stadium. But in that season, the Cardinals won more on the road (52-28) than at home (49-32). Their road record was assisted by a +19 home run differential; 369-256 run differential (leading in both categories); and a balanced pitching staff, with Steve Carlton and Bob Gibson heading up 5 pitchers with 10+ victories. The need for speed did not win the title, but pitching, timely hitting, and defense put the Cardinals back as champions. Flood, at 29, likely felt many years of job security lay ahead on a winning St. Louis ball club.

### The Real Beginning of a Labor Union

Baseball's first real labor leader took over in 1966. Marvin Miller, who had worked for the largest union in the country, the steelworkers, replaced the pro-owner, hand-picked representative judge Robert Cannon. Cannon was too congenial to owners and too difficult in his own contract demands for the establishment. Miller ran opposite of Cannon's existing doctrine. Cannon supported the reserve clause, purported that the

pension plan was the “finest in existence”, and the relations between labor and management were “magnificent (Miller 1990, 142).”

Obviously, this viewpoint was not shared by some players. When, in the spring of 1966, star pitchers Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale took a public stand to renegotiate their contracts, successfully garnering raises at what was the tail end of their respective careers. Koufax’s physical ailment – arthritis in his elbow – became unbearable. Drysdale: shoulder ailments came a year later.

But *Sport Illustrated* derisively wrote of their holdout for a better deal: “At first the K-D entry demanded three-year contracts, full ownership of California and Nevada and the Strategic Air Command, plus options on the Mississippi River and Philadelphia, all of which was above the presidential guidelines (Mead, *The Explosive Sixties: Baseball’s Decade of Expansion* 1989, 115).” Koufax and Drysdale were asking for three-year contracts of \$1,000,000 in total. Eventually, they both received one-year contracts over \$100,000 with Koufax retiring after masterful pitching in 1966 season, enduring enormous pain in his left elbow. This injury (and performing under it) would be handled much differently in the Tommy John surgery era. Such an injury with any MLB contract would shelve him until he was 100%.

Both Koufax and Drysdale were absolutely dominate in the National League, racking up an average of 300 innings per season, 21 victories per season *per man*, and roughly a .210 batting average allowed to opposing hitters (see tables below). Yet, their only recourse in negotiations during LA’s record attendance years and World Series appearances for the Dodgers was to hold out. Such contract disputes were not on the docket for the less-than-two decade old labor union.

Prior to Miller’s time, the concept of labor unions and contract disputes were short-lived; appearing only after World War II. In 1946, Robert Murphy, a Harvard-educated lawyer, attempted to unionize the game of baseball after talking to the Boston Braves players about their particular gripes. Murphy’s plan was derailed via a one-team vote in Pittsburgh – surprisingly getting that far – only to indirectly influence the formation of a weak company-like union. The “agreement” reached entailed a pension fund, 30 days of barnstorming, \$25 per week, and a cap on salary reduction of 25% (Allen 1950, 296-298). (Hardly a bargain for any player to talk of pay cut limits.)

**Table.** Starting Pitchers between 1963-1966 with over 900 IP

Pitcher	Wins	Losses	IP	Hits	BA Allow
<b>Don Drysdale</b>	73	61	<b>1,218.7</b>	1078	0.228
Juan Marichal	93	35	1,193.0	952	0.210
<b>Sandy Koufax</b>	<b>97</b>	27	1,192.7	<b>825</b>	<b>0.187</b>
Jim Bunning	69	44	1,137.7	1006	0.228
<b>Bob Gibson</b>	78	45	1,121.3	927	0.216
Larry Jackson	67	<b>65</b>	1,085.0	1046	0.243
Dick Ellsworth	58	<b>65</b>	1,039.0	1038	0.250
Dean Chance	60	54	1,011.7	826	0.214
Claude Osteen	56	56	996.7	969	0.245
Jim Kaat	70	45	990.3	964	0.245
Chris Short	64	42	988.0	876	0.228
Mudcat Grant	61	47	976.7	957	0.246
Jim Maloney	74	34	946.3	721	0.203
Tony Cloninger	66	47	924.7	837	0.232
Earl Wilson	53	53	907.7	832	0.234

Pitching WAR (Fangraphs)	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	Total/ Avg.
Dodgers	20.4	21.5	18.9	18.3	26.2	105.3
WAR Rank in MLB	2	2	4	4	1	2.6
Top Team (SP WAR)	Cards (20.6)	Reds (22)	Reds (21)	Pirates (20.1)	LAD (26.2)	<b>LAD #1</b>
Sandy Koufax WAR	6.2	9.8	6.8	10.7	10	43.5
Don Drysdale WAR	7.4	6.4	8	4.1	4.9	30.8
<b>% of Team SP WAR</b>	66.7%	75.3%	78.3%	80.9%	56.9%	<b>71.6%</b>
Bullpen WAR	0.8	-1.9	3.5	0.1	3	5.5
Bullpen WAR Rank	15	20	3	13	5	11.2

Marvin Miller's first task was introductions. Through education, he apprised the players of their labor rights afforded to them. In this, he found hostility from numerous teams as he offered this presentation. Luckily, he was undeterred. In one exchange, with the Yankees, he engaged Jim Bouton in a conversation about the unfairness of the reserve clause. Bouton suggested that if players moved freely, the top financial teams could corral all the stars. Miller replied was that really any different from a team (Bouton's team, no less) that had won thirty pennants in the last forty-five years (Belth

and McCarver, 106). After his trip to all twenty teams, and listening to their concerns, Miller was voted in as the executive director of the Players' Association.

### The Ending of a Career, the Beginning of a Fight

Before Flood's Supreme Court case, Miller irritated the baseball establishment and encouraged perplexing thoughts from the players by using the very words of those running the show. Buzzie Bavasi, long-time Dodger general manager, sat for numerous interviews, (some with *Sports Illustrated*) which spouted the tricks of the trade to gaining compliance by the players. One trick, the fake contract of another player left on the desk for effecting negotiations (as Bavasi left the room on purpose), caused or leveraged players to accept less than they likely could negotiate, if otherwise properly informed to their positions (111).

After opening up that discussion, Marvin Miller constructed the first basic agreement between owners and players on February 19, 1968, lasting just two seasons. The agreement included minimum salary requirements, an increase in per diem, and operation under the umbrella of the Uniform Player's Contract. But the biggest, and ultimately, the deciding perk was inclusion of a grievance procedure for contract disputes. Initially, this grievance protocol included a three-person panel of ownership, union, and the commissioner's office. But soon enough, a one-man impartial arbitrator took over the process. This final addition would haunt the owners of the game.

~

1968 proved a pivotal year in America history and sport: assassinations of Dr. King (whom Flood portrayed in an art piece) and Robert F. Kennedy; the nation's televisions locked to the quagmire of the Vietnam War; and in sport, the 'Year of the Pitcher', as Bob Gibson's 1.12 ERA and the game's lowest runs per game total since Teddy Roosevelt strode the White House. Flood hit .301, earning the *Sports Illustrated* cover of "Baseball's Best Centerfielder."

The 1968 World Series and off season were hashed out by the St. Louis media, as the Cardinals (and Curt Flood) were labeled overpaid, materialistic, and "undermining the very structure of baseball." Ownerships had for years doled out this sentiment to the media (with the media eagerly passing it on to the fans), allowing details of player's finances and their expenditures to leak. Meanwhile, ownerships' accounting books were under firm lock and key (131-133). (Or cooking them: upon exposure to assure a reported loss to the ownerships of franchises.)

Gibson and Flood made \$215,000 between them in 1969, as St. Louis's highest paid players ever to that date. Before the 1969 season started, baseball changed legal mound height to 10 inches, modified the playoffs, adding 'division' play and a new pro-ownership commissioner in Kuhn. The player's union fought for an ever-increasing portion of television revenues, asking for contribution to the player pension of \$125 per player in 1969. (See: Reagan Era on Media Growth.) With these modifications, conflicts ensued for years to come, as outgrowth of such adjustments: the designated hitter (DH) rule came to boost offense; player strikes and lockouts by owners over revenues division and rights. The commissioner's office in Kuhn sided with ownerships they liked (O'Malley), but nipped the hands of the ones they didn't (Finley). The business of baseball (contracts) became the fast, troubled track on which the LBJ era ran often to a fan's dismay.

Flood after 1969 grew further apart from his owner, Gussie Busch, and Bing Devine, the general manager. Being labeled disgruntled and overpriced, it was not an unusual tact to be traded. (Every profession known has this philosophy: cheaply had substitutes can replace the higher-priced talent if the new talent can adequately do the same services, cheaper, and yet effectively. Yet, in free markets, 'the talent' too should have the right to shop services to a new boss. Baseball did not allow this; thus, having-their-cake-and-eat-it-too mentality towards players. ) By then, Flood went through a decade of high expectations, triumphs on the field, divorce, cultural awakening, professional and artistic successes, but personal matters generally in flux. He had grown up; feeling the power of a man awakened to what was wrong in his sport and America.

In *Stepping Up*, Flood stated the crux of his belief system to Ken Burns of *Baseball* fame:

"I'm a child of the sixties, I'm a man of the sixties. During that period of time this country was coming apart at the seams. We were in Southeast Asia...Good men were dying for America and for the Constitution. In the southern part of the United States we were marching for civil rights and Dr. King had been assassinated, and we lost the Kennedys. And to think that merely because I was a professional baseball player, I could ignore what was going on outside the walls of Busch Stadium...All of those rights that these great Americans were dying for, I didn't have in my own profession." (Belth and McCarver, 151)



Little did Curt know that the 1969 season was to be his last as a full-time major leaguer. A full-time legal battle for those inalienable rights ceded to us by constitution was to begin.

### Flood v. Kuhn 407 U.S. 258 (1972)

When Curt Flood (and others) were traded to Philadelphia for Richie Allen (and others) on October 9, 1969 via a phone call made by a “middle-echelon coffee drinker in the front office” he was left little choice but to fight the trade. At first, he used the tactic of “I’ll retire,” hoping to stave off the trade. Next, he consulted with Marion Jorgenson and Allen Zerman, a lawyer who assisted Flood in his photography business, on the prospect of suing baseball. After this discussion, his options were bleakly clear: retire, sue, or go to Philadelphia.

With the trade still on, he soon consulted with Marvin Miller and Dick Moss in New York. Their advice was that this was an uphill battle, with a likely loss of any future in baseball and personal struggles coming with the fight. Flood was educated on prior cases defeats and quick settlements by others that challenged the game. (Outfielder Danny Gardella, who settled, and minor leaguer George Toolson, who lost in a U.S. Supreme Court ruling.)

Besides the unlikelihood of winning, the financial cost to move a case forward, from the filing to the appeals phase to an eventual ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, was high, and likely, take years. (Since the court decides to hear only a very small percentage of cases submitted for review – much less than 5%, and decreasing yearly as of this writing.) The opposing party, baseball ownerships, wielded plenty of influence too. Namely, the power to contort the media coverage, turn players and fans against Flood’s legitimate concerns, and color perceptions if Flood sought other employment. Even in a improbable win, no significant damage award could occur. In essence, Curt Flood was fighting on principle alone, with the sole benefits for future players.

Once Marvin Miller heard the reasons, Curt convinced the Player’s Union of the worthiness of the cause: first, explaining away any selfish motivations; and secondly, reflected that this was not “race motivated.” The Player’s Union voted to support him unanimously.

Miller then made a crucial decision to obtain legal counsel to argue the case: former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. Justice Goldberg was an anti-trust expert, and

a close acquaintance from Miller's Steelworker's Union days, with Miller assisting Goldberg. The prospect of a former "Supreme" arguing before the sitting court must have motivated some for Justice Goldberg. Flood, at that point, had to feel confident in his representation going forward; but the actuality of Goldberg's representation was far from his reputation.

Flood's legal team initiated attack by sending "the letter" to the commissioner, Bowie Kuhn, on Christmas Eve, 1969. The most biting line, "I do not feel that I am a piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes." Kuhn's response, in part, "I certainly agree with you, that you, as a human being, are not a piece of property...However, I cannot see its applicability to the situation at hand." The remainder of Kuhn's response was cordial, if strictly, legal meandering around the reserve clause, which was at the heart of Curt Flood's letter.

After this exchange of letters, Flood went to the media tact, specifically, Howard Cosell. As a long-time friend of Muhammad Ali, Cosell could push the envelope in sports reporting. In the interview, Cosell was aware of Curt's salary in St. Louis to which Flood's reply came: "A well-paid slave is, nonetheless, a slave (Belth and McCarver 2006, 158)." Flood's interjection of this analogy led to a many fans and sportswriters to mistake "his case" as just a cause for "his race, or his money" more than to the betterment of the game.

In a post-Civil Rights world, and growing calls for equality for women, misinterpreting objectives, or assigning motives, occurred with frequent regularity by observers of those seeking a fair shake. (Language shapes opinions as much any logic behind the argument. Emotions and ethics of the argument appeal to their respective constituencies. Against the backdrop of the 1960s, Flood's position was seen as "spoiled" by the same persons who once called him by various insults in the 1950s.) While others, like writer David Halberstam, understood the basics of what the reserve clause represented for the African-American ballplayer: a throwback to Jim Crow times, the Gilded Age and the pre-Civil War era, which all violated rights and human dignity (Belth and McCarver 2006, 160).

Support came sparingly from a few players, with former teammate Lou Brock, and trade-swap player Richie Allen giving their verbal support. For most, the possibility of getting the ownerships and managers individually upset meant saying nothing was in their best interests. Outspoken management supporters, such as Carl Yastrzemski, did little to improve Flood's public perception as a greedy boat rocker; a danger to the

financial viability of America's National pastime. Yaz received salary of \$125,000 in 1970; \$375,000 by 1979, all with Boston (Baseball-reference.com).

After submission of briefs, oral arguments took place in March 1972. Former associate justice Arthur Goldberg made a horrible, meandering argument. In the thirty minutes allotted, he spent more than half his time on facts leading to petitioner's filing of the case, baseball minutiae, but not arguing convincingly towards the three violations he felt existed: federal anti-trust; anti-trust at common law in the several states; or violation of the 13<sup>th</sup> amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He referenced cases (Collins v. Hardyman; Radovich) but without a cogent argument made. He was underprepared in listening to the audio at ([http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971\\_71\\_32](http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_71_32)) and so, the results were not surprising. The opposing counsel, Louis F. Hoynes, was fairly prepared, and was grilled by Thurgood Marshall throughout his rebuttal argument.

### The Outcome

The court upheld the long standing exemption to anti-trust laws for Major League Baseball through *stare decisis* (let the decision stand) set forth in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The Supreme Court's controlling decision, written by Justice Blackmun, referenced several viewpoints:

In the 1952 Report of the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 229, it was said, in conclusion:

"On the other hand the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence established baseball's need for some sort of reserve clause. Baseball's history shows that chaotic conditions prevailed when there was no reserve clause. Experience points to no feasible substitute to protect the integrity of the game or to guarantee a comparatively even competitive [407 U.S. 258, 273] struggle. The evidence adduced at the hearings would clearly not justify the enactment of legislation flatly condemning the reserve clause."

Citing Mr. Justice Clark:

"If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to answer, aside from the distinctions between the businesses, that were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate we would have no doubts. But Federal Baseball held the business of baseball outside the scope of

the Act. No other business claiming the coverage of those cases has such an adjudication. We, therefore, conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation and not by court decision. Congressional processes are more accommodative, affording the whole industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new legislation. The resulting product is therefore more likely to protect the industry and the public alike. The whole scope of congressional action would be known long in advance and effective dates for the legislation could be set in the future without the injustices of retroactivity and surprise which might follow court action." 352 U.S., at 450-452 (footnote omitted).

### **Blackmun's list:**

1. Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce.
2. With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. *Federal Baseball* and *Toolson* have become an aberration confined to baseball.
3. Even though others might regard this as "unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical," see Radovich, 352 U.S., at 452, the aberration is an established one, and one that has been recognized not only in Federal Baseball and Toolson, but in Shubert, International Boxing, and Radovich, as well, a total of five consecutive cases in this Court. It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce.
4. It rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs. Other professional sports operating interstate - football, [407 U.S. 258, 283] boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf - are not so exempt.
5. The advent of radio and television, with their consequent increased coverage and additional revenues, has not occasioned an overruling of Federal Baseball and Toolson.
6. The Court has emphasized that since 1922 baseball, with full and continuing congressional awareness, has been allowed to develop and to expand unhindered by federal legislative action. Remedial legislation has been introduced repeatedly in Congress but none has ever been enacted. The Court, accordingly, has concluded that Congress as yet has had no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes. This, obviously, has been deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence and passivity. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 241 -242 (1970).
7. The Court noted in Radovich, 352 U.S., at 452, that the slate with respect to baseball is not clean. Indeed, it has not been clean for half a century.
8. The Court has expressed concern about the confusion and the retroactivity problems that inevitably would result with a judicial overturning of *Federal*

*Baseball*. It has voiced a preference that if any change is to be made, it come by legislative action that, by its nature, is only prospective in operation.


The ruling majority upheld on “the infeasibility of changing” and “resulting confusion from it” than on any firm legal merits of prior cases cited, just the fact the decision was to grant the curious legal exception to baseball. But, decisions were flipped on other sports to rulings consistent with interstate commerce and labor laws pursuant to that function. Further evidence of weakness is reflected in Justice Douglas switching his allegiance from his prior decision in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), stating he had “lived to regret it.” Additionally, Chief Justice Burger narrowly held, suggesting, “grave reservations.”

Whereas, Justices Marshall and Brennan dissenting opinion reflected correctly:

“The importance of the antitrust laws to every citizen must not be minimized. They are as important to baseball players as they are to football players, lawyers, doctors, or members of any other class of workers. Baseball players cannot be denied the benefits of competition merely because club owners view other economic interests as being more important, unless Congress says so.

Has Congress acquiesced in our decisions in Federal Baseball Club and Toolson? I think not. Had the Court been consistent and treated all sports in the same way baseball was treated, Congress might have become concerned enough to take action. But, the Court was inconsistent, and baseball was isolated and distinguished from all other sports. In Toolson the Court refused to act because Congress had been silent. But the Court may have read too much into this legislative inaction.”

### Post-Hoc Flood: Financial Growth of the Sport




Much was written good and bad about the dealings and legal obfuscations of **Marvin Miller (1917-2012)**, the first substantial Major League Baseball Player Association

Executive Director. That in the arbitration inclusion laid the foundation of the favorable Messersmith/McNally decision is without argument; that normal labor rights overturned the 'reserve clause'; but, unconvincingly, that it was a harbinger of terrible financial outcomes in the game. So far, in forty years, baseball has ticked along with only one major setback in 1994. (Flood & Miller before making their public case.)

Miller's viewpoints and work continually put pressure on the owners, and luckily, for Major League players, his legal acumen won for players rights most people in America treasure, but rarely understand, completely. (This author included. Marvin Miller fought for limited free agency, to assure players could maximize earnings. Else too many free agents at once would depress pricing.)

Yet, in the legal challenges brought by Curt Flood, and later, Messersmith and McNally, a heated discussion evolved on what baseball appears to be (to owners, media observers, and fans) in the last two score: A money-driven proposition fueled by fans' dollars, for owners and players alike. But what is baseball, really? Entertainment? A gladiator contest? A matching of intellectual wits through computers and analytics (as sabermetricians take it by storm?)



(Baseball Max Salaries: Hauptert, Michael, [SABR.org](http://SABR.org), 2013)

In *The Image of Their Greatness*, baseball historians Donald Honig and Lawrence Ritter, labeled an entire chapter, Dollar Decade, The \$eventie\$. The implication being players

receiving salary upgrades, as one comment reflected: “Omens for the later seventies: the Dollar Decade was on its way! Financial and legal expertise were becoming necessities for the au courant baseball fan (Ritter and Honig 1984, 319).” In 1972, before free agency, 24 players were making over \$100,000 per season, still the benchmark for a top salary (319-321). In late 1940s, Joe DiMaggio cracked first the \$100,000 player barrier – at the twilight of his career. Over 25 years later, the barrier barely moved upward, reflecting some stagnation in top player’s salaries. This actuality while revenue streams increased substantially from television and media promotions. (In 1969, baseball television revenue was \$50 million. Total player salaries were \$20 million (Carter and Flood 1971, 136).)

As a result of unionizing, players became consciously aware of the unfairness in contracts and salaries, even though many top players stayed, or sided, with the management philosophy. (Their salaries *at that moment* might have influenced that proposition.) So with Miller’s help, MLB players began to receive salaries based on what a freer labor market would bear.

Even as such unfathomable compensation packages grew, one’s non-baseball skills too enhanced profits for the more adept and able ownerships. Owners turned stars into higher revenues through more outlets: local and national TV contracts, local, national, and international marketing and advertising, sports memorabilia, concessions promos, radio spots, online packaging of games and sports columns among the plethora of options. The ownership paradigm arrayed itself through a free-market system fueled by a healthy amount of public subsidies. (**See:** Clinton Era, Business of Baseball.)

For their side, player’s careers are at risk constantly to lose out: career cut short due to injuries, changes in roles due to trades, or washing out, the inability to perform. And many (drafted out of high school) are neglectful of their education to do other things, unless hired by a ball team after their careers (ending sometimes in their late 20s). Ownerships stay put for lengthier times, if they like. Have the ability to turn profits on selling the franchise, and can reinvent the team many times over during a capital life cycle of 30 years for a new stadium. A perpetual point: prior to the reserve clause’s nullification, players made only what *one owner* allowed until considered washed up.

Without being able to shop their skills to the highest bidder – which is the hallmark of America’s free-enterprise system – a player had little recourse, and limited earning potential. With the *LBJ Era* arbitration decision of Peter Sietz, the seismic change (to

team's structure and overall management) came in the off-seasons. Free agency became a rule of life for the general managers as the reserve clause was invalidated as a tool to keep players indefinitely tied to a ball team.

The complete rationale for five score had been to give owners overarching powers to tightly control the money to pay players with standard one-year contracts, leaving players little choice but to continue playing for that particular team. No options. Challenges before to the 'reserve' system had been made, however, the courts continually, if befuddling so, allowed ownerships to set rules. (Which at baseball's professional outset were actually practical, until the business blossomed, becoming sustainable and profitable. Then, restrictions to player movement should have been lifted. Yet, only through outside competition (the American League & Federals) did challenges ever happen.)

After the Seitz ruling, the owners were no longer able to purely command players at their beckoning. (Except in the minors. A different battle, but a same question going back to the Coolidge Era, with the National Agreement signed.)

## New York Yankees Circa 2011

Player	Position	Contract
Jeter	2nd base	\$19 m for 2 years
Cano	1st base	\$7.5 m for next 4 years
A-Rod	3rd base	\$27.5 m for 9 years
Sabathia	Pitcher	\$23 m for 7 years
Teixeira	1st base	\$22.5 m for 8 years
Posada	Batter's box	\$13.5 m for 3 years

Photo: Keith Allison

(Aswath Damodaran, iTunes: Corporate Finance, 2013)

**To The Victors, Go The Spoils:** Four Yankees. Four very well-paid ballplayers. Thanks to Curt Flood and Marvin Miller.



Curt Flood died after a long battle against throat cancer on January 20, 1997 – Martin Luther King Day. His last years were not as likely dreamed. But his legacy lay not in winning a court battle, but in winning the Civil Rights war. His was a battle against the way it is, and had always been.

### Astroturf & Stealing: The Weapon of Choice for Whitey Herzog

After watching offense take a precipitous downturn for a number of seasons in the 1960s, the 1970s presented a realistic case for running more on the base paths. The new ball fields built incorporated an overriding speed factor to contend with, unlike an entire generation of ballplayers born before the 1930s and 1940s ever envisioned: Astroturf.

The ‘carpet’ made its way into numerous places – The Houston Astrodome, Three Rivers, Comiskey (for a time), Veteran’s Stadium and Riverfront, amongst a large group – and required speedy guys to contend with balls hit in gaps and corners of the outfield. Infielders learnt very quickly to utilize the field as a way to get throws over to the 1<sup>st</sup> baseman in a hurry as players burned down the first base line. (Cincinnati’s SS Dave Concepcion is credited with innovating the one-hop throw, depending on the turf’s current condition (The New Professionals: Baseball in the 1970s, 112).)

Misplayed high pop-ups resulted in triples if the runner was fast, and bold enough. As then All-Star Boston CF Fred Lynn remarked, “I have to play deeper because the ball bounces so much higher and faster, and I can’t dive for a ball the way I do on grass because of the danger of getting hurt. When a ball bounces 30 feet over your head, I don’t think that’s the way baseball was meant to be played (Rieland 1989, 109).”

Other teams tried hard to advantage team speed on turf, using stolen bases to play “small ball.” Sometimes, this was more out of ownerships’ delight (Charlie O. Finley) at the excitement of taking such risks, than usefulness. 1976 Oakland A’s:341 thefts, 123 more than second place Kansas City. A player’s lack of ability to hit monster home runs contributed; as did the salary to acquire such a masher, once free agent prices kicked in. But as exciting as this particular play is, and supposed usefulness in close games, the total runs produced, and wins generated by a franchise are not at all highly correlated. (Exceptions exist; no analysis is without outliers to the normal course, and thus, the next section.)

## Run Rabbit Run

The two exceptions: The Kansas City Royals of the late 1970s and St. Louis Cardinals of the 1980s.


In the mid-1970s, Kansas City turned 3-year old Royals Stadium into a sprint track under manager Whitey Herzog, who implemented the same system in St. Louis once made manager in 1980. With a group of mites, LF/CF Willie Wilson, SS Freddie Patek, and 2B Frank White, and line-drive mashers, 3B George Brett, DH Hal McRae, and CF Amos Otis, the Royals competed with the power-laden Yankees for supremacy in the late 1970s. Much of their success was similarly attributed to the work of hitting coach Charlie Lau who steered players away from uppercut swings and yanking the ball to the pull field. Instead, drilling them for better contact, chop cuts, and smooth, one-hand releases of the bat after connecting (Rieland 1989, 113-114).

Whitey Herzog went through various organizations: started out as a scout for Charlie O. Finley in Kansas City; employed as Mets scouting director; thereafter, went to Texas Rangers as manager; and finally, and very briefly, as the California Angels skipper in the early 1970s. It seemed unlikely Whitey would make such a 360-degree connection back to Kansas City, taking over as manager of a young, soon-to-be aggressive bunch of players. But such is baseball jobs and security thereof.


Herzog's Royals made strides to unseat the Yankees while lacking their top-end pitching talent, or rather, their free agency-type salaries. The Royals' Dennis Leonard, Paul Splittorff, Larry Gura, or Doug Bird, were evenly matched against Ron Guidry, Catfish Hunter, Ed Figueroa, or later, Tommy John.

The three graphs below reflect the Yankee stars were only slightly ahead of Kansas City, in traditional stats – with ERA and K/BB ratios slightly superior in the starting staff. Surprisingly, the Kansas City bullpen held up better numerically against the Yankees. Even though, the Yankees possessed two of the best names in the closing business: Sparky Lyle and Goose Gossage.

### 1976-1979 Starting Pitching Staffs



### Relievers 1976-1979



Maybe most telling of all is the fact the two teams nearly split the season series over four years, and *Fangraphs* has pitching nearly awash, statistically:

Yearly Head-to-Head Wins	Yankees	Kansas City	Overall MLB Rk (76-79) (Fangraphs)	Starters	Relief	Total Pitching
1976	5	7	6: Royals	60	7.5	67.5
1977	5	5	7: Yankees	57.2	9.5	66.7
1978	5	6				
1979	7	5				

Shortly before the arrival of Whitey Herzog, pharmaceutically-wealthy Ewing Kauffman launched “the academy” to turn out ballplayers through scientific approaches to their training, specifically physical tests of eyes, hand-eye coordination, reflexes, balance, speed, and strength, almost similar to the NFL prerequisites for playing. Syd Thrift was its coordinator. However, resistance to the program by scouts led to its quick demise. However, one ballplayer, second baseman Frank “Six Million Dollar Man” White (Kerrane, *Dollar Sign on The Muscle* 1984, 128) came through the system employed. He played more games from 1976-80 for the Royals than any other ballplayer.

Herzog, while in Kansas City, did inherit a ball club with a great deal of talent. That being said, he was at odds with the owner after only a few seasons. From his own biography, the Kauffman’s (in their owners’ box) rarely welcomed Herzog’s family to the park.

The Royals did not win the World Series, though they appeared in 1980 under first-year manager Jim Frey (later the skipper of 1984 Cubs playoff demise). Herzog just took his strategy to new heights with the St. Louis Cardinals winning the 1982 World Series with jack rabbit base stealers Vince Coleman, Lonnie Smith, Willie McGee, and Ozzie Smith. They ran up against the Brew Crew (Harvey’s Wallbangers) of Robin Yount, Paul Molitor, and Ben Oglivie.

The two teams (Kansas City and St. Louis) did meet in the 1985 World Series with an older Kansas City team winning its lone championship with plenty of controversy. One such play involved the harder-than-it-looks play of covering first base by the pitcher. Though replay reflected that Joquain Andujar stepped on the bag, the umpire called the batter safe. The Cardinals lost to the Royals. But methodology on the field won two championships.

<b>Manager: Whitey Herzog – Jim Frey (1980) Win record</b>	
Year	Wins
1976	90
1977	102
1978	92
1979	85
<b>1980</b>	<b>97</b>

**Kansas City Royals Position Players 1976-1980**

<u>Name</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>AB</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>OBP</u>	<u>SLG</u>	<u>OPS</u>	<u>SB</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>TB</u>	<u>Hits</u>	<u>2B</u>	<u>3B</u>	<u>HR</u>	<u>RBI</u>	<u>YOB</u>	<u>POS</u>
Frank White	728	2408	0.256	0.290	0.362	0.652	103	307	871	617	111	25	31	254	1950	<b>2B</b>
George Brett	697	<b>2813</b>	<b>0.330</b>	<b>0.385</b>	<b>0.532</b>	<b>0.917</b>	90	<b>484</b>	<b>1497</b>	<b>928</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>442</b>	1953	<b>3B</b>
Amos Otis	694	<b>2527</b>	0.277	0.353	<b>0.448</b>	0.801	<b>127</b>	<b>408</b>	<b>1132</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>134</b>	22	<b>85</b>	<b>403</b>	1947	<b>CF</b>
Hal McRae	692	<b>2673</b>	<b>0.297</b>	<b>0.355</b>	<b>0.471</b>	<b>0.826</b>	72	<b>397</b>	<b>1259</b>	<b>794</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>394</b>	1945	<b>DH/LF</b>
Al Cowens	582	2188	0.287	0.329	0.418	0.748	63	301	915	628	97	<b>35</b>	40	307	1951	<b>RF</b>
Darrell Porter	555	1896	0.271	<b>0.376</b>	0.435	<b>0.810</b>	5	290	824	514	85	21	61	301	1952	<b>C</b>
Freddie Patek	542	1675	0.251	0.312	0.330	0.642	<b>153</b>	214	552	420	85	10	9	186	1944	<b>SS</b>
Willie Wilson	467	1531	<b>0.307</b>	0.339	0.400	0.739	<b>216</b>	299	613	470	56	<b>30</b>	9	115	1955	<b>CF/LF</b>
Pete LaCock	452	1104	0.277	0.332	0.380	0.712	6	137	420	306	64	7	12	151	1952	<b>1B</b>
John Wathan	365	1003	0.286	0.331	0.387	0.718	23	125	388	287	37	14	12	140	1949	<b>C</b>
U L Washington	333	966	0.265	0.326	0.359	0.686	43	121	347	256	31	18	8	88	1953	<b>SS</b>
Clint Hurdle	331	1009	0.273	0.350	0.423	0.773	1	119	427	275	66	10	22	153	1957	<b>RF</b>
John Mayberry	314	1137	0.231	0.329	0.370	0.699	4	149	421	263	44	3	36	177	1949	<b>1B</b>
Tom Poquette	311	916	0.276	0.323	0.396	0.719	9	103	363	253	50	18	8	100	1951	<b>LF/RF</b>

Bold Indicates Top 3 in category

Linear Weights: Analysis of Whitey Herzog Teams

To compare the runs scored by Herzog-influenced teams (including the 1980 Royals that were essentially of his design) to the rest of major league baseball, this author used Linear Weights to calculate the influence of Stolen Bases and Caught Stealing on the offensive production of the two groups: Herzog and Non-Herzog.

Utilizing multiple-linear regression, the coefficients of each variable can be calculated and analyzed for their significance to run scoring ability of a team.

The basic equation:

$$Y = AX_1 + BX_2 + CX_3...ZX_N$$

Where X<sub>1</sub> to X<sub>N</sub> are variables to predict run scoring

Y equals Runs Scored

And A, B and C are coefficients of each variable

Based on this formula, the following results were obtained:

**Table.** Comparison of Whitey Herzog Teams to Non-Herzog Teams (1975-1988)

Groups	Herzog	Without Herzog
Teams	15	345
R <sup>2</sup>	.9573	.9566
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.9003	.9556
SE	30.2989	21.4726
<u>Variables</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
<b>2B</b>	<b>1.3894</b>	<b>.6846</b>
<b>3B</b>	<b>1.0768</b>	<b>.8783</b>
HR	0.8416	1.4558
SB	0.4165	.1528
<b>CS</b>	<b>-0.7222</b>	<b>-.1315</b>
Outs	-0.1409	-.1039
Walk/HBP	0.4735	.3354
Singles	0.4710	.5242

	Teams	Mean	SD	SE	95% CI of Mean
2B	15	252.133	39.6842	10.2464	230.157 to 274.110
HR	15	89.600	26.5136	6.8458	74.917 to 104.283
SB	15	202.733	55.9649	14.4501	171.741 to 233.726

**The Original Fast & Furious Team**

What can be concluded is that Herzog teams received nearly triple the benefits of utilizing the stolen base (272%) but also received (550%) of the detriment of a caught stealing. This high risk/reward game in comparison to other teams of the time is reflected in their other baseball events. The Cardinals used the double and triple event much more as the driver of their offenses in comparison to the remainder of baseball outcomes. A home run for the Royals and Cardinals was not quite the primary driver of their offenses. Maybe most unusual is that “a walk is good as a hit” axiom did actually apply with the Royals/Cardinals compared to everybody else. Not an unusual occurrence since a walk by a Missouri player resulted in an attempt to steal second, very frequently.

Lastly, outs were a bit more precious to the Royals/Cardinals due likely to their inability to generate the two-out home run. With less than two outs, and anyone on base, they had a chance to steal their way to third base and get home via the sacrifice fly, bunt or

pitcher/catcher gaffe, or score at a high rate from second on singles that normally would not get other players home.


During this period the Herzog-led teams success rate on the base paths were uneven. Though the Royals had some talent to run, their success rate was only 70.96% with their best season on the bases taken place under Jim Frey in 1980 at 81.14%. (Since Herzog took over with many of the players already in place, it might be that he was not effective in calling, or pushed too hard of his players to do things. Also, consider he fired Charlie Lau, their hitting coach of choice for a time. Or as Bill James opined in *Baseball Managers*, new regimes get more buy-in, initially, if significantly different from the last manager. Frey in this case.) In taking over as skipper of the Cardinals in 1980, Herzog's players improved to 74.12% during the next 9 seasons, but only after a couple of seasons of fine-tuning the running game. In 1982, the Cardinals were above 75% consistently, a winning strategy that put them in three World Series while never hitting over 100 home runs in a regular season. (Though Ozzie Smith hit the most memorable one in 1985 that propelled them into the World Series against the cross state rival Royals.)

Herzog's teams were nearly a function of this ability: to run bases well and cover ground on defense. In comparison to the rest of the major leagues, the late 1970s Royals and 1980s Cardinals were designed around speed and scored significantly through the stolen base. As a passage from Bill James' *Historical Baseball Abstract* reflects on the speed of prominent outfielders for Herzog, "So there is never, or virtually never, a right fielder who is as slow as the slower left fielders – but also, there is virtually never a right fielder who is as fast as the faster left fielders. Think about it: has there ever, in the history of baseball, been a right fielder who was as fast as Brock...Willie Wilson...or Lonnie Smith or Vince Coleman? There hasn't, because if a player was that fast and could throw well enough to play right field...he would be a center fielder."<sup>12</sup>

But if we isolate the running game from the remainder of the offense, it is clear the significance of stealing bases was at best minimal to the overall production of runs. Using the values from this run prediction formula for a yearly analysis of actual scoring, predicted scoring broken down by base running and other events, the results were as follows:

**Table.** Runs Added by Base Running, Predicted, Differential and Base Running %

Year	Runs outside BR	Base Running	Predict	Differential	BR%
1975	701.5	23.2	724.7	-14.7	3.27%
1976	653.4	32.3	685.7	<b>27.3</b>	4.53%
1977	789.9	22.5	812.4	9.6	2.73%
1978	715.7	45.3	761.0	-18.0	6.09%
1979	782.4	46.2	828.6	<b>22.4</b>	5.43%
1980	709.1	19.2	728.3	9.7	2.60%
1981	452.3	11.7	464.0	0.0	2.51%
1982	653.0	33.6	686.6	-1.6	4.90%
1983	692.8	38.0	730.9	<b>-51.9</b>	5.60%
1984	573.6	<b>55.3</b>	628.9	<b>23.1</b>	<b>8.48%</b>
1985	675.7	<b>82.2</b>	757.9	-10.9	<b>11.01%</b>
1986	526.0	<b>69.9</b>	595.9	5.1	<b>11.64%</b>
1987	705.3	<b>67.4</b>	772.7	<b>25.3</b>	<b>8.44%</b>
1988	526.1	<b>66.0</b>	592.1	-14.1	<b>11.43%</b>
1980KC	763.3	<b>57.0</b>	820.3	-11.3	<b>7.05%</b>
Average	661.3	44.6	706.0	0.006	6.4%



As a result, base stealing isolated contributes at best only 11.64% to the total offense. Even during the Cardinals years (1980-1988) while running was most important the predicted runs in 1983 was dramatic 52 runs lower than expected by the equation.



With the speed game at its apex, many teams experimented with lineups of slap hitters and turning around natural right-handers, to bat left, in order to take advantage of their speed. (See Graph below.) The percentage of switch hitters in the game drastically increased, but the averages of the players did not rise above the typical left or right-hand hitter.

### Speed Kills Careers: Astro turf Woes

With the dawn of the Astrodome, these new surfaces of Astro turf became a staple of 1970s multi-purpose stadiums for both baseball and football teams. (At one point, 15 out of 28 then NFL teams used the 1<sup>st</sup> generation of artificial surface.) Teams like San Francisco Giants and the Chicago White Sox even experimented with Astro turf, only to have the owners wise up. (Bill Veeck took it out in Chicago.)<sup>13</sup>


This safety thought was decided by the reality that injuries were occurring in players at greater rates than normal. And with those injuries attributing to blown-out knees, ACL (anterior cruciate ligaments) tears, hamstring pulls and muscle/joint/bone jarring, these costly mishaps gave ample reason to tear out this 1<sup>st</sup> generation of artificial surface, thus giving it a curtain call. Field turf, a better surface from many medical studies<sup>14</sup>, has been installed since in many parks.

Many top players over the years went to natural grass parks, or avoided Astro turf home teams to save, or prolong their careers. (Andre Dawson being an example of this phenomenon in coming over to the often-plodding Cubs from the running Expos where Dawson was a speedy 20 SB-20 HR center fielder for quite a time. The Cubs Buck O'Neil had scouted Andre Dawson before he became Montreal's Rookie of the Year in 1977. Dawson's knees were taking a beating; and the money did not hurt either.)

As per the times, team owners preferred Astro turf, because it was much cheaper to maintain in comparison to natural grass. It supposedly sped up the tempo of the game, which owners like, because it was then more exciting to fans and, therefore, seemed to increase profits. As GM Bob Howsam reflected in *Cincinnati and the Big Red Machine*, "It allows baseball to be played the way it should be played. You only get true bounces...It avoids rainouts. One year we figure the carpet saved us twenty-seven, twenty-nine games. That year we had 2.7 million attendance." Meanwhile, manager Sparky Anderson also adds, "On the carpet the whole thing is speed. Speed's the whole thing: speed and defense...[But] it's hard on the legs. You have troubles when you get older. Playing on turf is not baseball, it's something else; or at least is a different form of the game."<sup>15</sup>

The speed factor too has always impressed scouts and fans alike. (Branch Rickey, and his adherents, felt it was the primary tool to look at.) It is likened to watching a track star run 100 meters or 400 meters in record times. And the disruption it causes to the ebb and flow of a 'normal' game does greatly stand out. Meanwhile, the owner only sees dollar signs on their muscle –the meat in the seats – and possibly, a championship to finally hold.

But often, the very skill of stealing bases, or running down fly balls (and crashing into walls) has become a detriment to other skills a player has. (Brooklyn Dodger Pete Reiser is an example of a gifted star from the 1940s that took tremendous chances, and shortened a career due to slamming into walls, thus injuries.) But as is the case in all sports, daring, physical gifts, and the ability to take advantage of those gifts, becomes the needed edge to beat other teams. "Speed kills," has been uttered to GM's delight.



In Volume 1, *Stolen Base Leaders by Era (100 Stolen Bases)*, a listing of the top theft masters in baseball history by era is included. These men would in some cases, like Rickey Henderson, Kenny Lofton, Willie Mays, or Lou Brock, come to represent each era in terms of the speed game, or fulfilling the leadoff man duties: get on base, cause havoc, and get to second base, and then, score.

The LBJ era was one of speedy changes to the fabric of baseball. From 1964 to 1977, the pace of theft masters increased while the salaries expected and received moved in relative lockstep. The country too flipped from a conservative and pride-filled bent towards a sarcastic, suspicious, and mistrustful of leaderships and the prevailing political winds. Daring was rewarded, if only in Andy Warhol's fifteen minutes of fame. That baseball was too shaped by the television, the broadcasts of sports, the instantaneous nature of a broadcast as Americans (nearly one and all) could watch baseball, or the growth of the NFL on Monday nights, meant the days of just simple fun at the old ballpark, or listening via the radio were significantly modified.

The cultural backdrop enlivened a spectrum of debates; brought us closer to our athletes (whether we accepted them or not); and brought to life more and more analysis of what it was to be a professional anything – ballplayer, CEO, or politician – and the benefits they deserved for the duties performed great, or poorly. The glare of the spotlight only grew with the advent of TV *all the time*.



**A Few Machine Parts:** Batting practice for The Big Red Machine overseen by an old, reliable masher, 1B Ted Kluszewski of 50s Reds fame. (Courtesy of John VanderHaagen)



**The Rickey being Rickey Show:** Henderson, the powerfully built, stolen base and lead-off home run machine, gave fits to every pitcher that fell behind on him. Get 'too fine': he walks; steals second, maybe third, and scores on any sac fly slightly beyond a Little League fence. Come down Broadway – middle of the plate – and he trots around the bases. Every owner sought his services as his resume is littered with teams, all in the hunt for a pennant when Rickey came to town. (Courtesy of **Sharon Chapman**. Taken at the Baseball HOF Museum.)

## REAGAN ERA (1978 – 1991)


- ◆ Growth of Free Agency
- ◆ Competitive Balance
- ◆ Rawlings sole baseball manufacturer 1977
- ◆ Collusion in 1985-87
- ◆ Fantasy Baseball begins
- ◆ Pete Rose banned

# Reagan ERA: Collusion & Free Agency



Reggie Jackson

Competitive Balance: 10 years of Different WS Winners



Fantasy Baseball: Begins as a hobby, soon to become... a business

Best MLB Players: Mike Schmidt, Ryne Sandberg, Ozzie Smith, Rickey Henderson, Paul Molitor, Cal Ripken Jr. Robin Yount, George Brett, Wade Boggs, Allan Trammell, Dale Murphy, Kirby Puckett, Andre Dawson, Gary Carter, Eddie Murray, Jack Morris, Nolan Ryan, Dennis Eckersley, Dan Quisenberry, Dave Steib, Phil Neikro

**Crash Davis:** I believe in the soul, the cock, the pussy, the small of a woman's back, the hanging curve ball, high fiber, good scotch, that the novels of Susan Sontag are self-indulgent, overrated crap. I believe Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. I believe there ought to be a constitutional amendment outlawing AstroTurf and the designated hitter. I believe in the sweet spot, soft-core pornography, opening your presents Christmas morning rather than Christmas Eve, and I believe in long, slow, deep, soft, wet kisses that last three days.

Actor Kevin Costner from the Movie *Bull Durham*. Written by Ron Shelton.

By 1979, the Carter administration was one beset by crises, both at home, and abroad. With soaring inflation, gas prices, and a nuclear meltdown brewing domestically, causing national aggravation and frustration in an ongoing decade of lackluster leadership. On foreign soil, the Iran hostage crisis further marred any positive viewing Carter's administration. The news program *Nightline* brought into homes every night this powder keg situation, born of Middle East discontent since time immortal. Powerful TV images resonated – on Day 444 it ended - but the damage, and continued cynicism from Watergate, led Americans to desire a new, hardball approach against these acts and a pushback against foes - the Iron Curtain – while promising prospects of a new voice free of the vices of increasing governmental interference and stagnation. Ronald Reagan was that voice.

The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, the long-time actor, baseball aficionado, and California governor, found the United States had donned the white-hat cowboy mentality that espoused plenty of tough talk. (Teddy Roosevelt 'big stick' approach.) Reagan's budgetary spending, in ramping up the military while engaging in harsh, but prescient criticism, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down that wall," towards the U.S.S.R., were embraced, but sometimes chided, depending on the political colors one wore. *Reaganomics* came to mean big tax breaks for the rich, reduction to, and often, evisceration of FDR programs, and plenty of tactical missiles for launching. His pet project, *SDI* (Strategic Defense Initiative) a.k.a. 'Star Wars', was DOA as the funding and technological developments lagged behind the movie magic of Reagan's intimate knowledge.

His rival for the 1980 nomination in the Republican Party called Reagan's policies "voodoo economics," but served gladly as vice-president. George Hebert Walker Bush, the former UN ambassador, China envoy, CIA director, and soon enough, president, took the post of vice-president, and remade it. Bush grew up closer to Wall Street than oil, despite his early post-graduate business dealings. His family, from father Prescott, to sons Jeb (John), Neil, to George Walker, gladly shook hands in the circles of men that counted off money in millions and billions on a daily basis. Baseball, also, was in the blood. (Two Bush family scions owned baseball teams for a time.)

In the late 1970s, "micro-computers" were on sale to the general public, long restricted by price alone with universities and research-related businesses needing such pricey mainframe or "mini-computing" power. The first spreadsheet program became available in 1979, *VisiCalc*, to the joy of accountants, and the despair of

accounting teachers. The *Apple II* carried the marvel. *Visicalc* killed by *Lotus 1-2-3* by 1983; Apple though had many chapters left to write in its story.

Cable television, only launched a decade prior, turned quickly into a staple of American living, packaging movies, sports, news, and advertising into unambiguous channels with specific and predominate programming thanks, in part, to the court decision HBO v. FCC (1977). With the allowance of niche broadcasting, energetic men like Ted Turner made a fortune in the 24-hour news format (CNN) while owning the Atlanta Braves (TBS). In 1980, the Tribune Company acquired the Chicago Cubs, who held WGN and a wide array of newspapers from coast to coast. The rise of such media conglomerations gained favor on *The Street*, climaxing with the AOL-TimeWarner failed championship merger in 2001. But such mergers, leverage buyouts, and media synergies were well-received in the Reagan Era. (LBOs were en vogue throughout go-go Big 80s.)



**President Ronald Reagan and Hall of Fame Broadcaster Harry Caray:** Reagan started out broadcasting ballgames in 1937 in Des Moines, Iowa. Caray was four years away from doing the same, working with Paul Harvey in 1941. Reagan ventured to *Hollywood* via the Cubs spring training at Catalina Island, and the rest of the story, is indeed, American history. Caray miked for the Cardinals, A's, White Sox, and the Cubs. Both communicated (expertly) in ways that left people to say: "Holy Cow!" and, "well..." (Picture: Courtesy of Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

With cable movies came VCRs too. Popular titles meant watching a movie at convenient times and over and over. Cell phones were status symbols of the “Me Generation” – as seen in the movies of this era. Then, these big bricks did not look all that useful; yet they evolved to the delight of the billions. In 1984, *Apple* launched a generation of users with a cutting edge commercial. *Microsoft* rose as an adversary to big blue, *IBM*. New tech, *Apple* and *Microsoft*, were destined as workhorses of *NASDAQ*. And stocks were hot once again with the wheeling and dealing on Wall Street nearly unfettered by the Reagan Treasury.

“Video killed the radio star,” when *MTV* debut in 1980 to the delight of tweens, and the liberal *Boomers*, the latter in it for marketing products with loud music and fads like parachute pants and break dancing. But within this rapidly growing media company, creative rock bands parodied existing nuclear war concerns, the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s new leader, and his hope for *perestroika* and *glasnost* (the opening up the USSR’s economic and cultural constraints) counterpose President Reagan. The prog rock band *Genesis* captured this existing landscape in their *Land of Confusion* spoof video. Such international intersections increased with artists *U2*, *Madonna*, *The Police*, *Duran Duran*, *Pink Floyd*, *Michael Jackson*, and *Bruce Springsteen* as the staples of the *MTV*’s Big 80s infinite playlist.



Chrysler was the first big Detroit automakers to lose out to Japanese models designed with superior quality controls and better fuel economy fostered (in part) by the teachings of an American: W. Edwards Deming. The U.S. government and Lee Iacocca stepped in, after a long stint at Ford Motor Company, to bail out the 3<sup>rd</sup> sister of the Big Three in 1980. Chrysler survived and paid back the money lent *with interest*.



But this global change was an omen of things yet to come.

On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle *Challenger* blew apart on live television due to Morton Thiokol's O-rings failing on the solid rocket booster. It once again reminded us of how difficult space travel is, and the dangers inherent with each space flight. Yet such dreams of space flight were better when the Space Shuttle rode piggy-backed across America on a modified 747, another marvel of flight in its day. (Left: The Space Shuttle *Discovery* lifting off to complete another mission of innovating things on Earth and beyond. *Courtesy of NASA.*)



**Dateline November 1989:** The fall of The Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end of the U.S.S.R. Soon, the Soviet state crumbled, embraced capitalism, and struggled to come to terms with the changes, and its place in world. Germany reunified after nearly fifty years separated via World War II, and then, the wall. Former President Reagan missed the fall by only ten months. But was instrumental to the process. (Left: Reagan speaking at the Brandenburg Gate. *Courtesy of The White House.*)

Even with tragedy and upheaval, Wall Street prospered – as windfalls, takeovers, and misgivings meant ‘action’ – defined by events such as: insider trading abuses of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken; the savings & loan debacle; and the October 19, 1987 stock market crash. Nevertheless, the wealthiest were enjoying the 1980s more, whilst Middle America worried about job security in a declining manufacturing market that

slowly shipped abroad to the cheaper labor havens. The movie *Wall Street*, starring Michael Douglas as Gordon Gecko portrayed the game of 'The Street' with a line taken from Milken's appearance at the Predator's Ball: "Greed is good." The book, *Barbarians at the Gate*, spoke of the inner workings of the mega deal: *RJR Nabisco* \$25 Billion dollar takeover bids. Movies like *Goodfellas* and *The Untouchables* harkened back to the heyday of wise guys 'making moves' that transpired during a similar time on The Street followed by a bailout from a perfect storm of greed and gullibility.

In the waning summer of 1988, hurricane Gilbert was recorded as the worst Atlantic storm ever, reaching maximum sustained winds of over 155 MPH. September 1989, hurricane Hugo landed on the southeastern coast at a cost of over \$4 Billion in damages. Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida at near Category 5 strength in 1992. Andrew was the most costly American disaster in U.S. history (to that point: \$20 billion), bringing further attention to weather patterns (*El Nino* and *La Nina*) and the growing changes to the climate, then called *Global Warming* by an informed few scientists.

But aside from these political, technological, and media-related advancements and events, *The Bronx Zoo* entertained a nation during the 1978 season, finishing with back-to-back championships. Owner George Steinbrenner bought Charlie O. Finley A's players, a tactic revisited, again and again under *The Boss*. A zoo of players brayed loudly during the labor disputes that dominated the early Reagan Era – causing many fans and owners to feel players' greed was unjustified, and undermining the game. Forgetting all the years of undervalued contracts pawned off on multiple generations of professional players by the owners; and distorted by sports reporters with equal parts distaste of a players' newfound wealth and talent envy. But the reporter, and his reader, the fan, still required the overarching need for unfettered access to their teams' best players and highest paid they were. Or the thinking went *then* on the former.

While fans' attendance at games increased yearly, the game lacked labor stability as the 1981 players' strike split the season. As each CBA (collective bargaining agreement) year, it seemed, the players and owners misgivings were bantered about. Between these business dealings, competitive seasons and exciting playoffs helped the game, but always came back to recriminations and arguments over rising salaries and the split

of the pot of media money. So, money was the root for players, big market owners, and the small market teams.

In 1990 this reached a near-term climax: The Reagan era concluded with collusion allegations proven true in court. As a federal arbitrator found MLB owners guilty between 1985 and 1987 of fixing “the free agency market,” forcing them to hand over \$280 million dollars in lost wages (Bryant 2005, 12).

Among this list included (Chass 1992):

Will Clark, \$1,600,000	Tom Seaver, \$358,654
Lance Parrish, \$1,383,332	Bryn Smith, \$358,281
Andre Dawson, \$1,000,000	Dennis Martinez, \$354,773
Tim Lincecum, \$633,667	Rudy Law, \$332,000
Doyle Alexander, \$625,000	Sammy Stewart, \$330,348
Bruce Bochte, \$600,000	Rod Scurry, \$312,406
Darrell Evans, \$540,000	George Bell, \$295,000
Lonnie Smith, \$516,979	Reggie Jackson, \$275,000
Carlton Fisk, \$500,925	Jesse Barfield, \$275,000
Al Cowens, \$500,000	
Rich Gedman, \$498,000	
Ron Guidry, \$475,000	
Bob Boone, \$452,846	
Enos Cabell, \$450,000	
Jack Morris, \$450,000	
Doug Corbett, \$427,858	
John Tudor, \$400,000	
Ray Knight, \$400,000	
Gary Ward, \$400,000	

The players' association did not feel this was punishment enough for such an action. As teams, such as the Cubs, had usually done little to improve or sign during much of the times (though, ironically enough, they made the playoffs in 1984 and 1989 - their only times since 1945) via the free agent and trade market. (The Cubs actually did plenty of wheeling and dealing during the 1980s in comparison to prior years. But, they balked for a long time before signing Andre Dawson, a collusion victim above (Chass 1992). The Cubs signed *The Hawk* after his agent, Dick Moss, presented them a blank contract. The Cubs let go Dennis Eckersley to offset this added salary in 1987. **See:** Franchises.)

Meanwhile, many owners carried their own grudges from the mid-1970s when free agency started. It became a bitter pill to swallow in the wake of the 1975 Messersmith/McNally decision. In 1990 season, a lockout was thwarted, as owners orchestrated against Fay Vincent and too many seeds were sown for the eventual 1994 season disaster: no World Series. What made these labor disputes such high drama, was the advent of the instantaneous destruction of their façades (owners and players alike) via the medium they both sought, and scourged daily: the television.

### Media Money Matters

After fighting the 'new TV medium', like radio before it, ownerships cottoned to dissemination of their product, baseball, which in turn generated revenues returned through advertising dollars vested in TV contracts. By the mid-1960s, television was engrained in the American psyche; hitched in a youthful and happy marriage to the National Pastime. And the growth of the game – in dollars – intricately tied to what advertisers were willing to put up for their 30-second spots and the home station programming promoted during these commercial breaks. As a result, even a legend of the early TV medium, folksy and homespun Dizzy Dean, needed to step aside – even over the objections of top sponsor *Falstaff Beer* which appealed to older men – to capture instead the young, upwardly mobile income earners, with non-fixed spending choices (Centerfield Shot: A History of Baseball on Television, 123-125).

This growing focus on market niches – realizing that older persons watched plenty of TV and had other targeted programming – meant broadcasts were now geared to the audience, and usually not to the particular talents, or lack thereof, of the announcers. (With exceptions too many, and too obscured by time, to be discussed in any detail here. Plead ignorance to this area of the game.)

But it always comes back to the money. The marriage generated assets based on Nielsen ratings, popularity attributed to broadcasters/teams, and the games played in October,

and sale of hotly promoted souvenirs. Each side had controlling points: Television giants ABC, NBC, and CBS, and soon, FOX, picked the announcers, broadcast frequency, promotional items tied to the sport, and playoff length (by 1985); baseball commissioners (Kuhn, Ueberroth) and the owners negotiated dollar amounts, start times, market blackouts, and which network would carry certain games. (As TV contracts sometimes were split across two major networks, or more, later.)

The growth of the monies dished out became the crux of the chasm between owners and players. The owners shared little information in the early 1970s – with a small percentage meant for player’s retirement fund – and also clung to their paternalistic “I know what is best for you” stance. Marvin Miller’s new association slowly unraveled that hold on money and information, to the ownerships’ annoyance, and ultimately, their collusion, later.

Table. TV Contract Growth in 25 years

<b>Years of Contract</b>	<b>TV Contract (millions)</b>	<b>TV GOTW Playoffs</b>
1969-1971	\$50	NBC
1972-1975	\$72	NBC
1976-1979	\$93	NBC/ABC
1980-1983	\$185	NBC/ABC
1984-1989	\$1,200	NBC
1990-1994	\$1,100	CBS

(Source: *Centerfield Shot*, Bellamy & Walker)

The jump in value to the billions category – during the *Reagan Era* – can be seen as Boomers taking their seat at the corporate table and buy-in to the best of the best. Cars, homes, stocks, and whatever else suited the generation’s move from hippie to yuppie.

Broadcasts changed with the numbers too. After Dean’s departure, Curt Gowdy’s non-intrusive style, gave way to Howard Cosell’s confrontational/too smart-for-baseball, and the clunky *ABC Monday Night Baseball*. Third bananas and on-the-field interviews thudded more often than thundered. Color and play-by-play still evolved as an art form as the 1970s proved that *ABC’s Monday Night Football* was dynamic, and soon, drowning in money by comparison as the NFL replaced baseball as America’s favorite sport. (Even as it did, in 1980, John Lennon’s murder was awkwardly reported by Howard Cosell during a football game. Such updates were like rough blogging, on-air, real time.)

After both extremes, NBC put smooth Dodger voice Vin Scully's synthesis of baseball perfection and Bob Costas youthful intellect to their best use on the color side. *The Games of Week* during the 1980s brought to life the legacies of Fernando Mania, the Sandberg Game, Doc Gooden, and Ozzie Smith's acrobatic exploits, and in the World Series, Kurt Gibson and Bill Buckner at their indomitable highs and abject lows in this author's youth.

Outside of the Big Three of broadcasting, cable grew from 19.9% of homes in 1980 to 57.1% by decades' end (Bellamy and Walker 2008, 142). The competition from cable superstations such as TBS, WGN, and MSG Network (WWOR) meant that the price to get dependable and advertising bankable products such as baseball games increased the future contracts, even when ratings were in decline, or even stagnated.

CBS saw this first hand as it overbid its hand in 1990. CBS's chaotic, uneven scheduling, and lack of focus destined baseball's *Game of the Week* to the dustbin. To be fair, the economy went into recession, an owner's lockout happened, and at the end, a player's strike, undid their "sports dynasty" deal. (They did NFL football, NCAA basketball and football, and the Olympics too – and soon lost NFL football, for a spell, to up-and-comer FOX.)

MLB took a swing at the broadcast arena with *The Baseball Network*, again splitting the kitty between NBC and ABC. From Wikipedia, "Under a six-year plan, Major League Baseball was intended to receive 85% of the first \$140 million in advertising revenue (or 87.5% of advertising revenues and corporate sponsorship from the games until sales top a specified level), 50% of the next \$30 million, and 80% of any additional money. Prior to this, Major League Baseball was projected to take a projected 55% cut in rights fees and received a typical rights fee from the networks. When compared to the previous TV deal with CBS, The Baseball Network was supposed to bring in 50% less of the broadcasting revenue. The advertisers were reportedly excited about the arrangement with The Baseball Network because the new package included several changes intended to boost ratings, especially among younger viewers."

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, FOX signed a \$2.5B contract for exclusive coverage of all significant post-season games for the 2001-2006 seasons. By 2012, ESPN, Turner Sports (TBS, TNT, TruTV), and FOX threw more billions at the sport. ESPN: \$700 million for 8 years. Fox: \$500 million for 8 years. Turner: \$300 million for 8 years. \$1.5B per broadcast season to MLB reflected a healthy game. (Revenues to be shared after MLB Properties and Advanced Media get their cut.) These megadeals dwarf the entire contract signed just 20 years prior with CBS.

## Shaking Up the Establishment

While the color of money did indeed shade baseball, the show that brought home the myriad of problems plaguing President Carter, presented a setback to forty years of Dodger legacy as it tore down myths about race relations in the baseball establishment. On April 6, 1987, in paying respect to Jackie Robinson's 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of breaking into the majors, *Nightline* hosted controversy as Al Campanis, long-time Dodger executive and VP of operations, made comments reflecting a presence of bias and racism in the hiring practices toward African-Americans after their playing careers ended. Saying that blacks, "lacked the necessities," and "should pay their dues in the minors." But also: "had other interests that were more successful."

It took only two days before Los Angeles owner Peter O'Malley asked Campanis to resign and the media storm brewed into a hurricane with commissioner Peter Ueberroth, Jesse Jackson, Reggie Jackson, and many others commenting on civil rights, affirmative action, shadow racism, and the "fatheads" of baseball, the owners, who had continue to put a ceiling on what certain men abilities are. While attuned to how television works, a few in the game of baseball still did not understand the ramifications of each and every word until it was too late. (Former CBS football analyst *Jimmy The Greek* was also fired for similar insensitive comments about performance differences by blacks. Other owners, such as Marge Schott, had foot-in-mouth problems whenever they found a mike close by.)

After that disturbing relevant, during the 1989 World Series, a major earthquake struck the California coast at 5:04PM as the San Francisco Giants and the Oakland A's were set to play. The entire west coast shook and shuddered under the forces of an angry mother. The roads and bridges and buildings of America's most populous state lay in disarray as ABC's sportscaster Al Michaels was thrust into another historical moment; a tragedy unfolding compared to the 1980 Olympiad and the *Miracle on Ice*. The sports event was irrelevant to the lives and damages done that day. Oakland went on to sweep the Giants, in their last World Series win. California still awaits yet another major quake.

A month later, a seismic political event shook the Iron Curtain to rust and rubble. The Berlin Wall – long the oppressive barrier that divided East from West in Germany – fell November 9, 1989. After nearly three decades of restriction of ideas and movements, the wall crumbled, while the media coverage attempted to cover every angle, at every moment, via whatever outlet it took, a foretelling sign of the media times.

## ESPN: 24/ 7/ 365

NBC, after 42 seasons as host to the National Pastime, shocked in ending their two score relationship on October 9, 1989 with the Cubs losing to the Giants. Vin Scully, at the mike for so many pivotal and historic moments, including Sandy Koufax's perfect gem against the Cubs on September 9, 1965, signoff to this last broadcast with: "The BART series begins in honor of A. Bartlett Giamatti (Scully, Vin [NBC Sports] 1989)." Scully molded poetry in the booth – even when the immediate game did not warrant his fluidity.

In taking up the mikes-with-hip analysis game, ESPN evolved into the real "total sports" package with a 4-year baseball contract for \$400 million (Bellamy and Walker 2008, 158). In acquiring and developing more first-run programming instead of the re-runs of World's Strongest Man, bodybuilding, or fly-fishing, ESPN gradually built in hype, and pre and post-games review shows such as *Baseball Tonight*. Soon playing to niche markets such as the NFL draft junkies, college football, and basketball season previews, fantasy baseball, which in turn, created the fantasy football craze, ESPN took only a decade to become their moniker: the new worldwide leader in sports. (And pairing with ABC, later, as the previous *Wide World of Sports* king.)

As a result, ESPN added spin-offs "channels" to their empire: *ESPN2*, *ESPNEWS*, *ESPN Deportes*, sports bar-restaurant *ESPNZONE* and *ESPN*, the magazine. The horizontal merger of a year-round sports platform with adequate market saturation took place when NBC-CBS dropped an 'on-air' fly ball onto the broadcast field, allowing ESPN to come in as *the closer*, and deal the pill with the effectiveness of a Mariano Rivera, if often, not the same class. ESPN, now, has the longest standing contract in servicing baseball until 2020, uninterrupted, with yet another billion dollar contract in place (Bellamy and Walker 2008, 168-70).

## Baseball's Ultimate Sin: A Prelude to Future Judgments

While race, a California quake, NBC's departure and ESPN's phoenix rising in broadcasting certainly shook up the baseball world, Pete Edward Rose's gambling on baseball triggered moral debates and aftershocks for years to come. Players, managers, and fans alike were dismayed and saddened by the icon of hustle and lunch pail baseball being accused in the *Dowd Report* of betting on the Cincinnati Reds as their manager. From Dowd's conclusions, commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti banned Rose from baseball for life. Just days after the ban, Giamatti died. The next commissioner, Fay Vincent, firmed up the stance against Rose, whose non-mea culpa attitude did little to dissuade on baseball's ultimate sin: gambling.



Rose, in 2006, after writing (ghostwriting) his autobiography, *Hustle*, in which he admitted to gambling on his team, still walked the line between the responsible acceptance of his past failings and pleas to and critiques of Fay Vincent, John Dowd, and others involved. On *The Graham Bensinger Show* in 2006 from Vegas, Rose said, “If it wasn’t for me [on his gambling]...No one would know who John Dowd was. I have no respect for either of those men. [Fay Vincent and Dowd.]”

As of this writing, no plans are in the foreseeable future to allow Pete Rose into the Hall of Fame. As it stands, both the all-time hit leader and home run king are unlikely for the Hall. And both *did time* for their sins. (Pete: 5 months jail in 1990. Bonds’ case resulted in house arrest.)

### A Sabermetrics Star is Born

About the time of Reagan’s assassination attempt in 1981, a former Pinkerton guard (the original bodyguards to the President (Gray 2006, 25)) was expanding the baseball discussion with a new style of writing and analysis of the game. **Bill James (1949 –)** wrote the ‘King James version’ of baseball history in his historical baseball abstracts, starting in the late 1970s with a self-published work of 75 pages advertised in the back of *The Sporting News*. (*Thou shalt not steal* applies to baseball too.)

James’ coinage of the term, *sabermetrics* after SABR (Society of American Baseball Research) and econometrics in 1980 launched a whole industry toward a greater appreciation of players without gaudy RBI numbers due to scarce opportunities, 80 walks per year drawers that hit .265, .260 thumpers with high secondary averages, and ‘glove men’ that too can hurt a teams’ chances to win. He infused criminal psychology, economics, obscure statistics, wit, vinegar, and sassiness into a moribund conversation about any baseball time period. To quote *The New Yorker’s* Ben McGrath in 2003, “In the process, James himself has become part of baseball legend. To some, he’s a philosopher-hero who brought baseball out of the Dark Ages; others consider him a calculator-punching pedant with too much time on his hands (The Professor of Baseball: Can the Master of Statistics Help Beat the Yankees?).”

In November 1978, Daniel Okrent (see next topic: **Rotisserie**), who had his own baseball addiction in *The Ultimate Baseball Book*, contacted Bill with interest about these fledgling baseball treatises. Connected enough, Okrent got Bill’s ideas in *Esquire* in the form of 1979 preview of the upcoming season. From there, Bill was hooked in like an old-time King Kelly slide into third base.

Never without detractors, as *Elias Sports Bureau*, the MLB statistical house, would not provide him precise statistics (even if Bill’s were accurate enough) to support his

groundbreaking-theories, thus garnering blowback, as an article about him was delayed for publication in 1980. Some felt his analysis was just “baseball by numbers,” (Gray, 49) oversimplifying his take, and ignoring real data analysis. (Or as W. Edwards Deming said: “In God We Trust; all others bring data.” But Deming also advocated that data only told you a small slice of the story. Bill James concurred, to point of saying, “never use a number when you can avoid it (McGrath 2003).”)

Among his early supporters, George Will called his abstracts: “the most important scientific treatise since Newton’s *Principia* (Gray, 86).” Then Oakland GM Sandy Alderson took up this statistical and analytical charge into the game – if in private – while in 1985, a 35-year old mediocre-player-turn-manager Bobby Valentine took the reins in Texas with sabermetric analyst, Craig Wright, in his circle of knowledge men (Gray, 87). Valentine, colorful and insightful, improved both Texas (and the Mets) into contending franchises. (The 2000 Mets won the NL Pennant.) Alderson keyed this statistical mantra when turning the GM reins over to a washout MLB player: Billy Beane.

Bill James had a loyal following: from Alderson to Will, and all the stat heads in between. Like all men, the voluminous amounts of time and dedication to the sport took its toll on a nuclear family as he moved away from the daunting statistical abstracts to raise them by the late 1980s. His coined term fluttered around in the 1990s, but never gained enormous critical mass until 2002. A billionaire came calling in John Henry, as his new toy required some attention, the Boston Red Sox. (**See:** Franchises.) Then, Michael Lewis’s *Moneyball* (a well-recognized author from his days on Wall Street at Salomon Brothers) made Bill a household name among fans with the further exploration of Oakland A’s.

### Rotisserie: History and Creating Two All-Rotisserie Teams

The landslide election of Hollywood legend Ronald Reagan in 1980 was appropriately timed with a new baseball hobby utilizing players in fantasy combinations; and pretending “to manage” them that became an obsession for millions of fans. The formation of this revolutionary idea in baseball gaming is now a nine-figure plus entity with variations aplenty. And it all began on a flight from Austin, Texas in November 1979 (Baseball Library 2006, Daniel Okrent Bio). Baseball writer/editor Daniel Okrent, along with Glen Waggoner, are credited with the forming rotisserie baseball, or fantasy baseball, in the modern parlance. By luck, the original Rotisserie name came from a monthly lunching place in New York, *La Rotisserie Française*.

This idea of “what-if” baseball was preceded by the Strat-O-Matic Company that based their play on previous season(s) of ballplayers performing a simulation within baseball game rules using player cards and a twenty-sided dice during simulated seasons of play

starting in 1963. (On March 29, 2007, *New York Times* reporter Richard Sandomir reported that the Strato-O-Matic ownership, the Richman family, was seeking an investor to buy a significant piece of their groundbreaking game (Sandomir 2007).) APBA too was a well thought of game of simulation baseball. Though both of these board games were popular among a loyal group of baseball fanatics, the usage of a *current* season statistics was a radical departure, even in 1980. (**Note:** Fantasy baseball is not solely the province of these outfits as legendary beat poet Jack Kerouac created his own fantasy baseball leagues in the 1950s. (The New York Times 2009).)

First, the accuracy and compiling of statistics were difficult as James' quest for data enforced above. Second, the first recognizable spreadsheet program had only been invented in 1979, and was hardly widespread, even amongst the *intelligentsia*. Third, the microcomputer was at best a 64 Kilobyte *Basic* programming tool, needing computing skills to make it most useful. Lastly, the *Internet* was a neat, if slow, concept – ARPA (later DARPA) in October 1969 sent its first message. With mostly university researchers utilizing the idea of sending files over the phone lines at a snail's pace, the internet usage would be instrumental only much, much later, to growth and form. Thus, the usage of simple categories (commonly reported by the newspapers, USA Today) made up the basis of the original scoring systems. RBI, Home Runs, Batting Average, Stolen Bases, Wins, Saves, ERA and WHIP were the first 4x4 categories used in 1980.

In 1981, with baseball's first in-season strike (and 1<sup>st</sup> half/ 2<sup>nd</sup> half playoff match ups), the downtime left sportswriters (many of whom came in contact with Okrent's group) an opportunity to further discuss this new game. The basic structure of the 'fantasy game' is as follows:

**Table. Basic League Structure**

<p>23 Man Roster - \$260 for an auction-based league. Or use a Serpentine Draft.</p> <p>Select a Commissioner, By Laws and Reporting Frequency and Statistics Min/Max for Innings Pitched</p>	<p>Decide the Scoring Format/Player Pool (4x4, 5x5, Head-to-Head, Point Values for Categories, AL/NL only, or Mixed)</p> <p>Form appropriate number of teams based on player pool</p> <p>Trade Protocols, Position Eligibility and Deadlines</p>
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**Table. Sample Roster Slots (Varies too much based on individual leagues)**

2 Catchers	1 3 <sup>rd</sup> Baseman	1 Middle Infielder
1 1 <sup>st</sup> Baseman	1 Shortstop	5 OF, and 1 DH
1 2 <sup>nd</sup> Baseman	1 Corner Infielder	9 Pitchers

The inaugural rotisserie league in 1980 became far more than just a blueprint to building a fantasy baseball team. It provided a lifelong hobby; that millions partake in, while in thousands of leagues; and dutifully pay in hours of time, while tinkering with new ways (and sometimes, old methods) of analyzing player data. With the Internet revolution, affordable spreadsheets formats (developing in concert at about the same time), real time information, and telecommunications connectivity seen since the early 1990s, fantasy baseball leagues have grown significantly; and fostered friendships and rivalries from New York to New Delhi. Many have never met their counterpart owners/GMs/Managers except online, but that has not stopped the growth of the obsession.

In fact, without the Internet and its convenience, such a pastime still be a very local affair. The ability to keep track of large amounts of data utilizing spreadsheets/websites made fantasy leagues more realistic than much of what constitutes other games. The nearly instantaneous collection of statistics put people in charge of a dynamic experience – much like operating a ‘real’ baseball team. The overall ability to make decisions, such as trading away a player, via an Internet connection has put the game on the map, permanently. As Greg Ambrosius, President of the Fantasy Sports Trade Association, surmised, “It used to be thought of as (something for) just geeks and hard core fans. But this isn’t a small closet hobby anymore. This son of bitch is a big, big industry, and it’s all due to the Internet (University of Florida, Interactive Media Lab 2006).”

Greg Ambrosius and Kit Keifer, in a breakroom at Krause Publications, first designed *Fantasy Baseball Magazine* in 1989. As Greg Ambrosius writes, “We knew we were doing something special at the time, but we had no idea that the Internet would soon revolutionize our world and eventually propel the fantasy sports industry into the mainstream of every day American life (Ambrosius 2007, 6).” His two decades of dedication to the production of various baseball related magazines, card books, and the growth of fantasy football reflects the nature of this addictive pursuit. **(Author’s Side Note:** My personal experience also extends back to 1989 as a high school senior when several classmates set out to form our first 5x5 Roto League for the 1990 season. The only player I recollect having is Nolan Ryan. In college, I participated in on-line leagues and joined several *USA Today* salary cap leagues while reading publications on the fantasy baseball scene yearly. Always, there was a prize for the winners – but just the excitement of “baseball management” was the reward. Between life interruptions (moves), hard luck, and poor ‘in-season’ moves, I have seen mediocrity in most of the twenty years since starting the hobby. Similar to my favorite real team, the Cubs.)

## Legality Reality

As the growth of this phenomenon created new very profitable ventures in other professional sports, fantasy baseball faced its first legal test from the very owners of the sport it loves.

CBC Distribution and Marketing (CBC), based out of St. Louis, engaged in fantasy sports operations since 1992. Their products expanded as the growth of the industry warranted and promoted their products in the *USA Today* and *Sporting News*, among other outlets. Going by the name CDM Sports, their salary cap fantasy baseball games are very popular, participated in by thousands of people in an expanding multi-million-dollar industry. CBC filed a preemptory motion against MLB based on email/letters that threatened legal action based on utilizing names and statistics of MLB players in their fantasy games.

From the complaint for declaratory judgment:

“In an e-mail dated January 19, 2005 (Attached as Exhibit A), George Kliavkoff, a senior vice president for Major League Baseball, wrote to Charles Wiegert, the Vice President of CBC, stating: [t]his morning, MLB Advanced Media (“Major League Baseball” or “MLB.com”) and the Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) announced that they have agreed to a relationship whereby Major League Baseball will be the exclusive licensee and sublicensor of the MLB player’s [sic] rights with respect to interactive media Fantasy Baseball Games.... Please also be aware that Major League Baseball has not yet issued any applicable licenses for the MLB Rights and other related fan activities for the 2005 season and, except for certain licenses in the wireless Licensed Media, the MLBPA has not issued any applicable licenses for the PA Rights for 2005. Please be advised that if your Company is using the above-described rights without a license, all such uses must cease immediately (emphasis added).”  
(CDC v. MLBAM PDF File)

Later, in a court decision by Judge Mary Ann L. Medler, CDM was allowed to continue their operations, disallowing the infringement of copyright that Advance Media would try to invoke as a violation. Her decision (CBC v. MLBAM and MLBPA, August 8, 2006), in part, reads as follows:

“The court finds that the undisputed facts establish that the players do not have a right to publicity in their names and playing records as used in CBC’s fantasy games and that CBC has not violated the players’ claimed right of publicity...that the names and playing records of Major League baseball players as used in CBC’s fantasy games

are not copyrightable and, therefore, federal copyright law does not preempt the players' claimed right to publicity..." (Ambrosius 2007, 128)

Thereafter, the 8<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision, stating, "the information used in CBC's fantasy games is all readily available in the public domain, and it would be a strange law that a person would not have a first amendment right to use information that is available to everyone. It is true that CBC's use of the information is meant to provide entertainment, but '[s]peech that entertains, like speech that informs, is protected by the First Amendment because '[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right.' *Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n*, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) quoting *Winters v. New York*, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (Arnold 2007)." MLBAM appealed the 8<sup>th</sup> Circuit's ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court on June 2, 2008; the court denied writ of certiorari.

The originator of fantasy games, Daniel Okrent, was interviewed by the *Los Angeles Times* about the decision, commenting, "wonderful...The only thing that saddens me about it is that there won't be a public trial, during which MLB's incredible greed would have been on public display (Ambrosius 2007, 129)."

In late 2006, specific language was added to an anti-Internet gambling bill passed by the U.S. Congress, allowing fantasy sports to continue unhindered with the following stipulations:

Prizes are stated clearly and in advance of the operation of the league (not based on participation)

Contests are determined by skill and results from real-life games (Ambrosius 2007, 130)

As a result, fantasy sports are alive and well – growing widely and wildly from Major League Baseball, National Football League, to the NBA, and other professional sports. Licensing agreements changed significantly as ESPN, for one, opted out of a \$140M deal three years into the seven hitch to MLBAM just three months after the above decision (Ourand 2008). Such expansion of the fantasy world has evolved to daily leagues like *Draftstreet.com* with variations from salary-cap to survivor leagues as players can addictively play as much for prize money that requires 'skill' to win. *Rotographs* et. al. provide analytics to determine who to play, sit, or trade for in whatever league style a player has gone into. But little did the founders know that what they started on a plane and in a diner revolutionized analytical dreams.

## Best of the Best in Fantasy

But what would an all-time great rotisserie team look like? How could you build two All-Star teams? Who gets left off? What are the logical, positional constraints?

This author decided to try out this task utilizing only players that have been around since 1947. (Racial Integration.) Before that time, inflated statistics in the Coolidge era by the best players predominated the rosters put together. The game has evolved, and that should be accounted for appropriately, *even in this fantasy task*.

Next step: a selection of 28 (5 bench) players from every franchise that existed before 1992. (Apologies to Colorado, Florida, Tampa Bay, Arizona, Todd Helton, Larry Walker, and Gary Sheffield, and others.)

Third, the positional stipulations are:

**Table. Positions Maximums**

POS	Maximum	POS	Maximum
C	2	RF	2
1B	3	CF	3
2B	2	LF	2
3B	2	SP	9
SS	2	RP	5

This position maximum stipulation balances the roster and avoids the inclination to stack the squad with five first basemen while having only one shortstop. Realistically, players that had versatility during their careers are some of the best choices. Lastly, each team will have at least one representative and the rotisserie scoring will use the point system of many *CDM* fantasy games. (Ease of calculation. See Below.)

Very basic Criteria for being on the team:

3,500 Plate Appearances

150 Wins for Pitchers (one lefty min) – an important stat in original fantasy

2,000 IP for Starters

600 Relief appearances for Closers

Overall peak excellence at some point in their career

Played significant time for one team – 3 seasons minimum

Overall play considered *separate* of team success

Table. NL Fantasy Team All-Stars

NL Franchises	Pitchers (11)	Position Players (17)
Atlanta Braves	John Smoltz, Warren Spahn	Chipper Jones, Henry Aaron
Chicago Cubs		Ernie Banks
Cincinnati Reds		Joe Morgan, Frank Robinson
Houston Astros	Billy Wagner	Jeff Bagwell
Los Angeles Dodgers	Sandy Koufax	Mike Piazza, Jackie Robinson
Montreal Expos		Vladimir Guerrero
New York Mets	Tom Seaver	
Philadelphia Phillies	Steve Carlton	Mike Schmidt, Bobby Abreu
Pittsburgh Pirates		Ralph Kiner
San Diego Padres	Trevor Hoffman	Brian Giles
San Francisco Giants	Juan Marichal, Gaylord Perry	Willie Mays, Barry Bonds
St. Louis Cardinals	Bob Gibson, Bruce Sutter	Stan Musial, Mark McGwire

(NOTE: Analysis was not finalized as of August 2022.)

This exercise was created solely to design a dream team of fantasy statistic stars; and do this across a generational divide made by accident with the advent of this new twist on the oldest professional sport. (While putting up another divide on pre-1947 players. And goes to the point: why each era should be measured with respect to the era in which their numbers were obtained. Because many others can be inserted on this list.)

Table. AL Fantasy Team All-Stars

AL Franchises	Pitchers (14)	Position Players (14)
Baltimore Orioles	Jim Palmer	
Boston Red Sox	Roger Clemens, Pedro Martinez	Ted Williams
LA/Anaheim Angels	Nolan Ryan	
Chicago White Sox	Hoyt Wilhelm	Frank Thomas, Dick Allen
Cleveland Indians	Sam McDowell	Manny Ramirez, Jim Thome, Larry Doby
Detroit Tigers		Mickey Tettleton
Kansas City Royals	Dan Quisenberry	
Minnesota Twins	Bert Blyleven	
Milwaukee Brewers	Rollie Fingers	
New York Yankees	Whitey Ford, Mariano Rivera	Mickey Mantle, Joe DiMaggio
Oakland Athletics	Dennis Eckersley	Jose Canseco
Seattle Mariners	Randy Johnson	Ken Griffey, Jr., Edgar Martinez
Texas Rangers	Fergie Jenkins	Alex Rodriguez
Toronto Blue Jays		Carlos Delgado

(NOTE: Analysis was not finalized as of August 2022.)

In the **Appendix**, is a list of all-time best seasons with the 100 All-time hitters and 271 best pitchers.

### Point System for Hitters:

Total Points = Total Bases + Stolen Bases + Runs + RBI - 2\* Caught Stealing



## Point System Scoring for Pitchers:

Points:  $10 * \text{Wins} + 5 * \text{CG} + 5 * \text{SHO} + \text{SO} + \text{IP} + 5 * \text{SV}$

Quality Rating (QR) =  $\text{ERA} + \text{WHIP}$

Power =  $\text{IP} / \text{HRA}$

S Rating =  $\text{Points} / \text{QR}$

Rating =  $100 * \text{Points} / (\text{IP} * \text{QR})$

While these statistics are just another way to categorize players, we must remember behind every fantasy stat line is a real person. And that our love should not be just of stats and winning, but the work it took to be a MLB player. The game can be better for the focus on stats – while many will argue otherwise – because it brings in more fans, analysts, and people never concerned with sport that may see patterns and garner new insights that assist in a non-sport way. (Ask your local economist. Or maybe not.)

As a precursor to the next topic (Franchises), amongst the best hitters' parks ever according to Allan Schwarz, a writer for Baseball America and ESPN:

### Fenway Park – Home of the Green Monster




**Past 100, Looking Good:** Fenway has the ostentatious signature of a founding father above it, in John Hancock. (Courtesy of Darrin Schieber)

“Fenway was rebuilt by new owner Tom Yawkey for the 1934 season and added its most distinctive and enduring feature -- the 37-foot-high Green Monster -- in 1936, to protect

the shop windows on Lansdowne Street. It immediately became a hitters' park, with right-handed batters popping short flies over the wall and left-handers poking line drives off it. (This helped hide the fact that Fenway's right-field fair territory has actually been quite immense, with a 302-foot foul line almost immediately falling back to 370-380 feet, causing many flies that would easily clear Yankee Stadium's fences to fall safely into the gloves of Jackie Jensen and Dwight Evans.) Summer breezes from home toward the outfield also boosted offense. In light of all this, Fenway has always invited extra scrutiny of individual batting statistics ranging from Ted Williams -- in comparisons to Joe DiMaggio -- to Fred Lynn and Jim Rice. The effects appear to have been dulled, though; construction of the 600-level suites in the early '80s, which altered Fenway's wind patterns, seems to have dulled the park's offensive excitability. It now plays pretty average." Lifetime Park Index: **112**

Fenway Park officially opened to the fans on April 20, 1912, with the New York Highlanders (Yankees) as the first team to visit the new grounds. Boston's CF Tris Speaker drove in the winning run in an 11-inning contest in front of 27,000 (Nowlin, et al. 2005, 90-91). The Osborn Engineering Company of Cleveland built the original Fenway Park (sans the Green Monster) and Yankee Stadium (the House that Ruth Built.) In an equal turn of scheduling, the Red Sox visit the Yankees on their inaugural day, losing 4-1 with Ruth hitting a 3-run home run. And thus, the tension between these two rivals dates at least 95 years in baseball, and according to *Blood Feud* authors Nowlin and Prime, back to pre-*Revolutionary War* times (Nowlin, et al. 2005, 80-81).

Atlanta Fulton County Stadium (Image: Courtesy of the *Baseball Encyclopedia*, 5<sup>th</sup> Revised Edition, A.S. Barnes & Co.)



“In a way, this was major-league baseball's first experiment in playing at altitude -- the park stood 1,050 feet above sea level, highest in the majors. Despite normal fence distances (330-385-402-385-330 after a bit of a boost in the 1970s), the light air appeared to particularly help left-handed hitters, though the Braves typically had only a few such starters, like Ralph Garr and Darrell Evans. (Had advanced sabermetrics been around during that time, perhaps they would have had more.) As for premonitions of Coors, the Braves caused a sensation by having three 40-homer hitters -- Davey Johnson, Darrell Evans and Hank Aaron -- in 1973, one year after San Diego's Nate Colbert slammed five home runs in a doubleheader in Atlanta. In 1986, Bob Horner hit four home runs in one game there, only to watch his team lose 11-8.” Lifetime Park Index: **112**

## Wrigley Field – The Friendly Confines



With Veeckian spirit, **Wrigley Field** keeps alive ivy-kissed daytime ball. (Courtesy of Jeff Flowers)

“Originally built for the Federal League and named Weeghman Park, the stadium soon had its name changed by Cubs owner (and chewing-gum magnate) William Wrigley Jr. and became known for masticating pitchers. It first had longer fence distances than we know today -- generally about 10 feet deeper -- but they got trimmed back over 20 years as the small park underwent renovations to increase capacity. It was then that offense really boomed, particularly during all those day games when the wind blew out. Who can forget those classic Cubs-Phillies tilts in the late '70s, with scores like 18-16 (with four Mike Schmidt home runs) and 23-22? Of course the Cubbies didn't win too many of those slugfests. In 1975 they lost to the Pirates 22-0 as Rennie Stennett went 7-for-7.” Lifetime Park Index: **105** (Schwarz, ESPN, 2003)

On May 28, 2006, the Atlanta Braves hit 8 home runs (while the Cubs hit none) on a record setting day for home runs against a young and much maligned Cubs staff. The final score: 13-12 Atlanta in 11 innings. (The air temperature of 92° missed the record high for that particular day by 1°.) 3 weeks later, the Detroit Tigers tomahawked another 8 home

runs off the anemic pitching of the Cubs in Wrigley – the first time in MLB history such a feat had been done twice in the same season off the same pitching staff.

### Franchises: The Chicago Cubs and The Boston Red Sox

Two franchises in opposite leagues with the oldest active ballparks linked by years of futility: that would be a simplistic analysis of the Chicago National League franchise and Boston American League ball club. This linkage goes back to the inauguration of the National League when Albert Spalding and friends came from the Boston Red Stockings (NA) to Chicago White Stockings as likely the biggest trade made in National League history, before the National League had even played an inning. Boston was the powerhouse of the National Association, while Chicago's history in 1871 was known more by a devastating fire, and as formerly named, Ft. Dearborn.

The Boston Americans (Red Sox) were born in 1901 at the Huntington Avenue Grounds, whereas the Chicago Orphans (Cubs) were playing at West Side Park II. Both parks had center fields over 530 feet away from home plate. In 1903, Boston won the first World Series, won the American League again in 1904 (no World Series), and the Cubs were four-time representatives of the National League from 1906-1910. Both franchises enjoyed their best times while President Teddy Roosevelt ruled with a big stick and approved of the 'Big Dig' in Panama.

Fast forward to 1918, the Boston Red Sox won the World Series against the Chicago Cubs 4-2, their 5<sup>th</sup> title in 15 years. Babe Ruth won two games against Chicago, one by shutout and the other an 8-inning 1-run performance, setting a then-unmatched World Series record of 29.2 innings without allowing a run. (Until Yankee Whitey Ford pitched 33 straight scoreless through 3 World Series: 1960-1962.) Carl Mays won the other two games for Boston – but was to be more famous for killing SS Ray Chapman with a beanball. Both players were gone from Boston before the Roarin' Twenties careened toward the Great Depression.

Another 86 seasons came and went before the Red Sox tasted victory again. The Cubs are still sans a championship since 1908 as of the end of 2014 season. In 1918, the Cubs were already four-time participators in the fall classic, winning twice.

In game three of 1932 World Series, ex-Bostonian Ruth hit the famous 'called shot' to centerfield off Charlie Root. Lou Gehrig followed it up with one of his own, as the powerful Yankees, built off the old Red Sox powerhouse, took the Cubs to task 4-0 that year. Boston finished 64 games behind the mighty Yankees and lost \$798,611 between 1930-1934 while Chicago made \$342,244 during the same interlude.<sup>16</sup> Franchises no

longer connected by success, as the Cubs were in the midst of their last dynastic foray while Boston was mired hip deep in a disastrous decade.

In the midst of Great Depression, Thomas Yawkey and Phillip K. Wrigley came to baseball operations through inheritance, the former through a \$20-million dollar trust fund from his Detroit baseball uncle, the latter, a well-run gum business passed on by an energetic, but too-soon departed father, but each took decidedly different tactics in running their franchises over the course of forty plus years. Yawkey's need to spend out of hero worship and personal demons ran contrary to each other, and left Boston a franchise that went to a World Series once a decade (aside from the 1950s), but never to win it all. P.K. Wrigley frugally ran the operations of the Cubs; reap the rewards of remaining talent; but never applied his business acumen to the betterment of his father's most lasting legacy as the owner of Wrigley Field. The two men passed away within a year of each other (1976-77) – linking them again – and serendipitously avoiding the move into the free agency era in 1977 under their reigns.

In 1946, Boston Red Sox ran away with a 'war' pennant only to lose 4-3 to Cardinals, the archrival of the Cubs, this after the Cubs last appearance in the World Series in post-WWII 1945. Chicago, like Boston, benefited in that first year back from war, while other franchises resumed winning operations under a different paradigm: racial integration. Both teams spent the next two decades watching New York-based franchises run over their respective leagues, even when they moved west, amassing talent in farm systems, and integrating quicker than either Chicago or Boston could (or would) do. As Dan Shaughnessy summarizes in *Reversing the Curse*, "The Red Sox...They were not consistently championship-driven nor particularly well run. They were at times unlucky, inept, controversial, racist, and petty."

Much of the same insights apply to Chicago Cubs for majority of the past 65 plus years. Luck – whether tied to omens from billy goats to black cats – or fielders booting a key ground ball in the playoffs, has not been on the Cubs' side. Drafting talent, ditto, as the Cubs have fared very poorly in 50 seasons. Inept – that goes up to ownership and down to performances from the players. Petty might be best defined by quickly ushering away a successful GM, Dallas Green, or the lasting riff with the teams' all-time home run leader (Sosa). These are prevalent in all teams at some time, but, for the Cubs, it might as well be *As The World Turns* soap opera. There are reasons behind prolonged losing.

Both teams hired HOF skipper Joe McCarthy – the Cubs improved and delighted in his abilities, but won no World Series – but in Boston, they obtained McCarthy in the midst

of an alcoholic daze that likely cost them visits to the 1948 and 1949 World Series. In both years, the Red Sox came up one game short: in a playoff against ex-Chicagoan Bill Veeck's Cleveland Indians, the other, versus Casey Stengel's still powerful Yankees, McCarthy's former employer.

Both franchises hired HOF SS Lou Boudreau as their manager, after initially employing him for differing purposes. Boston traded for his diminishing playing skills at 34 years old in 1951, only to place him in the role of manager in 1952. Boudreau ousted Dominic DiMaggio as the centerfielder over rookie Tom Umphlett even though DiMaggio had just hit .294. As the late David Halberstam reflects in *Teammates* the feelings of DiMaggio, "He thought Boudreaus's reading of talent was marginal: One of the players that Boudreau was particularly excited about was young outfielder name Gene Stephens. 'There was all this talk that he was going to be the next Ted Williams,' Dominic said years later. 'Boy, were they high on him. He was a good kid, but there was a terrible hitch in his swing...I told Joe Cronin that he wouldn't hit .210...When they sent him down I think he was hitting .208.' (Actually, Stephens hit .204 that season and became a career .240 hitter.)"<sup>17</sup> DiMaggio left the game in 1952 after only 3 at bats – still able to play but unwanted by Boudreau. Boudreau led Boston to no higher than 4<sup>th</sup> in the AL in his three years as skipper.

After taking over the moribund Kansas City A's in 1955, Boudreau came back to Chicago as a broadcaster (he was Harvey, Illinois native), but switched places with frequent Cubs manager Charlie Grimm, 17 games into the 1960 season. The Cubs finished dead last under the initial impetus of the P.K. Wrigley *College of Coaches* idea. It was Boudreau last season as a manager, as the Cubs reemployed him back in the broadcast booth. Boudreau successes as a player, or manager, occurred in Cleveland during the 1940s. But the Red Sox and Cubs obtained the lesser returns while under his leadership.

On November 21, 1959, Boston 1B/OF Dick Gernert for Cubs 1B Jim Marshall and P Dave Hillman was the first inter-league trade consummated that did not require waivers in MLB history.<sup>18</sup> 1B Gernert played 50 games in Chicago, bounced to Detroit, then Cincinnati to appear in his only World Series pinch-hitting 4 times without damage for the Reds.

Boston 1B Jim Marshall was traded before the 1960 season first to Cleveland with retiring C Sammy White in March, so the trade was cancelled by Cleveland. (White would make a short come back in 1961.) Then two weeks later to San Francisco for RP Al Worthington before the 1960 season. Worthington rounded into form after a brief stint with the Boston Red Sox, becoming by 1965 a consistent option as a relief specialist/closer,

amassing 110 total saves, mostly in Minnesota during their best years of the mid-late 1960s.

Jim Marshall had a significant managerial career back as skipper of the Chicago Cubs for 2½ terrible seasons in the mid-1970s. He was likely behind the trade that sent 1B Andre Thornton to Montreal for 1B/OF Larry Biittner (20 HR, 196RBI over 4 seasons) and Steve Renko (10-13 for the Cubs.) Evidently, Thornton's 1<sup>st</sup> base play discouraged the former 1<sup>st</sup> sacker Marshall.

Marshall then managed the Oakland A's in 1979 during Rickey Henderson's rookie campaign. (Serving as a placeholder for in-through-the-out-door manager Billy Martin, who turned Rickey loose on the American League to starting pitchers' anxiety attacks.)

In the late 1960s, both franchises saw a brief revival in their fortunes, Boston led by a New England native, Carl Michael Yastrzemski, the last triple crown winner (.326,44,121) in 1967, Chicago managed by long-time New Yorker, Leo Ernest 'The Lip' Durocher, who played for the vaunted Murderer's Row. Boston's *Impossible Dream* season fell again to St. Louis in 7 games, dismantled by Bob Gibson 3-win performance with 27 strikeouts. Yaz hit 3 home runs and batted .400, but Boston did not taste the champagne.

Durocher's Cubs brought to life a lifeless organization. The Cubs' 1966 attendance was 635,891, with only the Senators' newly built stadium attracting less people, as the Cubbies reached the bottom of goodwill well. The media, the fans, and the critics returned in droves to Wrigley Field after twenty seasons in the wilderness of despair before Leo came to town. As good as they played, going above .500 every year from 1967-1972, the Cubs never finished closer than a bridesmaid during the period. In 1969, their 9 ½ game lead over the Mets vanished in less than a moon cycle while Neil Armstrong bounced on that celestial orb just a month earlier. It was another thirty-one seasons – with the hiring Dusty Baker in 2003, another ex-Giant manager, no less – before the Cubs finished above .500 for two seasons in a row.

In 1978, after the two long-time owners passed away, the Red Sox were 14 games ahead on July 20<sup>th</sup>, only to collapse, fight back, and tie the hated Yankees, leading to a one-game playoff and the fatal Bostonian words: "Bucky Fucking Dent!" Dent was a .243 hitter with 5 home runs in 1978. Boston's manager was Don Zimmer, one-time Cub player, and future manager of the 1989 division winning Cubs. Zimmer, like Durocher, was accused of overusing his players down the stretch of various seasons in both organizations. As former NBC late night comedian Conan O'Brien put it, "When the Yankess lost Don Zimmer in the off-season, they lost the man who was instrumental to their World Series in 2000, 1999, and 1978."<sup>19</sup>



On the 1978 Boston team was a 24-year-old twenty-game winner who was integral in the history of both clubs: Dennis Lee Eckersley. The 'Eck' was traded to the Cubs in 1984 for 1B Bill Buckner and OF Mike Brumley. The Cubs utilized Eckersley well for that season, winning their 1<sup>st</sup> division title in 39 years, but missed the larger picture on The Eck.

Buckner will be forever known (in Boston) for his error on a ground ball hit by Mookie Wilson with two outs in the ninth inning in game 6 of the 1986 World Series against aptly: another New York team. Dave Stapleton had usually substituted for Buckner throughout this exciting series. Manager John McNamara somehow felt Buckner needed to be in during that crucial moment. Buckner retired after the 1987 season, and McNamara saw the pinnacle of his managerial career in winning 95 regular season games.

The Cubs moved Dennis Eckersley again after a mediocre year as a starter in 1986. 'The Eck' went on to a HOF career as a closer in Oakland, but gave up a miracle home run to an ailing L.A. Dodger, Kirk " \*&%!" Gibson in 1988. (This after saving all four games in the American Championship series against the Boston Red Sox.) Gibson dialed up the Eck collect, and courageously catapulted the Dodgers to victory in his lone at bat for the entire series. The Cubs meanwhile got three truly forgettable players back for The Eck.

In 2003, the Cubs made it again to the post season, and were within 5 outs of reversing their curse of World Series appearances. But the Florida Marlins, Steve Bartman, and SS Alex Gonzalez's glove formed a triumvirate of misfortune that the Cubs did not overcome. Across the league, and within the same 5 outs, Boston's Pedro Martinez and the New York lineup were engaged in their yearly dance of death (with real criminal behavior<sup>20</sup> and Don Zimmer once again involved) as Bostonians had another no-name player to curse, and another manager to fire at the end of a "Yankees Win!" dinger: 3B Aaron Boone and manager Grady Little.

To fix the Cub's problems of fielding and batting, they traded for Boston favorite, SS Nomar Garciaparra in July 2004, even as he was still recovering from an injury and was considered one of the worst fielding shortstops (on pivots and double plays turned) in baseball from 2003-2005.<sup>21</sup> But it was Boston that reaped the rewards of this timely trade, and became world champions once again after four score and six years ago of success. (Garciaparra moved later to 1<sup>st</sup> base – upon his free agency – and in 2007, was the second worst fielding 1<sup>st</sup> baseman in MLB.<sup>22</sup>)

The 2004-2006 Cubs were saddled with the pitching woes of Mark Prior and Kerry Wood, Nomar's hurt groin, and Derrek Lee's broken wrist, leaving them out of contention while their cross-town rivals and division nemesis, Chicago White Sox and St. Louis Cardinals, followed up Boston's miracle run thus making another group of three that foiled the best

laid ideal plans of Cubs. 2007-2008 saw them return to the playoffs – twice! – only to lay eggs, 0-3, in the National League divisional series.

In 2002, the Red Sox were put up for sale by the Yawkey Trust, and acquired by John Henry, Larry Lucchino, and Tom Werner for \$700 million. The Chicago Cubs topped that price tag by \$145 million; technically being acquired (twice); first by Samuel Zell then by the Ricketts family, led by Joe of *TD Ameritrade*, a stock trading company adding hard assets during an economic tailspin. In 2011, the Ricketts family added Theo Epstein from Boston. The connections stronger still as the two entwined yet again.

But the lasting impression of these two franchises has been one of inept trading and management that made them more memorable for their defeats in the season (and beyond) than wins on the ball field. As Allen Barra, at [www.slate.com](http://www.slate.com), once remarked, “The Red Sox are the team God dislikes; the Cubs are the team God merely forgot about.”<sup>23</sup> The analysis of why they got to specific events in their history is a blueprint of what all franchises can reflect on at one time or other: dismantling, poor trades, poor scouting, manager errors, and ultimately, getting it right in the case of Boston in 2004 and 2007.

#### Successes & Failures of the Chicago Cubs: William Wrigley, Bill Veeck, Sr., & Joe McCarthy

When William Wrigley bought out Charlie Weegham in late 1918/early1919, the Cubs got an owner not afraid to be different. He had energy and vitality that was renown around the business and baseball world, starting out as a salesman of scouring soap in his early teens before moving into the gum-making business.<sup>24</sup> His acumen as a salesman and advertising genius, led him to use innovative ways to support his fledging experience as a baseball owner of an all ready storied franchise.

Before Wrigley’s tenure, the restaurateur Charles Weeghman had circumvented the failure of the Federal League (and Chicago Whales) by taking the opportunity to buy quickly the Chicago Cubs from a disliked Charles Murphy, who is the only owner to have seen a World Series triumph by the Chicago Cubs. But it was Weeghman (not Wrigley) that built a baseball field for \$250,000<sup>25</sup> at Clark and Addison on land purchased from Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary that served as an Indian burial mound before the Christians’ ownership. Weeghman fell on hard times as his restaurant empire went south during the war, and Wrigley stepped into his lasting place in baseball.

Wrigley put an immediate stamp on the franchise with his insertion of Bill Veeck Sr., a sportswriter for the *Chicago American*, as president/general manager of the Cubs in June 1919 that came to fruition because of Veeck’s articles that critically analyzed the

Cubs team using a pseudonym of Bill Bailey.<sup>26</sup> After bringing Veeck over for dinner, the two came to run the Cubs for the next 14 seasons, and two World Series appearances.

From that start, both learned slowly how to build a championship-caliber team, but more pressing, was to build up the innovative ways to market the team. Seeing radio as an advantage, not as a detracting force, in 1925 they utilize the idea of Judith Waller (WMAQ director) to broadcast games live against the initial rejection of National League owners. Even as the woeful Cubs (at the time in 1925) made their way to the bottom, many fans came from other states to visit the Cubs, Wrigley noted in response to radio broadcasts, and reaped the benefits from the broadcasts.<sup>27</sup> Another promotion also became a staple: *Ladies Day*. On June 6, 1930 this promotion set a one-day attendance of 51,556<sup>28</sup> to the delight of ownership. From those off-the-field maneuvers, William Veeck tentatively hired on July 7, 1925 the wildest player-turned-manager of his day: shortstop legend Rabbit Maranville.

To know Rabbit Maranville was to love, tolerate, and worry about what he would do next. Always a free spirit, with spirits, antics, and his showmanship on and off-the-field, Rabbit brought energy, if not sanity, to the Cubs' operation in his brief tenure of eight weeks. The night he was named to the position, he dumped ice water on his sleeping players in Pullman berths at two in the morning, announcing, "There will be no sleeping on this club under Maranville management."<sup>29</sup> Under Rabbit, the still sleepy Cubs went 23-30, and 68-86 overall in 1925 under three managers. Rabbit was sent down the hole of history in his only managerial stint.

As the year turned to 1926, with the Cubs obviously floundering on the field, Bill Veeck, Sr. utilized his newspaper connections in Louisville to hire Joe McCarthy, winner of the American Association pennant for the Louisville Cardinals in 1925, and secured a soon-to-be great manager. Even his future rival in the '29 World Series, HOF Connie Mack, estimated McCarthy for success as early as 1925 at a dinner celebrating his hiring by Chicago.<sup>30</sup>

A perfectionist, cut from the cloth of minor league ball, McCarthy had to earn the respect of major leaguers. His first unorthodox act was to cut loose HOF pitcher Grover Cleveland Alexander, who was fighting Joe's management style. (Cleveland went to St. Louis on waivers...and helped the Branch Rickey-designed team win the 1926 World Series for the first time in franchise history.)

McCarthy's knowledge of players and building a team, through Bill Veeck's and Wrigley's permission and money, brought about a decade of success and the best of Cubs' winning baseball.

## A Decade of Success

Even with the passing of William Wrigley, Jr. on January 26, 1932, the Cubs were at the pinnacle of the National League and the national spotlight for vastly different reasons than today: winning baseball games and pennants. This standing changed little over the next six seasons, winning the NL flag in 1932, 1935, and 1938, only to lose to Yankees 4-0 in '32, Detroit 4-2 in '35, and the Yankees in the midst of a four-year run in 1938, again 4-0. But the Cubs were a force in the National League; only the St. Louis Cardinals and New York Giants provided ample competition year in and year out, winning the pennants (and the World Series) for the elder league during the FDR administration.

**Table.** Yearly Wins of Franchises from 1929-1938

Franchise Name	LG	Wins	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	Pennants
New York Yankees	AL	<b>952</b>	88	86	94	<b>107</b>	91	94	89	<b>102</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>4</b>
Cleveland Indians	AL	818	81	81	78	87	75	85	82	80	83	86	0
Washington Senators	AL	812	71	94	92	93	<b>99</b>	66	67	82	73	75	1
Detroit Tigers	AL	807	70	75	61	76	75	<b>101</b>	<b>93</b>	83	89	84	2
Philadelphia Athletics	AL	772	<b>104</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>107</b>	94	79	68	58	53	54	53	3
Boston Red Sox	AL	674	58	52	62	43	63	76	78	74	80	88	0
Chicago White Sox	AL	652	59	62	56	49	67	53	74	81	86	65	0
St. Louis Browns	AL	614	79	64	63	63	55	67	65	57	46	55	0
Chicago Cubs	NL	<b>903</b>	<b>98</b>	90	84	<b>90</b>	86	86	<b>100</b>	87	93	<b>89</b>	<b>4</b>
New York Giants	NL	<i>875</i>	84	87	87	72	<b>91</b>	93	91	<b>92</b>	<b>95</b>	83	3
St. Louis Cardinals	NL	<i>855</i>	78	<b>92</b>	<b>101</b>	72	82	<b>95</b>	96	87	81	71	3
Pittsburgh Pirates	NL	832	88	80	75	86	87	74	86	84	86	86	0
Brooklyn Dodgers	NL	720	70	86	79	81	65	71	70	67	62	69	0
Boston Braves	NL	693	56	70	64	77	83	78	38	71	79	77	0
Cincinnati Reds	NL	633	66	59	58	60	58	52	68	74	56	82	0
Philadelphia Phillies	NL	607	71	52	66	78	60	56	64	54	61	45	0

But as Phillip K. Wrigley took over, and lost the energetic minds of William Veeck (Sr. and later, Jr.), following the too-soon departure of Joe McCarthy, the Cubs' damnation to the annals of futility was evident in the misfiring of trades, lackadaisical (if done at all) scouting, hiring of ill-prepared management personnel, and the weirdest ideas that all permeated the organization for decades, even into the Tribune Company's reign as owner. For nearly half a century, the Wrigley name took a beating under the son who was nearly the polar opposite of his well-liked, outgoing, spend-wise father.

The fall off from this preeminent position took a while, even under P.K. Wrigley, but the first blow on his watch came on October 5, 1933 when President/GM Bill Veeck Sr. died from leukemia after the season. Veeck's (and McCarthy's) adroit moves while running the Cubs' operations (starting in the mid-1920s) included the wise additions of:

**HOF Manager Joe McCarthy**, considered among the elite managerial minds of MLB history, he ran the Cubs for five seasons starting in 1926, after the Maranville/Gibson/Killefer disaster. In 24 seasons total, his teams finished first nine times. Joe's lifetime regular season record: 2125-1333, .615 Winning %. As discussed, his pinstriped Yankees of the late 1930s and early 1940s won five World Series with 'Ruthless' efficiency.

His firing took place in favor of a way-past-his-prime Roger Hornsby, and soon after, player/manager Charlie Grimm. But McCarthy was the driving force behind the acquisitions of the following players, as Bill Veeck Sr. signed the checks and listen to his legendary manager, almost always.

Adding **P Charlie Root**, who won double-digit victories ten times (eight times over 15 wins) for the Cubs from 1926-1941. He was a cast off from St. Louis organization headed by Branch Rickey.

**OF Hack Wilson**. Coming over (supposedly)<sup>31</sup> through a clerical error that made him a minor leaguer (and draft eligible)<sup>32</sup>, John McGraw's Giants lost Wilson after a semi-horrible season in 1925. Wilson then caught fire for five seasons with the Cubs. Hitting over .330 (.416 OBP), with 163 Doubles, 177 Home Runs and 708 RBIs, Wilson was a one-man wrecking crew in 1930 with 190 RBIs! Let go after 1931 (traded for failing pitcher Burleigh Grimes), he had one more solid season in Brooklyn before calling it quits in 1934 for Philadelphia. Wilson provided 'character' to what would be a ferocious lineup.

Sadly, Wilson's last days would find him in Baltimore, penniless, dying alone. He passed away only to be claimed by future commissioner Ford Frick, three days after his death in 1948.<sup>33</sup>

**OF Riggs Stephenson**. After playing part-time as a utility 2B/3B in Cleveland, Riggs was drafted<sup>34</sup> and found a home in Chicago for the remainder of his career as a left fielder. From 1926-1933, his statistics were: .339 BA, .406 OBP, 629 Runs, 664 RBIs and 283 Doubles in nearly 4,000 at-bats.

**SS/3B Woody English**. A 20-year old brought over from Toledo Mudhens<sup>35</sup>, the top Giants minor league team, to replace light-hitting glove man Jimmy Cooney at shortstop (1926 leader in Double Plays and FA%), English stayed productive until 1934. During this eight year stretch he hit .294 (.363 OBP) and scored 703 Runs in 1,000 games. His fielding was likely comparable to Joe Cronin/Leo Durocher mix.

**Table.** Fielding Average of Shortstops from 1927-1934

First	Last	POS	G	PO	A	E	DP	TC	Made	F%	Chances/G	DP/G
Travis	Jackson	SS	993	2168	3496	263	632	5,927	5,664	0.956	5.97	0.636
Joe	Cronin	SS	946	1929	3123	264	600	5,316	5,052	<b>0.950</b>	<b>5.62</b>	<b>0.634</b>
Dick	Bartell	SS	813	1943	2724	239	540	4,906	4,667	0.951	6.03	0.664
Leo	Durocher	SS	772	1549	2347	167	469	4,063	3,896	<b>0.959</b>	<b>5.26</b>	<b>0.608</b>
Glenn	Wright	SS	745	1508	2342	243	484	4,093	3,850	0.941	5.49	0.650
Mark	Koenig	SS	688	1348	2016	269	379	3,633	3,364	0.926	5.28	0.551
Tommy	Thevenow	SS	678	1426	2325	201	446	3,952	3,751	0.949	5.83	0.658
Woody	English	SS	653	1376	2064	161	410	3,601	3,440	<b>0.955</b>	<b>5.51</b>	<b>0.628</b>
Rabbit	Maranville	SS	601	1324	2001	141	386	3,466	3,325	<b>0.959</b>	<b>5.77</b>	<b>0.642</b>
Billy	Rogell	SS	596	1107	1913	164	371	3,184	3,020	0.948	5.34	0.622
Hod	Ford	SS	587	1255	1821	119	445	3,195	3,076	0.963	5.44	0.758
Charlie	Gelbert	SS	537	1187	1795	158	359	3,140	2,982	0.950	5.85	0.669
Joe	Boley	SS	527	918	1330	102	245	2,350	2,248	0.957	4.46	0.465
Red	Kress	SS	518	1079	1422	165	323	2,666	2,501	0.938	5.15	0.624
Lyn	Lary	SS	507	995	1501	133	261	2,629	2,496	0.949	5.19	0.515

**RF Kiki Cuyler.** Traded from Pittsburgh on Nov. 28, 1927 for utility infielder Sparky Adams and part-time OF Pete Scott, Kiki Cuyler rounded out a dominate outfield with Wilson and Stephenson forming a formidable **.330 BA** wrecking crew. Kiki Cuyler from 1928-1934 amassed .327 BA, 75 HRs, 584RBIs, 643 Runs and 158 SBs. Meanwhile, Sparky Adams career was never any better than it was in Chicago. Pete Scott left the majors with a .303 Lifetime BA in 1928 after only three seasons as a part-time player. The trade was triggered by a dispute with manager Donie Bush over a play involving a slide at second as Cuyler was thought dogging it.<sup>36</sup>

**P Pat Malone.** As a 26-year-old, he burst on the scene as the Cubs best pitcher in 1928, taking up slack for one of Charlie Root's few off years. In 200 starts over seven seasons, he amassed a 115-79 record in 1,632 IP (averaging over 8 innings per start), before becoming a Yankee (for McCarthy) in 1935, and leaving the MLB after 1937.

Before coming over, John McGraw caught him drinking after a tryout, released him to Giants' Toledo team, where Joe McCarthy picked him up later from Minneapolis on deal with team owner Mike Kelly.<sup>37</sup> Alongside Wilson, he brought his imbibing ways to Chicago and the stories of fighting and winning games. (McCarthy liked broken players with talent.)

**P Guy 'The Mississippi Mudcat' Bush.** Though with the Cubs, prior to 1926, he rounded into form under McCarthy. A versatile righty, pitching more than 40% of the time from the bullpen, Bush amassed seven straight seasons with 15 wins for the Cubs, leading the NL in wins and saves from the 'pen several times. He completed 151 games in 308 starts in a 17-year career.

The 1929 World Series saw him win the only game for the Cubs with a 0.82 ERA. In 1930, Bush hit .282 in 78 AB. In 1945, the Reds brought back Bush to pitch in 4 games, garnering his final save in an unsuccessful comeback.

Along with 1B Charlie Grimm, C Gabby Hartnett, and the hardheaded gambler **2B Roger Hornsby**, the Cubs had pitching, hitting, and characters in their lineups daily. In a blockbuster trade for Hornsby in early November 1928, the Cubs sent five players to the Boston Braves and \$200,000. None of the players traded led the Braves above a .500 record. However, the Boston Braves 'broke' through in 1933 with 83 wins.

Roger Hornsby gets plenty of criticism for his arrogance while playing and inability to get along with management. He was after all the best right-handed 'average' hitter in the game at .357 clip lifetime. From *Wrigleyville*, author Peter Golenbock reflects:

"...he was a perpetual irritant on whatever team he played...in 1923 he got into a fistfight with [St. Louis] manager Branch Rickey...[After the 1924 season]...William Veeck of the Cubs first attempted to buy him from Cards owner Sam Breadon for 300,000, the same price that Giants owner Charles Stoneham had offered."<sup>38</sup>

Neither man got Hornsby, or his .400 bat, then, but Hornsby got the job of manager added to his resumé as his former boss Branch Rickey was permanently bumped to the executive suite of the Cardinals, where the 'Mahatma' made his historic name during the next forty years. Then though, Rickey was just another failed field manager with good ideas.

After the 1926 World Series title and Hornsby's bickering over money and player moves<sup>39</sup>, he was shipped out to New York to the even more-controlling John McGraw.

One of the most erroneous discussions was that Hornsby never helped teams he was traded to [referencing Bill James.] Brock J. Hanke wrote in the *Big Bad Baseball Annual 2000*, "Yes, it is true that, of the four teams that traded Roger Hornsby, three gained ground the next year...the net gain...is *6 games*. However, it is also true that, of the four teams he joined, three also gained ground...the net gain of *25 games*..."<sup>40</sup> The evidence of him riding a 9-7 W-L record GC Alexander to a pennant in 1926 is also erroneous by James. (Alexander saved his best in the World Series, going 2-0 for a 0.89 ERA. In that respect, James is right.)

All in all, it's likely that Roger Hornsby was much like other ballplayers before him that played at an elite level and wanted into the action of management and ownership, as his gambling on horses<sup>41</sup> points to an addictive personality that ran in the same circles as

owner Charles Stoneham, John McGraw, and Arnold Rothstein of 1919 Black Sox infamy<sup>42</sup>. (Pete Rose, Ty Cobb, and Cap Anson come to mind as great players, not so lovable managers, with money and gambling problems in Anson and Rose's cases. Cobb was tainted unfairly by a gambling tint.) Even against Bill Veeck's advice (and short-lived resignation), William Wrigley and Joe McCarthy wanted Hornsby and did get to the promise land with him on board in 1929.

Hornsby was never well liked, that is not in dispute, but he was not solely responsible for his bad reputation in baseball history. At least one player, double play partner Woody English, seems to have responded to Hornsby well. Additionally, Ron Santo, as an average<sup>43</sup> prospect in Mesa, Arizona recounted that Hornsby picked Billy Williams and him out of a group of twenty as the only MLB ready players, tagging others as C-ballers, A-ballers and all levels in between. Santo affirms: "I was thinking, these are prospects, young kids. What does he know? We were the only two that made it to the big leagues."<sup>44</sup> Meaning the loner did find a friend, knew hitting talent, while many, many others may have look for reasons to dislike every essence of the man. But baseball has had many less-than-loveable men, some deserving that moniker, others in dispute.

Maybe Hornsby should have been a scouting director after his HOF career.

### 1929 World Series

1929 World Series saw a Cubs meltdown in game 4. (Soon to be joined by others in Cubs history, 1969, 1984, and 2003.) Leading 8-0, and down 1-2 in the series, the Cubs watched as the A's began a barrage of hits, helped by poor fielding in a difficult sun field (center) by Hack Wilson<sup>45</sup>, but evidently more than assisted by others, 3B Norm McMillan and LF Riggs Stephenson had their opportunities according to 2B Hornsby and SS Woody English. Wilson hit a series-leading .471, but that was forgotten in the wake of the debacle of allowing a three-run inside-the-park homer. In one of his rare blunders, Joe McCarthy, found himself at a loss as to what to do.<sup>46</sup>

Earlier, Connie Mack had started righty sidearm junk baller Howard Ehmke in game 1, handcuffing the right-hand dominate Cubs lineup (with only 1B Charlie Grimm a lefty), in garnering a win with double-digit strikeouts in front of over 50,000 fans at Wrigley. This pitching selection was made weeks in advance by Mack in sending Ehmke to 'scout' his assured opponents.<sup>47</sup>

That year, Connie Mack had two very good lefties as his aces throughout the season: HOF Lefty Grove and the erratically effective Rube Walberg, who were both used instead out of the bullpen masterfully to the tune of 12 2/3 innings, 0.00 ERA, 1 win, 2 saves, and 18 Ks. Altogether the Cubs struck out 50 times in 5 games, reflecting an overwhelming



performance by the A's staff against the 982-run scoring machine that was the Cubs in 1929.

Due to the outcome, Joe McCarthy experienced the one glaring weakness of William Wrigley: an inability to show patience with managers.<sup>48</sup> As the 1930 season resulted in a 90-win campaign, but two behind the Cardinals, the top men of the Cubs, had designs to fire McCarthy. McCarthy beat them to the punch, and resigned. (In *Wrigleyville*, McCarthy and Wrigley argued over prospective P/OF Lefty O'Doul, who was a 1930 Cubs killer and a former Cubs prospect that McCarthy did not care for in 1926. Wrigley, however, did.<sup>49</sup> **See:** Centerfielders, DiMaggio Bio.)

Hornsby was installed as manager, to the dislike of many players. But the success did not disappear immediately, but the damage...it certainly was an omen of things to come in Cubs' futility.

Though they never took a World Series during this time, the Cubs put an entertaining team on the field and never strayed far from the top of the National League during the only 'golden era' of Cubs baseball since 1906 -1910.

### **Success Fades, the Problems Come from the Top**

In the mid-1930s, the Cubs managed to replace the likes of Cuyler, Wilson, Stephenson, English and Malone with a steady, if indifferent, LF/RF Chuck Klein (later traded), star spark plug 2B Billy Herman, .300 hitting 3B Stan Hack, and OF Augie Galan along with starting pitchers Bill Lee, Larry French, Lon Warneke, and long-time Cub, 1B/OF Phil Cavarretta, but the talent grew less and less dominant. After the *Homer in the Gloamin'* by Catcher Gabby Hartnett in 1938, the Cubs no longer ran rough shod over their National League counterparts.

The talent missed out on started apocryphally with HOF center fielder **Joe DiMaggio**, due to a bum knee.<sup>50</sup> The Yankees signed Joe away for a measly \$25,000 and five players, from the Pacific Coast League San Francisco Seals. A horde of scouts had been coming to San Francisco since 1933 when Joe hit .340 and amassed 169 RBI in the long PCL season. Owner Charley Graham was looking for \$100,000, or more, until DiMaggio had a freak accident in May 1934. For \$25, a doctor performed a "careful" evaluation of the Clipper, yanking and contorting his knee until it hurt from the evaluation, but passed muster for Yankee scout Bill Essick to close the deal.<sup>51</sup> The Cubs ownership, with a PCL team in Los Angeles, would struggle to find a legit center fielder until Andy Pafko came into the fold in the mid-1940s. (Castle's claim is dubious at best. Since many could lay claim to the 'could have had Joe' in my lineup story. Joe was a well-known commodity.)

Around the same time, left hand **rookie 1B Dolph Camilli** was traded on June 11, 1934 for Phillies' lefty 1B Don Hurst by William Walker, the new GM. Hurst was done as a MLB player at the end of the season. Camilli became a legit home run hitter for eight straight seasons hitting over 20 home runs (and doubles per season) at a .277 clip.

Shortly after missing out on the DiMaggio sweepstakes, HOF SS Lou Boudreau, as mentioned, was interested in staying close by as a Cubs shortstop after completing two-sport glory in high school. (Castle, pg. 3.) Then manager Charlie Grimm suggested Boudreau get an education nearby at Illinois – a Cleveland scout gave Lou a shot immediately, instead – and the Cubs were now without two primary position players that could have made them a juggernaut going into the 1940s.

Though disputed, the Cubs got a second bite at the shortstop apple, in the acquisition of either Bobby Sturgeon or **Marty Marion** from Rickey's St. Louis crop-growing operation. Marion it was said would cost the Cubs only \$25,000 while Sturgeon went for \$35,000. (Castle, pg. 3.) Sturgeon went on to 1,220 AB, 1 HR, 80 RBIs, and 7 SBs. Marion statistics: 5,506 AB, 36 HRs, 272 2Bs, 624 RBI and 35 SBs. But he is remembered much more for his fielding prowess than offensive output.

**Table.** Shortstops Fielding Statistics from 1940-1949

First	Last	POS	G	PO	A	E	DP	TC	Made	F%	Chances/	DP/
<b>Marty</b>	<b>Marion</b>	SS	1383	2701	4378	236	864	7315	7079	0.9677	5.29	0.625
<b>Lou</b>	<b>Boudreau</b>	SS	1372	2831	4252	193	1060	7276	7083	0.9735	5.30	0.773
Eddie	Miller	SS	1233	2671	3974	188	824	6833	6645	0.9725	5.54	0.668
Vern	Stephens	SS	1126	2038	3559	245	698	5842	5597	0.9581	5.19	0.620
Luke	Appling	SS	1100	2077	3470	280	707	5827	5547	0.9519	5.30	0.643
Pee Wee	Reese	SS	983	2075	3004	200	605	5279	5079	0.9621	5.37	0.615
Phil	Rizzuto	SS	828	1771	2460	150	634	4381	4231	0.9658	5.29	0.766
Buddy	Kerr	SS	820	1625	2653	148	420	4426	4278	0.9666	5.40	0.512
Eddie	Joost	SS	787	1752	2341	189	554	4282	4093	0.9559	5.44	0.704
Eddie	Lake	SS	606	1037	1716	154	394	2907	2753	0.9470	4.80	0.650
Lennie	Merullo	SS	601	1150	1808	172	328	3130	2958	0.9450	5.21	0.546
John	Sullivan	SS	531	1063	1516	158	324	2737	2579	0.9423	5.15	0.610
Billy	Jurges	SS	525	975	1619	94	272	2688	2594	0.9650	5.12	0.518
Skeeter	Newsome	SS	525	951	1549	98	314	2598	2500	0.9623	4.95	0.598
Frankie	Crosetti	SS	486	958	1371	124	299	2453	2329	0.9494	5.05	0.615
Johnny	Pesky	SS	433	867	1335	78	280	2280	2202	0.9658	5.27	0.647

As the table above reflects, both Marion and Boudreau played more games at shortstop than anyone else in the 1940s by a substantial margin over 3<sup>rd</sup> place, journeyman glove specialist Eddie Miller, who played for the Braves, Reds, and Phillies during the decade. Additionally, Boudreau and Marion were both premier fielders in the decade, sporting a

.967 FA% or greater. (Lou Boudreau compares well with even the best of the shortstops in the 1970s and 1980s, though his ability was due to positioning than foot speed, or a rifle arm.) The Cubs' failure to acquire either player meant poor hitting, and poorer fielding, as Lennie Merullo and a cast of others would rotate through the spot for the Cubs.

But the worst luck was yet to come.

In losing out on center field and shortstop, another outfielder (supposedly) almost slipped into the Cubs hands: HOF **LF Theodore Samuel Williams**. One can only imagine the damage of his bat in Wrigley's friendly confines (even as a lefty). As noted historian David Halberstam recounts:

"...It was Red Sox owner Tom Yawkey who almost blew it. That year's baseball winter meetings were held in December in Chicago, where Collins and [San Diego owner Bill] Lane were supposed to meet and finalize the deal. But suddenly Yawkey balked. He had lately been paying a lot of money for aging stars like Jimmie Foxx and Lefty Grove, and it was all short-range, so they had decided to go another route: to build up their farm system. To Yawkey, who had a number of drinks that day, the Williams deal suddenly seemed to smack of the old way...now officially known as the wrong way. For whatever reason – perhaps it was the cloud of alcohol – it was hard for the owner to understand that this was not the same kind of deal.... They were using the Padres as a de facto farm club, and Williams was not a player on his way down, but...a kid, with a stroke like Joe DiMaggio's. A deadline had been set for the Boston offer, as Bobby Doerr recalled the story, the clock was ticking and finally Collins was able to persuade Yawkey that this case was different. Collins was properly terrified that he was going to miss Lane's deadline...[As] it turned out to be just in time – [Bill] Lane was going out the door of his room on his way to meet with the Chicago Cubs to sell them Williams."<sup>52</sup>

On April 16, 1938, SP Dizzy Dean was signed before the season went into full swing (Veeck and Castle). This after breaking his toe in 1937 – and changing his throwing motion to compensate – but the Cubs went ahead, giving up three players (Curt Davis, Clyde Shoun, and Tuck Stainback) and \$185,000. (And P.K. Wrigley knew about the injury, ignoring it due to Dean's drawing power at the gate.)

The 35-year-old Davis had the best season of his career in 1939 winning 22 games. 26-year-old Shoun pitched out of the bullpen and spot started for decade finishing with a 73-59 overall record with 29 saves for additional teams. In 1940, he won 13 games for St. Louis leading the league in appearances at 54 games. Part-time OF Stainback played for seven teams in a twelve-year career. Dizzy Dean never won more than 7 games in 4

seasons with the Cubs due to a sore arm developing from improper healing of his toe and modification of his pitching motion. He retired far from his St. Louis dominating style. And the Cubs were well on their road to mediocrity.

In *Wrigleyville*, **Whitlow Wyatt**, a hard throwing journeyman 31-year-old pitcher was on the Cubs minor league team in Milwaukee<sup>53</sup> showing promise in 1938. The Cubs passed on him, allowing the Brooklyn Dodgers to get their hands on him in 1939. For the next five seasons, he became a different man, striking out batters and winning games like never before. His win totals: 8, 15, 22, 19 and 14. Then player/manager Leo Durocher benefited from his 22-win performance taking 'Dem Bums' to their first World Series in twenty plus seasons, long before the Dodgers became the elite National League team.

### Lost Championship(s)?

In the early 1940s, the Cubs hired former sports scribe Jim Gallagher to run the front office, taking over for former Los Angeles Angels manager Boots Webb, who was hog tied by Phil Wrigley as a GM, a common theme of the new establishment. Gallagher did not waste time before making a questionable trade of popular **2B Billy Herman** for Brooklyn's 2B Johnny Hudson and OF Charlie Gilbert and \$65,000. Neither player hit much above .200 as part-time Cubs players. Meanwhile, Herman had three more solid seasons as a Dodger, once amassing 100 RBIs, a career best.

As a passage in *Nice Guys Finish Last* reflects the nature of trade for Herman:

"Billy Herman had been the premier second-baseman in the National League for nine years. He had become universally accepted as the classic #2 hitter in baseball, an absolute master at hitting behind the runner...For years, everybody had been saying that Billy Herman had everything it took to make a great manager, but when the Cubs fired Gabby Hartnett at the end of the previous season they hadn't hired him. [In the days of player-managers, of which Leo was one.] Instead, their new general manager, Jim Gallagher, had hired Jimmy Wilson...Common sense told you that Herman had to be very unhappy, and Billy had always been a convivial chap with a coterie of close friends...Altogether a rotten situation which Gallagher, who had brought it on by hiring Wilson in the first place, should be only too happy to solve by getting rid of Herman."<sup>54</sup>

As the story continues, prodigious imbibor Brooklyn's Larry MacPhail was allegedly set up to get drunk by Gallagher and the heroic<sup>55</sup> Wilson, in a friendly talk late at night, to get the parts of the deal in place. As a result, the Cubs lost Herman to the 1941 pennant-winning Dodgers. MacPhail headed to the New York Yankees and Rickey's Cardinals dominated in the next few war-torn years, before Rickey went to the Dodgers.

But by then, the Brooklyn Dodgers, St. Louis Cardinals, and New York Yankees were well ahead of the Cubs in the idea of a farm system and were gaining the ample dividends as the standings reflected. As Phil K. Wrigley asserted, “We don't need farm systems.” Instead, the Cubs still chose to buy talent from independent minor leagues. And the Cubs sometimes sold off their own minor league talent to competitors to make money for the lower clubs!<sup>56</sup>

The teams that did grow their talent found it easier to replenish players that either got old, injured, or soon, were off to fight the Germans and Japanese in WWII. Branch Rickey took on 100s of players from a wide array of minor league systems, and soon, his players dominated in the Major Leagues. And the results were seen in the rise of the Cardinals and Dodgers to the cream of 1940s baseball. As Rickey commented comically (and presciently) on the Cubs system: “This team has to approach cooperative perfection to remain in the shadow last place. There is artistry in ineptitude, too, you know.”<sup>57</sup>

Phil Wrigley made another ‘odd’ move in foregoing lights in the ballpark. Instead, donating the steel girders to the United State Armed Forces. This decision forestalled night games in Wrigley Field until August 8, 1988, some 47 years after the start of World War II. And the revenue lost by the franchise due to day baseball during the work week, can only be surmised as totaling tens of millions in ‘mid-20<sup>th</sup> century’ U.S. dollars. All other MLB teams had lights by the mid-late 1940s. Wrigley’s later justification came out of the dramatic rise in attendance in post-WWII games. (As seen in earlier in this book.) But also, since he was not the first to put them up, they, therefore, were not his idea, and not worthy of further discussions.

But another idea he did think of was told of via Bill Veeck in *Wrigleyville*:

“One afternoon, I was called to Mr. Wrigley’s office. It’s a big office with a big desk in front of a big window. Seated in one of the easy chairs along the desk was a ferret-faced, wizened little guy in a checkered suit. [Think Leprechaun...] He was puffing on a cigar in that self-pleased, self-important way that only a cigar can bring out. You could see that Mr. Wrigley was pleased with himself, too. ‘He's going to help us,’ he told me. ‘He’s going to give us a psychological advantage.’ From the look of this little bum, I’m thinking that the only psychological advantage he could give us would be to sneak into the visitors’ locker room...and steal the spikes off their shoes - an assignment for which he seemed eminently suited.”<sup>58</sup>

This squirrely man was hired for \$5,000 (plus \$25,000 large for a pennant) to place hexes on the visiting team from behind home plate.<sup>59</sup> An amazing event considering the inability to spend \$25,000 on Joe DiMaggio, then, and later questionably titled, 'the greatest living baseball player.'<sup>60</sup>

In the early 1940s, the remaining talent of RF Bill Nicholson, CF/1B Cavarretta, 3B Stan Hack and SP Claude Passeau (a lopsided trade made with lowly Philadelphia in 1939) kept the Cubs from the cellar, and little else. During the wartime, with many players off to fight, the National League saw St. Louis run away to three straight pennants between 1942-44. The Cubs stayed in the second division until 1945.

A 1941 Cubs Possible Starting Lineup (**Bold are players lost or jettisoned**)

1B <b>Dolph Camilli</b>	2B <b>Billy Herman</b>	3B Stan Hack
SS <b>Lou Boudreau</b>	LF <b>Ted Williams</b>	CF <b>Joe DiMaggio</b>
RF Bill Nicholson	C Al Todd	P <b>Whitlow Wyatt</b>

1941 'Lost' Statistics:

**Herman:** .291BA (.359), 3 HR, 41 RBI, 30 2B

**Boudreau:** .257BA (.352), 10 HRs, 56 RBIs, 45 Doubles

**Camilli:** .285BA (.403), 34 HRs, 120 RBIs, 29 Doubles

**DiMaggio:** .357BA (.435), 30 HRs, 125RBI, 43 Doubles

**Williams:** .406 BA (.533), 37 HRs, 120 RBI, 33 Doubles

**Wyatt:** 22-10, 2.34 ERA in 35 Starts

With Claude Passeau (14), Curt Davis (13 wins: Dean trade), Vern Olson (10), and Bill 'Big Bill' Lee (8), the Cubs pitching staff certainly could have done better in head-to-head match ups, with enormous power and better defense behind them. Either Gabby Hartnett or Billy Herman get the manager's chair in 1941 to a National League pennant and World Series championship. Instead, Brooklyn took the crown that year with Dolph Camilli, Billy Herman, and Whitlow Wyatt on their squad, facing off in the World Series against DiMaggio's Yankees.

Starting centerfielder Phil Caverretta gets only the 4<sup>th</sup> OF slot backing up Williams, DiMaggio and Nicholson – or as the 3<sup>rd</sup> best, sans DiMaggio – giving the Cubs the best OF in the majors, bar none. Likely upon return from the war, the 1946-1947 Cubs, with Boudreau, Williams, and new CF Andy Pafko, the Cubs challenge for National League supremacy. As it was, Phil Wrigley believed in hexes placed on the other team for long-term success and not farm systems and proper payment and evaluation of talent. And the Cubs were doomed for the long-term.

## A Last Stand for Glory, By Luck and War

The miracle year of 1945, saw the Cubs get great pitching (leading the MLB in runs allowed and a snappy 2.98 ERA), timely hitting (top MLB BA at .277) and top the fielding average of all MLB teams at .980. With star newcomer CF Andy Pafko knocking home 110 RBIs, the Cubs made use of unexpected peak years from SP Hank Wyse, Claude Passeau, Paul Derringer, Ray Prim, and Hank Borowy.

39-year-old Derringer won 16 games with a 3.45 ERA, only to retire after the season. A 39-year-old Ray Prim, back after an 8-year hiatus from the MLB in 1943, won more games (**13**) in 1945, than all the seasons prior or after, while garnering two shutouts. He also hit .251 as a pitcher. Hank Borowy was traded from the Yankees for \$97,000 after winning 10 games, only to win 11 more as a Cub in securing the NL pennant. Borowy went 2-2 in the World Series, going on a day's rest in the 7<sup>th</sup> game, just to get knock out in the 1<sup>st</sup> inning. (*Baseball Encyclopedia*, pg. 2758.) Even 39-year-old Hy Vandenburg (picked up after 3 years out of MLB) gave the Cubs nearly 100 innings and 6 wins out of the bullpen and spot starts.

This pennant is more explained by the lack of talent in the entirety of both leagues (considering the three 39-year-old pitchers) and Hank Borowy being superior to the 'then league' talent. Borowy immediately found rougher waters in the NL as the stars of the pre-war years came home to exulting crowds and new talents from the Negro Leagues and beyond came to play.

**Table. Hank Borowy's Career Stats**

Team	Year	G	W	L	ERA	GS
NYA	1942	25	15	4	2.52	21
NYA	1943	29	14	9	2.82	27
NYA	1944	35	17	12	2.64	30
<b>NYA</b>	<b>1945</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3.13</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>CHN</b>	<b>1945</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.13</b>	<b>14</b>
CHN	1946	32	12	10	3.76	28
CHN	1947	40	8	12	4.38	25
CHN	1948	39	5	10	4.89	17
PHI	1949	28	12	12	4.19	28
PHI	1950	3	0	0	5.68	0
PIT	1950	11	1	3	6.39	3
DET	1950	13	1	1	3.31	2
DET	1951	26	2	2	6.95	1

After dominating before the age of thirty (born 1916), Borowy's ERA made a climb to the upper 3's and low 4's and never came back to his dominate WWII form.

With the poor talent in the majors, the Cubs lucked into a NL championship. That year, for example, they won 21 of 22 meetings with the Cincinnati Reds. (*Baseball Database Team vs. Team File*.) This vast disparity points to the team's dominance of 1945 war performers. By then, just about every able body man (non-4F) was off to fight. So much

so, that one-arm OF Pete Gray and one-legged pitcher Bert Shepard obtained chances at significant playing time in the majors.

Phil Wrigley likely thought the addition of three near 40-year-old pitchers, along with a 36-year-old Passeau, were somehow a good way to reach championships. 1945 was the closest the Cubs have come to a World Series win since 1908 (losing 4-3). Wrigley felt he was close and kept Jim Gallagher on that train that was too soon departing: war time players vanishing into obscurity.

As later moves proved, the Cubs continuously traded good young talent for washed up (often injured) veterans that were making it on name recognition alone. The Cubs wasted golden opportunities to rebuild around their young talents, throwing money away on over-30 players that had little possibility to lead them to next level.

### Mediocrity, Poor Horse Trading and Laughable Ideas

As Jim Gallagher gave way to new GM Wid Matthews in 1949, the Cubs were well on their way to the bottom. As this table below reflects, the Cubs had seen their last .500 team for a while in 1946.

Only the Yankees (now ran by George Weiss), Brooklyn (Rickey) and Cleveland (Veeck) won over 900 games during this decade of play. Surprisingly, but understandably, Rickey and Veeck left well before this period ended, but their ideas and their talents were firmly established (in Rickey's case, for decades) and carried forth in the franchise's future success in the 1950s.

**Table.** Franchise Wins between 1946-1955

Franchise	LG	Wins	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	Pennants
New York Yankees	AL	964	87	97	94	97	98	98	95	99	103	96	7
Cleveland Indians	AL	908	68	80	97	89	92	93	93	92	111	93	2
Boston Red Sox	AL	873	104	83	96	96	94	87	76	84	69	84	1
Detroit Tigers	AL	767	92	85	78	87	95	73	50	60	68	79	0
Chicago White Sox	AL	754	74	70	51	63	60	81	81	89	94	91	0
Philadelphia Athletics	AL	666	49	78	84	81	52	70	79	59	51	63	0
Washington Senators	AL	648	76	64	56	50	67	62	78	76	66	53	0
St. Louis Browns	AL	576	66	59	59	53	58	52	64	54	54	57	0
Brooklyn Dodgers	NL	948	96	94	84	97	89	97	96	105	92	98	6
St. Louis Cardinals	NL	838	98	89	85	96	78	81	88	83	72	68	0
Boston Braves	NL	822	81	86	91	75	83	76	64	92	89	85	1
New York Giants	NL	816	61	81	78	73	86	98	92	70	97	80	2
Philadelphia Phillies	NL	764	69	62	66	81	91	73	87	83	75	77	1
Cincinnati Reds	NL	686	67	73	64	62	66	68	69	68	74	75	0
Chicago Cubs	NL	680	82	69	64	61	64	62	77	65	64	72	0
Pittsburgh Pirates	NL	605	63	62	83	71	57	64	42	50	53	60	0



Charlie Grimm, the long-time Cub, was fired for former St. Louis player/manager Frankie Frisch in 1949. The 'Fordham Flash' was inducted to the Hall of Fame in 1947, and so, the impetus to hire a HOFer was likely there for a P.K. Wrigley. Frisch made a name for himself as the titular leader of the Gashouse Gang, taking that team to the top only once in 1934. With the hiring of Frisch, the Cubs did not improve they actually regressed from modest mediocrity.

In 1950, the Cubs received offensive help from Pafko and Hank Sauer, but little else. They languished at the bottom due to poor showings in pitching, horrid fielding (201 errors), and a lackluster batting average (.248), that contributed to leaving runners on base and ultimately, a 2<sup>nd</sup> to-last finish.

In *Our Chicago Cubs*, Evanston, Illinois native Rick Phalen in interviewing Hank Sauer found some of the problems plaguing the Cubs: "I would say the one I liked more than anyone else was Frank Frisch. As tough as he was, he was honest...he'd be reading a book on the bench. He'd be reading a book on the bench and all at once he looks up, he says, 'What's the score, guys?' They say, 'It's 1-0.' He says, 'That figures.'"<sup>61</sup> And about the GM Wid Mathews: "I personally did not think Mathews was a good GM...he'd never tell you the truth, as far as I'm concerned."<sup>62</sup> Mathews left more than a few people questioning his maneuvers with the team.

GM Wid Mathews, a former assistant in the Rickey front office, decided to pull the trigger to obtain several of 'Rickey Rejects.' (Castle pg. 6) In a huge trade, the Cubs sent CF Andy Pafko, P Johnny Schmitz, C Rube Walker, and 2B/3B Wayne Terwilliger for Brooklyn's OF Hermanski, middle infielder Miksis, pitcher Hatten and backup backstop Edwards in 1951.

This after Pafko's career year in 1950 where he was 2<sup>nd</sup> in slugging and home runs and 5<sup>th</sup> in total bases with a .304 BA. At the very least, the Cubs should have moved a 30-year-old Pafko for a quality starting pitcher, a real need given their ineptitude at the top of the rotation. (25-year-old Carl Erskine, or even closer, Clem Labine (also 25), were more logical moves to make for them against Brooklyn's powerhouse. Otherwise, no deal.)

By far, Andy Pafko was the best player in the deal, and the Cubs gave up three other players to boot! In essence, the sides swapped players, position for position. A very dubious move for the bottom feeder team to do with the preeminent power in the National League. Wid Mathews prior Dodger role leaves one to question his motives, given the steal the Dodgers got in obtaining a power bat for an already potent lineup of Jackie Robinson, Duke Snider, Roy Campanella, and Carl Furrillo.

Pafko played 1½ seasons for Brooklyn and finished out with seven years in Milwaukee as part-time outfielder. He stayed valuable for four more seasons as a full-time player.

OF Hermanski played parts of 3 seasons unsuccessfully with the Cubs and was soon out of baseball. Utility player Eddie Miskis had his best season(s) as a Cub: .251 BA, 8HR 39RBI 13SBs and 61 Runs in 1953. He played on several woeful Cubs teams of the early 1950s. Catcher Charles (Bruce) Edwards hung around the MLB as a backup catcher until 1956. And 35-year old Joe Hatten won six games as a Cub pitcher and was through with baseball.

The Dodgers utilized now LF Pafko's 19 home runs and 85 RBIs in 1952 in its run to the NL Pennant and demise in the World Series to the hated Yankees. The Cubs fired an overbearing<sup>63</sup> Frisch and inserted Phil Cavarretta as their field manager, who guided the team to its only .500 record, without Pafko.

The 1952 Cubs starting center fielder was Hal Jeffcoat, a .219 hitter with 4 HRs, who soon became an actually more successful pitcher in various roles for Chicago, then Cincinnati. But the damage was done; the trade for Hermanski as Pafko's replacement was detrimental to any Cubs' success. As Phil Cavarretta said, "That deal was horseshit...You make a deal like the Brooklyn deal, you're lost." (Castle 7.) Cavarretta's managerial tenure changes drastically if not for this horrendous deal, and another, less remembered.

The acquiring of 'Rickey's Rejects' was not the only center fielder lost by the Cubs due to bungling of personnel. In the mid-1940s, the Cubs took a small bite at the sweet apple of Phillies' HOF CF Richie Ashburn. In Bill James' *Historical Baseball Abstract*, the Cleveland Indians had sent a contract to a then 16-year-old Ashburn in 1943. This was against the rules of baseball and commissioner Landis voided the contract. (Landis oddly supported player's rights in several instances going back to the 1920s.)

Once Ashburn graduated from high school in Nebraska, he was signed by scout Cy Slapnicka destined for a then Chicago Cubs-owned Nashville team. Unfortunately, a provision was included that enriched Ashburn monetarily if he was sold to a major league ball club.<sup>64</sup> Once again, an illegal maneuver, and the Cubs' lost their rights to a potent leadoff man as Ashburn became by 1948, and stayed until the early 1960s.

To say, 'what could have been' again with Richie Ashburn leading off the Cubs for over a decade is to imply the Cubs finish above .500 in 1952 with Phil Cavarretta as manager, and Ashburn's ball-chasing talents. This saves Cavarretta's job for a while even under P.K. Wrigley and alters the course of the franchise ever so slightly to the good. (As it was, the

Cubs acquired Richie Ashburn after his most productive years were behind him, just to let him go again to the Mets.)

Throughout the 1950s, the Cubs had average-to-below average pitchers, poor lineups, and constantly changing philosophies that did not adjust ever to a revolving door in management. After the .500 record in 1952, the Cubs went backwards, and Cavarretta was gone in favor of Stan Hack. (Cavarretta did himself no favors in criticizing the team - being fired in spring training by Phil Wrigley – but this frustration was born of a stark reality: the Cubs were not going anywhere but down. Cavarretta could no longer deal with the quirks of P.K. Wrigley.)

As another Cubs' retreat, a P.K. Wrigley staple of inept management, Hack lasted three seasons (1954-1956) putting up 64, 72 and 60 wins after Cavarretta's demise. In 1957, former Cubs catcher Bob Scheffing from the 1940s, made his appearance into the managerial fold alongside another dim GM in John Holland that made some of the worst trades in MLB history as general manager of the Cubs over nearly two decades (1956-1975).

Scheffing had some talent on the field: HOF SS Ernie Banks, P Moe Drabowsky, and reliever-turned-writer Jim Brosnan represented a nice little group to build on. This group would have been even more talented, if in 1954 the Cubs could have been actually worse on the field. As George Castle reflects, "The Cubs couldn't even win a consolation prize for their losing ways. One story had [GM Wid] Mathews, always looking at the Dodger's system for talent, supposedly eyeing a young Puerto Rican outfielder named Roberto Clemente. The Dodgers tried to hide [him]...The team with the NL's worst record would get first dibs at drafting Clemente. [Clemente was a Bonus Baby on a 40-man roster.]"

But the Pirates were decidedly worse in 1954, and took Clemente off the Dodger's usual flush hands. (Another story relates that LHP Sandy Koufax, while at Cincinnati was discovered by Cubs scout Ralph Di Lullo who called in urgently after seeing him pitch in 1954, or 1955. Cubs brass at that moment refused to back the play.<sup>65</sup> Later, Ralph Di Lullo scouted and signed Bruce Sutter for \$500 in 1971.<sup>66</sup>

(Are these just typical apocryphal stories? One has to wonder...)

To add to the insult of those unusual situations, the Cubs refused to dive into the Negro Leagues full bore in obtaining talent. In acquiring talented black ballplayers, the Cubs showed trepidation by only signing/bringing up players in pairs, and held back on players that could have helped. "Players had to have roommates on the road. Segregation continued in the supposedly integrated major leagues. No black-white tandems existed

anywhere in the early 1950s.”<sup>67</sup> And so, the Cubs likely missed the boat on the enormous talents that pervaded the 1950s baseball landscape. Only through Ernie Banks, Billy Williams, and later, Fergie Jenkins did the Cubs become a team of considerable talent, yet let a young Lou Brock go.

By 1960, the Cubs were consistently and woefully lost. They were full out of ideas, as evidenced by Phil Wrigley's *College of Coaches* brainchild in 1961. This stillborn idea came out of the odd maneuver to switch manager Charlie Grimm with broadcaster Lou Boudreau in 1960, because Wrigley believed managers were expendable and interchangeable, like “relief” pitchers.<sup>68</sup>

Wrigley hired Charlie Grimm after the Cubs had won over 70 games in 1959 under Bob Scheffling, but felt ‘Jolly’ Grimm could rouse the younger players along quicker.<sup>69</sup> Grimm, the second time retread, was in over his head, and the bullpen call was made to Boudreau. “Every time we call on Grimm, the Cubs win a pennant,” Phil Wrigley surmised prior to the switch.<sup>70</sup> It is obvious that Wrigley was never far from the very few names he knew; and the Cubs were destined to keep the same W-L record almost as a result of no logical management.

**(Side Insanity Note:** A sign of insanity is to continue doing the same things expecting different results. Though to be fair, Elvin Tappe had the idea of rotating coaches, not managers, but Wrigley interfered as usual, causing Tappe to remark: “You got some real great arms on Drabowsky and Hobbie and Drott...Even if you bring in a new pitching coach, they’re going to make changes. We’ve gotta systemize this thing. You got too much talent here to be changing all the time.”<sup>71</sup> Tappe wanted to standardize the instruction, but rotate the underling coaches to standardize play, and techniques. But the boss (the MLB manager) shall remain stationary. Wrigley ruined the concept.)



**Phil Wrigley** – Never spared expense on his father’s ballpark, but was not prone to spend it on improving the ball team.

As if it were by chance, Bob Scheffling did lead a 101-win team in Detroit in 1961 with 1B Norm Cash, RF Al Kaline, LF Rocky Colavito and Ps Jim Bunning, Don Mossi and Frank 'The Yankee Killer' Lary but soon lost his final managerial position in 1963.

Scheffling went onto to become a talent scout for the New York Met organization – a franchise the Cubs became far too acquainted with in the late 1960s. Around the same time, Charlie Metro came from the Detroit organization to take his turn as a *College of Coaches* manager.

In 1961, the Cubs media guide trumpeted the usage of the *College of Coaches* scenario utilizing a popular science fiction title takeoff, “Stranger in Strange Surroundings”<sup>72</sup> thought, a direct borrowing of Robert Heinlein’s *Stranger in a Strange Land*. The purpose being to suggest players would not be strangers to coaches coming up in the minors to the majors. The Cubs tied into the computer operation of Big Blue (IBM). (But likely did not understand what to put into the system to get out the appropriate data. Garbage in, garbage out.)

While in taking this odd, quasi-innovative turn, they made serious mistakes in signing only six players for the entire 1962 season to the minor leagues. As Cubs beat writer George Castle reflects on a conversation with Bobby Cox, the potential HOF manager of the Braves and Blue Jays, the Cubs minor leagues in the mid-1960s were bereft of talent due lack of signings and overspending on just two players, OF/P Danny Murphy (\$130,000) and 1B Mack Kuyhendall (\$70,000.)<sup>73</sup> Adding to this entire fiasco, they brought in Air Force General Robert Whitlow as the new athletic director. (The military soon got a ‘cup of coffee’ in the Commissioner’s office in the form of an Air Force general.)

Not to be outdone, GM John Holland began a series of moves that painfully destroyed the momentum of what was a productive minor league system in the late 1950s due partly to the personal touch scouting of Buck O'Neil, the first black coach in the majors. (Buck was poorly utilized by the Cubs, as was the status quo.)

### **Trades That Make You Go Hmmm, Yuck**

GM John Holland, a mirror of PK Wrigley’s conservatism, was hired in large part to his relationship to the Cubs’ minor league teams in the early 1950s. After a brief stint as GM of the Los Angeles Angels, long a powerhouse in the PCL, Holland was brought to Chicago to run the club with his Triple-A manager Bob Scheffling.<sup>74</sup> Evidently, Holland was far more outgoing, initially, but soon found out that to question P. K. Wrigley is to be fired by P.K. Wrigley. His main cohorts in this debacle were Gene Lawing, Vedic Himsl, and Carroll Lockman, who ran player development, scouting, and procurement at various points while Holland was in charge.

Holland's trade choices as a GM/Executive VP are among a graveyard of players the Cubs wish they had back at the time:

**Ron Perranoski LH RP** - traded for Dodgers 3B Don Zimmer along with Johnny Goryl, Lee Handley and \$25,000. Triggered by the early spring demotion of a young Ron Santo, who became the man for 13 ½ seasons. Zimmer hit 19 HRs and 75 RBIs in two seasons for the Cubs. Perranoski went on to a 79-74 record, 179 Saves, and 2.79 ERA in a career while leading the AL in saves twice, appearances three times, including 1969, for the Twins.

He became the pitching coach for the L.A. Dodgers of the late 1970s and early 1980s soon coaching Cubs starting pitchers Rick Sutcliffe and Burt Hooton. As of 2007, Perranoski still works as pitching expert for the San Francisco Giants.

**Jim Brewer RH RP** with C Cuno Barragan to Dodgers for P Dick Scott, who played in 4.1 IP for a 12.46 ERA as a Cub. Brewer went on to a consistent career as a solid middle reliever & closer at a 62-49 W-L Record and 3.07 ERA and saved 132 games. He credits the tutelage of HOF Warren Spahn with introducing a screwball into his pitching repertoire.<sup>75</sup> Barragan never played in MLB again.

**Lou Brock CF** with Jack Spring and Paul Toth for Ernie Broglio, Bobby Shantz, and Doug Clemens. LF Brock traded for a pair of broken down pitchers. Brock set the then MLB mark for stolen bases (938) and reached the 3,000 hit plateau. Broglio barely played after his trade from St. Louis. This trade haunted the Cubs through the 1969 season in which his bat and speed could have made the difference over the Mets – being the Cubs had problems in center field – where Brock adequately could fill in, even as a left fielder. Unfortunately, one reason Brock was traded was his inability to adjust to center field position, instead, becoming a solid-for-a-decade left fielder. (Good instructors can make a speedy guy better at CF. It does happen.)

In *October 1964*, Halberstam relates the gifts of Lou Brock discovered by Buck O'Neil: "The first thing Buck O'Neil saw was Brock's speed...O'Neil thought immediately of Cool Papa Bell [legendary Negro League centerfielder]...Cool had been a little bit taller and a little slimmer than Brock, but this young man was already more powerfully built than Cool...O'Neil also noticed the hunger in Brock."<sup>76</sup>

When the trade was consummated, the Cardinals players were not in favor of Brock's acquisition (Bob Gibson and Bill White), while the Cubs (particularly sportswriters) were ecstatic as one writer, Bob Smith regarded Lou Brock amongst the worst outfielders in history: "Nice doing business with you. Please call again anytime."<sup>77</sup>

Brock's problems were reflected in the handling of his development. He went from C-ball to the majors in a season. He was told by a circus of managers what to do to improve, all mechanical and mental, which only pushed a young player that was pushing all ready too much instead of relaxing. But those Cubs teams had too many holes, and Brock was deemed a void in a struggling franchise? Hmmm...

**Billy North CF** - for 35 yr. old pitcher Bob Locker. North amasses nearly 1,000 hits, 620BB, 640 Runs and 390 SBs for Oakland and later San Francisco. Locker won 10 games as a reliever then retired.

**Ken Holtzman SP** for **OF Rick Monday**. This trade is ultimately one of (**Huge Delayed Rewards**). Holtzman had a bad 1971 season at 9-15, but with 9 complete games and 3 shutouts. But went to Oakland, winning 59 games while losing 41 with an ERA under 3.00 in Oakland's championship run of 3 seasons.


The 1965 overall #1 draft pick, Rick Monday did hit 106 HRs as a Cub while providing adequate defense. But Monday soon wore a Dodger blue, because of his \$100,000 per year contract demands, with the Cubs getting 1B Bill Buckner and SS Ivan DeJesus back. Both players are instrumental to later trades made in 1982 (Sandberg) and 1984 (Eckersley), with the totality, leading to the Cubs first division championship ever and first post season appearance since 1945.

However, the loss of an ace-like pitcher from the now pitching poor Cubs (as evidenced by also trading Fergie Jenkins and Burt Hooton, too) did not lead immediately to any more victories even with the addition of Monday's bat. It was more than decade before this deal worked out to the Cubs ultimate benefit. The Cubs obtained two HOF players in those two deals for Monday.

Holtzman remembers prior to the trade, "I felt at the time that the front office could have done a little bit more to make it more conducive to winning. I was frustrated at the end of the '71 season, and I told Mr. [John] Holland, 'Look, I am not interested in any individual-type awards...I want to win...And I just disagree with the philosophy around here.'" <sup>78</sup> As it was, Holtzman started Game 1, 4, and 7 in the 1973 World Series against the upstart Mets who had beat the Cubs by only 5 games.

Holtzman won four World Series games against one loss with a 2.54 ERA in eight fall classic starts in Oakland.

## Anatomy of Trade with Delayed Rewards



**Burt Hooton SP** (May 2, 1975) for SP Geoff Zahn and RP Eddie Solomon.

30-year pitcher Zahn was waived after going 2-8 as a Cub in early 1976. A clever lefty, Zahn then went to Minnesota and California racking up 105 wins versus 95 losses with 20 shutouts, leading the American League once with five shutouts. Even as a .500 pitcher, he managed a solid 18-8 record in 1982 for California leading them to a 1982 playoff appearance. From 1977-1985, he amassed 78 CGs, 1,682IP, and 3.77 ERA.

Solomon pitched in six games for the Cubs then was waived. He also hung around for 7 seasons with a 36-42 record, lifetime 3.99 ERA as a part-time starter/middle reliever.

As the 2<sup>nd</sup> overall pick in the 1971 draft, a 25-year old Hooton departed for the two throwaway Dodgers, but was an integral part behind the Dodger championship runs in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Hooton started out his new career in LA by winning 12 straight decisions, breaking a Koufax/Drysdale record of consecutive wins by a pitcher.<sup>79</sup> In winning 18, 11, 12, 19, 11, 14 and 11 games from 1975 to 1981, with a 2.92 ERA over that time in So Cal, the Cubs truly lost out all the way around in these departures.



As Hooton surmised, "When I was with the Cubs, one of the reasons I probably had a little difficulty at a young age was because I had three different managers and four pitching coaches. Consistency wasn't one of the things that was prevalent with the Cubs then. The best pitching coach that I ever had was...Red Adams when I first went to Los Angeles."<sup>80</sup>

Hooton's 96-63 W-L, 57 CGs in 211 starts in seven seasons sans a Chicago home is another blunder. This maybe the single worst trade (aside from Brock) given also that:

Hooton performed well for the Dodgers over 7 seasons, going 5-3 in the post season.

Lefty Zahn was waived too soon. Minnesota, then California, managed to get mileage out of his stuff to the tune of over 100 wins. Hooton would only win 117 games as a Dodger.

Solomon, also released, hung around for several seasons as a fill-in pitcher.

None of these players provided their peak production for the Cubs. Why the trade was made at all, with the lack of patience obviously seen, is a question left unanswered.

**Andre Thornton 1B/DH/OF** - shipped out of town by freshly minted GM Salty Saltwell on May 17, 1976. (John Holland makes the same deal since he was the Executive VP over Saltwell.) Manager Jim Marshall and Thornton conflicted over the latter's first base play. Soon Thornton's bat makes that an irrelevant note, in going to Cleveland to slug away in an abysmal ballpark for power hitters.

Between 1977 and 1985, Thornton hit 197 HR while Cubs 1<sup>st</sup> baggers produced only 152 HR, leaving aside Thornton did not play at all in 1980, and the fact some playing time was split in the left field for the Cubs 1<sup>st</sup> baseman. (Andre also was considered a team leader and hard worker<sup>81</sup>, a major weak spot in the Cubs during this time. The ballpark factor plays to Thornton's favor.)

Thornton was a DH by the early 1980s, but the statistics he put up in 1977 through 1979 certainly are impressive when accounting for Cleveland's Municipal Stadium and the era of speed merchants. His OBP was significantly better; and he took 186 more walks than Cubs' 1B in 2,200 less at bats.

**Table. Comparison of Cubs 1B to Andre Thornton (1977-1985)**

Year	Player		G	POS	AB	Hits	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	TB	OBP	OPS	BA	SLG	TC
1977	Larry	Biittner	80	1B	493	147	28	1	12	62	35	213	0.345	0.777	0.298	0.432	9.71
1977	Bill	Buckner	99	1B	426	121	27	0	11	60	21	181	0.318	0.743	0.284	0.425	10.34
1978	Larry	Biittner	62	1B	343	88	15	1	4	50	23	117	0.303	0.644	0.257	0.341	9.77
1978	Bill	Buckner	105	1B	446	144	26	1	5	74	18	187	0.349	0.768	0.323	0.419	11.03
1979	Bill	Buckner	140	1B	591	168	34	7	14	66	30	258	0.319	0.755	0.284	0.437	9.87
1980	Larry	Biittner	41	1B	273	68	12	2	1	34	18	87	0.296	0.614	0.249	0.319	6.56
1980	Bill	Buckner	94	1B	578	187	41	3	10	68	30	264	0.357	0.814	0.324	0.457	9.56
1980	Cliff	Johnson	46	1B	196	46	8	0	10	34	29	84	0.333	0.762	0.235	0.429	10.52
1981	Bill	Buckner	105	1B	421	131	35	3	10	75	26	202	0.351	0.831	0.311	0.480	10.26
1982	Bill	Buckner	161	1B	657	201	34	5	15	105	36	290	0.342	0.783	0.306	0.441	10.60
1983	Bill	Buckner	144	1B	626	175	38	6	16	66	25	273	0.307	0.743	0.280	0.436	10.60
1984	Leon	Durham	130	1B	473	132	30	4	23	96	69	239	0.371	0.876	0.279	0.505	9.68
1985	Leon	Durham	151	1B	542	153	32	2	21	75	64	252	0.358	0.823	0.282	0.465	10.12
Totals			1358		6065	1761	360	35	152	865	424	2647	0.337	0.773	0.290	0.436	

Year	Player		G	POS	AB	Hits	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	TB	OBP	OPS	BA	SLG	TC
1977	Andre	Thornton	117	1B	433	114	20	5	28	70	70	228	0.366	0.892	0.263	0.527	9.38
1978	Andre	Thornton	145	1B	508	133	22	4	33	105	93	262	0.376	0.892	0.262	0.516	9.88
1979	Andre	Thornton	130	1B	515	120	31	1	26	93	90	231	0.347	0.796	0.233	0.449	9.01
1981	Andre	Thornton	11	1B	226	54	12	0	6	30	23	84	0.309	0.681	0.239	0.372	6.55
1982	Andre	Thornton	152	DH	589	161	26	1	32	116	109	285	0.387	0.871	0.273	0.484	
1983	Andre	Thornton	27	1B	508	143	27	1	17	77	87	223	0.387	0.826	0.281	0.439	8.22
1984	Andre	Thornton	11	1B	587	159	26	0	33	99	91	284	0.369	0.853	0.271	0.484	8.64
1985	Andre	Thornton	122	DH	461	109	13	0	22	88	47	188	0.307	0.715	0.236	0.408	
Totals			715		3827	993	177	12	197	678	610	1785	0.361	0.828	0.259	0.466	

HOF SP **Fergie Jenkins** for **3B Bill Madlock** – both sides did get what they wanted, initially.

However, the Cubs not wanting to put up the money for Madlock (\$200,000-300,000 per season) in 1977, so instead they shipped ‘Mad Dog’ off to San Francisco for a declining 31-year-old OF Bobby Murcer who played 2 ½ seasons for the Cubs with mediocre hitting, aside from some power in 1977.

The 25-year-old 3B Madlock, coming off back-to-back batting championships, moved to 2B by San Francisco (then back to 3B by Pittsburgh), but maintained his hitting ways until 1983, winning two more batting titles, and always walking more than striking out. Murcer was paid \$320,000, setting a poor precedent that African-Americans were not to be paid for their accomplishments at that time.

As George Castle wrote, “But dumping Madlock while rewarding Murcer sent out all the wrong messages about prejudice.”<sup>82</sup> Later, the Cubs could have reacquired Madlock by virtue of a waiver block of the Pirates trade, who were higher in the standings in 1979, but the Cubs did not swallow their pride. The Pirates won the World Series over Baltimore with Mad Dog’s assistance.

The Cubs reacquired a well-past-his-prime Fergie Jenkins, who managed one decent season before hanging up the spikes in 1983. (To be repeated with Greg Maddux after GM's Larry Himes contract bungling, thus costing the Cubs several Cy Young awards, and once again, dooming their pitching staff.)

Awkward handling of training stunted many more up-and-coming players. The poor development of a coaching philosophy, understaffing, and the apathy in playing in a slipshod organization that was the Chicago Cubs for nearly 50 years were key to shortcomings. Wrigley's indifferent nature permeated even the best minds of instructors and former MLB players' teaching, to a point that, along with monetary constraints, stifled any hopes of playing winning baseball in October.

### Cheap, Cheap, Cheap

As writers Peter Golenbock and George Castle both note, the Chicago Cubs were not an organization that spent money to make money. Phil Wrigley believed in self-sufficiency of all his baseball teams, meaning they had to not lose money in the operations, with even a modest profit preferred in what was just a small bit in his vast array of investments. No additional money was available to persuade young prospects to sign with the Cubs back before the draft (1965) or after free agency (1977). However, spending money on the fan experience at Wrigley was something altogether different.

As Bill Veeck noted in *Wrigleyville*, the planting of trees (that did not work) and building the center-field bleachers in 1937 cost in excess of \$200,000. The process of making a shrine to William Wrigley was spared no expense<sup>83</sup>, but the process of making a contender or champion, fell into a rather bizarre understanding of what is necessary for winning baseball.

As Phil Wrigley stated: "There are a great many stockholders in the Wrigley Gum Company who would be the first to complain if any of their money was used in baseball. So none of it ever has been used for that purpose, or ever will. We aim to have the Cubs pay their own way..."<sup>84</sup> As such, being among the cheapest organizations, these glaring potholes stood in the way of the Cubs organization building a winning tradition:

**Poor training facilities.** In the 1950s through 1970s, the Cubs training facilities were horrific compared to such jewels as the *Dodgertown* complex in Vero Beach, Florida. While others invested in the minors, the Cubs made do with one-and-a-half fields, sleeping in barracks under the stands at Rendezvous Park in Mesa, AZ and sharing time with college teams (in one spring training in California). The Cubs ran a backward version of a professional operation.<sup>85</sup> In the late 1970s, the Cubs offered used baseballs and old uniforms from the big clubs to their farmhands.<sup>86</sup>

**Lack of adequate coaching or too few to accomplish the task.** Instructor Elvin Tappe codified a book that could be called the 'Cubs' Way' but it fell on deaf ears. No one in the organization took up the idea of consistent instruction offered in the manual. The manual itself was self-published; due to the lack of funds offered to make it a legitimate manual.

Freddie Martin was an excellent roving pitching coach that assisted the likes of Ken Holtzman, Joe Niekro, Burt Hooton, Rick Reuschel, Bruce Sutter, and Dennis Lamp.<sup>87</sup> But was spread too thin to honestly provide long-term assistance to all these pitchers. Due to that, player-coaching was done due to the lack of excellent instruction - according to Bob Tiefenauer and Ron Piche who played in Tacoma in 1969.<sup>88</sup>

As HOFer Bruce Sutter notes: "Today a lot of clubs have...a pitching coach at every level, and they have rovers that go around. When I was playing, we had one pitching coach for the entire minor leagues! We'd see him five days – he'd try to see all the starting pitchers once...After I had my elbow operation, I was reluctant to throw the slider and try to snap off curve balls, so he [Fred Martin] said, 'Why don't you try this,' meaning the split-fingered fastball. And the rest speaks for itself."<sup>89</sup>

As Peter Golenbock remarks in Wrigleyville, pitching coach Roger Craig was not the innovator of the split-fingered fastball, Fred Martin was. But Martin is forgotten due to the Cubs inability to win, and put more hands-on instructors in the right places.

Sudden Changes in Coaching, weird plans, such as the **College of Coaches** fiasco. Just about anyone who was anyone in the Cubs organization thought Wrigley's College of Coaches was an insane idea. Don Zimmer and Buck O'Neil both made negative comments (Zimmer while playing, Buck in his book: *I Was Right On Time*) that spoke to the inanity of having rotating managers. The lack of cohesiveness and continuity spoke to the entire MLB world that the Cubs did not get it, and more likely did not even know what 'it' was.

To be fair, the idea of roving instructors is sound. Whereby the instruction on fielding fundamentals, hitting adjustments, and base running skills is uniform in the organization. The best organizations have tried ultimately to do this. However, changing the leadership is a plan to fail. Players adjust to the style of authority slowly, and if that changes too much, chaos ensues.

**Executives, scouts and coaches never empowered** to make the right deals or use their ideas. In looking at the grand scheme, many in the Cubs' employment were stuck in the never-changing world of PK Wrigley. No self-confident, self-assured mavericks need apply for a job in the operation of the Cubs, which is exactly why Bill Veeck Jr. left the Cubs in

the 1941, to run the bankrupt Milwaukee Brewers minor league franchise on a \$25,000 loan.<sup>90</sup>

At twenty-eight, Veeck realized how lost Phil Wrigley was in doing what his father William Wrigley truly wanted. Bill Veeck's Cleveland Indians won a World Series in 1948 with Larry Doby and Satchel Paige on his roster. Veeck's insertion of a midget, Eddie Gaedel, into a MLB game was one of many gate attraction schemes he was remembered (and sometimes derided) for by the baseball men. Veeck saw a new horizon always; Wrigley was stuck on a well-worn Noel Coward record played at 78 rpm.

Scouts and players alike saw the Cubs far behind in curve of what made modern baseball, baseball. Players traded to the Cubs (especially from the Dodgers) got a rude awakening to what made Cubs baseball so bad from spring training to season's end.

PK's only maverick hire – Leo Durocher – brought a spirit that was lacking for a generation, but is excoriated for the collapse of the 1969 Cubs. Durocher may have been an average manager of the Cubs. Leo was 64, and a product of the 1930s and 1940s baseball, but the Cubs had lacked 'average' management for two decades, hiring old Cub players and sycophantic company-line men with zero success. As soon as Leo came to town, positive trades were made, a pitching staff was developed, and young talent in Fergie Jenkins, Ken Holtzman, Glenn Beckert to go along with Ron Santo and Billy Williams brought the Cubs up from second division ne'er-do-well to contending for five seasons against decidedly better run organizations.

**GM John Holland nearly defined the philosophy of P.K. Wrigley:** Cheap, backward, stuck in the 1930s, financially and possibly, racially, for nearly two decades. Wid Matthews and prior GMs were the beginning of this trend. Jim Gallagher, sportswriter, made his bad baseball moves in the 1940s. (Billy Herman trade and cutting salaries...)

**Salaries.** In 1977, according to George Castle, the follow salaries were paid out to several teams:

Cincinnati Reds: \$1.7 million

LA Dodgers: \$1.443 million

Philadelphia Phillies: \$1.386 million

New York Yankees: \$1.495 million

Chicago Cubs: \$805,000<sup>91</sup>

Of that \$805,000, three players, Bill Buckner, Bobby Murcer and Jose Cardenal made \$500,000 between them. (With Buckner and Murcer coming over from trades discussed.)

In 1977, the Cubs ran out to a 47-22 start, only to finish 81-81. The falloff of 34-59 was mainly due to the loss of Bruce Sutter and others spending time on the DL. The front office refused to pony up any cash to get talent. Instead, they traded with Charlie Finley for another beat up relief pitcher.

Another story recounted in George Castle's *The Million-to-One Team*, tells of 1950s GM Wid Mathews being budgeted \$300,000 for the signing of all players. Any money left over after signing went to Mathews – with the usual Cubs results pointing to a healthy remainder for Mathews.

It was a given that money was last on the list of assets the Cubs used to make strides to the top. Since they lacked a productive minor league system (or traded their best prospects away too soon) and often refused to pay out top dollar for free agents (or made for an unattractive place to relocate to at various points), the Cubs could only hope their current roster would miracle their way to championships. No miracles have not encroached on the field.

(**Note:** Various sources report the Cubs in 1977 paid significantly more than Castle reports. Rich Hill and Professor Rodney Fort compiled Excel spreadsheets that reflected these differences. So the argument that the Cubs are cheap may not always apply. Post-Wrigley, the glass is nearly empty.)

### Leo and 1969

In the year the United States first landed on the moon, the Cubs looked assured to find terra firma in their first World Series since the end of WWII hostilities. With a solid lineup and an excellent top of the rotation, the Cubs had a commanding lead less than a month after Neil Armstrong's first steps. But the meteoric rise and fall of the 1969 Cubs really comes down what every team has to do, as quaint as it sounds: play 162 games as hard as possible and let the chips fall where they may.

Much has been said about those Cubs failures, mostly pointedly to the derision of their manager, Leo 'The Lip' Durocher. Durocher came aboard in 1966, taking over the bottom feeding, soft-as-cotton joke of the National League that was the Chicago Cubs. The Cubs had for twenty seasons dwelt the second division with only a sniff of .500 baseball years apart and Leo was a radical paradigm shift for the Chicago fans, media, and players.

Born in West Springfield, Massachusetts on July 27, 1905, Leo embodied his sun sign as an aggressive, no-nonsense, quick-tongued, oft-immoral, winning-comes-first attitude towards life. By one account, *Durocher's Cubs*, Leo was drawn as much to gambling as he was to baseball at an early age – shooting marbles, playing pool and seeking 'action'.<sup>92</sup> By

time he was twenty, Leo was in the same dugout as Babe Ruth and alleged to have taken the big man's watch. Leo played a more significant part on the 1928 Yankees, who won the World Series behind the usual suspects: Ruth, Gehrig, Combs, Lazzeri, Dugan, and Koenig with Hoyt, Pipgras and Pennock off the bump.

Never a good hitter, but always money conscious, Durocher was out in New York due to his salary demands (and unpaid debts) heading first to Cincinnati then to St. Louis to join Rickey's Cardinals. His slick fielding and firebrand nature fit in well with the characters in St. Louis, a.k.a. the Gashouse Gang, winning another World Series as their starting shortstop.

By the end of the 1930s, Durocher's role as a player gave way to a promotion to field managing under Larry McPhail then Branch Rickey. He led the 1941 Brooklyn Dodgers to their first World Series only to lose in 5 games to McCarthy's Yankees. By 1947, Leo Durocher was the highest paid manager in baseball at an estimated \$60,000.<sup>93</sup>


In the mid-1940s, Durocher became embroiled in several off-the-field incidents that all but assured lasting fame in baseball. He was 'associating' with known mobsters; he fought a patron at the Dodgers game; he married 26-year-old actress Lorraine Day essentially before she was divorced in California by going to Mexico for the license; he feuded with his former boss, now Yankee executive, Larry McPhail and drew the ire of Branch Rickey and commissioner Happy Chandler. With these events, Durocher was not long as Dodger manager, being suspended for a year by Happy Chandler in 1947, only to become the New York Giants head taskmaster midway through 1948, thus becoming the first to manage two teams in the same league in the same season.

But Leo was not done as a kettle stirrer. While still managing the Dodgers, and with Jackie Robinson in the pipeline, the loose-lipped Durocher made the comment that he didn't care if Jackie was black, white or zebra-striped, he would play for the Dodgers. Robinson and Durocher were noted to argue (riding each other) during numerous encounters (22 a year) that the two New York National League powers had during the early 1950s. (When they played, the clubhouse walls were so thin that both Jackie and Leo could carry on their retorts quite adequately.)

In 1951, Leo took over the baseball upbringing of a young, talented Alabama native in Willie Mays, and as Paul Harvey intoned, "now you know the rest of the story." Leo left baseball management in 1955, but took on once-a-week broadcasts on NBC, and was later an outspoken critic as a 3<sup>rd</sup> base coach of Walter Alston's Dodgers in the early 60s. (Leo obviously never wandered far from the best organizations: Dodgers and Giants were the premier organizations in the National League.)

With Durocher's hiring in 1966, it became plain to see Leo was perceived, as an outsider than lacked Chicago class, was too arrogant (with the media), too stubborn, and too hard on players at his whims' notice. He not so subtly attacked Ernie Banks, who was declining from his lofty playing heights of the late 1950s. (Undoubtedly looking to change the culture, and wishing Banks would be let go for good. Not an unusual management philosophy given the prior results.)

Sportswriters and broadcasters in Chicago, namely Jerome Holtzman, Jack Brickhouse, George Langford, Jim Enright, and Lou Boudreau, were nearly always entrenched in word battles with Durocher – making one to wonder – who was supposed to making the decisions, the manager or the scribes? (And who was less mature?)



The graph reflects the unfortunate nature of two other seasons aside from 1969. In 1970 and 1972, the Cubs should have amassed over 95 wins and could have won their division outright in 1970. As it was, they finished out of the top money (2<sup>nd</sup> both times.)



Also during this time span (1963-1973), only the Baltimore Orioles suffered even worse luck in coming up short in 1967 (-13) and 1972 (-16.1.) But those failures were also counteracted by four World Series appearances (1966, 1969-1971), thus erasing the sting of those 'unusual' seasons.

Meanwhile, the New York Mets in 1969 benefited by 6.5 games to the good over the projected number (expected to win 94 games). If the formulation was perfect, the two teams should have tied for the first NL East title, requiring a one, or three-game playoff.

Many authors, sportswriters, and sabermetric analysts place the most blame (greater than half) solely on Leo Durocher for the collapse of the 1969 Cubs. As a group they cite his ungracious persona with the media, his riding players via the media (or the clubhouse), and his inability to adapt to the game. They also point out his failure to utilize his entire roster, overworking starting pitching, using only Phil Regan as a closer, and not resting his stars (Hundley, Kessinger, Beckert, Santo and Williams) while giving his bench more playing time. They even sight Leo's lack of gambling – with base stealing or young pitchers in the bullpen – as contributing factors. Beyond that, the players are felt to have choked due to the rock star spotlight and the newness to pennant-winning baseball. For all his efforts, Leo is dismissed and made the 'goat' for the season. But the actuality of his management (and the player's real responsibility) is somewhere between Leo's total responsibility, and complete absolution for the teams' demise.

### Starting Pitching of the Era

Amongst the points used to criticize Leo Durocher is his over utilizing his three best starters: Jenkins, Holtzman, and Hands. As Claerbaut asserts: "Pitchers burn out much faster than position players. There were only 13 National League hurlers who totaled at least 475 innings for the 1968 and 1969. Three of them pitched for the Cubs...tops by far among NL threesomes." (pg. 128) Actually, the Dodgers racked up 1648 frames and the San Francisco was a 'distant' third by 17 innings at 1,637. But more striking is the success seen (in the mid 1960s and early 1970s) utilizing this heavy threesome rotation scheme. (See: **Table.** below)

What is interesting is the 1965-66 Dodgers were in both World Series. The 1968 Detroit Tigers made the fall classic. The 1969-1971 Baltimore Orioles made the series three times and the Oakland A's won three straight World Series. With that said, the ability to find three durable men to throw 275-300 innings per season for two years seems to correlate rather well with reaching of the fall classic, aside from the Chicago Cubs and Giants franchise.

**Table.** Top Innings Amassed by Two-Year Trios of Starting Pitchers

<u>1965-66</u>	<u>LAN</u>	<u>CHN</u>		
SP1	Sandy Koufax	Dick Ellsworth		
SP2	Don Drysdale	Jackson/Holtzman		
SP3	Claude Osteen	Buhl/Jenkins		
Big 3 IP	<b>1768</b>	<b>1336</b>		
<u>1968-69</u>	<u>CHN</u>	<u>LAN</u>	<u>SFN</u>	<u>DET</u>
SP1	Ken Holtzman	Don Sutton	Mike McCormick	Earl Wilson
SP2	Bill Hands	Bill Singer	Gaylord Perry	Mickey Lolich
SP3	Fergie Jenkins	Claude Osteen	Juan Marichal	Denny McLain
Big 3 IP	<b>1654</b>	<b>1648</b>	<b>1637</b>	<b>1600</b>
<u>1969-70</u>	<u>CHN</u>	<u>BAL</u>		
SP1	Ken Holtzman	Mike Cuellar		
SP2	Bill Hands	Dave McNally		
SP3	Fergie Jenkins	Jim Palmer		
Big 3 IP	<b>1738</b>	<b>1639</b>		
<u>1970-71</u>	<u>BAL</u>	<u>CHN</u>		
SP1	Mike Cuellar	Ken Holtzman		
SP2	Dave McNally	Bill Hands		
SP3	Jim Palmer	Fergie Jenkins		
Big 3 IP	<b>1697</b>	<b>1628</b>		
<u>1973-1974</u>	<u>OAK</u>	<u>CHN</u>		
SP1	Catfish Hunter	Rick Reuschel		
SP2	Ken Holtzman	Burt Hooton		
SP3	Vida Blue	Jenkins/Bonham		
Big 3 IP	<b>1673</b>	<b>1407</b>		

In the case of Kenny Holtzman, he achieved this goal with the Oakland A's whose intra-squad disputes, abrasive personalities, immense egos, and a cheap-and-demanding owner in Charlie Finley surely made for an interesting drama, likely more abrasive than even Leo's persona brought to the Cubs. While pitching roughly the same amount of innings as he had in Chicago, Holtzman's Oakland performances reflected well on his ability to carry on under the "burn out" theory.

But the ultimate point to take is that Leo Durocher was not utilizing an old tactic, or even an aberrant one for this era of baseball. Walter Alston, Dick Williams, Earl Weaver, and Mayo Smith represent in three of the four cases HOF skippers who were running their best out to the bump 38-42 times a season. No one strenuously questioned this

philosophy *then* because it garnered the desired results of post-season appearances. Yet, it was likely very harmful, and many pitchers of *that era* broke down trying to start 37-40 games for teams that did not make it to the final October series. Moreover, these less-durable rotation guys moved around from team to team that inevitably meant a new skipper had to adjust to their performance levels and inability to finish what they started.

It also turns out that most of these workhorses were Hall-of-Fame caliber performers, else why would they be throwing that many innings in back-to-back seasons? Sandy Koufax, Don Drysdale, Juan Marichal, Don Sutton, Gaylord Perry, Jim Palmer, Catfish Hunter, and Fergie Jenkins are all in Cooperstown. The ones not inducted were very good pitchers in their heyday.

And Walter Alston was much more abusive than Leo Durocher ever was when it came to starters *or* relievers.

**Table.** Managers Who Overworked Top-3 starters

Manager	W	L	Win%	Pennants	WS Titles	HOF
Walter Alston	2040	1613	0.558	7	4	1983
Leo Durocher	2008	1709	0.540	3	1	1994
Dick Williams	1571	1451	0.520	4	1	2008
Earl Weaver	1480	1060	0.583	4	2	1996

**Exhibit #1:** Sandy Koufax from 1964-1966 was known to have severe arm problems and swelling after pitching due to traumatic arthritis as diagnosed by Dr. Robert Kerlan<sup>94</sup>, yet was ran out to the mound in a manner that was beyond what any medical professionals allowed after the radical success of Tommy John's surgery in 1975 while with Alston-led Dodgers. Koufax started 82 games, completed 54 in two seasons, taking the bump every 4<sup>th</sup> day. But the Dodgers won two World Series behind Koufax's mighty-but-damaged left arm. If rested, Koufax might have pitched several more years, but would the Dodgers have had the *same results*?

**Exhibit #2:** Mike Marshall relief exploits make Phil 'The Vulture' Regan '69 season look ordinary. In back-to-back seasons Marshall appeared in 198 games and 387 innings. Marshall's record 102 appearances in 1974 coincided with the Dodgers 102-win season. (Later, after baseball, *Doctor* Mike Marshall has advocated throwing programs vastly different from the norm, and therefore, is considered by the mainstream baseball community as a fringe element. However, many of the establishment are too uneducated, stubborn, or unwilling, to make proper use of the techniques Marshall advocates.)

But Walter Alston was revered and loved by the press (given his quick admittance to the HOF seven years after his final year managing). With his 1-year contracts renewed and his quiet leadership, Alston is never called out on these destructive tactics on pitchers because championships, and consistent winning came with their usage. Leo was not quiet; and was not loved by the press (in Chicago) for certain. Add to that Leo's personal dealings, the falling short of a title in Chicago, and one sees why a vastly different portrayal of these two managerial rivals exists. Yet Alston's tactics with pitchers are applauded, while Leo's were derided.

Even sabermetric master Bill James reaches a difficult conclusion on this point of pitcher usage: "Looking back at it from this vantage point there is surprisingly little evidence that pitching 320 to 350 innings did much to shorten any of these pitcher's careers, except maybe Mickey Lolich. [In referencing 1970s pitchers with huge inning totals.] If pitching 325 innings was destructive to any of these pitchers, the fact is surprisingly subtle in history."<sup>95</sup> This trend was after the 1969 season.

To further reflect the actuality, an analysis of starting pitchers shows that over usage was beneficial to many teams over a period of thirty years. See: **Appendix**. Abuse of Pitchers (1949-1980)

Leo was following the very plan others used to succeed in reaching for a pennant. It just so happens he was not rewarded for the strategy. The Cubs were lucky enough to have three starters whose durability, though stretched too far on today's micromanaging and salary-conscious teams, was not unheard of with the 4-man rotations that existed during the mid-LBJ Era, and pre-free agency.

#### Searching for Mr. 4<sup>th</sup> Bar

If Leo did miss out on the durability of any starting pitching prospect it was in the usage of Joe Niekro, whose knuckleball could be thrown every 4<sup>th</sup> day without a problem. His brother Phil Niekro was all ready an innings eater with his knuckler, and later, was made a HOF inductee. Yet it seems Joe didn't even throw a decent knuckler then, a fact David Chaerbaut may have missed. In Rick Talley's *The Cubs of '69* Joe Niekro recounts that, "I didn't have a knuckleball then,"<sup>96</sup> and Leo's traveling secretary/ part-time assistant general manager Blake Cullen reflected that his other pitches were not that good at the time.

As it was, Durocher sent Joe packing to the expansion San Diego team in 1969. But Joe did not find a legit home until his 5<sup>th</sup> MLB team, playing in the pitcher's haven, the cavernous spectacle that was the Houston Astrodome in 1975. But David Chaerbaut recounts Leo's impatience with Niekro's knuckler in 1968: "Leo told Niekro to take his

knuckleball and shove it and threatened Hundley never to give the sign for it,' says Nye. That knuckleball would later be the right-hander's meal ticket to a solid career containing 221 major league wins. Leo liked conventional, meat-and-potatoes pitching."<sup>97</sup>

What Chaerbaut fails to mention is that Niekro got a reasonable shot before leaving Chicago and did not win as many games again (14) until 1978, after P.K. Wrigley passed away, and Leo retired for good. Durocher's meat-and-potatoes approach was the norm in baseball, and most sabermetric analysts tend to reflect that hard-throwing strikeout pitchers last longer, and produce better results by a substantial margin.

Junk ball pitchers do not have a long shelf life – and Leo probably saw more of them in his forty prior seasons to realize he dare not depend on one for a consistent 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> starter.

Quirky pitchers have survived; but they do not dominate the majority of pitching staffs as top-end or starting pitchers. Leo was undoubtedly searching for that 4<sup>th</sup> starter, and to his estimation, figured Joe Niekro was not that in 1969. Leo was not proven 'wrong' about Niekro until 9 years, and four team hats later.

Another vociferously negative ex-Cub pitcher veterinarian Rich Nye, was given his time in Chicago to excel under Durocher, but was not the pitcher for the 4<sup>th</sup> spot either. After receiving 57 starts over 4 seasons (1966-69), Nye finished out a mediocre career in 1970 with the Cardinals and Expos. But to hear the story from him alone, Durocher was mistreating him. "Durocher couldn't communicate with young players,' Nye points out. 'In fact, the way we found out where we stood was through the papers.'"<sup>98</sup> Nye engages in plenty of berating of Durocher's tactics with regards to pitching in Talley's and Chaerbaut's books – but never seemed to get his own baseball career on track. Nye later recounts how Durocher turned to Hundley, his signal caller, to tell him how a pitcher was doing.

This philosophy is not unusual if you understand later the same Hundley was a difference maker calling the game when he went down due to injury in 1970. Without Hundley, the Cubs were not the same pitching staff as Chaerbaut reflects in his 1970 analysis. With Hundley that season, the Cubs recorded a 3.45 ERA in his 87 games. They mustered only a 4.12 ERA without him.<sup>99</sup> It seems Durocher was only intelligent if he solely made the decision, but relying on the catcher's opinion was somehow wrong to do. Though Hundley was well thought of, so much so, that he was the Cubs' representative in the Players' Association– even as Leo thoroughly despised the union, he still respected Hundley's intellect, and turned to the backstop for the pitcher's in-game condition.

Nye's career reflects he was not the answer Leo likely wanted him to be and Randy Hundley's opinion of a pitcher's stuff was as inherently sound as his game calling skills. Nye's comments throughout *Durocher's Cubs* are driven more by a personal vendetta than any legit argument that his baseball skills were ultimately important to the 1969 Cubs.

With two options tried, Durocher turned to Dick Selma acquired from San Diego for Joe Niekro and Gary Ross in late April to fill the 4<sup>th</sup> spot. Selma put up adequate numbers (10-8, 3.63) for the job he was asked to do in 1969. GM John Holland likely could take credit for filling in this gap – if only waiting until the end of April to have a fourth man.

### Who's The GM?

Once again Claerbaut creatively portrays John Holland as a suddenly better GM in his dealings while Durocher was in town, opining that, "Holland, a quiet, nondescript man who preferred the background, did little to quell Leo's less than subtle attempts at claiming hegemony. Nonetheless, it was Holland who pulled the trigger on the trades involving the reshaping of the team."<sup>100</sup> But earlier Claerbaut stated: "It was Durocher again, recognizing the potential of Jackie Robinson, who openly resisted the prevailing racism of his day...Furthermore, although GM John Holland had a strong hand in acquiring much of the young talent mentioned, it was Durocher who had the ability to sniff out their true value and the resourcefulness to deploy them effectively."<sup>101</sup>

Does it seem more logical that a "nondescript man" would be responsible for all the wheeling and dealing to obtain, insert, or swap around players, or a man with a driven to win-at-all-costs-attitude who had picked out superstars and utilized them quickly in winning games and pennants before? GM John Holland had over a decade of experience running the Cubs from the mid-1950s to the middle 1960s, and had traded away marquee talent, and done little before to prove his understanding of winning operations.

And as discussed, Holland's nondescript-ness permeated the franchise and its woes.

Meanwhile, Durocher was new to Chicago, and with little ado, was winning with numerous players acquire around a small nuclei of solid performers. Shortly after his hiring, in December 1965 the Cubs acquired SP Bill Hands and C Randy Hundley for Closer Lindy McDaniel, OF Don Landrum, and P Jim Rittwage. The Cubs obtained the better of the deal, a unique change for the franchise, while San Francisco would only benefit from McDaniel's arm for 2 ½ seasons. Does Holland get the credit, or Durocher?

Durocher had seen the Cubs for thirty-plus seasons upfront on the field and off the field winning or splitting the head-to-head 13 out of 19 seasons as manager. It makes more

sense to say Durocher had a weighty hand in discussing who was coming to town, and what exactly he planned on doing with them. It makes much more sense that Holland deferred to him when logically it suited the needs of the team – in picking out trade targets, or releasing players Durocher did not see a future for as a ballplayer. (Even Ernie Banks, Mr. Cub, was given short thrift by Durocher, while looking to supplant Banks. Banks' career as a first sacker is termed as "hang around value"<sup>102</sup> in Bill James' *Historical Baseball Abstract*.)

**Table.** Leo's Head-to-Head with Cubs over 19 seasons

(**Note:** 1948 counts for both clubs, with a 22-22 overall record)

<u>Managed</u>	<u>Tenure</u>	<u>Won</u>	<u>Lost</u>	<u>Win %</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Dodgers	1939 -1948	87	89	0.4943	Dodgers lost key personnel to WWII, Cubs didn't
Giants	1948 -1955	114	84	0.5758	Most dominate: 1950,1951 and 1954
Astros	1972 -1973	15	12	0.5556	Likely includes wins as Cubs manager (defeats)
	Overall	216	182	0.5427	

GM John Holland is described as an Oklahoman than carried forth the usual prejudices of his day. His day being the 1930s and 1940s, with the coded meaning of biased toward outspoken black ballplayers. Leo, on the other hand, was certainly color-blind<sup>103</sup>, and/or win-biased.

Once again, the contrast between two men: one who had won a World Series with little upheaval over using star African-American ballplayers (1954 New York Giants: Mays, Irvin, and Thompson) and the Cubs organization that had brought black ballplayers along only if they were not considered 'trouble.' As a result, though Ernie Banks, Billy Williams, and Fergie Jenkins starred for them, none were verbally outspoken during the late 1960s, per say, at a time when such opinions were considered the norm of the generation. Even a raw 19-year-old OF Oscar Gamble was likely traded away as a result of dating Caucasians after the 1969 season.<sup>104</sup> (Gamble hit 200 home runs in playing 17 'half seasons' as a DH/OF with (James) rating him at #103 amongst Right Fielders in 2001.)

Leo cared only if a ballplayer could help him, not about his race. Holland's record before Leo's arrival, and subsequently thereafter, cannot be seen as free of bias, or knowledge of winning.

### Show Me The 1930s

Leo's main weakness was generational, as a 60-year-old managing twenty-to thirty-year old men, who never had won a title in Chicago during the Vietnam War and the birth of the *Counterculture* generation. He was a company man – adhering to a pro-management philosophy, instead of an undying support of players and their concerns – thus often

running at odds to the new emphasis on player's rights, and contract concerns. (The Cubs were, as an organization, anti-union, voting initially to reject Marvin Miller's appointment as lead spokesman for the Player's Association in 1966.)

Leo had long been in close proximity to the top of the teams he served on. Going back to his playing days in Cincinnati, he made it a personal philosophy to get close to the ownership and the top baseball men (Ed Barrow recommended Leo to McPhail<sup>105</sup>), thus he never was going to be a player's friend when it came to any shortcomings on the field, or contract complaints off of it. Being paid well (tops in the majors in 1947 at \$60,000), producing results (winning world series as a player and manager) and looking good (marrying a Hollywood starlet) were Leo's main concerns. That was not always said about the Cubs' organization, a mainly staid and safe organization.

John Holland served on the board of directors for the Cubs after his GM days, until his passing in 1979. During his nearly quarter century Cubs' affiliation, Holland never assisted in the winning of a division, finishing closest (2<sup>nd</sup>) under the management of Leo Durocher and his 1972 replacement Whitey Lockman. Lockman took over the Cubs in 1973, led them to the all-too-familiar cellar in the next two seasons, and never managed again. (Lockman played 1<sup>st</sup> base and outfield under Leo Durocher from 1948-1955.)

After Leo Durocher left town, the Cubs were banished back to mediocre performances, and trading away good talent while John Holland ran the show abysmally until 1976. It wouldn't be until Dallas Green came to town with Jim Frey (World Series opposing managers in 1980) that the Cubs were finally in first again. Time stood still for Leo's generation – and Holland's too.

### How Do You Spell Relief?

Problems surrounding the usage of the bullpen ignores the fact little was done by the general manager to acquire a mid-season stopper to support Phil Regan. In the 1969 season, two former Cubs, Ron Perranoski and Jim Brewer, were having excellent years and their presence undoubtedly was the deciding difference in close games that the Cubs now found themselves fighting in.

36-year-old journeyman knucklerballer Ken Johnson was brought over from the Yankees in a purchase on August 11<sup>th</sup>. That was it for relief pitching additions between May and October of 1969. (Of course the Cubs were dominate in the until the August.)

The Cubs bullpen was headed up by Regan at 32, Ted Abernathy at 36, and Hank Aguirre at 37 with Don Nottebart at 33, and the aforementioned Ken Johnson rounding out the old-timers. 25-year-old lefty Rich Nye was a swingman, pitching as a starter five times,



and twenty-nine other occasions as a reliever. Durocher likely lost confidence in Nye – he allowed 13 home runs in 68.2 innings or 1.7 dingers per nine innings – over using Regan who allowed only 6 home runs in 112 innings, but kept the ball in the park. Rich Nye was tagged with a 5.11 ERA, and didn't strikeout many hitters. Overall, Regan, Abernathy, and Aguirre combined to allow only 14 home runs in 252.3 innings. Using a 'Nye type' results in nearly 50 home runs in 250 innings. No way Leo buys into that managerial career ender.

Durocher lacked patience with youthful pitchers, that is the norm of older managers, what can be noted is that of the ones that made appearances – Joe Decker, Dave Lemonds, Gary Ross, Archie Reynolds, Jim Colborn, and Alec Distaco – none had a significant impact in the majors other than Joe Decker. Decker started 17 games in 1970 for the Cubs, but failed to impress with high walks (56) and hits (108) in 109 innings. It wasn't until 1973 that Decker won in double digits for Minnesota. He followed it up with another solid year (16-14, 3.29 ERA), but that was all for him. The remaining players never amassed much of a major league career.

Phil Regan was the best of available options in Durocher's mind. In 1966, while managed by Walter Alston, Regan as the Dodgers first-year closer appeared in 65 games for 116.2 innings at a 1.62 ERA. Durocher saw this performance repeat in 1967 triggering a trade for Regan and 1B Jim Hickman in 1968, giving up OF Ted Savage and P Jim Ellis, neither player made an impact for the Dodgers, or anybody else. Durocher was hard pressed to do much better in his bullpen given that Abernathy and Aguirre were also trade acquisitions made shortly before 1969 season.

Leo Durocher ran out of options; became scared of young pitchers that gave up home runs, or lacked a killer instinct; and likely abused the ones he counted on the most via the trades he pulled. But in comparison to the 1969 Mets pitching staff, Durocher was playing with a meager deck.

### Met Pitching Power

The Mets had for starting pitchers: Tom Seaver, Jerry Koosman, Don Cardwell, Jim McAndrew, and Gary Gentry, working a five-man rotation. The top three, Seaver, Koosman, and Gentry threw 748 innings between them. Chicago's big three racked up 872.2 innings, obviously a wide disparity, due to Durocher using a four-man setup, like the usually vaunted Dodgers, while most other teams had trouble finding four, or even five men to start twenty games.

What is missing from the Cubs, and added to the Mets, is a key component of the bullpen: swingmen.

The New York Mets had Tug McGraw and Nolan Ryan working as both starters and relievers to the tune of a 15-6 record, and 13 saves with a sparkling 2.84 ERA. Both had great careers as their lifetime numbers reflect. McGraw finished with a 3.13 ERA in 1,516 IP with 180 Saves, and 89 lifetime wins from the pen. Nolan Ryan struggled through control issues to become the all-time strikeout king, and winner of 300 games. None of the Cubs pitchers amassed more wins, or saves in their careers. (And these were your bullpen pitchers!)

Aside from those contributions, Ron Taylor and Cal Koonce were both veteran bullpen guys still in their late twenties, and effective. Together they saved twenty more games for the Mets, giving them four consistent options. Lefty Jack Dilauro had twenty-three appearances (four starts) for 63.7 innings at 2.40 ERA – only to pitch one more season before leaving the majors. With the sheer talent of two, and the effectiveness of the other three, Gil Hodges had an easy time picking whom to run out to the mound after Seaver, Koosman, or Gentry, because all were solid options.

The Mets balanced the load on their bullpen, but every arm they used was younger, more talented, and more effective than the Cubs. In fact, the Cubs had more men (17) to (15) for the Mets thrown in ballgames. Durocher was impulsive, but given the careers of those he gave up on, one can hardly argue Leo was negligent in his overall assessment of their talent. None of the Cubs pitchers but the Big Three (Jenkins, Holtzman, and Hands) were effective after the 1969 season.

The Cubs' best options only racked up 68 wins while the Mets' top slabmen accounted for 75 wins, almost the exact margin of error for the division. (Atlanta got to 80 wins with their best.) And Chicago had plenty of company in sending men the distance in ballgames. San Francisco led the way. Even the Mets were heavy in complete games, and led the league in win percentage (.610) out of their starters.

The 5<sup>th</sup> starter/bullpen losses of Chicago (22) were too much given the Mets' dominance from their staff. (**See:** Tables below.)

**Table. NL Pitching Staffs (10 Starts or More)**

Atlanta		Chicago		Cincinnati		Houston	
Player	GS	Player	GS	Player	GS	Player	GS
Niekro	35	Jenkins	42	Merritt	36	Lemaster	37
Reed	33	Hands	41	Cloninger	34	Dierker	37
Jarvis	33	Holtzman	39	Maloney	27	Wilson	34
Pappas	24	Selma	25	Arrigo	16	Griffin	31
Stone	20	<b>Total GS</b>	147	Nolan	15	Ray	13
<b>Total GS 145</b>				Fisher	15	<b>Total GS</b>	152
				Culver	13		
				<b>Total GS</b>	156		

Los Dodgers		Montreal		New York		Philadelphia	
Player	GS	Player	GS	Player	GS	Player	GS
Sutton	41	Stoneman	36	Gentry	35	Jackson	35
Osteen	41	Robertson	27	Seaver	35	Fryman	35
Singer	40	Wegener	26	Koosman	32	Wise	31
Foster	15	Renko	15	Cardwell	21	Johnson	21
Drysdale	12	Reed	15	McAndrew	21	Champion	20
<b>Total GS 149</b>		Waslewski	14	Ryan	10	<b>Total GS</b>	142
		Jaster	11	<b>Total GS</b>	154		
		Grant	10				
		<b>Total GS</b>	154				


Pittsburgh		San Diego		San Francisco		St. Louis	
Player	GS	Player	GS	Player	GS	Player	GS
Veale	34	Kirby	35	Marichal	36	Gibson	35
Ellis	33	Niekro	31	McCormick	28	Briles	33
Blass	32	Santorini	30	Bolin	22	Carlton	31
Bunning	25	Kelley	23	Sadecki	17	Washburn	16
Moose	19	Sisk	13	<b>Total GS</b>	103	Torrez	15
Walker	15	<b>Total GS</b>	132			Taylor	13
<b>Total GS 158</b>						Giusti	12
						<b>Total GS</b>	155

The fault should be shared between Leo's overusing Regan late in season, and the Cubs' inability to acquire a difference maker to support the pitching corps before 1969 and during the early part of the season. Where then was GM John Holland when they needed him to find another starter/reliever?

**Table.** NL Starting Staffs Won-Loss Record (10 Starts or more)

Team	Wins	Losses	CG	IP	Win %
ATL	80	59	38	1140 1/3	0.576
CHN	68	50	57	1041 1/3	0.576
CIN	61	57	23	1033 1/3	0.517
HOU	68	54	50	1078 1/3	0.557
LAN	65	58	46	1095 1/3	0.528
MON	38	82	26	1027 1/3	0.317
NYN	75	48	50	1124 2/3	0.610
PHI	52	69	45	965 1/3	0.430
PIT	68	59	39	1099	0.535
SDN	29	72	14	881 1/3	0.287
SFN	63	49	68	1106 1/3	0.563
SLN	75	61	62	1244 1/3	0.551

**Diagram.** Comparison of 1969 Cubs and Mets Pitching Staffs



## Cubs' September Swoon and The Mets' Boom and Doom Them

Going into September, the Cubs were 82-51 and the Mets were 76-54. The Cubs came off an 18-11 mark in August; the most wins they had in the summer just to finish 10-19 in September, and October. The Mets ran off to 24-8 in the final frame, including 3 of 4 from the Cubs in two series. But the most telling breakdown comes in the analysis of the pitching and 1-run ballgames and shutouts between the two teams.<sup>106</sup>

**Table.** Comparison of 1969 Cubs and Mets Final Month

September/October Games	Cubs	Mets
1-Run Game Record	4-4	<b>9-1</b>
2-Run Game Record	3-4	4-3
Team Shutouts Pitched	0	<b>10</b>
Blowouts (lost by 4 or more)	7	4
Runs Allowed per game	<b>4.71</b>	<b>2.5</b>
Runs Scored per game	3.32	3.78
Projected (actual Win %)	.331 (.341)	.695 (.750)

The Mets were extremely hot during the month of September, amassing 10 shutouts in 32 contests. Project that over a season, and you get 50 shutouts. The team record for total shutouts (32) was set by the 1906 Chicago White Sox, 1907 and 1909 Chicago Cubs during the glory days of both franchises, and incidentally, the last time the Chicago Cubs won a World Series.

The Mets since that extremely pitcher-friendly era (pre-1920) are tied for second behind the 1968 Cardinals (30) with their 28 goose eggs in 1969. The Cubs had a very comparable 22 shutouts, but none in that final month. While the Mets rode their aces Seaver (6-0, 2 shutouts), Cardwell (3-1, 2 shutouts), Koosman (5-1, 3 shutouts), and Gentry (4-0, 3 shutouts) to glory, the Cubs' horses were lassoed by Steve Blass, Doc Ellis, Jim Maloney, Mudcat Grant, Steve Carlton, Bob Gibson, and Tom Seaver.

The Cubs were adequate in 1-run games, a fair measure of success or failure among elite teams, posting a 4-4 record. The Mets though were otherworldly, going 9-1 for the month. This difference alone, five games, accounts for most of the 8 games the Cubs trailed at the end of the season. The Mets were less dominating in 2-run games, owing to their lack of a premier offense, while the Cubs did muster a respectable, if mediocre, 3-4 record.

Of the Cubs last 19 defeats, seven were by 4 or more runs, giving little hope of miraculous comebacks via some managerial maneuvering. This shows a complete failure by the team, mostly from the pitching staff.

The Cubs' offense was held to zero or one run 6 times and 16 times to less than three runs in 29 games. Leaving 13 times where they scored 4 or more. The Mets scored less than three runs 16 times in 32 games. The biggest difference: Mets won three times by 1-0 scores and twice 2-0. Five wins with 7 total runs scored accounts for 38% of their close wins.

The overall difference in run differential (-1.39 for the Cubs, +1.28 for the Mets) accounts for the drastic change in fortunes of the teams. It reflects the actual greater importance of masterful pitching over having more offense. The Cubs bats did go cold; however, dismissing the lack of quality pitching performances down the stretch from the Cubs is not at all valid.

### A Brief Psychology Portrait of Leo Durocher

Understandably, author Claerbaut tries hard to portray Durocher as a simple and sociopathic-like man by making these points:

Most writing about Leo is far more descriptive than analytical, driven by either the writer's admiration or more likely contempt for him, rather than by an effort to understand. (pg. 22)

Durocher clearly suffered from a severely addictive personality, a major key to understanding so many of his often, self-destructive antics.

Adventurous sex was another apparent high for Leo (pg. 23)

Impulsivity and impatience (pg. 24)

Little man from West Springfield could not abide anything other than being the center of attention. (pg. 25)

Research on addictive personalities is replete with references to shaky self-esteem and emotional insecurity. (pg. 25)

The unvarnished reality is that under all the smoke and fire, Leo Durocher was hardly a complex entity. (pg. 27-28)

Granted, the doctor knows his psychology, but does the mental quirks of one manager that does not bat, or run, or throw, have as much to do with the end results of a season? Most analysis done on field management reflect a few things:

A new manager to a team can get a significant bump in performance (more than 5 wins) just by installing a different philosophy from the last man in the job

Maneuvers (trades and player promotions/switches) either prior to, or during the season, can be the critical asset a manager can bring into a team and move the win column upward.

The day-to-day is overvalued due to sportswriters' need to critique and make copy

Once installed for several years, a manager is only as good as his overall talent – as routines are set, and motivating tools have marginal effects on the team's success

If *Durocher's Cubs* misses the point of Durocher's career, it mistakes his personal faults and flaws as a human being as undeniable proof of Durocher's total mismanagement of the 1969 Cubs, and beyond. Durocher could have mismanaged every game of that season – in as much as role players projected a greater voice against Durocher than the stars – but are his personal flaws (in totality) relevant to the analysis of the 1969 season by Claerbaut?

No.

What really comes through is the rehash of sacred cow sportswriters, bitter, old part-time players, and numerous young fans now grown up who look for a particular scapegoat in Durocher, yet almost ignore the simplest, most important fact of baseball: the men on the field decide the outcome of every game. And certain shortcomings existed in the Cubs' personnel before the season was even started – and those weaknesses caught up to them by the law of averages.

In *Our Chicago Cubs*, Fergie Jenkins stated: "Leo was playing most of the veterans because he had more confidence in them. I think that we didn't have a strong bench but if you look at the Mets...they started a string of games – they won like 30 of 37...And they were the only team in baseball that had a five-man [starting] rotation."<sup>107</sup> In another quote: "We had some solid athletes...but we were a little short in the bullpen and in the infield..."<sup>108</sup> And finally, "You know, Leo couldn't play for us."<sup>109</sup>

Dick Selma, who played just that one season for the Cubs, recounted what he thought of Leo as a very typical manager who did not play youngsters and chew ass as good as anyone when mistakes were made. Yet, the day after, Leo forgot the mistake and moved on.

Selma's most pointed statement came about sportswriters, "Most sportswriters, and I shouldn't say most, I should say 99% of all sportswriters do not print the truth."<sup>110</sup> By Selma's estimation, the ideas sportswriters have are intermingled with a quote or two from a player, turn of a phrase and presto! You get a different meaning. And that was done often in 1969 in the twilight of the season.

Selma's short stay in Chicago likely gives the clearest examination of situation, not tainted by media bias, or cozy relationships of any nature. His days as a Cub were not seen through any prism of Chicago bleacher fans, sportswriter deadlines, or the 20/20 blame-game, rather, just a player who got dropped into the midst of a pennant chase.

### The Weak & Weary

Success or failure is uniquely driven by the outcomes of countless situations. There have been countless teams whose mere presence on a diamond meant a nearly insurmountable obstacle for their opponents. The Cubs were not that. If anything, Durocher was lacking a meaningful bench, a strong bullpen, a centerfielder, and decided to overuse his best players hoping they would make it 162 games. Managers and teams have done it - that has happened before for those that play the game regularly.

(**By comparison:** Leo's 1954 Giants deployed Dusty Rhodes hitting .333 off the bench with 15 dingers, 50 runs batted in, 31 runs scored in only 164 at bats. Marv Grissom (53 Relief Appearances, 19 saves, 122 IP, 2.35 ERA, 10 Wins), Hoyt Wilhelm (57 RA, 7 SV, 111.3 IP, 2.10 ERA, 12 Wins) and Windy McCall (29 RA, 2 SV, 61 IP, 3.25 ERA, 2 Wins) provided good options behind starters Johnny Antonelli, Ruben Gomez, Sal Maglie, and Don Liddle. Willie Mays won the MVP, Male Athlete of the Year award, and made *The Catch*. Was Leo wrong that year too?)

**Table.** 1969 Chicago Cubs Bench Players (Bold indicates traded mid-season)

Player	AB	H	HR	RBI	R	POS	PH	AB
Rick Bladt	13	2	0	1	1	1B	0	1
Oscar Gamble	71	16	1	5	6	<b>CF</b>	0	0
Johnny Hairston	4	1	0	0	0	C/LF	1	1
<b>Jimmie Hall</b>	24	5	0	1	1	<b>CF</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Adolfo Phillips</b>	49	11	0	1	5	<b>CF</b>	0	4
<b>Paul Popovich</b>	154	48	1	14	26	2B/3B/SS	<b>8</b>	<b>25</b>
Jim Qualls	120	30	0	9	12	<b>CF</b>	2	4
Ken Rudolph	34	7	1	6	7	C/LF	3	10
Willie Smith	195	48	9	25	21	1B/LF	12	40
Al Spangler	213	45	4	23	23	RF	1	26
Don Young	272	65	6	27	36	<b>CF</b>	0	0
<b>Bench Totals</b>	1149	278	<b>22</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>138</b>		<b>32</b>	<b>133</b>
<b>Overall BA</b>	<b>0.242</b>							
<b>Pinch Hit BA</b>	<b>0.241</b>							



Billy Williams played all 162 games as he had in several seasons before. His performance down the stretch was considered among the best of all the Cubs. Bill Hands went (4-3) in the late going, losing tough outings by a shutout, one and then, two runs. Their teammates faltered; thus utilizing the typical excuses that belie the performances seen from April to August. Those excuses come with the Cubs franchise all too often: too many day games, circadian adjustments after road trips, wind blowing in, or wind blowing out, too hot in the summer, and a penny-pinching ownership.

But maybe the 1969 Cubs just did not have *it*.

**Table.** Comparison of Overuse of Players in 1969

<u>Chicago 1969</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>AB</u>	<u>BB</u>	<u>SF</u>	<u>POS</u>
Don Kessinger	158	730	664	61	5	SS
<b>Billy Williams</b>	162	704	642	59	3	OF
<b>Ron Santo</b>	160	685	575	96	14	3B
<b>Ernie Banks</b>	155	614	565	42	7	1B
Randy Hundley	151	586	522	61	3	C
Glenn Beckert	131	572	543	24	5	2B
Jim Hickman	134	389	338	47	4	OF
Don Young	101	310	272	38	0	OF
<u>Willie Smith</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>221</u>	<u>195</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>OF/1B</u>
<b>Average</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>535</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>4.7</b>	
<u>Cincinnati 1969</u>						
<b>Pete Rose</b>	156	721	627	88	6	2B/OF
<b>Tony Perez</b>	160	699	629	63	7	3B
Bobby Tolan	152	666	637	27	2	OF
<i>Lee May</i>	158	659	607	45	7	1B/OF
<b>Johnny Bench</b>	148	588	532	49	7	C
Alex Johnson	139	559	523	25	11	OF
Tommy Helms	126	499	480	18	1	2B/SS
<u>Jimmy Stewart</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>241</u>	<u>221</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2B/SS/3B/OF</u>
<b>Average</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>579</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>41.8</b>	<b>5.3</b>	

The table above reflects that the Cincinnati Reds were also ‘abusers’ of their best performers, even more so than the Cubs. Each has 3 HOF position players (technically, two apiece) that were used heavily. Among non-pitchers that played over 100 games, the Reds averaged 6 more games per player, and 44 more plate appearances.

But their 89-73 record and 3<sup>rd</sup> place finish in the NL West was due to a lack of quality starting pitching. Cincinnati led the NL in runs scored by a wide margin (798 to 725), but also gave up the 2<sup>nd</sup> most runs (768 to 791.) This points again to another primary argument made by critics: that Leo was doing things abnormal for the league. He was not.

### The Big Red ‘Workhorse’ Machine

In 1975, at the height of the Big Red Machine, the Reds played Boston and won in 7 games with a heavy dosage of Pete Rose, Joe Morgan, and Johnny Bench. Their regular season

record of 108-54 under Sparky Anderson rates amongst the best teams ever assembled. (See: Dynasties.)

**Table** below reflects their moderate abuse compared to Boston's. Manager Sparky Anderson used only 29 players the entire year. A total in the 21<sup>st</sup> century that is a near impossibility.

In both years (1969 & 1975), Pete Rose was the No. 1 abused player, getting plenty of plate appearances, and bringing up the average PA of the Reds by 15-20 per player.

This author wonders: would Pete have hit better with more games off?

**Table.** Lineups of the 1975 World Series Teams

<b><u>Boston 1975</u></b>	<b><u>G</u></b>	<b><u>PA</u></b>	<b><u>AB</u></b>	<b><u>POS</u></b>
Rick Burleson	158	<b>634</b>	580	SS
<b>Carl Yastrzemski</b>	149	<b>632</b>	543	1B/DH/OF
<b>Jim Rice</b>	144	<b>608</b>	564	OF/DH
<b>Fred Lynn</b>	145	596	528	OF/DH
Dwight Evans	128	461	412	DH/OF
Rico Petrocelli	115	448	402	3B/DH
Bernie Carbo	107	405	319	OF/DH
Cecil Cooper	106	327	305	1B/DH
<u>Doug Griffin</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>307</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>SS/2B</u>
<b>Boston Average</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>438</b>	
<b><u>Cincinnati 1975</u></b>				
<b>Pete Rose</b>	162	<b>752</b>	662	3B/OF
<b>Joe Morgan</b>	146	<b>636</b>	498	2B
<b>Johnny Bench</b>	142	<b>603</b>	530	1B/C/OF
<b>Tony Perez</b>	137	571	511	1B
Dave Concepcion	140	550	507	SS/3B
Cesar Geronimo	148	550	501	OF/DH
Ken Griffey Sr.	132	533	463	OF/DH
<u>George Foster</u>	<u>134</u>	<u>508</u>	<u>463</u>	<u>OF/1B</u>
<b>Cincy Average</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>588</b>	<b>517</b>	

### It Ain't Over, 'Til It's Over

In 1951, Leo Durocher was on the opposite end of the comeback equation as New York Giants staged a 13-½ game resurrection to force a 3-game playoff against the despised Dodgers. In beating the Dodgers, they overcame a better team on paper. But the game is not played on paper, only discussed via books, newspapers, radio and other media outlets.

What is often forgotten is that the Chicago Cubs still had to play a divisional series against Atlanta, if they had won the NL East. They were good against Atlanta (9-3) in 1969, but playoffs are a different animal. The Mets went (8-4) against Atlanta only to sweep them in 3 slugfests: 9-5, 11-6, 7-4. A far cry from the 1-0, 2-1, and 3-2 ballgames they usually participated in down the stretch of 1969. There is no way to assert the results if the Cubs had played in that playoff series. Or what their fate again could be against a superior

Baltimore team that saw the Mets quickly outperform Baltimore's aces after game one: 2-1, 5-0, 2-1, and 5-3.

The season that was 1969 fell on more than one man as the sole blame. Leo Durocher made enemies of the sportswriters (always a bad tact), needled young players (that have made their feelings well known later), and drove a team too hard in the end. His management style worked in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, yet lost its veneer of polish in the late 1960s, with players fighting for more freedom and respect from many accounts. Leo's mistakes though were hardly the only reason the Cubs lost anything.

The players, Ernie Banks for one, went ice cold for nearly an entire month. Fergie Jenkins came back on 2 days rest (September 9<sup>th</sup>) to face Seaver and lost 7-1. (Leo's last desperate attempt to right the ship.) Tom Seaver went that day on only 3 days rest, in a five-man rotation. (The Mets were in the midst of a 10-game win streak.) Each probably knew that was the turning point of the season – and one showed up, the other did not. Both had HOF careers.

The Cubs lost 11 out of 12 games from September 3<sup>rd</sup> through the 15<sup>th</sup>. In that stretch they lost 3 1-run ballgames but were blown out five times. The metal of the Chicago Cubs was not forged in prior success, or around confidence from the players. Leo had lost them – in just a matter of weeks – though the signs by sportswriter's accounts were there in July. But in July, the Cubs players were doing advertisements and lapping up the praise of the fans. Leo was able to leave town to wed and visit his son-in-law. If anything, the club was too loose.

Yet those things were not the problem. The problem was on the field the Cubs lacked the confidence to right the ship, had never been in a real fight to the finish, and let outside influences project emotions into their psyche while playing.

As the oldest man on the field, Leo Durocher was detested by some of his younger hands, whose careers reflected their talent, and intimidated his better workhorses, who should have been able to adapt, and overcome.

He held the media in little regard and they gave him little back.

The fans were desperate for a winner; and the overblown feelings of being so close made this one season never to be forgotten by a generation.

But the fall was not one man's desire or flaws, but the product of plenty of forces in the perfect storm of ineptitude closing out a season, and a century of professional baseball.

## Tribune Company and Beyond

Since the Tribune Company took over, the Cubs have made the playoffs in 1984, 1989, 1998, 2003, 2007, and 2008. Likely what Commissioner Bud Selig and his blue-ribbon panel determined that a “regularly recurring reasonable hope of reaching post-season play.” But the sweet taste of each playoff was embittered either by a better team, or quirky events that cost the Cubs that hallowed World Series appearance.

This closeness (to a World Series) under their management has led to numerous firings, hirings, changed philosophies, and wild variations in salaries paid. The story is nearly as convoluted as the prior 50 years under the world of P.K. Wrigley. And includes as many wild schemes, poor drafting, poor trading, and unhappy players (and coaches) as the Wrigley reign did.

Starting with no-nonsense Executive VP/GM Dallas Green, the Cubs achieved their first playoff appearance only to fall short in a heartbreaking five games to San Diego. His trades and understanding of his prior team, Philadelphia, led to the addition of HOF 2B Ryne Sandberg as minor league player in Ivan DeJesus/Larry Bowa deal, then LF Gary Matthews, and CF Bob Dernier in late March 1984. These three batted #1, #2 and #3 for the Cubs in 1984, setting the table for that glorious run with an excellent .377 OBP.

In a risk-reward move, Green traded away SP Mike Krukow for pitchers Dickie Noles, Dan Larsen and a versatile hard-nose Texan in Keith Moreland, who batted #3, #4 or #5 in his six seasons as a Cub. ‘Zonk’ was never considered fast a foot (odd considering he was defensive back for football legendary coach Darryl Royal at Texas) but was a ‘gamer’<sup>111</sup> that made plays in the outfield, infield, and even a few behind the plate. For the Cubs, he was a do-it-all type that produced nice dividends at the plate.

With the Cubs always in need of a 3<sup>rd</sup> baseman after the Santo days, they added Ron Cey for a minor league pitcher and outfielder. The ‘Penguin’ usually provided ample power and consistent, if unspectacular, play at 3<sup>rd</sup> for four seasons. Topping it off with trades for pitching starters, Scott Sanderson, Steve Trout, Dennis Eckersley, and Rick Sutcliffe, the Cubs finally had a talented team.

The 1984 Cubs shook off the dust of the perennial loser; and went to a NL championship as a slight favorite. After demolishing the Padres at home by a combined score of 17-2, the Cubs headed west, to what John Kuenster’s book described perfectly: *Heartbreakers: Baseball’s Most Agonizing Defeats*.

The question of using Rick Sutcliffe in game four instead of saving him for a potential game five would be an issue bantered about for years to come. The Cubs manager, Jim

Frey, stated: "The biggest reason we're not bringing Sutcliffe back on three days' rest is that we're not yet in position where we have to do that. If we do...then we've got the right man at the right place."<sup>112</sup>

Instead after Eckersley lost game three, they brought back Scott Sanderson, whose back problems were well known. Sanderson pitched decently in game four, but left early in the fifth inning with the score locked at 3-3. In the ninth, Lee Smith gave up the game-winning home run to Steve Garvey, who had four hits that night. Smith was pitching through a pulled groin and rib cage strain that bothered him all season. As Smith put it: "I would try them again. [His pitches to Garvey.] Garvey is human; he can hit it or miss it. But it just was that the whole year wasn't good for me because of all the injuries...I didn't have to go out there. But I went out there for the team..."<sup>113</sup>

**Game Five:** With Sutcliffe on cruise control until the sixth, then HOF Tony Gwynn, Steve Garvey and Craig Nettles assisted in a two-run rally to pull close, 3-2. The Cubs were ahead on the homers of C Jody Davis and 1B Leon Durham, but in the latter's case, Leon made an error in the seventh, followed up by a bad hop grounder that ate up the always sure-fielding 2B Ryne Sandberg that propelled the Padres to a lead that cemented the series for the Padres. The Cubs threatened once more, only to watch ex-White Sox/Yankee Goose Goosage slam the door shut on potential game tying at bat by Gary Matthews with a strikeout.<sup>114</sup>

Cubs' 3<sup>rd</sup> sacker Ron Cey on the decision of Sanderson over Sutcliffe: "We had the knockout punch available for Game Four with Rick Sutcliffe. He was ready to pitch that game and San Diego would have to face a pitcher who had only lost one game all season...I would have preferred us to go after the title in Game Four with Sutcliffe, because once you get to a deciding game of a series, anything can happen...By saving Sutcliffe for Game Five, we gave San Diego hope and confidence."<sup>115</sup> Even Steve Garvey thought Trout was a tougher match up for Game Five, if Sutcliffe lost a Game Four.<sup>116</sup>

Before the sting of the 1984 NL championship series healed, Dallas Green resigned. Somehow the Tribune Company executives and Dallas Green's no-holds bar mentality conflicted over the growth of a solid organization from the major league team to the minors. Once again, as with the irascible Leo Durocher, Chicago fans lost more than it gain from the subtraction of Green for years to come.

Dallas Green was a director of Minor Leagues and Scouting in 1969 for Philadelphia and throughout the 1970s, thought this of the Cubs prior to his leadership: "And we just come to find out that they really had not done a good job in terms of their scouting and

development...They weren't very progressive and they just played the game of baseball. And as I said, accepted losing with gusto it seemed."<sup>117</sup>

After hiring Green, watching him successfully resurrect the team, and instill some pride in the organization, the Tribune's John Madigan told him about 'philosophical differences', and the plans to bring corporate executives into the baseball operations devoid of any baseball backgrounds. Dallas Green, Gordon Goldsberry, and Jim Snyder were key reasons behind the 80s Cubs' team success. (More can be learnt of their abilities and mentors, Hugh Alexander, legendary scout, from Kevin Kerrane's *Dollar Sign on The Muscle*.)

Maybe the more important outcome for the Cubs' future was the minor leagues were greatly assisted by short-time director Jim Snyder, hired by Dallas Green, that took the likes of P Greg Maddux, P Jaime Moyer, 1B Mark Grace, SS Shawn Dunston, and 1B/LF Rafael Palmeiro in the 1980s. But once Green's management was gone, the team fell on difficult times in producing talent, and went back to making weird trades and hiring charlatans guised as gurus.

#### Jim Frey Takes Control of the Wheel and Drives Off the Road

In 1984 June amateur draft, the Cubs drafted LF Rafael Palmeiro (22<sup>nd</sup> overall), Greg Maddux (2<sup>nd</sup> round) and Jamie Moyer (6<sup>th</sup> round). Rarely does a team hit the ultimate lottery of drafting a 3,000 hit/500-HR hitter, a 300-game winner, and a 250-game workhorse (and still going) in the same draft, but the Cubs did it during their first playoff season in 39 seasons. The chances of selecting three long-term stars are fairly slim given only 11% of draftees<sup>118</sup> will ever pick up the pea and fire it around the horn in a major league game. And of those who make it to 'The Show' maybe 10% will become steady everyday ballplayers for a decade thus making the odds just over 1% of getting one premier player in one amateur draft per MLB team. The Cubs beat those heady odds. According to Bill James' 2001 *Baseball Abstract*, Rafael Palmeiro (#6) and Greg Maddux (#10), were among the ten best players of the 1990s.<sup>119</sup>

Just two years earlier, the Cubs had selected New York City star Shawon Dunston as their future everyday SS with the 2<sup>nd</sup> overall pick. Though Shawon was not a superstar performer, or particularly sound in key situations, he was a durable, rocket-armed fielder that was tracked with the Shawon O' Meter, a creative batting average sign flashed in the left field bleachers during the Don Zimmer's tenure. He utilized good range and his arm to keep active would-be first sackers. In 1985, slick-fielding, .300 hitting 1B Mark Grace came into orbit with his 24<sup>th</sup> round draft selection. 'Amazing Grace' was all of that with

Dunston (winding up and throwing) but Grace ended up with more hits in the 1990s than any other player. (Batting a lot helps.)

With the stars aligning for the Cubs under Dallas Green's leadership, a solid future seemed assured if only left to time, and proper patience. But "frustration be thy name" as the Cubs floundered under the reins of Jim Frey, Al Goldis, Syd Thrift, and Larry Himes.

After unfortunate injuries to the entire starting pitching staff and key position players in 1985, the Cubs stepped backwards in 1986. GM Dallas Green remedied this by adding perennial All-star CF/RF Andre Dawson in March 1987 with assistant GM/SP Rick Sutcliffe adding his two cents. Dawson was originally scouted by Buck O'Neil only to go to the now oft-talented Expos as the Rookie of the Year in 1977. His five-tool prowess (7-time gold glove, power with moderate BA, and good speed early on) was translated into a home run bopper that signed for a meager, collusion-depressed salary (\$700,000) in 1987. (Many superstars at that point got 2-3 times that amount.)

While on bad knees, due to a decade on Astroturf, Dawson thrived on natural grass hitting 49 home runs. In what has become an all-time faux pas, the MVP went to Dawson on the last place Cubs while Ozzie Smith took the Cardinals back to the World Series.

This was Green's 2<sup>nd</sup>-to-last major move as future HOF closer Dennis Eckersley left a month later. Tribune Co. executives hounded Green about players' problems, and their salaries. (Eckersley was a heavy imbiber and made \$833,333 in 1987.) Cutting bait after a 6-11 W-L in the 1986 campaign seemed logical. The salary swap was sound – Eckersley for Dawson – but the lack of acquiring good talent was not. But this is just a small blemish on Green given his overall track record from 1982-1987. Eckersley was made over into a premier closer with a K/BB ratio that topped out at 18-to-1 in 1989-90 while saving 81 contests over the span. Eckersley compiled 387 saves after leaving the Cubs while all Cubs pitchers combined over the span would amass 402 saves (1988-1997).



**Hindsight 20/20?** : If only the Cubs knew what Oakland's then-manager Tony LaRussa and pitching coach Dave Duncan did about people management and situations. The Eck trade is averted; and the Cubs get a closer for a decade.

In 2007, St. Louis manager Tony LaRussa was pulled over for a DUI, leading one to wonder: did understanding come from personal experiences? George Will's 1990 *Men at Work* suggests not. "He does not drink."<sup>120</sup> Later, in the same passage, LaRussa said, "...I'm not even comfortable with Budweiser being advertised in our ballpark."<sup>121</sup> But people change; or the reflections do. Or Will was covering up for Larussa.

**Above:** *A rare breed*, LaRussa has won WS championships in both leagues. And has always had great 1<sup>st</sup> basemen around. (Picture Courtesy of Dirk Hansen)

After Green's departure, the Cubs made more bad deals. Partly satiated by the 1989 NL East divisional championship that convinced fans things were going to be different from now on.

### Bad Trades, Lost Players, and Weird Ideas (Part 2)

**Closer Lee Smith** for Boston pitchers Calvin Schiraldi and RP Al Nipper. New GM Jim Frey gladly traded Smith because of his training habits (wind sprints instead of jogging)<sup>122</sup> and 1984 NL playoff game four performance under Frey. As Fergie Jenkins remarked in *Wrigleyville*, "The bullpen is a predominant part of a ball club now. They are a force that the manager works all the time...all the strategy revolves around the bullpen. And the Cubs haven't understood that."<sup>123</sup> Lee Smith was certainly a force – and had some heart-stopping moments too – but left the Cubs an embittered player. He focused though and continued closing games to the tune of 266 additional saves and (446 lifetime) including many against the Cubs as a Cardinal.

Lee Smith in 1988 received \$850,000 in compensation while Al Nipper and Schiraldi salaries were \$604,500 to carry on the team. Neither Nipper nor Schiraldi were an answer to anything. In less than a year, the Cubs traded away two HOF-caliber closers for nothing of use in return. (Eckersley's trade produced OF Dave Wilder, INF Brian Guinn, and P Mark Leonette.) As a result, they compounded this mistake in the search for a viable closer.

**1B Rafael Palmeiro**, pitchers **Jamie Moyer** and Drew Hall for RP/Closer Mitch Williams, Steve Wilson, Paul Kilgus, and INF Curtis Wilkerson and two others. 'Wild Thing' Williams, though a good closer in 1989, was the goat of 1993 World Series giving up a homer to ex-Cub Joe Carter while Palmeiro turned into a 35-HR, 100 RBI force in the American League.



Jamie Moyer took several years to round into form (like Joe Niekro), but became a steady 15-game winner in the American League. The Cubs short-sightedness with both Eckersley and Smith was compounded further in sending away two future steady players. Rumors circulated that Palmeiro was embroiled in dalliance with another Cubs' wife, but this analysis will not go into any certainty of that fact. Jamie Moyer is still active in 2010!

**Greg Maddux** lost to free agency. Going on to win multiple Cy Young awards, then coming back to the Cubs at 38 years old, only to be traded again for weak-hitting, glove-only SS in Cesar Izturis. Maddux became the ace of the Atlanta staff from 1994-2000. The Cubs had the usual troubles of replacing his #1 arm. Izturis lasted approximately ½ a season before being traded to Pittsburgh. Meanwhile, Maddux pitched on in San Diego – and renegotiated another 1-year contract after his 2007 season. (Retiring with over 350 wins.)

Under the *Tribune* watch, the hiring of oddball characters (**Syd Thrift**: player development, Assistant GM) to utilize eye tests and balancing techniques on tires was employed in 1992 under GM Larry Himes, thus reinstalling the Cubs losing ways. Syd Thrift and Al Goldis provided a step backward in instituting a “School of Thieves” approach led by Al Goldis in 1993. The usage of balance drills on tires and plywood distracted players from their real goals. Goldis and CF great Jimmy Piersall never saw eye to eye on how to develop better players. And Doug Glanville, former No.1 Pick in 1991, struggled until Goldis was removed.<sup>124</sup> The use of “science” by Thrift was a bit too focused on mundane things; instead of improving the players they acquired via the draft. (Bill James is a more heavy-handed critic.)

Limited (if any) scouting of Latin America, until the late 1990s

Recycling and keeping of dinosauric scouts and techniques

Lack of an adequate front office and scouting department (even in 2009)

### Dusty, Prior and Wood: So close, yet so far away

In 2003, the confluence of Dusty Baker, who just took San Francisco to the World Series, the phenomenal ‘Kid K’ Kerry Wood, and Mark Prior led the Cubs to a 88-win year that raised the hopes of thousands of fans, hundreds of reporters, and one writer. As quickly as people can fall in love, they can become disenchanted, and soon, embittered, by the fiascos that dominated the Chicago Cubs from 2004-2006.

Dusty Baker came in as a savior, riding a horse of a consistent track record of handling baseball's most petulant 1990s star: Barry Lamar Bonds. The Giants won consistently behind Dusty, Bonds & Co. 103 games in 1993 in losing out to Atlanta and 95 wins only to

come up short in the 2002 World Series. But the Cubs swooped up Dusty to handle the ego and talent of Sammy Sosa, and drive the Cubs' herd to the promise land. By providence, the Cubs out pitched and out slugged their division to get to the playoffs only to see another implosion of epic baseball proportions as discussed earlier.

In 2004, with the disastrous post-season allegedly behind them, injuries to their newly minted aces, Prior and Wood, did not seem fair. Prior, who went 18-6 in 2003 after being drafted 2<sup>nd</sup> overall in 2001, found rough going as a rash of weird incidents and odd DL stints left fans scratching their heads. Since that 2003 season, Mark Prior won only 18 games while losing 17 for the Cubs – and was dumped into the “coulda, shoulda, but wasn't” dustbin.

Kerry Wood's 2004-2007 DL stints are less surprising given his Tommy John surgery in 1999, and poor pitching mechanics. Announcer Steve Stone, ex-Cub pitcher and 25-game winner with the Orioles in 1980, spoke often on WGN broadcasts of Wood's mechanics working against him sustaining a long career. As if foretelling the future, since amassing 420 innings in 2002 – 2003, Kerry Wood had only 36 total starts in three seasons, 2004-2006. Wood was assigned to bullpen duty permanently after rehabbing, and fixing his delivery for good. (On August 5, 2007, Wood made his 2007 relief debut. Then moved on to the Cleveland Indians after a decade of Cubs play.)

Meanwhile, the remaining starting pitching relying heavily on Carlos Zambrano and Greg Maddux, and the Cubs offense tied to low-OBP and high home run-producing players, the Cubs posted a winning record in 2004 (89-73), but faltered down the stretch again behind a shaky bullpen and cold bats in the last two weeks of the season.

In 2005 and 2006, they fought against the injury bug (the aforementioned starting pitchers, SS Nomar Garciaparra's groin, and 2005 batting champion 1B Derrek Lee going down with a broken wrist) and the wallet of the Tribune Company (with attendance over 3,000,000 for 3 straight seasons). In refusing to obtain help via free agency (and because talent in the minors was considerably thin), the Cubs posted miserable records while the division rivals Houston Astros and St. Louis Cardinals punched their World Series tickets.

Lacking difference makers, the 2005-2006 Cubs reverted back to the early 1990s teams with a topflight starting pitcher, a quality 1B, and a few other players of marginal value. (1991: Maddux, Grace, Sandberg, Dawson. 2005: Zambrano, Lee, Ramirez, Alou.)

## 2007-2009 Seasons: Spend, Sell, Boom, Bust to Who Knows?

After firing field manager Dusty Baker, it was Andy McPhail's turn as long-time Cubs chief of operations, son of American League President Lee McPhail, and a former architect of the championship winning Minnesota Twins of 1987 and 1991, to resign from team operations. His replacement, John McDonough, a long-time marketing guru, got the opportunity to remake the Cubs in an effort to make the team more attractive to potential buyers after the Tribune Company was put on the market in a hasty effort to get better stock value for the Chandler family, then the majority owners of the Tribune Company.

Samuel Zell, Chicago real estate magnate, put together an ESOP (Employee Stock Option Plan) to buy the Tribune, and looked to sell the team to any takers, after divesting of non-performing, and non-media related assets. (Zell sold off land in Hollywood and *Newsday* for over half billion dollars.)

Estimated selling price bantered around in 2008 for the Cubs: **\$850-1,000 million dollars.**

As a result of the put-in-play company, the pocketbook opened wide and deep to the tune of over \$300 million for the 2006-2007 hot stove league. The Cubs replaced two-fifths of their starting rotation, signed LF Alfonso Soriano to an 8-year, \$136 million contract, and resigned Aramis Ramirez for over \$70 million. With additional backup players the money spent amounted to three seasons worth of salaries for a top-10 payroll in the 2007 season.

Assigned to manage this hefty payroll is Lou Piniella. His prior successes as Cincinnati's World Series victor in 1990, and managing the Seattle Mariners was a known to the Cub faithful and 'Sweet Lou' had developed a style that is his own. As management expert Jeff Angus writes, "Lou Piniella is the master of one-year turnarounds." (Cincinnati, Seattle, Tampa Bay [After] working for the functionally socio-pathic Yankee owner.)<sup>125</sup>

But Lou also abused his pitchers: Randy Johnson, in particular, racked up high pitch counts while in Seattle. Something that Dusty Baker was accused (and convicted of) while in charge of his two frail starters.

After a tumultuous ride through the first two months of the 2007 season, – leading to a fist fight between staff ace Carlos Zambrano and soon-to-be traded catcher Michael Barrett, an ejection and suspension of Piniella, and a bench-clearing beanball thrown at Derrek Lee – the Cubs turned around their season in June and July to lead the NL Central by August.

In September, the Cubs continued to lead over the young-and-improved Milwaukee Brewers with 1B Prince Fielder hitting 50 home runs, becoming the youngest to ever accomplish the feat. (His father Cecil also hit 50 home runs.) Meanwhile, the Cubs broke their team record for most home runs in September, with Alfonso Soriano leading the way with 14 dingers, in breaking Ernie Banks mark for the month.

The Cubs eventually clinched the division on the road at Cincinnati, the sight of Lou Piniella's best managerial moments. But alas, the division series went south for the Cubs, as they slept-walk through three games against the pesky Arizona Diamondbacks. Crucially, in game one, Piniella pulled Carlos Zambrano after 6 innings, to bring him back on three days rest for game four, this while the game was tied 1-1. After young relief phenom Carlos Marmol allowed a home run, the game was lost, and the Cubs never saw a game four.

The 2008 Cubs proved there was more winning to come, racking up 97 wins. Yet, the results in the playoffs were much the same: Three and out.

They added in 2009 Japanese import Kosuke Fukudome, who for 60 to 70 games, was ultra patient, and wielded a good bat. But as teams figured out his holes, the average went south, and his flaws became all too apparent.

A blockbuster trade for Oakland's Rich Harden, a power pitcher but with fragility issues, brought life to the second half. Yet, as great as the regular season was, the playoffs again left faithful Cubs followers to scratch heads with all the joys sans the payoff they so yearn.

### The Search is Over

Thomas Ricketts and family purchased the Cubs for \$845 million in late August 2009, after the Tribune Company, in whole, fell \$13 Billion into debt. The Tribune Co. (Zell) still holds a minority stake in the club (5%) to avoid capital gains taxes.

The Ricketts have the Cubs, an empty chalice, until they put a World Series champion back in the city of the broad shoulders. Promises have been made to increase staffing (the Cubs have the 2<sup>nd</sup> smallest front office); to improve facilities (batting cages, locker rooms); to provide a financial foundation based on team success; and to emulate the successes of the Boston Red Sox on the field and off.

The promise land lay ahead; but for Cubs fans, mirages have been all too frequent. The sands of time flow on in the century-long quest for champagne on ice during a late October night in *Wrigleyville* to quench the thirsty Cubs faithful.

As it turns it, the next franchise provided the General Manager that broke the curse.

## Da Sox: Dismantling and Assembling a World Series Champion

After winning the last World War I World Series in 1918, the Red Sox seemed a lock to repeat as champions with the likes of pitching-slugging star Babe Ruth, 1B Harry Hooper, durable SS Everett Scott, starting pitchers Carl Mays, Joe Bush, Sad Sam Jones, and Dutch Leonard. This Red Sox pitching staff was young (all under 28) and dominating – leading MLB in Shutouts with 26, Complete Games with 105, 3rd in ERA at 2.31. Only Washington, behind the 326 innings of Walter ‘The Big Train’ Johnson, and Chicago, assisted by Hippo Vaughn, put up the same ERA numbers in a weakened baseball era due to wartime recruitment. With The ‘Work or Fight’ decree handed down by the country’s leaders.

But this success only gelled when new owner Harry Frazee hired Ed Barrow, a man unafraid to change the scenario in Boston. As a passage from *The Big Bam* reflects: “Owner Harry Frazee, theater promoter, hired the physically imposing, practical, straight arrow Ed Barrow to replace player/manager Jack Barry who was lost to the war effort. Barrow had bounced successfully from one station to another in his life, starting out in newspaper publishing in Des Moines, partnering in the hotel business in Pittsburgh, working as the manager of the Detroit Tigers in 1903 and 1904 and presiding over minor league affiliations, including the International League. Frazee nicknamed him ‘Simon,’ after the harsh slave owner in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* as a close representation of what Barrow's job was as the new manager in a chaotic season shortened by preparations for war entry.”<sup>126</sup> With his diversity of employment and his strict discipline, Barrow was able to mold the Red Sox further into a pennant winner and world champion.

The Red Sox had the best gloves, racking up a MLB leading .971 Fielding Average, which spoke well of their ability to stop runs, leading the majors in runs allowed at 380 runs in 126 games in 1918. With this marriage of fielding and strong pitching, the 1919 Boston Red Sox were set up well for another title run after the guns stopped shooting. As history tells us, the Red Sox floundered below .500 in 1919, allowing the White Sox to throw a World Series in the process.

But what can be firmly asserted is how one man solely came to represent the game: George Herman ‘Babe’ Ruth. In *Management by Baseball* author Jeff Angus summarizes the climatic shift that was the Babe’s momentum-changing influence:

“Major-league baseball in 1919-1920 was at a critical juncture, the first major turning point it had come to since the turn of the century. Rapid changes in the game on the field were triggered by the post-World War I economy and vastly altered social values. The pace of change was accelerated by ownership’s need to counter skepticism about the

sport that bubbled up in the wake of rumors about the 1919 World Series being thrown...environmental factors that made change desirable and possible.

That spark was the surprise hitting performance of a pitcher name Babe Ruth, and it was applied by the most important management innovator most management experts have never heard of: Ed Barrow...Ed Barrow managed the Boston Red Sox in 1918...[The] Red Sox had lost two well-regarded outfielders, Duffy Lewis and Tilly Walker – excellent players very similar to Andruw Jones and Bernie Williams at their peak...The 1918 team featured a glut of very good pitching (Carl Mays, Bullet Joe Bush, Dutch Leonard, Sad Sam Jones, Ruth), but hitting and defense...[had] less potency and was further weakened in the off-season...Barrow experimented with getting Ruth more appearances at the plate..."<sup>127</sup>

But even disagreement can be seen on exactly how Babe Ruth came to be used as a powerful hitter, as Montville Leigh tells in one passage: "[Ed] Barrow was convinced that Ruth stay a pitcher...Ruth let it be known that he liked to hit."<sup>128</sup> Not unusual with Ruth (or any other superstar in sports), that these two men rarely connected, as Leigh reflects further, "Barrow and Ruth rarely saw eye-to-eye on anything. Headstrong and opposites in life's outlook, these two fought over just where Ruth was most useful, with a spat one time ending in Ruth quitting the team after hitting his manager [Barrow] in the nose. All though was soon patched up after a discussion was brokered by Hooper and other teammates."<sup>129</sup>

What may be considered interesting is that Ed Barrow continued on with this handful-of-a-man derisively called, "The Big Monkey," on his future team.

### Yankees' Dominance, Courtesy of the Boston Red Sox

The New York Yankees made a series of moves with the Red Sox in the late 1910s to early 1920s that built their team up while leaving Boston in a state of complete futility. The first of these lopsided trades started with the exportation on July 29, 1919 of right-hand submarine SP **Carl Mays** for P Allan Russell, P Bob McGraw and **\$40,000**, a year before his beanball incident that killed a Cleveland star SS Ray Chapman in August 1920. Mays, a reticent loner, with only a desire to play ball from most accounts, did not disappoint the Yankees in coming over in 1919. He racked up 79 Wins with 89 Complete Games over 4 ½ seasons, twice going over 25 wins.

His trade partners struggled to a 18-26 W-L record in Boston with Bob McGraw coming back to New York in 1920 for 15 wild relief appearances before bouncing to the National League five years later.

**Babe Ruth** came to the Yankees for **\$125,000** (plus a **\$300,000 loan**)<sup>130</sup> secured by grounds at Fenway Park on January 3, 1920. (Author Seth Mnookin reports this was \$100,000 (p. 26) in December 1919 (p. 46) in *Feeding the Monster* (2006). The trade was discussed rather openly by Frazee in December, but consummated officially in January 1920.) No amount of written space here does justice to what Babe Ruth accomplished for the New York Yankees, or major league baseball in the 1920s and 1930s. The ‘Big Bam’, the ‘Sultan of Swat’, the ‘King of Crash’, the ‘Colossus of Clout’, and ‘The Babe’, all say more than enough about the prodigious talent Ruth brought to the Yankees.

The cost of the Babe’s trade [in 2005 dollars] is roughly \$1,357,500 (without the loan), a bargain to say the least. As Leigh Montville compares the Babe’s salary:

“A conversion system from the *American Institute of Economics Research* translates the Babe's [contract in 1922 of] \$52,000 into \$564,737.43 in 2005 dollars. Only two members of the 2005 New York Yankees, outfielder Bubba Crosby at \$322,950 and second baseman Andy Phillips at \$317,000, made less than \$564,737.43...[For the Babe] to make the same amount in 1922 dollars as Alex Rodriguez, Ruth would have had to sign for \$2,246,913.58. Baseball simply didn't pay that kind of money.”<sup>131</sup>

Frazee’s \$1,357,500 [in 2005 dollars] for the loss of 659 home runs, works out to just less than \$2,060 per dinger. Even in the 1920s, this amount was easily made up at the gate for a \$.50 ticket, a typical seat price. An underlying factor to cutting Ruth loose was that ‘The Babe’ was well versed in the idea of contract renegotiation as soon as 1919, at age 24. After signing for a three-year contract in 1918 for \$10,000 per annum (just an amazing amount to consider in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century), Ruth was back after the 1919 season wanting double that amount.<sup>132</sup> With his Ruthian antics already stretching the boundaries of the behavior at the beginning of the *Roarin’ Twenties* era, the issue of more money was certainly not what Harry Frazee was bargaining for this early in his ownership. Frazee soon disparaged his former ballplayer by bringing up all the episodes of petulance in the clubhouse, various tantrums, and the Babe’s growing appetite and corpulence.

Ed Barrow moved from Boston's leadership on the field to front office digs with the Yankees after the 1920 season. As Montville Leigh *The Big Bam* reflects:

“The biggest move was that Ed Barrow, no fool, had sent himself to New York. The Yankee business manager, Harry Sparrow, had died, and Barrow took himself out of the Boston dugout and back into the front office. He was back with the Babe, resurrecting their tenuous relationship, but more importantly he was back in a situation where his owners had cash...It is a baseball fact that the presence of money makes baseball executives smarter.”<sup>133</sup>

Soon after, December 15, 1920, Ed Barrow first transaction as a Yankee GM was to obtain 21-year-old pitcher **Waite Hoyt**, C **Wally Schang**, P Harry Harper and UT Mike McNally for C Muddy Ruel, 2B Del Pratt, OF Sammy Vick and P Hank Thormahlen from his former boss, Harry Frazee. Again the Yankees got a steal in securing starting pitcher Hoyt, who pitched consistently for Murderer's Row from 1921 to 1930, and Schang, as an everyday, solid-hitting and defensively sound backstop for five seasons (though he holds the AL record for most errors at 218). Schang was discovered by George Stallings of the 1914 Miracle Braves on the sandlots of New York in 1912<sup>134</sup> and manned three different championship teams; the 1913 A's, 1918 Red Sox, and 1923 Yankees, all winners, with him as the trusted backstop.

Waite Hoyt is considered No.78 on Bill James' list of top pitchers while Wally Schang rates as a top twenty catcher.<sup>135</sup> Hoyt furthered his acclaim as the Cincinnati Reds play-by-play announcer from 1942 to 1965 working for Burger Beer, and with, among others, Lee Allen. His broadcasts included a two-hour, ad-libbed eulogy to Babe Ruth – on the day he died in August 1948 – but were also filled with insightful analysis of the game, once critiquing reliever Jim Maloney's performance after he gave up four runs in 1961 game. (Chronicled in Jim Brosnan's *Pennant Race*. 'That second guessing old s.o.b.! Maloney yelled. 'I guess he could do any better.'<sup>136</sup> )

Meanwhile, the Red Sox kept defensive catcher Muddy Ruel (No. 51 according to James) for only two seasons then sent him to Washington where he found a .300 batting average for five years after he'd struggled to hit .260 with the Yankees and Red Sox. Ruel went on to the 1924 World Series as Walter Johnson's ace backstop and became a hero due to another catchers' *foul up*, literally. Del Pratt played two seasons at 2B with modest success, only to retire by 1924, four hits shy of 2,000, and never to play in a World Series. Outfielder Sam Vick and southpaw pitcher Hank Thormahlen barely saw playing time again, and were soon out of the majors.

The next off season, the Yankees went back to the ever-willing, discount owner<sup>137</sup> Harry Frazee to get Christmas early in swapping for SS **Everett Scott**, pitchers '**Sad**' **Sam Jones** and **Joe Bush** in exchange for SS Roger Peckinpaugh, P Jack Quinn, P Rip Collins, and P Billy Piercy on December 20, 1921. Bullet Joe Bush had his best three seasons as a Yankee, winning twenty-six games in 1922, and pitched well in the 1923 World Series. Sad Sam Jones started for the Yankees winning twenty games once (and losing twenty in 1925) during his five-year tenure with the formidable lineup around him. Shortstop Everett Scott played everyday for everyone, as his 1,300+ consecutive games streak reflects. Light-hitting, but likely the most sure-handed fielder of his era (.965 career



Fielding Percentage to .941 for the league norm)<sup>138</sup> he gave to the Yankees as much as he did in Boston.

Boston sent Peckinpaugh packing to Washington in a three-way deal where he garners the most dubious AL MVP award in 1925 before imploding for eight errors in the World Series. Jack Quinn pitched four decent seasons then went to the Philadelphia A's, finding greener pastures again in the Win-Loss column for Connie Mack in 1928 and 1929. (Also obtaining a World Series title, though pitching badly in the series (9.00 ERA.)) Rip Collins got a year in Boston pitching, then went to Detroit for the majority of his eleven-year, hundred-win career. Bill Piercy was most famous for his domination early of Babe Ruth - while winning only twenty-seven games in his career.

In late July 1922, ever the bargain hunter Ed Barrow (with Col. Ruppert's money flowing freely to Frazee) picks up **3B Joe Dugan** and OF Elmer Smith for 2B/OF Chick Fewster, OF Elmer Miller, SS John Mitchell, P Lefty O'Doul and **\$50,000**. (Probably the only trade in MLB history with two Elmers switching sides.)

Dugan played 6 ½ seasons of 3<sup>rd</sup> Base for the Yankees hitting respectably in Murderer's Row in racking up over 3,000 AB, second only to Ruth's contribution in hitting. Part-time Slugging OF Elmer Smith stayed 1½ seasons before finishing up with the Reds in 1925. On the Boston side, none of the players amass anything but part-time numbers. The highest OPS of the four players sent over was 2B/OF Chick Fewster's at an anemic .627.

A forgotten trade is the acquisition of **P George Pipgras** and OF Harvey Hendrick for C Al DeVormer and an undisclosed cash amount on January 3, 1923.<sup>139</sup> Pipgras pitched two seasons in New York, then left (to the minor leagues), only to resurrect in the big leagues for the Murderer's Row '27 Yankees. In 1928, he led the league in innings pitched at 300+ in winning 24 games. Late in his career, Pipgras was traded back to Boston when Thomas Yawkey became the owner. Hendrick played two seasons as part-time OF for the Yankees. Then found a nearly full-time utility job in Brooklyn for 4 ½ seasons. From there, Hendrick bounced around the National League with a very respectable .308 lifetime average in 2,910 AB. He took only one at bat in the World Series: while playing for the 1923 Yankees.

Catcher Al DeVormer played two seasons more as a backup catcher in Boston then for the Giants. He finished with a 2 homers and a .258 lifetime BA. Again, a terrible deal for Frazee's Red Sox to consummate.

On January 30, 1923, **P Herb Pennock** completed the pitching staff of ex-Boston players – going 19-6 in his first season as Yankee. Going over to Boston were: OF Camp Skinner,

Utility man Norm McMillan, George Murray, and **\$50,000**. Right-hand starter/reliever Murray won 9, lost 20 for Boston, before leaving the game in 1928 with 20 total victories. McMillan hit .253 in 459 AB with 13 SB. He left for the St. Louis Browns in 1924. Camp Skinner had 13 AB for Boston, and left the majors.

In these seven lopsided trades between late 1919 and early 1923, the Yankees had fleeced the Red Sox to the tune of the best power-hitting, erstwhile pitcher-turned-outfielder in baseball history, an ultra-durable defensive shortstop, a solid catcher, a mainstay 3<sup>rd</sup> baseman, and six high-quality starting pitchers that amassed nine twenty-game winning seasons, 8,873 IP, 71 Shutouts, 96 Saves and an overall record of 629-388 (.618) in thirty-seven seasons of work. (This also includes five wins by Ruth. 58.2% of Yankees' wins in the 1920s were courtesy of ex-Bostonian pitchers.)


And all these trades were made with the hands of Ed Barrow and Harry Frazee shuffling the 'player' cards.

Frazee's ownership (with a heavy dose of liquid courage supporting his decision-making process (from Montville Leigh's accounts)) has to rate as one of the worst episodes in baseball management history, if not the worst, considering the short time frame. Ruth alone is considered a steal, but the additional front-line players explains why the Yankees racked up a record of 933-602 (.608) in the Roarin' Twenties while Boston limped to a 595-938 (.388.)<sup>140</sup>

Ed Barrow's move to the Yankees' management was likely more out of his intelligence in seeing his former boss's inability to either pay the money necessary to keep players (the **\$565,000 total cash** in the trades) or his ineptitude in understanding successful baseball operations (since the 18 players obtained never made any real impact in Boston). Using that knowledge, Barrow proceeded to take advantage of prior friendship most likely, or more negatively; Frazee was willing to destroy his team for financial returns.

And the making of *No, No Nanette* was but a small concern in continuing to give players up (since it didn't run on Broadway until after Frazee's ownership of the Red Sox) – and certainly without reason, given that no logical argument can be made for trading an entire pitching staff to another team, especially an excellent staff.

## Fortunes of Two Teams: Yankees vs. Boston



Frazee would give up the Red Sox in August 1923, turning operations over to J.A. Robert Quinn<sup>141</sup> – but the damage was done. Quinn was washed up as a talent groomer, and did the Red Sox little good while pulling the strings, adding insult to iniquitous by again giving the Yankees a Hall of Fame pitcher in Red Ruffing for OF Cedric Durst. In nine seasons, Quinn was in the cellar seven times.

In Seth Mnookin's recent book, *Feeding the Monster*, Frazee's battles with Ban Johnson are noted as one reason for the sale of Ruth. Ruth's crass and petulant behavior was the second reason. And the myth of Frazee's financial difficulties is (to Mnookin) exactly that, a myth.<sup>142</sup> (But the cash received, and trades evidenced, suggests strongly otherwise.) Nevertheless, the inability to make sound business decisions in his short tenure of seven years left the Sox in disarray until the ownership of Thomas A. Yawkey came into play in 1933.

## Overall Analysis of 7 Boston-Yankee Trades Made Between July 1919 and Feb. 1923

Players Received	Pitchers	Hitters
New York	7	7
Boston	7	11

Hitters Comparison	AB	R	HR	RBI	OBP	SLG	OPS
New York <sup>2</sup>	17,576	3,190	736	3,069	0.385	0.492	0.876
Boston	4,774	460	18	459	0.295	0.314	0.609
<b>Differential</b>	12,802	2,730	718	2,610	0.090	0.178	0.267

Pitchers Totals	Games	GS	W	L	SV	CG	ERA
New York <sup>1</sup>	1,452	1,070	629	388	96	628	3.630
Boston	491	308	118	174	19	133	4.200
<b>Differential</b>	961	762	511	214	77	495	-0.570

Offenses (1920-29)	Runs	Hits	HR	BB	OBP	SLG	OPS	Trade % <sup>3</sup>
New York	8,486	15,386	1,211	5,486	0.358	0.439	0.797	30.60%
Boston	6,229	13,845	315	4,531	0.325	0.358	0.683	7.38%
<b>Differential</b>	2,257	1,541	896	955	0.033	0.081	0.114	23.22%

Pitching (1920-29)	RA	ER	IP	CG	SHO	SV	ERA	Trade % <sup>4</sup>
New York	6,790	5,703	13,753	828	100	155	3.732	58.20%
Boston	7,964	6,656	13,667	739	73	76	4.383	19.83%
<b>Differential</b>	(1,174)	(953)	86	89	27	79	-0.651	38.37%

Win Totals (1920-29)	W	L	% Winning
New York	933	602	0.608
Boston	595	938	0.388
<b>Differential</b>	338	-336	0.220

1. Includes pitching seasons past 1930

2. Includes all pitchers statistics while batting


3. Measured by Runs Scored/ Runs Scored in the 1920s (Removes 594 Runs for Ruth in 1930s)

4. Wins amassed in 1920s by Pitchers /Total Yankee Wins in 1920s

What this analysis reflects clearly is that the pitching gains garnered through these trades were much more substantial than just Ruth's bat, both on the field and at the gate. Without Ruth, the Yankees would not have succeeded to such a degree as to become dynastic in the annals of major league baseball history, but equally important was the addition of 6 successful starting pitchers obtained for nearly nothing. (Aside from \$565,000 in cash payments, the talent traded away cost the Yankees next to nothing in opportunity costs.)

As a passage in *Baseball in Billions* reflects: “According to leading baseball historian Harold Seymour, both leagues made a profit every year from 1920 to 1930, with the Yankees making the biggest profit - \$3.5 million over the decade.”<sup>143</sup>

If we consider that the acquisition cost was \$565,000 with 18 players at near zero value over replacement players (as the trade analysis points out), then the return on investment, without time value of money considerations, is still enormous. The Yankee turned their investment over in a period of less than 20 months, aside from the on-field success (led by Ruth, Hoyt, Mays, and others discussed), obviously drove the people to the games. This phenomenon can be best seen in the attendance during this time frame.



After 1918’s disappointing showing by the world champions at the gate, Frazee was likely miffed by the Yankees’ attendance numbers, given the wide disparity in the teams’ fortunes at the moment. With the rebound of attendance in 1919 greater for the Yankees than Boston, despite the ownership of Ruth’s bat and arm, Boston’s sale of Ruth was likely a foregone conclusion for Frazee, since he received little benefit, and disliked the man. Ed Barrow jumped ship after seeing the huge burst in attendance, almost solely

attributable to the Babe's 58 majestic blasts. As Boston stumbled further and further downward, and the Yankees' fortunes rose and fell on the whims of Ruth, baseball as a sport was revived from the doldrums of the war years, and the Federal League threat.

### One 'Monkey' Comes Off Their Backs – but they can't change their spots

From most accounts, Thomas A. Yawkey fell in love with baseball via a connection to his uncle, William Hoover, who bought the Detroit Tigers using money acquired in the timber and mining industries.<sup>144</sup> After years of contact with famous baseball players in Detroit (including Ty Cobb), he inherited a substantial amount (more than \$20 million) and bought the Red Sox less than a week after receiving it. At age 30, he was an owner of the worst franchise in major league baseball, but spent freely to change that reality. (Boston also had a chance at Joe DiMaggio, and didn't take a chance on him due to the same knee injury discussed previously.)

Given the Great Depression climate and the ever-the-willing dismantler of teams, Philadelphia A's owner/manager Connie Mack, Yawkey championed Eddie Collins to spend freely in acquiring player after player, averaging a player every two months for three years.<sup>145</sup> But this trick of the trade could only carry the Red Sox so far. Even the acquisition of talent via trade dries up and grooming ballplayers in a minor league system has to come about. As the Cardinals, Dodgers, and Yankees were full steam ahead in doing. As a result, though much better than before – and that was assured by the dollars – the Red Sox were still looking up at the Yankees.

Yawkey's management philosophy was only slightly better (than Frazee or Quinn) due to the fact plenty of money fixes numerous mistakes. As a passage from *Mind Game* reflects:

“Despite this improvement, the team was hamstrung by Yawkey's management style...delegating everything then disclaiming all responsibility for the results. Yawkey apparently did not think it was in his province to offer any direction at all, especially if it meant conflict with any of the player/manager/drinking buddies who increasingly populated the team.”

Yawkey's drinking-enhanced episodes of loyalty to manager Joe Cronin and Pinky Higgins later spelled setbacks for the franchise and his inability (and refusal<sup>146</sup>) to desegregate the team (as Boston was the last to bring in African-Americans) would ultimately leave Boston in second (or worse) to the Yankees for years to come. As *It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over* recounts: “Owner Tom Yawkey's franchise had withered under years of neglect, institutional racism, and a country-club atmosphere...”<sup>147</sup>

The Red Sox had the first crack at Jackie Robinson, Sam Jethroe, and Marvin Williams in April 1945, but barely deemed their presence acceptable at this tryout. Later, a Boston scout passed over Willie Mays, writing up a bogus report, instead of actually seeing him play. Higgins kept his job due to his friendship with Yawkey, but interfered with progress of his African-American ballplayers due to his blatant racism.<sup>148</sup>

Even when the Yawkey's trust money actually beat the Yankees, the Red Sox did not win the championship. The 1946, 1967, 1975, and 1986 teams all faltered in the World Series, all of them in 7-game contests. Meanwhile, 39 appearances by the Yankees led to 26 World Series titles, many by sweeps. The 'Boston Psyche' was bruised to the point of exhaustion – with the media dealing the blows to management, star players, and even fans, indiscriminately, while inventing curses to explain away ineptitude (Dan Shaughnessy's *The Curse of the Bambino* and *Reversing the Curse*).

Ted Williams, the greatest left hand hitter of all time with little argument, despised the local press. In his biography, *My Turn at Bat* he recounts: "I felt – I know – I was not treated fairly by the press, and I'm not going to go soft on that now...Oh, I hated that Boston press...I can still can remember the things they wrote, and they still make me mad: How I was always trying to get somebody's job – the manager's, the general manager's, the guy's in the radio booth – and I never coveted another man's job in my life. Or how I didn't hit in the clutch...I was a draft dodger...I didn't hit to left field."<sup>149</sup> Williams did not dodge any draft; and likely would have hit to left field if the fences were not so easy for him to reach in right field. But that was the Boston press; and the monkey of not winning a title on Williams' back.

In 1946, Boston found themselves well ahead of the hated Yankees, but alas, did not cash in on the opportunity. The World Series was close as the Cardinals were equally matched against Boston that had greats SS Johnny Pesky, 2B Bobby Doerr, CF Dominic DiMaggio, and LF Ted Williams along with young starting pitchers Boo Ferriss and Tex Hughson. Most famous, and erroneously reported on, is the delayed throw of Johnny Pesky to cut down Enos 'Country' Slaughter at the plate on a left centerfield gap hit by Harry 'The Hat' Walker.

In *Teammates*, David Halberstam spells out the situation in detail of how a hard luck injury to Dom DiMaggio, a premier defensive centerfielder, led to a replacement's hesitancy in Leon Culberson.

With a 3-3 tie in the bottom of the 8<sup>th</sup>, Dominic DiMaggio had just tied the game on a double. The problem was he pulled a hamstring in trying to leg a sure double into an aggressive triple on a near-miss home run over right fielder Enos Slaughter. With his

removal, Boston lost defensive familiarity with a Sportsman's Park outfield that rated as a cow pasture from Boston players' accounts. So Leon Culberson became the new centerfielder – a journeyman having his best overall season at .313 BA – but he was backup for a reason. After an Enos Slaughter single to center, failed bunt attempt and flyout, Harry 'The Hat' Walker came to the plate. Even though he was a left hand hitter, Walker was strictly a punch-and-judy hitter, and a rare strikeout (15.1 to 1 AB-K). His natural stroke took him to left center, and DiMaggio knew this, and tried to signal Culberson before the at-bat, with only marginal success.

As if by design, Walker hit a lazy gaper to the right of Culberson, as Enos Slaughter, a no-holds-bar player, broke on the pitch. As he rounded second, he saw the play in front of him hustling like always. SS Pesky had initially broke to cover on the attempted steal, but went out to take the cut off throw. Culberson delayed on the ball, not taking an aggressive route, allowing Slaughter to make his ultimate risk-reward decision: scoring from first on a long single.

As Slaughter told St. Louis sportswriter Bob Broeg, "I knew I was going to score before I hit second base because I knew Culberson was in center, not DiMaggio."<sup>150</sup> With St. Louis the home team, it made sense to press the issue at this juncture, with two outs all ready, a tie game in the last of the 8<sup>th</sup>, Slaughter analyzed the situation superbly.

Culberson made several mistakes, all likely due to unfamiliarity with the field, inexperience with pressure situations, and his overall talent compared to 1<sup>st</sup> rate outfielders. First he positioned based on a standard hitter's typical ball placement – paying only modest attention to an All-star centerfielder's urging. Second, he was tentative in his overall approach to the ball once hit. Third, he was not aware of the lead base runner's projected base (3<sup>rd</sup> or Home) and did not hit the appropriate cut-off, throwing to Johnny Pesky was a 3<sup>rd</sup> base cutoff play, not a throw towards home.

Pesky's only real mistake was typical: he had his back to the play in a loud playing environment. When he turned, after a weak waist high throw by Culberson, the read took him first to second then home. But he saw Slaughter, and made an offline throw that likely would not succeeded even if near perfect.

Pesky took the blame; and never has openly criticized Culberson. Even *The Baseball Encyclopedia*, refers to this play as: "Pesky hesitated throwing the ball after Walker's hit...and Slaughter raced from first to home..."<sup>151</sup> In the days before televised World Series play, the lack of a replay meant that print reporters and radio broadcasters were unaware of the actualities involved in the scenario.<sup>152</sup> So the myth replaced the reality – because no one told it any different.



Dominic DiMaggio was impotent to do anything but watch – as he saw the climax of Boston’s only World Series appearance from 1918 to 1967. Enos Slaughter told Dominic DiMaggio that he would have never tried to score – and might have been thrown out at 3<sup>rd</sup> – if DiMaggio had been in center.

Maybe even more destructive in the overall scheme of the series was that Ted Williams incurred an injury to his elbow after being hit (on accident) by an Mickey Haefner in a practice game arranged by manager Joe Cronin while Boston awaited a 3-game playoff between St. Louis and Brooklyn for World Series participation. Ted Williams hit a paltry .200 in 25 at-bats with 5 walks. Ted Williams did not use this as an excuse, but received criticisms over the years for the poor performance in the fall classic. (This unusual practice event certainly does not take place in any recent World Series.)

Boston never fulfilled the promise seen in the 1946 season – losing two pennants in 1948 and 1949 – but instead gained insight later into glorious lifelong friendships as written by historian David Halberstam in *The Teammates*. (Though Halberstam has his critics on baseball information.)

### The Impossible Dream Season

Ted’s replacement, HOF LF Carl Yastrzemski played on two AL pennant teams in 1967 and 1975 in a 23-year career. His moniker, ‘Yaz’, was a given with his agile fielding, accurate, strong arm, and powerful left-hand bat – the Bostonian benchmark in the LBJ Era. (Odd considering Boston’s predicated right hand power bias with the Green Monster looming only 300 feet away.)

During the last few weeks of 1967, in a tight pennant race, the Red Sox put on a run behind Yaz’s exploits while leading the Red Sox to their most improbable pennant. In another 7-game duel with the Cardinals, Boston lost to a salty St. Louis Cardinal club.

**Highs:** Young, and abrasive, manager Dick Williams takes the Sox to the series, turning around the country club culture. **Lows:** OF Tony Conigliaro’s fractured occipital lobe hampers what was to be a great career. The Sox fired Williams only to see him take over in Oakland to impressive results.

### 1975, Fisk and Yawkey’s death

In 1975, Cincinnati’s Big Red Machine and Boston’s sluggers pounded out likely the most memorable 7-game series of all time. With HOF talent a plenty on both sides, the most memorable moment in World Series history (since TV) came three days late (due to rain) when HOF Boston Catcher Carlton Fisk hit an extra-inning home run just inside the left field foul pole, with his hands waving it over and over fair, as Boston tied the series 3-3 apiece. (Earlier, a former Red, Bernie Carbo, hit a 3-run smash to tie the game in the 8<sup>th</sup>.)

As fate would have it, Boston lost the series, once again in 7 games.

In 1976, Thomas A. Yawkey passed away and his ball team passed on to his wife, Jean, as did the legacy of losing the big games to the Yankees, from Bucky Dent in 1978 to Aaron Boone in 2003.

Even when they did not lose to the Yankees (as the 1986 WS championship went to the Mets), mysterious forces seem to curse them to the point of insanity. Goats, as baseball terms players that make crucial, deciding errors on the field, came in all varieties in New England. It took an ex-Cub (Buckner), whose long, alleged cursed by an actual goat's refused admittance to the 1945 World Series, to ultimately lock in the idea that Boston had suffered the *Curse of the Bambino* as Boston sportswriter Dan Shaughnessy titled his ultimate book on the novelty. (In a takeoff of Peter Vecsey's "Babe Ruth Curse Strikes Again," article written after game 6 of the 1986 World Series.)

Something needed to change badly – a fresh face to lead them into the 21<sup>st</sup> century – and Bostonians acquired that in the form of a descendant of the writers of the film classic *Casablanca*.

#### 2004 & 2007: Theo Epstein, and the Assembling of a Champion

2004 Boston's offensive philosophy: "The 1985 Cardinals this was not."<sup>153</sup> After the Aaron Boone *Dialin' 9* off of knuckleballer Tim Wakefield in the 2003 ALCS game seven, it was back to the drawing board for the Red Sox brain trust. The off-season started with the maneuver of putting LF Manny "Being Manny" Ramirez on irrevocable waivers less than week after the Florida Marlins spanked the Yankees in the World Series. The goal was to off load his enormous salary so that financial room was made for a better all-around player: SS Alex Rodriguez.

But once this hot stove battle commenced, the Red Sox found themselves outgunned by their usual nemesis: the spend-thrift New York Yankees. Boston could (would) not come up with the total salary Alex Rodriguez's was currently owed via contract. (Alex wanted to lower his salary to move to Boston's team. But the Player's Association rejected that idea.<sup>154</sup>) As a result, Boston could not get the deal done, since Manny was not shipped out, but had a few other ideas at work.

Pitching, it is said to be (50% – 75%) of the game, and the Red Sox had to shore up that area after watching Pedro Martinez implode late in game 7 of the 2003 ALCS. (More like tire as normal – he no longer was able to go beyond 115 pitches.) With the 2003 statistics of Manny Ramirez (37 HR, 97 BB), David Ortiz (31 HR, 58 BB), Trot Nixon (28 HR, 65 BB),

Kevin Millar (25 HR, 60 BB) Nomar Garciaparra (28 HR, 39 BB) and Jason Varitek (25 HR, 51 BB) they had enough sabermetric offense, and now the market dictated they should get the best starting pitcher and closer available.

SP Curt Schilling had proven to be a legit ace with his performance in the 2001 World Series against the Yankees. Alongside SP Randy Johnson, they had formed the top power pitching tandem in the NL from 2000-2003. The Red Sox got Schilling at a decent bargain of 4 prospects: SP Casey Fossum, RP Brandon Lyon, RP Jorge de la Rosa, and Michael Goss, with none turning into top-tier talent.

Schilling's 2004 season (21-6, 3.26 ERA, 226+ IP) and ALCS performance (bloodied ankle win) was everything they had envisioned. (**Irony**: Boston originally drafted him in 1986, the last Boston World Series appearance.<sup>155</sup>) To go with Derek Lowe and Pedro Martinez, the Sox had as good a #1 through #3 starting pitching in all of baseball.

Oakland's top relief ace was Keith Foulke signed in mid-December, shortly before the Yankees nabbed their starting pitcher from the now-defunct Montreal Expos, Javier Vazquez. Foulke proved to be consistent in his 2004 follow up (32 SV, 2.17 ERA) to his best overall year in Oakland. With a funky delivery and good control (15 BB in 83 IP), the Red Sox had a bullpen lineup that worked well. With Alan Embree, Mike Timlin, Curt Leskanic, and Scott Williamson, this bullpen was a strength in going behind the short outings (less than 6 innings) of Tim Wakefield, Bronson Arroyo, and Derek Lowe. With Foulke, the bullpen-by-committee strategy was no longer considered viable.

Under-thirty Boston GM Theo Epstein had tried to undo years of Boston frustration by bucking the mold of traditional Boston teams that were based around right-hand power hitters (aside from Yaz and Williams, considered their two best hitters), and cozy home domination. As Mike Vacarro explains: "...an honors graduate from the New School of Baseball Thought, a philosophy popularized during the 2003 season by Billy Beane's continuing success in Oakland and his ability to craft winning teams with a minimum of fiscal resources and a maximum of raw statistical data...They acquired players accordingly, which is how [1B Kevin] Millar, [3B Bill] Mueller, [DH David] Ortiz and [2B Todd] Walker, among others, found themselves in Boston."<sup>156</sup>

But the linchpin of the 2004 success came at the trade deadline: SS Nomar Garciaparra. He was by many Boston accounts, the face of the Red Sox, even after acquiring Manny Ramirez. For many reasons, the Boston management grew tired of his petulance and injuries that reminded them of likely so many failed experiences to win a World Series. As a result, obtaining 1B Doug Mientkiewicz and SS Orlando Cabrera for

Nomar, and Dave Roberts, who did bring the 1985 Cardinals to life *for a crucial moment*, were the necessary ingredients needed to stir the drink of a World Series victory.

On the mound Curt Schilling brought a bloody ankle and a memorable performance to bear on the high-salaried Yankees, shutting down yearly MVP candidate Alex Rodriguez. With Derek Lowe taking up slack for Pedro Martinez, the Red Sox dominated for 8 straight games – winning their first championship in four score and six years.

**Table. 2007 Boston Statistics of Players with over 100 AB**

<b>Player</b>	<b>OBP</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>BB</b>	<b>HR</b>	<b>2B</b>	<b>G</b>
<b>David Ortiz</b>	0.445	<b>116</b>	<b>111</b>	35	52	149
<b>Jacoby Ellsbury</b>	0.394	20	8	3	7	33
<b>Kevin Youkilis</b>	0.390	<b>85</b>	<b>77</b>	16	35	145
<b>Manny Ramirez</b>	0.388	<b>84</b>	<b>71</b>	20	33	133
<b>Dustin Pedroia</b>	0.380	<b>86</b>	47	8	39	139
<b>Mike Lowell</b>	0.378	<b>79</b>	<b>53</b>	21	37	154
<b>J.D. Drew</b>	0.373	<b>84</b>	<b>79</b>	11	30	140
<b>Jason Varitek</b>	0.367	57	<b>71</b>	17	15	131
<b>Coco Crisp</b>	0.330	<b>85</b>	<b>50</b>	6	28	145
<b>Eric Hinske</b>	0.317	25	28	6	12	84
<b>Alex Cora</b>	0.298	30	7	3	10	83
<b>Julio Lugo</b>	0.294	71	48	8	36	147
<b>Wily Mo Pena</b>	0.291	18	14	5	9	73
<b>Doug Mirabelli</b>	0.288	9	11	5	3	48
<b>Boston Championship Teams</b>			<i>2004</i>		<i>2007</i>	
Runs Scored			949 (1 <sup>st</sup> )		867 (4 <sup>th</sup> )	
Home Runs, Doubles			222 (5 <sup>th</sup> ), 373 (1 <sup>st</sup> )		166 (18 <sup>th</sup> ), 352 (tied 1 <sup>st</sup> )	
Earned Runs Allowed			676 (10 <sup>th</sup> )		618 (2 <sup>nd</sup> best)	
Total Runs Allowed			768 (14 <sup>th</sup> )		657(1 <sup>st</sup> )	

## 2007 Championship Team Statistics and Youth Movement



**CF Jacoby Ellsbury:** In a short season, he offered a .394 OBP with 9 stolen bases.



**2B Dustin Pedroia:** 2007 AL Rookie of the Year. **On Base Percentage:** .380, with 39 doubles. Soon enough, 2008 AL MVP to boot. (Both Pictures: Keith Allison)

### **A List of 2007 Championship factors:** *Repeat of the 2004 formula, with a few wrinkles?*

Signed Daisuke Matsuzaka as #2 pitcher behind Josh Beckett (15-12, 4.40 ERA, 201 Ks)

Jonathan Papelbon placed in the bullpen (58.3, 1.85 ERA, 37 Saves)

Less of Manny and Ortiz, more Mike Lowell and Kevin Youkilis (see above statistics)

Homegrown youngsters 2B Dustin Pedroia, CF Jacoby Ellsbury, and LHP Jon Lester

Another Japanese import in LHP Hideki Okajima (69 IP, 2.22 ERA)

10-2 in the post season, won the last 7 games against Rockies & Cleveland

Defeated Colorado, who went 21 of 22 coming into the series (with a young team, great defense, and young power)

2007 WS MVP Mike Lowell was a throw-in in the Beckett trade (a salary dump)

The Red Sox found new ways to win with their 2<sup>nd</sup> championship in 4 years. While their long-time partner in losing, the Chicago Cubs, are just getting to where Boston was in (1999-2003).

It is a tale of two different franchises. *Da Sox* are wicked hardcore. *Da Cubs* were too soft in the core until they finally did it in 2016.



**Mr. Clutch:** David Ortiz came from the Land of 10,000 Lakes to the Land of 1,000,000 Heartbreaks, Boston. Since arriving, he bailed out *Da Sox* with regularity. (Keith Allison)



**The Captain:** Mr. Derek Jeter is the heartbeat of the last Yankees Dynasty and Sportsman of the Year in 2009. He also now holds the Yankee record for most hits, passing Lou Gehrig at 2,721.

He has more hits (153 through 2008) in the post season than anyone else in baseball history. But he still has a ways to go to get to Yogi Berra (71) in the World Series play. (Keith Allison)

## CLINTON ERA (1992 – 2005)

- ◆ Continued Salary Escalation
- ◆ Competitive Balance questioned?
- ◆ First Year without World Series since 1904
- ◆ Steroids Usage
- ◆ Offenses Explode Again
- ◆ Ballpark Building

# Clinton ERA: Escalation & Enhancement



Mark McGwire

Fantasy Baseball grows and develops into Multi-million dollar industry

Toronto Blue Jays Win back to back Titles with highest payroll...to date

Strike:  
No World Series

Tampa Bay Devil Rays & Arizona D-backs added to MLB

Former MVP Ken Caminiti admits using Steroids

Labeled 'Steroid Era' by Media



Expanded Playoffs & Inter-league Play

**Best MLB Players:** Barry Bonds, Ken Griffey Jr., Craig Biggio, Tony Gwynn, Mike Piazza, Alex Rodriguez, Frank Thomas, Nomar Garciaparra, Sammy Sosa, Albert Belle, Roberto Alomar, Bernie Williams, Derek Jeter, Greg Maddux, Roger Clemens, Pedro Martinez, John Smoltz, Randy Johnson, Curt Schilling, Tom Glavine

**Crash Davis:** Yeah, I was in The Show. I was in the show for 21 days *once* - the 21 greatest days of my life. You know, you never handle your luggage in the show. Somebody else carries your bags. It was great. You hit white balls for batting practice, the ballparks are like cathedrals, the hotels all have room service, and the women all have long legs and brains.

– Actor Kevin Costner from the Movie *Bull Durham* written by Ron Shelton

As the 20<sup>th</sup> century closed out with the over-hyped panic over the Millennium Bug and the 2000 Presidential election, that was eventually decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Major League Baseball recovered fully from a possible death knell to the sport in 1994. Labor disputes between the players and owners led to a year without a World Series (the first since 1904) and loyal fans were dismayed by the callous nature of both sides even in glaring media light of big contracts and ego-driven behavior. A dramatic resurrection of baseball in 1998 transpired through (of all things) a home run hitting contest between Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire, bringing fans back to the game. As a result, the game

has undergone double-digit growth in revenues according to Smith College economist Andrew Zimbalist.<sup>157</sup>

Just like many other situations in the Clinton Era, the scandals of Whitewater and Monicagate, the problems were set aside and supplanted by an ever-growing technology boom felt from Wall Street to the White House to Waveland Avenue in Chicago.



**An Asian Internet Café.** The growth of the *Net*, and now, (bang!), *Capitalistic-Communitic* China are a significant part of the late Clinton Era. (Photo: Wikipedia Creative Commons)

As Microsoft products dominated the business and home office, the era of nearly instant technology upgrades came to fruition. Moore's Law held true – every 18 months technology was twice as fast (or small) as the last incarnation.<sup>158</sup> The rise of computers and the Internet as the driving forces behind a company's bottom line has required the globalization of all economies, utilizing cheap connectivity and dynamic ways to address corporate productivity and interconnectivity. The portability of information inside laptop computers, PDAs, cellphones, and the ubiquitous Blackberries made working and entertaining as easy (and as technically complex) as the inventors had envisioned.

Computer dating & marriage websites, disseminating of ideas instantaneously through cellphones and wireless internet, streaming online video, amazing pictures and presentations hyped by marketing chains, and hip individuals that blog, are all spidering an endless array of files around the globe to the curiosity of anyone that desires the information. And it's all growing faster by the nanosecond.

Outside of the tech boom, oil prices, terrorism, and climate change concerns are the conversations round the globe. Wars of genocide, rarely focused on in the mainstream



American media because they occurred in Africa or The Balkans, took place, and were again a reminder of the cruel nature of Man. The Middle East, in its ceaseless war between Muslims vs. Judaism and Christianity, takes greater priority once again in the American foreign policy of the new millennium. In the last twenty-five years, “Think globally, act locally,” has emerged as a philosophy to maintain our planet in light of greenhouse gases and toxic emissions, but is slow to take hold within the federal bureaucracy. And the technology driven solutions to fighting the problems of scarce natural resources, engaging in guerilla warfare, and developing spying technologies continues daily in America, while other countries and groups use and fight with the same gadgets for similar, and unfamiliar purposes. We are connected by tech and the struggle for resources.

On TV, *Seinfeld*, the show “about nothing,” but laughter, put forth four seasons’ worth of Steinbrenner material with consummate loser George Constanza being hired by the New York Yankees. Every action, from “living” under a desk, putting players in shrinkable cotton uniforms, dragging a championship trophy in the parking lot to wearing Babe Ruth’s uniform, and purposely dribbling strawberry juice on it, gets even crazier responses from George Steinbrenner’s character, who, as discussed, has a psyche approximated by the combination of Daffy Duck, Frank Burns, and Henry the VIII in temperament, philosophy, and vindictiveness. One classic Steinbrenner characterization: “We wanna look to the future. We gotta tear down the past. Babe Ruth was nothing more than a fat old man, with little girl legs. And here’s something I just found out recently. He wasn’t really a sultan.”<sup>159</sup>

In the sports world, the growth of big business labeling in all sports avenues made it difficult to remember the names of basketball arenas, baseballs fields, and football stadiums. The naming rights of such stadiums bring in huge contracts for the seller of the rights. The marketing of all items, brands and labels via all outlets of the pervasive media, whether it be in print, audio, video, or online, overloaded even the most well-versed fans. Such marketing firms no longer catered to needs (if they ever did), but only to desires, and they manipulate and stimulate those desires through ever more sophisticated methods of motivational and market research.<sup>160</sup> These methods create profits in the sports world and other far-reaching enterprises.

Within the globalization of economies, technology and usage of Internet connections, baseball sought a new emphasis to globalize its reach. For years, the Far East was noted for its dominance in Little League World Series competition. Since the early 1960s, only a handful of players of Japanese heritage had ever sported a MLB uniform, with little success. But in the mid 1990s, the import of the pitcher Hideo Nomo to the Dodgers led

to renew interests in the Japanese Leagues, leading to the addition of MLB superstar Ichiro Suzuki, a perennial All-Star in Japan, and the record holder for most hits in a season in breaking George Sisler's long-standing mark. Shortly thereafter, Hideki Matsui donned a Yankee uniform, providing a consistent power bat in the middle of a juggernaut lineup. As Paul Archey, VP of International Business Operations in MLB states, "We still have significant growth...we're a long way from where we can be, even in our most traditional international markets. If we continue to sign international players, the business is going to continue to grow. And I don't think we're finished signing international players."<sup>161</sup>

Those 'traditional markets' are predominated by Latin American ballplayers where the likes of Roberto Clemente came from in the 1950s and where scouts still scour the area until no stone is left unturned in adding premier talent. (See: Table below.<sup>162</sup>) Places like San Pedro de Macoris in the Dominican Republic, long a scouting haven for youngsters, develop kids into premier talent. Middle infielders Tony Fernandez, Juan Samuel, Alfonso Soriano, Luis Castillo, Mariano Duncan, and Jose Offerman along with outfielders Sammy Sosa, Pedro Guerrero, Rico Carty, and George Bell, all came from this sugarcane town in a country of less than 10 million people. From this small island, 441 ballplayers reached the show. Some attain superstardom; others, just footnotes to baseball history.

These remaining 'international' players came to play in the inaugural World Baseball Classic showing off the talents of MLB players and non-MLB players. The Japanese team won the 1<sup>st</sup> WBC behind the pitching of tournament MVP, Daisuke Matsuzaka. In late 2006, the Boston Red Sox added the all-star pitcher for over \$100 million dollars in total purchase price, becoming apart of a growing group that have \$15 million dollars plus paid for their services. (His contract was \$51.1 million to 'talk' to Daisuke as a player in the Japanese league, and \$52 million for six years with a possibility to earn more.)

**Table. Breakdown of Players by Ethnicity**

Total MLB Players (April 2007)	849	----
Players born Outside the U.S.	246	29.0%
Players from Latin America	208	24.5%
Players from Asia and sub-continent	18	2.1%
Players of African-American descent	100	8.4%

The growing usage of computer-derived training methods and online marketing made professional baseball just as tied to the zeroes and ones of the computer science world as any other business arena is today, and with that, the Moore-like explosion of salaries and stadia followed in lock step; as these dollar amounts approached unfathomable levels to the normal, working man's world.

But these are just a small sampling of events important to the Clinton Era.



From TBS to CNN to **Turner Field**: Media Mogul Ted Turner gets his name on the new building just in time for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. “America’s Team” dominated the Clinton Era in the National League. However, it resulted in only one World Series title in 1995 in the old Fulton County Stadium. (Courtesy of Peter V.S. Bond)

### Business of Baseball: Salary Escalation & Public Funding of Stadiums

In 1992 and 1993, the Toronto Blue Jays won the World Series, the first from outside the United States. With an All-Star/Hall-of-Fame roll call consisting of: Dave Winfield, Paul Molitor, Rickey Henderson, Joe Carter, Roberto Alomar, Devon White, John Olerud, Jeff Kent, Jack Morris, David Cone, Dave Stieb, Jimmy Key, David Wells, Dave Stewart and Tom Henke, this group was recruited and assembled for the sole purpose of assuring a championship for Canada. Assisted by a young Al Leiter, Woody Williams, Mike Timlin, and then mainstays Juan Guzman, Duane Ward and Todd Stottlemyre, the Jays were an amazing group of up-and-coming talent and salty veterans. As teams go, this two-year group actually underachieved in winning only 95 and 96 games in the regular season under Cito Gaston’s managerial leadership while having the highest payroll in MLB in both seasons (\$47,279,166 and \$44,788,666 in 1993 and 1992, respectively).

But this was the money championship impetus reinforcing the growth of payrolls during the Clinton Era. In 1989 and 1990, the Kansas City Royals were the highest payroll in MLB at \$23,361,084, with the Dodgers leading the way in 1989 at \$21,071,562. The lowest payrolls hovered around \$9 to \$11 million. With scarcely enough time to complete high school, the upper tier payrolls rose to over \$40 million (by 1994) and the bottom end payrolls were at \$17 to 21 million, a substantial payroll just four years earlier.

To further interpret this phenomenon, the publication of *Baseball and Billions* by Andrew Zimbalist in 1992 defined the business aspects of baseball to fans in ways that are still relevant; even now under the new revenue-sharing and luxury tax system operating in the sport. His book explained the history of the business side of baseball, the special privileges tied to the National Pastime, and how the relationships between owners, players, public entities, and United States policy-making bodies developed often to the dismay, anger, and disappointment of the fans.

**Table.** Payroll growth of MLB teams

1989-90 Season <sup>1</sup>	Salaries	1993-94 Season <sup>2</sup>	Salaries	% Increase
1989-90 Top Payroll	\$23,361,084	1993-94 Top Payroll	\$49,383,513	111%
1989-90 Top 10 Average	\$21,096,074	1993-94 Top 11 Average	\$43,760,621	107%
1989-90 Bottom 10 Average	\$9,704,250	1993-94 Bottom 11 Average	\$19,824,587	104%
Overall Average (52 Teams)	\$15,444,517	Overall Average (56 Teams)	\$32,671,008	112%

1. Payroll Information comes from Sean Lahman Database 5.3 and 5.4

2. Payroll Information comes from Sean Lahman Database - does not reflect Strike Non-Payments

Even the explosive rise in salaries of the 1980s pales to the mega-millions received by players across the league under the free agency system in place during the Clinton Era. During the initial decade of free agency, players fought for the right to shop their skills to an appropriate team reaching the \$2-to-3 million plateau in top salaries by 1980. By 1991, \$4-to-5 million became feasible for multi-year deals. Then with the signing of a \$252 million, 10-year contract by Alex Rodriguez in 2001, a whole new class of salary level was surpassed with little ado.

**(Scandal Changes Everything:** Except for the fortunes of the Texas Rangers, who soon traded 'A-Rod' for 2B Alfonso Soriano to the never cash-strapped Yankees, in ridding themselves of this hefty contract negotiated by super agent Scott Boras. To be fair, Alex Rodriguez gets more grief for his play on the field than nearly anyone else in baseball. Which is undeserved given the numbers he produces yearly. He may surpass Babe Ruth, Hank Aaron, and Barry Bonds on the all-time home run list by 2013-14. In November 2006, Alfonso Soriano received an 8-year, \$136 million dollar contract, then, the 5<sup>th</sup> largest in MLB history from the Chicago Cubs. Agent Scott Boras played professional baseball for the Cubs organization, and completed law school at the University of the

Pacific on the Cubs' dime.<sup>163</sup> Later on, A-Rod obtained another MLB record contract shortly before becoming outed as a user of performance enhancers, and the subject of a tell-all biography, *The Many Lives of Alex Rodriguez*.)

The number of players making in excess of eight figures now is only limited by the imagination of ownerships. The New York Yankees led in this salary debauchery by having (ten) players making over \$10,000,000 per year in 2005.<sup>164</sup> By 2009, nearly every team has two or three players making at or over \$10 million. The few teams that do not, Florida, Pittsburgh, Minnesota, and Kansas City amongst the group of small market franchises, still occasionally expend \$6-8 million for a mid-level free agent. Not that signing one player can be the sole difference in the winning or losing, or at least it has not been the case outside of the Miami, Florida area. (Winning championships in 1997 and 2003.)


But it is a fact that salaries escalated far beyond the normal workingman's reality or ambitions that is close to the green root of the recent despising and disparaging of ballplayers based upon their salaries. And the media more than supplies the ammunition in broadcasting daily the salaries of top players and the contracts offered to free agents. (Not a new development there either; just more 'transparency'.)

Yankee Players	Salary (in Millions)	2006 Status
<b>Alex Rodriguez</b>	\$26.0	3rd baseman
<b>Derek Jeter</b>	\$19.6	Shortstop
<b>Mike Mussina</b>	\$19.0	Starting Pitcher
<b>Randy Johnson</b>	\$16.0	Starting Pitcher
<b>Kevin Brown</b>	\$15.7	Retired
<b>Jason Giambi</b>	\$13.4	1st Baseman
<b>Gary Sheffield</b>	\$13.0	Outfielder
<b>Bernie Williams</b>	\$12.3	Resigned at lesser salary
<b>Jorge Posada</b>	\$11.0	Catcher
<b>Mariano Rivera</b>	\$10.5	Closer
<b>Carl Pavano</b>	\$9.0	Starting Pitcher
<b>Hideki Matsui</b>	\$8.0	Outfielder

What was started in December 1975, with the Messersmith/McNally arbitration decision by Peter Seitz, evolves in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century far beyond then imagination of ownership, field managers, and players alike. The owners willingly passed on the pricey contracts to the consumers, the fans, in \$100 plus dollar ticket prices for less-than-ideal seats at the ballpark. The ballplayers are increasingly more sensitive to the amount of money they are paid, and watch their statistics more than ever. As Zimbalist noted even then, in a conversation between sportswriter Bob Nightengale and Whitey Herzog, with

Herzog pointing out, “All of the sudden team baseball is gone. Especially for a guy in his walk [free-agent] year. He doesn’t want to give himself up and hit the ball to the right side. Oh, he might act like he’s doing it, but it doesn’t happen.”<sup>165</sup>

As the Graph 7.1.1. reflects, average salaries leveled off in the mid 1980s, jumped modestly in the early 1990s, leveled off once again, then spiraled up and beyond the \$2.5 million dollar barrier. The number of ‘\$10-million-dollar men’ reached well in excess of forty players going into the Bush Era.



In a December 2009 interview, Donald Fehr, retiring from heading up the MLBPA (Player’s Association union), reflected that since 1984 the average major league salaries have grown from \$290,000 to nearly \$3,000,000 per year in 2009.<sup>166</sup> He of course considers this a successful feat; the ordinary American citizen, meanwhile, sees his salary (adjusted for inflation) decreasing over the same period of 25 years.

Each one of these players could be considered a corporate CEO/CFO, given their salaries. And as such, there is much more second guessing and critiquing of play (and off-the-field incidents) to be handed out by the sports pundits due to the shock value of generating negative headlines – in regards to a player’s underachieving performance while making

enormous sums of money. (In the ‘normal’ business world, CEOs are (at times) buffered from such critiques but can and should be held to a higher standard of conduct and performance. This idea is amplified by the fact the Top 10 CEOs in 2005 all earned between forty and seventy million dollars.<sup>167</sup> In only a few years, this “greed is good” repeated mantra is the subject of heated debate as enormous bank bailouts ran into the 100s of billions, and the bankers still presume large bonuses were in order for their work. And despite reports Goldman Sachs betted billions against ‘investment paper’ they were selling hard to clients as ‘good investments’, but calling it ‘shit’ in private.)

As then 2008 presidential hopeful, law professor, and White Sox fan Barack Obama points out in *The Audacity of Hope*, “In 1980 the average CEO made forty-two times what an average hourly worker took home. By 2005, the ratio was 262 to 1. Conservative outlets like the *Wall Street Journal* editorial page try to justify outlandish salaries and stock options as necessary to attract top talent, and suggest that the economy actually performs better when America’s corporate leaders are fat and happy. But the explosion in CEO pay has little to do with improved performance.”<sup>168</sup> This widening disparity in salaries for the average American and the ballplayer (and salary comparable CEOs) is amplified by the instantaneous media.

#### 1929 Team Salaries

RANK	TEAM	TOTAL
1	<a href="#">New York Yankees</a>	\$365,741
2	<a href="#">Chicago Cubs</a>	\$310,299
3	<a href="#">New York Giants</a>	\$291,368
4	<a href="#">Philadelphia Athletics</a>	\$255,231
5	<a href="#">Philadelphia Phillies</a>	\$250,000
6	<a href="#">Brooklyn Dodgers</a>	\$245,309
7	<a href="#">Boston Braves</a>	\$238,260
8	<a href="#">Washington Nationals</a>	\$231,618
9	<a href="#">Cincinnati Reds</a>	\$224,655
10	<a href="#">Chicago White Sox</a>	\$220,000
11	<a href="#">St. Louis Cardinals</a>	\$219,815
12	<a href="#">Cleveland Indians</a>	\$215,523
13	<a href="#">St. Louis Browns</a>	\$200,312
14	<a href="#">Detroit Tigers</a>	\$185,771
15	<a href="#">Boston Red Sox</a>	\$171,260
16	<a href="#">Pittsburgh Pirates</a>	\$140,422

#### 1939 Team Salaries

RANK	TEAM	TOTAL
1	<a href="#">New York Yankees</a>	\$361,471
2	<a href="#">Detroit Tigers</a>	\$297,154
3	<a href="#">Chicago Cubs</a>	\$292,178
4	<a href="#">New York Giants</a>	\$291,448
5	<a href="#">Cleveland Indians</a>	\$272,359
6	<a href="#">Chicago White Sox</a>	\$243,041
7	<a href="#">Philadelphia Phillies</a>	\$234,141
8	<a href="#">Cincinnati Reds</a>	\$231,389
9	<a href="#">Boston Red Sox</a>	\$227,237
10	<a href="#">Brooklyn Dodgers</a>	\$204,047
11	<a href="#">St. Louis Cardinals</a>	\$192,085
12	<a href="#">Boston Braves</a>	\$171,159
13	<a href="#">Washington Nationals</a>	\$165,849
14	<a href="#">Philadelphia Athletics</a>	\$165,258
15	<a href="#">St. Louis Browns</a>	\$159,925
16	<a href="#">Pittsburgh Pirates</a>	\$144,255

## 1946 Team Salaries

RANK	TEAM	TOTAL
1	<a href="#">Boston Red Sox</a>	\$511,025
2	<a href="#">Detroit Tigers</a>	\$504,794
3	<a href="#">New York Yankees</a>	\$442,854
4	<a href="#">Chicago White Sox</a>	\$386,377
5	<a href="#">Cleveland Indians</a>	\$378,773
6	<a href="#">Washington Nationals</a>	\$356,631
7	<a href="#">Chicago Cubs</a>	\$348,546
8	<a href="#">New York Giants</a>	\$344,635
9	<a href="#">Boston Braves</a>	\$322,000
10	<a href="#">Cincinnati Reds</a>	\$316,137
11	<a href="#">St. Louis Cardinals</a>	\$313,530
12	<a href="#">Brooklyn Dodgers</a>	\$313,369
13	<a href="#">Philadelphia Phillies</a>	\$312,312
14	<a href="#">Pittsburgh Pirates</a>	\$302,471
15	<a href="#">Philadelphia Athletics</a>	\$271,925
16	<a href="#">St. Louis Browns</a>	\$221,789

Sources for 1929, 1939, and 1946 Salaries:  
House Judiciary Comm., Organized  
Baseball, 82nd Cong., 1st Session,  
1951, P1610.

## 1976 Team Salaries (Rich Hill)

RANK	TEAM	TOTAL	AVG.
1	<a href="#">Boston Red Sox</a>	\$2,052,460	\$82,098
2	<a href="#">Philadelphia Phillies</a>	\$1,803,000	\$72,120
3	<a href="#">Cincinnati Reds</a>	\$1,679,500	\$67,180
4	<a href="#">New York Yankees</a>	\$1,630,900	\$65,236
5	<a href="#">Texas Rangers</a>	\$1,507,700	\$60,308
6	<a href="#">Los Angeles Dodgers</a>	\$1,498,500	\$59,940
7	<a href="#">Kansas City Royals</a>	\$1,467,500	\$58,700
8	<a href="#">Chicago White Sox</a>	\$1,191,500	\$47,660
9	<a href="#">Pittsburgh Pirates</a>	\$1,174,500	\$46,980
10	<a href="#">Oakland Athletics</a>	\$1,116,700	\$44,668
11	<a href="#">Chicago Cubs</a>	\$1,104,000	\$44,160
12	<a href="#">Atlanta Braves</a>	\$1,100,000	\$44,000
13	<a href="#">Baltimore Orioles</a>	\$1,062,000	\$42,480
14	<a href="#">Montreal Expos</a>	\$1,033,500	\$41,340
15	<a href="#">California Angels</a>	\$1,030,000	\$41,200
16	<a href="#">Cleveland Indians</a>	\$1,014,060	\$40,562
17	<a href="#">St. Louis Cardinals</a>	\$961,500	\$38,460
18	<a href="#">San Francisco Giants</a>	\$936,000	\$37,440
19	<a href="#">Houston Astros</a>	\$933,120	\$37,325
20	<a href="#">New York Mets</a>	\$927,500	\$37,100
21	<a href="#">Detroit Tigers</a>	\$784,500	\$31,380
22	<a href="#">San Diego Padres</a>	\$743,000	\$29,720
23	<a href="#">Milwaukee Brewers</a>	\$685,250	\$27,410
24	<a href="#">Minnesota Twins</a>	\$681,000	\$27,240

Going back to the Depression era days (above), salaries were obviously significantly lower, and in line with the perceived fairness of athletes competing in their job. (With significant owner interference in contracts, and usage of the media again as a cudgel to keep such salaries at bay.) Over the course of 30 years, from 1946 to 1976, the top salaried team only quadrupled; the median salary level tripled; and the lowest similarly tripled.

The birth of free agency pushed the salaries upward. But also coincided with the move of the United States off the gold standard; 1970s inflation and the oil crisis; and an explosive credit card regime into lower social-economic classes (who overuse these methods to pay



to go to the ballparks, resulting in more and more personal debt). Additionally, the top marginal tax bracket was adjusted downward from 70% to 35%, provided the impetus for a widening disparity between super rich, and the middle classes.

Shortly after the Seitz decision, the 1977 season saw two teams top \$3,000,000 in salaries paid (Yankees & Phillies) and the dead last, expansion franchise Toronto Blue Jays paid nearly \$200,000 more than the Twins of 1976, who had upped their ante by over \$280,000. The money pit was now being filled; and players were on their way to millionaire status, and “role model” responsibility.

### I’m Not a Role Model

Since a majority of ballplayers are less than adept at dealing with the unusually harsh criticisms of in-game decisions and/or off-the field incidents, the battle between players vs. media/fans/ownerships has reached, in some respects, a high watermark. As Zimbalist quotes *Boston Globe* sportswriter Steve Fainaru nearly two decades ago: “Some would say the game is in an increasingly bad mood. Tension between management and players, players and players, players and umpires, and, especially, players and fans, has never been more noticeable, mostly because of salaries...borders on obsession.”<sup>169</sup> This tension has not dissipated; but only gone viral with the passage of time.

What took place prior to 1976, with the owners controlling and coercing players into unfair, less-than-market value contracts, now sees players receiving more-than-adequate compensation, with ownerships passing along the cost to the consumer. Again, many of these players grew up in the minor leagues, far from a post-secondary education and rarely (less than 15%) expected to make it to The Show, and become superstars. And unlike their CEO counterparts, who are much older, are experts in their unique fields without the harsh media attention showered on their accomplishments (or failures), and generally have special training in handling media spotlights, professional ballplayers are in most respects uneasy about constant criticisms of their game. More pointedly, they are an elite class of performer than only can turn to other ballplayers typically for support. And as noted, resentment has grown significantly amongst ballplayers themselves due to contracts and performance. Add to that, the widening controversy over steroid usage, pitting ballplayers against each other over that issue, and one begins to easily fathom where the particular mindsets and entrenchment philosophies of MLB players comes from, often to ignoring, or avoiding drug usage conversations. (To their detriments: Darryl Strawberry and Doc Gooden would be only two examples.)

Aside from those feelings, the ownerships are vilifying players while they in turn have reaped enormous profits and drove franchise valuations well above the \$12-billion-dollar

plateau for all teams. Once again, the motivation is about the money – shifting through the accounting process – and not about winning championships alone, for nearly all owners. (Aside from king George Steinbrenner.)

As of yet, consumers have yet to reach a point of ‘negative marginal utility’, whereby such costs outweigh the benefit received from more and more usage. Though, behavioral economists may say that our American addiction to entertainment of all forms may be driving us to irrational choices, spending money (our credit) to provide such entertainment for our families while more pressing concerns such as vehicle choices, housing, food essentials are being short changed. The Joneses battle is alive and well.

### Franchise Value and Making the Playoffs

A ‘typical’ franchise sold can regularly expect \$500 million to  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a billion dollars for the purchase value.

**(Examples:** The Boston Red Sox were transferred for \$700 million while the Washington Nationals were purchased from MLB for \$450 million dollars. Meanwhile, the Seattle Mariners are owned by Hiroshi Yamauchi, former long-time CEO of Nintendo. As discussed, the Cubs were sold for over \$800 million in 2009.)

According to Michael Ozanian, financial writer for *Forbe’s*, the Yankees were worth more than \$1 billion dollars as of 2006 season, and over \$1  $\frac{1}{2}$  billion in 2009. (See: *Forbe’s* Website/Business of Sports link for more information on the franchises and ownerships.)

The ratio of Franchise Value (FV) to Revenues (Graph 7.1.2. below) has remained fairly consistent hovering between 2.28 and 2.48, and both revenues and FV steadily rising over the past 9 seasons even in light of steroids allegations and revelations.

It is fairly obvious that fans are not turned off even in the midst of the congressional investigations of Major League Baseball, a new steroid policy introduced into the sport, and continual castigation of the players for earning large contracts. Even in the midst of this consistent financial improvement, a Commissioner-sponsored report on how badly the disparities were between the top and bottom teams was initiated to the furtherance of revenue sharing and luxury tax policies.

In July 2000, an intense study of the game’s financials and winning was released: *The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics*.

Authored by award-winning columnist and baseball writer George Will, Yale University president and economics professor Richard Levin, former Senate Major Leader George Mitchell, and ex-Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker, the panel concluded that significant changes to the system were needed to remedy competitive imbalance existent in baseball. That among other things:

Large and growing revenue disparities exist and are causing problems of chronic competitive imbalance.

These problems have become substantially worse during the five complete seasons since the strike-shortened season of 1994, and seem likely to remain severe unless Major League Baseball (“MLB”) undertakes remedial actions proportional to the problem.

The limited revenue sharing and payroll tax that were approved as part of MLB’s 1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) have produced neither the intended moderating of payroll disparities nor improved competitive balance. Some low-revenue clubs, believing the amount of their proceeds from revenue sharing insufficient to enable them to become competitive, used those proceeds to become modestly profitable.

In a majority of MLB markets, the cost to clubs of trying to be competitive is causing escalation of ticket and concession prices, jeopardizing MLB’s traditional position as the affordable family spectator sport.<sup>170</sup>

~

Their study though focused too narrowly on the period immediately after the first strike-shortened season, the absence of the 1994 World Series, and significant changes to the offenses in baseball. This was also the time when the Yankees became a powerhouse again; had a bevy of homegrown talent; and money flowing into (and out of) their hands from (1996– 2000) and the taint of steroids usage much, much later on. To point this out, in Payroll Disparities section of the report, the first four statements relate to this fact:


In 1999, one club had a payroll approximately equal to the sum of the payrolls of the lowest five payroll clubs.

In 1999, the combined payrolls of the highest two payroll clubs exceeded the *combined* payrolls of *all* clubs in payroll Quartile IV by \$30 million.

In 2000, the salary of the game’s highest paid player is equal to the entire Opening Day player payroll of one club (Minnesota).

In 2000, three clubs (Minnesota, Florida, Kansas City) had Opening Day player payrolls that were less than the combined salaries of two players of one club. The seven clubs that comprise payroll Quartile IV each had a player payroll that was less than the combined salaries of the Yankees' or Dodgers' highest paid three players.<sup>171</sup>

Graph 7.1.2. Estimated Franchise Values to Revenues for 30 MLB Teams



Moreover, the Commissioner, Bud Selig, was (still) a small-market owner obviously looking for an excuse to increase revenue sharing from the wealthiest ownerships (the Yankees and Red Sox) to the smallest media markets and, by happenstance, the worst teams (the Brewers, Pirates, and Royals amongst that group). This conclusion was reached after such reforms were all ready in place in the 1996 CBA, as mentioned, that allowed for revenue sharing, and a luxury tax. And yet, this theory of redistribution does not work well according to noted economist Andrew Zimbalist.

From his *In the Best Interests of Baseball* an example of the reality of revenue sharing and keeping ballplayers:

“Carlos Beltran. The Royals would calculate that Beltran generated 20 million in revenues based on (ticket sales, concessions, parking and signage revenue, etc.) but being taxed at 47% on that extra revenue, means Beltran would only be ‘worth’ \$10.6 million. Whereas, the Mets, a top revenue team, is taxed at 39%, would value Beltran higher most likely, but even at 20 million, would be able to see \$12.2 million in additional value. The difference of \$1.6 million means the Mets would always outbid based on the current structure of revenue sharing.”<sup>172</sup>

To address this problem related to the effective tax rate, Zimbalist offers this alternative structure of the implementation of revenue sharing: “The proper way to design revenue sharing is through a tax on forecasted, not actual, revenue. Forecasted revenue is a function of the market’s characteristics: media market population, the number of large corporations, per capita income, the size of the baseball television territory and so on.”<sup>173</sup>

Also by framing the condition under the “regularly recurring reasonable hope of reaching postseason play”<sup>174</sup>, this commission was muddling the facts in that many of the franchises in the (allegedly) worst financial positions were there because of their inability to evaluate talent, selling off their finest players, and drafting philosophies that were found inefficient, and not just because of the payroll disparities between them (the low-payroll, small-market teams), and the Yankees.

As Jeff Angus surmised in *Management by Baseball* about the financially poor Brewers:

“...the breathtakingly awful 1993-2004 Milwaukee Brewers, a team depopulated of any excellence by its owner’s apparently deliberate strategy to create a low-payroll team that could cash in on an odd internal-to-baseball tax scheme he [Bud Selig] had helped shepherd through MLB acceptance...a team package to sell by lowering costs and stripping assets, and eventually being manipulated to harvest tax breaks – tax breaks that are easier to harvest if the team roster remains significantly inferior to its competitors.”<sup>175</sup>

Meanwhile, the Oakland A’s, Minnesota Twins, and the Florida Marlins proved that small payrolls do not mean it is impossible to reach the playoffs on a “recurring basis” and win games against the Goliaths of the baseball world, and do it, in the case of Oakland, and Florida, while occupying truly horrific markets for any fan support. **(See Appendix 9.3.)**


Soon after this commission's results were released, the New York Yankees failed to buy a World Series championship (2001-2008), not due to any spending decrease, as we've seen, but due to their talent under performing in the chancy arena called: the playoffs.

Since the 2000 season, the Florida Marlins, Chicago White Sox, and St. Louis Cardinals have won the World Series to the usual displeasure of George Steinbrenner's tactics of buying up high-price talent that is overvalued for their abilities, but he (and his sons) continue to fund these extravagant payrolls. Later, division rival Tampa Bay decided to break through in 2008 to the delight of other, small market teams. Colorado joined in the parade of doormat-makes-good in 2007, undermining the Ribbon's theory.

Bud Selig and his 'Blue Ribbon' panel failed to look back properly at the days prior to the strike season, when competitive balance saw 10 different teams win in ten different years (1978-1987), the three decades of dominance by the Yankees in the 'restraint of trade' era, when they used MLB franchises as 'farm' systems, and failed to properly assess the period where ownerships were intentionally colluding to stop the movement of free agents, and therefore, depressing the market value of otherwise star performers. (As owners saw the money changes being too scary for even their well-heeled and educated tastes.) Along with the inefficient nature of baseball talent procurement, as referenced before, the reasons put forth to garner a shift of revenues from rich to poor were not convincing. And the report was ill-timed for its intended purposes: to balance winning and fairness. (Which is odd, as the free-market econ people tend to come from more conservative-minded sorts: baseball moguls and their friends on the report.)

While no one is especially 'special' when considering one's own current salary versus a professional ballplayer, the fact is they are a rare breed; often derided for their money, and behaviors, but until one is considered as 'unique', you, the fan, still have a choice: not to pay the going rate to the ballparks of some of these scheming ownerships. And the playoffs come from solid analysis, not 'recurring' money moves.

## 2010 'Elite' Player Salaries



## The Ballpark Biz: Using Public Money to Fund A Billionaire's Theme Park

**Dateline:** June 5, 1989.

Toronto's Skydome opens the new era of massive ballpark building and first broke the 4-million visitor barrier in MLB. As the newest jewel, the ability to attract free agents, raise ticket prices, and field a champion, were just around 3<sup>rd</sup> base coach's box. Toronto, inspired owners in America to take the plunge, and built it so more people would come to their new digs.

While the ballpark is an obviously important part of a franchise's vitality and viability, the structure has become a theme park to be paid for by public funds (taxes) that could be directed to services considered more beneficial in the service of we, the people.

During the Clinton/Bush Era, stadiums builds jumped dramatically in cost, from \$250 million to well over a \$1 billion, and were vigorously debated in many localities. As such, baseball parks costs became a hot research subject as Kevin Delaney, Neil DeMause, Rodney Fort, Roger G. Noll, James Quirk, and Andrew Zimbalist et al. have written various papers, and books, on the subject of stadium finance, ticket prices, and all things economically tied to the build.

As players' salaries escalated as a percentage of revenues from 32% in 1989 to 54% by 1996 and consistently over 50% since the mid 1990s<sup>176</sup>, ownerships sought ways to garner the greatest benefits from building these behemoths while using the backs of the public to get the dirt, the steel, and the concrete ready for install. Their billions, as quite a few are billionaires, are not to be squandered on the low-ROIs of these fun projects, but instead, seek the approvals of the entertainment-happy, but rich guy-suspicious public to foot the bill.

When the calendar flipped to 1990, many stadiums in baseball were well over 30 years old, fully depreciated. Comiskey Park, then the oldest surviving structure from the great builds of the Taft Era, was made a memory before President Bush lost the country's overwhelming approval rating of his administration. The new park – soon called U.S. Cellular Field, a.k.a. 'The Cell' – was wholly subsidized by the public to the tune of \$167 million in 1991. This was primarily done to keep the team from abandoning the rough South side of Chicago for the sunnier side of lively Tampa Bay.

Arguments undoubtedly made to keep the Sox ranged around longevity and people's connection of/to the franchise, the economic benefits created by a new park build, and the stature of Chicago being demoted if they lost one of two baseball teams in such a large metro area. Of these, the benefit of building a new park is the salient point to economists.

As Dr. Craig A. Depken of University of Texas reflects the nature of studies done prior to the build and after the games are being played:

“One reason for the differences between academic and consultant studies is that most academic studies take place *after* a stadium has been built, while those studies that predict tremendous economic benefits almost universally occur *before* a stadium is built. The source of the different conclusions should be apparent. Studies published in the peer-reviewed literature are *ex post* studies that use *actual* data, however imperfectly measured, whereas *ex ante* studies utilize imagined or estimated impacts, which however motivated are much more susceptible to mistake.”<sup>177</sup>

So the question is, do we trust academic *post hoc* studies, or the consultants that are usually paid for by the ownerships to report the most favorable economic outcomes?



Such benefits of reduced unemployment, tourism increases, urban development around the park, and added tax revenues from property value increases are often just a hazardous guess for anyone unless they have numerous experiences with such stadiums, even going back to the last stadium built in the host city.

As urban centers have changed, often to the decline due to suburban sprawl and recent manufacturing moves, the despair of most cities is to find economically additive developments that will spur more of the same. Meanwhile, owners are looking to increase their franchise value on paper, shift much of the burden of a build onto the public, and justify ticket and concession price rises via the new park and (usually) new player acquisitions needed to compete for the championships they promise.

But how can any one stadium really have such an effect?

*And so, why do we build them?*



**A Reason to Build?: Camden Yards** became the benchmark to hit when building a new stadium in the Clinton Era. At 96% Public Subsidized<sup>178</sup>, \$226 Million in build costs, the impact to the Maryland economy was actually negative. But people came. (Courtesy of Landon Owen)

Economist Robert Baade of Lake Forest College confirms that of 30 cities that had stadium builds, 90% (27) had zero change in per capita income, a usual indicator of economic benefit. The remaining three builds actually decreased per capita income. The 'themed stadium' just becomes a substitute for alternative projects with the positive

benefits going almost solely to the ownerships (and players), who are not likely to reinvigorate the local economy directly, thus not increasing the spending multiplier that economists look for in new developments.<sup>179</sup>

The outside consultants put up a best-case, pie-in-the-sky numerical bait to switch when the assumptions of the study are not remotely met. Economists, even when vocally against such issues, are usually ignored as was the case when 90 such experts presented an open letter against the Washington Nationals new stadium build in the Anacostia waterfront region.<sup>180</sup> The stadium went up, nonetheless.

The unfortunate story is that stadiums, gleaming and glossed-up though they are anew, are not much of a positive benefit to the host community, unless you own one, root for the team, and they win more, were contracted to provide services for the stadium, or had a lower wage job than the one the ballpark provides six-seven months out of the year. Or you're just a ballpark fanatic.

If it were only one stadium, the concept of such a feat to design and fill a wonderful arena to honor the sport would be an admirable and worthy feat. As building is a Mankind obsession. Just as empires are made (and lost) from the excesses of rulers, and their designs, their desire to leave a mark – the larger, more pronounced, and ostentatious it is, the better – is done as the alpha-male, “I want to pronounce the extent of my empire” statement to the masses.

And we buy it. Literally.

### I Must Be In The Luxury Box

One of the classiest ways to spruce up these panoramic visions, is to include luxuries that no one else has, and more importantly, an owner does not have to share the largesse of to other ownerships. Luxury boxes are the playgrounds of corporate executives, entertainment icons, and bigwigs of sport and politics. No new stadium (and many of the older ones have refitted themselves to include this perk) goes up without the shiny overhead booths with the best liquor, food, and big screens to watch the game your currently at from. (A *Truman Show* moment can be had.)

The cost increases accordingly to fit these boxes at the top rung of the stadium with unobstructed viewpoints. Ownerships garner the unobstructed revenues without sharing the monies with their fellow owners. However, when the public catches wind of the proposed boxes during builds, whatever good will an owner has will diminish according to the team's current season standings.

Scarcity is also a reason to do this. Newer ballparks never approach the 60-70,000 seats that Cleveland Stadium put into play back 75 years ago. By creating a lack of capacity, ticket prices rise. Luxury boxes do this task smartly; providing ample room at a premium for people the owners want to see – or at least their massive checking and investment accounts for the purchases of advertisement or other business.

### What's In A Name

If you got a multi-billion-dollar company, and would like to promo it, and have people speak your name adoringly, then put it on a ballpark, stadium, or arena. Naming rights have become a tidy sum of money for the owners to set their sites on during the run up to the grand opening. It was once a habit to name the field after the man who owned the team (Connie Mack, Wrigley, Ebbets, Busch, et. al.) but as the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> generation of ballparks flew up, so to went the welcomes to corporations to put their stamp on the field.

That said, the name plates have come with expiration dates; spoiling right before a fan's eyes.

Team	Old Name	New Name
Toronto Blue Jays	Skydome	Rogers Centre
Texas Rangers	The Ballpark at Arlington	Amerquest Field in Arlington
Oakland A's	Network Associates Coliseum	McAfee Coliseum
Florida Marlins	Joe Robbie Stadium	Pro Player Stadium/Dolphin Stadium
Houston Astros	Enron Field	Minute Maid Park
Chicago White Sox	Comiskey Park II	U.S. Cellular Field
San Francisco Giants	PacBell Park	SBC Park/AT&T Park
Arizona Diamondbacks	Bank One Ballpark	Chase Field

Some of these are due to corporate switchovers to a new brand name; others, like Enron, were more nefarious. Reflecting, at least, that if you want a name on a park, negotiate the rebranding fee with the owner, and you can be called anything, anywhere, for a price. (And many owners are called “anything, anywhere” without a price tag.) And confuses the fan if he cannot afford to show up every year.

Such ideas have been kicked around for the venerable ballparks too. Wrigley Field, under the short-term ownership of Sam Zell, was to be renamed if Zell could find a buyer willing to do the trick. As it turned out, no takers came to take Wrigley off the field – to the relief of Cubs fans. (But Toyota is looking to buy signage around the park – in the wake of their disastrous handling of gas pedals.)

## Billion Dollar Baby

Home of the mega-deal, Donald Trump's real estate empire, and The Rockettes, New York opened not one, but two ballparks in 2009. Their combined outlays swelled to over \$2.3 Billion. (Neil DeMause, [FieldofSchemes.com](http://FieldofSchemes.com), June 2008.) The public is to pick up over \$1 billion of that Manhattan-sized tab. Shortly before leaving office, then Mayor Rudolph Giuliani spent his final days making sure these parks got built. Giuliani, who was a 2008 Presidential candidate that stayed closer to the ballparks than he did to the campaign trail, lent his friendship and ex co-worker relationship in assisting Yankees president Randy Levine in building the new house.<sup>181</sup>

And while it does not surprise that New York, being the relative birthplace of baseball, is also the originator of the first billion-dollar stadiums and franchises, it reflects again the nature of the game. As dollars are put forth to entertain us, the fan in all of us, should worry that we are becoming alien to the auspices under which baseball fostered in us a truer spirit. The 'New York' game is no longer as Cartwright or Adams dreamt up. Their baby has gone astray.



**Now Open at Night: Citi Field.** With the backing of a multi-trillion-dollar corporation, the Mets have a grandiose field to compete with the new 'House That A-Rod Financed' in Yankee Stadium II/III. (By permission of Landon Owen.)

## Corporate Welfare

These stadiums built are but one of the best examples of corporate welfare that the United States has recently had a too unhealthy dosage of via the Great Recession of 2008-2009. For many of these business people, who proclaim strict adherence to free-

market Capitalism, it is the height of hypocrisy to take hundreds of millions in subsidies to fuel their bottom line. As the public swallows tax abatements given to these selected projects, the foregone interest payments put more debt on the public, and deprives them of their taxes going toward schools, infrastructure, and businesses creating high-paying jobs and cutting edge technology that are needed to compete in a globalized marketplace, where a click and a teleconference can seal an American company's fate all too easily.

As Paul Gessing puts into perspective the vast amount of money that could be used elsewhere:

“One easy solution is to simply divide that \$1 billion in taxpayer funding among all 18 million citizens of the state, which amounts to \$55 for every man, woman, and child. Another way to look at the situation is that the public money for these stadiums could fund the New York City Sanitation Department for an entire year.”<sup>182</sup>

Given the current economic climate, one starts to wonder where and why does their money go to a group that while this author adores for their on-the-field feats, oft despises them for their selfish and sanctimonious posturing when speaking about the necessities of a sports stadium.

A recent example of miscalculation of a sports stadium is the massive Lucas Oil Stadium in Indianapolis, Indiana. The stadium opened to much fanfare, however, it was determined that the bond payments were being unmet, and therefore, a local surcharge (a tax) was placed on the hotels, car rentals, and various outlets to raise the money to fund this new baby. (The Colts made an Indy 500 run at the perfect season, starting 14-0, while the New Orleans Saints did the same in their Katrina-ravaged Superdome. May the 'least costly' win: Katrina was a \$200 Billion+ natural disaster. The Saints won the Super Bowl – the most 'deserving' won. **Side Note:** The New Orleans Superdome was determined to be a massive 'economic loser' to the tune of \$70 million during the 1954-1986 era of stadium building.<sup>183</sup>)

But back to baseball.

In a Pennsylvania Public Interest study (PennPIRG) related to Philadelphia soon-to-be Citizens Bank Ballpark by Beth McConnell in 2000, she concluded the process instituted to get taxpayers on board followed a concise game plan dissected by (Cagan and DeMause) that can be easily countered:

Stadium is too old and falling down. (Wrigley & Fenway still function with moderate retrofits.)

Threaten to move franchise. (While done in the past, most often, the popularity of the sport in the locale and ownership goofs are the real reasons no one cares about the franchise.)

Cannot compete in stadium. (Again, a retrofit and/or aligning team scouting and development with park's quirks can solve this dilemma.)

An independent study performed to the economic benefits. (As discussed, done with a con man's fluidity with numbers, and little regard for realities.)

Hurry up and decide or else will move. (A way to expedite the process without allowing anyone to see 'the hustle' too closely – or the flaws to the financing.)

Move the goalposts in asking for more money. (Since the project is underway, they can coerce a city that the sunk cost (money spent) is too great all ready. Project abandonment is an option in all plans.)<sup>184</sup>

McConnell notes that the efficiency of job creation is horrendous as most stadiums create jobs at nearly \$250,000 per head, whereas, small business loans are around \$35,000, and the best job injectors are 25 times more effective than any ballpark. The best stadium project in recent memory (Camden Yards) was at a net of -\$11 million to the local taxpayer as each resident of Baltimore foots a \$14.70 per year to fund the best new retro park of the Clinton Era.<sup>185</sup>

### People Will Come and Things Will Change

While it is easy to critique a situation where stadium builds have exploited the taxpayer to a usual end, many forms of this exist across the spectrum of public policy. Agendas are honed; arguments presented using emotions, statistics, and prior successes (or defeats) to bolster such positions. The money is often just a number – like 755 or 511 or .406 – and we roll our eyes at the sound of “million”, “hundreds”, or “billion.” We become immune to the weight, or are gluttons for the punishment that implausibly started out as, “let's build a new ballpark to honor the game.”

In a recent paper, professor Rodney Fort presents us with plenty of fodder to the future of all sports – a few items that should be of little surprise.

**Steroids (and worse) will grow vertically and horizontally.**<sup>186</sup> Fort surmises that enhancers increase the *absolute and relative quality of performance* since fans pay more for better fare. The athlete continues to improve via longer, and year round training regiments, and the quality of performances will continue to break records, traditionalists to be damned.

**Fan-driven HOF supplants the Writer's HOF.** As players are named as steroid users (see: steroids discussion) become eligible for the Hall, not everyone will sit idly by. Some entrepreneur will seek a new niche as a HOF builder and prognosticator. And the public will give credence once it figures out the predictors and pathways for their favorite players to the new plaques. Sportswriters should pay heed. Their HOF shtick is a dying language for web-connected fans.

**Sponsorship will continue to grow.** Anyone that watched the Cubs put *Under Armor* ads on the doors in the power alleys and generate more income via the *Chicago Board of Trade* seats on the 3<sup>rd</sup> base line knows this is true. As firms sponsor half-innings and stolen base successes, we have only the limit of marketing's imagination. It is possible the buttocks of Grady Sizemore might become a TAG body spray logo to be fawned over by the females that admire the human form.

**Ownerships will continue to annoy, make bad choices, and seem stupid.** Fort digresses into an academic thought, it is his right:

“The world is an uncertain place, especially in sports production. And while we are all prone to fallacious *ex post* statistical reasoning, many sports writers have it honed to a fine skill. It is invalid to look at owner choices after the fact, point out the good outcomes that a particular owner could have obtained if they had only acted like some other owner, and then point out the bad outcomes that their owner could have avoided at the same time. Here is the statistically valid approach to criticism. At the same time that the owner is making their choice, the analyst points out the predictable errors and makes them public. Then, after the fact, if the analyst is correct, there is something to talk about.”<sup>187</sup>

What would be the fun in that? Here, one should contend that ownerships have nearly unlimited access to top business brains, Ph.D. economists and engineers, potent ex-players who can inform on player psyches, and doctors that can rebuild people *better* often than they were before. While it is a business – as we are informed, too often – it seems the best at the business have better toolboxes (or tax accountants) than whatever team you might be rooting for not located in a New York borough.

But Fort's point is well taken; as the Bush Leagues section will explain at the end.

**No one makes money running a sports franchise.** Fort has in his crosshairs the arguments made by the owners, that they are: caretakers of the sport and concern with the community charity; that players get all the cash; and that taxes are just the same for them as they are for us.

This last argument is undermined by current taxation laws (circa 2006-7.)

- 1) “The buyer of a pro sports team is allowed to count the entire purchase price of the team as a depreciable asset for a period of 15 years.”<sup>188</sup>
- 2) “If the owner organizes the team as a pass-through firm for tax purposes (Subchapter S corporation or limited liability partnership, for example), the paper loss on the team goes over to personal 1040 forms to shelter non-sport income. At the current highest tax brackets, this pass-through ‘loss’ saves about 35 cents on the dollar.”<sup>189</sup>
- 3) Cross ownership of supporting businesses to the sports franchises make it possible to minimize taxes on other ventures, like cable networks.
- 4) If any franchise was that big of a loser, why would people (smart ones with money oozing from their designer suits) continue to evaluate them as worth more than they were only a handful of seasons prior?

The answer is simple: sports franchises are not money losers. With lax, loophole-laden tax rules, a forever creative accounting regime, and increased revenues obviously taking place, ownerships have profits coming from the ball team. And while the public sector is boondoggled into footing the bill for new stadiums – another depreciated asset – the owners smartly hire accountants to work out the best plan to make their fair share of the pie grow at much, much greater rates than China’s GDP. (8%+ year over year).

There is always a hopefulness that people can and will reasonably take to heart the information provided by the scholars, and use it to make better decisions. That they will choose to come only to the better run facilities – sans public money – and support the best teams that are as philanthropic as the owners put themselves out to be. But fans would not be fans if they were purely rational. Foregoing years (and generations) of support to jump ship to another team is not a fan trait. And then you have the players – moving around to wherever the dollars add up – which exasperate their loyal fan bases at their last stop.

But it makes for another discussion, another field of statistics, and circumstances that provide more employment opportunities from the architects and project managers and economists to the hot dog and beer vendors hired to serve up those \$5.00 Dodger dogs and \$8.00 ice cold Budweisers.

*Does it get any better than this?*





**At the Juice Box: Minute Maid Ballpark** was once Enron Field. After the scandal of multi-billion-dollar corporation being found using creative (and illegal) accounting methods to its advantage, the Field became a Ballpark, once again. The Cubs' Derrek Lee is at the plate. (Courtesy of Jeff Flowers)

**Table.** New Ballparks in the Clinton Era

Clinton Era Ballpark Builds			Year	Initial Cost <sup>(1)</sup>	% Public	Public	Ticket <sup>(2)</sup>
No	Team	Stadium	Completed	(Millions)	Financed	(Millions)	Price % ↑
1	Arizona Diamondbacks	Chase Field	1998	\$355	76	\$269.80	31.5%
2	Atlanta Braves	Turner Field	1996	\$235	0	\$0.00	
3	Baltimore Orioles	Camden Yards	1992	\$235	96	\$225.60	38.6%
4	Cincinnati Reds	Great American Ballpark	2003	\$297	17	\$50.49	
5	Cleveland Indians	Jacobs Field	1994	\$173	87	\$150.51	34.3%
6	Colorado Rockies	Coors Field	1995	\$215	75	\$161.25	103.0%
7	Detroit Tigers	Comerica Park	2000	\$290	50	\$145.00	50.6%
8	Houston Astros	Minute Maid Park	2000	\$266	67	\$178.22	39.2%
9	Milwaukee Brewers	Miller Park	2001	\$322	64	\$206.08	51.3%
10	Philadelphia Phillies	Citizens Bank Park	2004	\$346	50	\$173.00	65.3%
11	Pittsburgh Pirates	PNC Park	2001	\$230	71	\$163.30	31.9%
12	San Diego Padres	PETCO Park	2004	\$411	70	\$287.70	75.2%
13	San Francisco Giants	AT&T Park	2000	\$306	5	\$15.30	35.2%
14	Seattle Mariners	Safeco Field	1999	\$517	76	\$392.92	
15	Texas Rangers	Ameritrust Field in Arlington	1994	\$181	80	\$144.80	
Totals/Avg				\$4,379	58.93%	\$2,564.0	<b>50.6%</b>
1. Wikipedia Article, <i>List of Major League Baseball Stadiums</i> 2. <i>Baseball Between the Numbers</i> , pg. 211-212							

### Public Remodel, Private Woes

From *Baseball Between the Numbers*: “So if you’re angry about those \$30 nosebleed tickets, better blame Ronald Reagan or the nation’s love affair with garlic fries.”

The table above reflects half the baseball fields were turned over in the Clinton Era.

Bud Selig’s commissionership has been a busy remodeling job of the entirety of professional baseball from ballparks, high-tech ball bats, umpires judged by a computer program, and performance enhancers. As we can see, more than half of the stadiums were bought by us, the ordinary public. Meanwhile, we obtained the pleasure to pay much more to see our favorite player grind his bat into sawdust whilst a pitcher stands with a smoother, livelier baseball ready to throw it in excess of 95 MPH, while hoping the batsmen forgot what he saw on videotape before the game, and the ball will not soar into the newly-branded-by-marketers \$100 seats to the pitcher’s demotion to the minors.


A father, in an afternoon off from a declining Midwest business, though wishes for a homer to give his son to justify (if only to himself) the \$350 afternoon spent at the ol’ ballpark.

### Going Green Cathedrals

The selling points on making ballparks apart of a greater cause, and an economic positive, do exist. A recent book by David Owen (*Green Metropolis*, 2009) on the super efficiency of cities, and sustainability concerns facing all Americans, lends itself well to any building of new ballparks, if we commingle the usage of industrial, commercial, and residential areas around the ballpark. Eliminate cars from the picture – public transport, subways, and walking to a vibrant and bustling downtown – and build wide sidewalks and shops below residences. Small parks and grassy areas next to tech centers and a ballpark tied into the mix of it all. Among the more likeable parks – Wrigley and Fenway – offer much of these city efficiencies.

# Green Metropolis via Ball Parks

(Downtown: Min. Zoning, Buses, Wide Sidewalks, Segways )



While not a panacea to the lavish parks the public subsidizes by half, if people can take in an afternoon ballgame, shop at the local deli, run the dog in the park, and go in late night to the tech center to complete their work, and do it all within a walk, or a Segway's useful range, then cities come back to life. And populations will return from the sprawl of suburbia. And a different way of thinking comes about. (**Note:** Author's 2000s green phase of life. Everyone comes to an awakening in their own course.)

## Enhancement & Steroids: The Statistics & Power Surge II

“Everybody’s blaming the pitchers,” [Tim] Belcher said. “It’s smaller strike zones, smaller parks and steroids. That’s not a good combination.”<sup>190</sup> Steroids. The word evokes images of players swollen with muscles and looking akin to the Incredible Hulk. Outlawed via various pieces of federal legislation, starting with the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988, and followed up by a semi-contentious United States Senate hearing in 1989<sup>191</sup>, which led to The Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990<sup>192</sup> that classified the drug as Schedule III, including 27 named specifically, steroids are a consistent chant to sing for all fans, media gurus, and even the well-informed types to apply in describing (and critiquing) the outbursts of home run power in the 1990s to the present day. (With the date of the ‘home run’ problem ranging from 1993 to the 1998 MLB season.)

For this discussion, it is an imperative to layout the basics of:

A History of Steroid Usage

The Media: Agenda Building

The ‘*War on Drugs*’ mentality as it has been applied to steroids

The Statistics: Surrounding the ‘Steroid Era’

The Other Factors: Things that just as likely changed the statistics of players

Public Concerns: What has transpired in the wake of discovering that MLB players are taking steroids and Human Growth Hormone to enhance performance in some meaningful way

### A History of Steroids Usage

The likely originator of performance-enhancing (anabolic) steroids is John Bosley Ziegler. Ziegler’s work in the 1950s and 1960s led to the development of a chemical while working at Ciba Pharmaceuticals: methandrostenolone, which the company marketed as Dianabol.<sup>193</sup>

In *When Winning Costs Too Much* by John McCloskey and Dr. Julian Bailes, Ziegler’s Dianabol was developed in 1958, and then supplied to the 1960 U.S. Olympic weightlifting team.<sup>194</sup> A long-standing source, Dr. William N. Taylor, reports the same Dr. Ziegler had those initial users wear T-shirts that read: “Dianabol, Breakfast of Champions.”<sup>195</sup>

Another source, [www.anabolics.com](http://www.anabolics.com) places unconfirmed usage back as far as the 1940s under the inauspicious and torturous might of the Hitler regime, with Hitler himself as a willing guinea pig.<sup>196</sup> (In 1935, it was discovered that testosterone could build muscle mass.)<sup>197</sup> In any case, the foundations of usage were crudely experimental then in the

late 1930s through 1950s, and undoubtedly, numerous volunteers were needed to test the validity of the results seen in other trials during those first twenty years.

At the beginning, anabolic steroids primary usage was to assist burn victims, treat heart conditions (angina pectoris)<sup>198</sup>, premature infants, sexual shortcomings, those suffering from wasting diseases, and the elderly. But obviously (and partly due to Dr. **Ziegler's** life-long interest in bodybuilding), the administration of this substance to muscle building programs became more prevalent and salient to the discussion.

Justin Peters further states:

“Weightlifters and other athletes clamored for "Doc Ziegler's mysterious pink pills." Ziegler himself only prescribed Dianabol in small doses, but iron gamers eager for a competitive edge regularly exceeded his recommendations. Ziegler was horrified by this excess, especially when he examined Dianabol users and found enlarged prostates and atrophied testes. The lifters paid little heed, as John Fair recounts in his recent book *Muscle town USA*. ‘What is it with these simple-minded shits?’ complained an exasperated Ziegler. ‘I’m the doctor!’”<sup>199</sup>

By the 1960s, NFL football took notice of the results from steroid usage: “Alan Roy was hired by the San Diego Chargers in 1963 to be the first strength coach in the history of pro football. It was believed that, during training camp, Roy would routinely place steroid pills next to his players’ plates. The pills were believed to be Dianabol...”<sup>200</sup> The NFL was far from the only place steroids took hold. Olympic weightlifters used steroids as early as 1954, with usage spreading throughout the Olympic games by 1964.

A year before the 1984 Olympic games, nineteen athletes were disqualified from competing for using steroids.<sup>201</sup> Numerous stories in the mid 1970s abounded concerning the former Eastern Bloc nations, specifically, the East Germany female swimmers, using all types of enhancers that pushed the bar and garnered gold in international competition. These horror stories are reflected in *Game of Shadows* and *When Winning Cost Too Much*.

And most famously, Ben Johnson sustained much negative publicity in the U.S., and around the world, for his positive steroid test in the 1988 Olympics after achieving a gold medal in the premiere Track-and-Field event: the 100-meter Dash. (Though in April 2003, the media released reports that Carl Lewis tested positive for minute quantities of a three banned stimulants (ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanoamine) prior to 1988 U.S. Olympic trials. The United States Olympic Committee ignored Lewis’s positive test (considering it inadvertent), after an appeal.<sup>202</sup>

Yet that ‘omission’ greatly assisted Lewis in his ‘media defeat’ of Ben Johnson during the 1988 Olympics.) In *When Winning Cost Too Much*, Dr. Bailes and John McCloskey conveniently left out any mentioning of the Carl Lewis report, but considered their “unprecedented collection” a comprehensive rendering of the PED (Performance Enhancing Drugs) problem.

As Dr. Bryan Denham notes in *Hero or Hypocrite?: United States and International Media Portrayals of Carl Lewis amid Revelations of a Positive Drug Test*:

“Given the international importance of the Olympics (Bairner, 2001; Rivenburgh, 2003), and the fact that United States media companies may have been operating at unusually high levels of nationalism (Hachten and Scotton, 2002), one might expect United States media to have stayed relatively quiet on the Lewis story. In contrast, one might have expected journalists writing for newspapers published internationally to have considered the Lewis situation yet another instance of arrogance on the part of the United States, its own Olympic committee having found a way for Lewis and others to compete internationally — just as US political leaders found a ‘reason’ to dismiss opposition to the war in Iraq.”<sup>203</sup>

This reflects a tendency of bias based on the nationality of the reporters and close association to the subject as underscored in the absence of the Lewis report in *When Winning Cost Too Much*. (Or the ignoring of a lack of evidence in the support of a prominent reason (WMDs<sup>204</sup>) to go into the Iraqi War, as reporters failed to push back upon discovery there were no weapons of mass destruction.)

In the early 1990s, the NFL specifically banned steroids from its sport. This was in light of Lyle Alzado’s revelations about steroid usage in his career and his unfortunate death due to a brain tumor that again pushed steroids to the forefront. (In the recent years, former New Orleans Saints head coach Jim Haslett stated that some of his pro football teammates were using steroids.) Former Pittsburgh Steeler lineman and author of *False Glory*, Steve Courson, talks about the effect Lyle Alzado’s (and John Matuszak’s) death had on his life during the time he was fighting a diagnosis of dilated cardiomyopathy and his fight to educate the NFL, and the general public, to the dangers of steroids. This after taking steroids (and other drugs) during his own NFL career.

Since then, the focus of the steroid allegations and positive tests revolved around the sports of the Olympics, pro cycling, professional baseball, and youth usage, with the last group being the most logical reason to stop the “epidemic” of over 1,000,000 steroid users in young America.

## The Media: Agenda Building

Maybe the biggest reason the steroid issue took hold once again (via MLB Baseball) is the idea of Agenda Building. In which an issue gains prominent notoriety and becomes greatly influenced by media coverage. As Dr. Bryan Denham, professor of Mass Communication at Clemson University outlines<sup>205</sup>, quoting from Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard, *Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, and Uses in the Mass Media*: (NY: Longman, 1992.), the following steps take place (in concert or separately, italics reflect the agenda building theory as it has applied to the steroid issue):

The press highlights some events or activities and makes them stand out.

*Steroids prominently discussed on TV, Internet, radio sports talk, and the print media outlets.*

Different kinds of issues require different kinds and amounts of news coverage to gain attention.

*Critical editorials, leading newspaper's headlines, Congressional hearings and national media focused on Steroids/HGH and home run hitting in the Major Leagues from 1998-2007.*

The events and activities in the focus of attention must be 'framed,' or given a field of meanings within which they can be understood.

*An illegal activity, threat to lifetime baseball records, and children being harmed are all ways in which steroids are 'framed' for public consumption.*

The language used by the media can affect perception of the importance of an issue.

*Much of the rhetoric revolves around key words: Illegal, BALCO, Barry Bonds, Jose Canseco (a.k.a. "the Typhoid Mary")<sup>206</sup>, cheaters, threatens the game, convicted of felonies, perjury, harmful, evil, causes death and many other negative or polarizing words to alter/continue perceptions of steroid users & usage.*

The media link the activities or events that have become the focus of attention to secondary symbols whose location on the political landscape is easily recognized.

*In tying so much of the recent home run power outburst directly to steroids, and the perceptions of the MLB played in the years prior to 1980 as being 'pure' and somehow 'free of drugs', the secondary symbols are old-time players that are well-known in the Americana of the National Pastime. The 'purity factor' has always been a strong motivating factor in the American Society in judging who or what is*

*considered good. Baseball is such a symbol of the American society that even the 'rule of law' was altered and/or ignored for its betterment or survival.*<sup>207</sup>

Agenda building is accelerated when well-known and credible individuals begin to speak out on an issue.

*As the steroid issue unfolded, prominent doctors, U.S. Congressman, Hall-of-Fame Baseball players, current MLB players, former Senate Majority Leader and the President of the United States, all spoke on the issue of steroids within the past few years.*

These steps are seen in *Sports Illustrated* reporting of the initial outcry against steroids in the mid-to- late 1980s according to Dr. Bryan Denham's research.

To move forward, the recent buildup of media coverage about steroids can be most visibly seen on *ESPN* broadcasts (*Sportscenter, Quite Frankly, Outside the Lines, Rome is Burning, Around the Horn* and any Major League Baseball broadcast inclined to report such findings). Other media outlets (*USA Today, CNN/SI, CBS Sports, Fox Sports, The Sporting News, San Francisco Chronicle, The Boston Globe, Yahoo! Sports* to name a very select few) picked up quickly on the steroid topic after Ken Caminiti's *SI* interview with Tom Verducci, and more fervently, once Jose Canseco wrote his scathing tell-all book about MLB players, the baseball media, and personnel managers. Canseco talked about his two-decade usage of steroids, other players' usage (including Mark McGwire and Rafael Palmeiro), misinformation about himself (and Latinos) and the racial problems still existent in Major League Baseball (amongst Latin Americans) that were rarely reported. But the most important topic addressed was: steroids in baseball.

As early as 1995, Bob Nightengale sarcastically reported for *The Sporting News*, "Come on, you know there's no steroid use in baseball. Those bodies and dramatic increases in strength and bat speed are only the byproducts of these athletes dedicating their bodies to the gym all winter. That's what baseball tells us."<sup>208</sup> At that moment, media outcry was barely a whisper in the overcrowded room of professional sports journalism.

But on the heels of the absence of the World Series and loss of fans because of it, no one made much of that in the particular comment. The reasons were obvious: baseball needed rebuilding financially; fan bases needed integrity and excitement to come back to the game; and the media was concentrated on the travesty of losing the 1994 World Series due to a labor dispute that quick resolution by all parties involved may have averted the current dilemmas. The dubious insertion of an owner-in-kind Commissioner of Major League Baseball (Bud Selig of the Milwaukee Brewers) was exactly what the



doctor ordered in addressing the most important aspect of baseball: monetary gain by the ownerships, players, and executives.

Once again in *The Sporting News*, in 1999, Mark Emmons quotes Dr. Charles Yesalis, professor of Health and Human Development at Penn State and author of *The Steroid Game*: “Androstenedione is a steroid. Now what we don’t know is if it’s an anabolic (muscle-building) steroid. But these aren’t vitamins. This is an honest-to-goodness drug...I’ve seen lean-mass increases in ballplayers that I frankly cannot attribute to changes in strength training alone...Forget about creatine. To me, it’s very obvious that anabolic steroids have taken a major foothold in major league baseball.”<sup>209</sup> This partial reference to Mark McGwire’s usage of a banned substance in the NFL, the NCAA, and the IOC (International Olympic Committee) and the prevalence of unusual changes in body shapes of MLB players was foreshadowing the events to come. Dr. Yesalis was outspoken in 1989<sup>210</sup> at the Subcommittee Hearings regarding steroids that eventually led to the felonious criminalizing of distribution and/or intent to distribute anabolic steroids of various kinds without a prescription.



**Jose Canseco a.k.a. Typhoid Mary:** In *Juiced*, he outed himself, and others, as steroid users. His revelations were truthful as Roger Clemens fell from grace – when no one believed this Bash Brother of Mark McGwire was telling the truth. (Glenn Francis)

Yet in reading this piece, one could only see an acceptance that supplements and weight training were now the ‘norm’ in baseball, though thought, at one time, being counterproductive to hitting, or in throwing of a baseball by the ownership, coaches, and

some media correspondents. Furthermore, the 'Andro' story was dismissed completely by the author, stating, "Early signs there will be none."<sup>211</sup> [Regarding fallout.]

And that more importantly, the players firmly believed in the substances, regimens and workouts they utilized. (Alex Rodriguez, Sammy Sosa, Mark McGwire, Jose Canseco, Dante Bichette, and Tim Salmon are all mentioned as advocates of lifting programs. Dante Bichette and Mark McGwire being users of Androstenedione. Prominent mentioning of the Angels & Rockies superior workout facilities and the Padres' joking motto of 'benching 300 is better than hitting .300' is even more indicative of the tone of the piece.)

In a May 1, 2004 piece, Wayne M. Barrett, then Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of *USA Today*, critiqued Major League Baseball reactions:

"CAN'T THE CLOWNS who run major league baseball make up their minds? First, they were against drugs that hinder performance (unless it really is possible to locate the strike zone better when stoned or flying on coke). Now, they are against drags that enhance performance (unless you thought Barry Bonds taking on the body and personality of the Incredible Hulk was a coincidence). Worse, there is all this ludicrous hand-wringing about the integrity of the game, how once-sacred records have been broken because contemporary players are bulking up on the illegal juice served up by the BALCOs of the world...Seriously, where does this hypocrisy and madness end? Major League Baseball, from both the labor and management sides, has known for years that one of the main reasons home run totals have been skyrocketing is steroids and the keepers of the game were glad of it. The subtleties of our National Pastime have long since disappeared, relegated, as the cliché goes, to the dustbin of history. More home runs means more excitement, which, in turn, translates into more fans and advertising dollars. The modern fan may not tolerate snorting cocaine in the bullpen, but he sure does not seem to mind steroid-powered longballs clearing the fence at a record pace..."<sup>212</sup>

But even this short-term head burying by the ownership, the commissioner, and the media outlets covering the sport came to an abrupt halt when Caminiti spilled the pills to Tom Verducci of *Sports Illustrated* that steroid use assisted him<sup>213</sup> in garnering the 1996 NL MVP award, unanimously. With that outing of himself, and projecting steroid usage at nearly 50%<sup>214</sup>, Ken Caminiti greatly assisted *Sport Illustrated* back to reporting a story that was a primary focus during the 1980s run of its magazine.<sup>215</sup> This, along with Canseco's book, started the media ball rolling towards a critical and hulking mass achieved on March 17, 2005 – the day the United States Congress held hearings on steroid usage

players in requesting Jose Canseco, Curt Shilling, Rafael Palmeiro, Sammy Sosa, Mark McGwire, Frank Thomas, Bud Selig, and Donald Fehr testify before them.

**(Presidential Note:** Prior to this hearing, in an odd juxtaposition, President George W. Bush mentioned steroids in his January 2004 State of the Union address. This coming from a man who was a highly visible part owner of the Texas Rangers in the early 1990s when the Texas Rangers acquired Jose Canseco from Oakland A's, even as opposing fans denigrated Oakland players and called out Jose by various 'steroid' slurs. And, the future president had access to significant intelligence-gathering power in his father's *prior role* as the Director of the CIA in the 1970s. According to McCloskey and Bailes, a White House aide presented Bush's opinion in *Sports Illustrated* as, "...He brought up the issue of steroids...He has a unique perspective on this. His father played baseball. He was a team owner. He doesn't like fake home runs."<sup>216</sup>)

As Denham reflects on the nature of the revelation of steroid usage:

"The *Sports Illustrated* exposé told of a Major League Baseball that probably did not exist in the minds of many fans and sports journalists alike, which may explain why so many reporters reacted immediately and vocally. Baseball is (or was), after all, a part of Americana and those who grew up with the game seemed to have little tolerance for cheating within it. Following intense press reaction to the drugs-in-baseball report, Congress held hearings on the issue and by early August 2002, the players union had advanced a proposal for drug testing to begin the following season. Although experts scoffed at what the union proposed, characterizing it as little more than a starting point for curbing steroid use, the proposal nevertheless went forward and, on 30 August, following negotiations, Major League Baseball enacted a policy on performance-enhancing drugs."<sup>217</sup>

Soon after though, the agreement on stiffer penalties related to testing positive for steroids in Major League baseball was completed – with tougher deterrents installed via a "three-strike" approach. Baseball is one for chances. (As 1980s LA Dodger pitcher Steve Howe could attest to six times.)

Since then, the 'steroid talk' has only increased – just as the number of baseball books penned in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century include Steroids as a primary topic: *Juiced*, *Game of Shadows*, *Juicing the Game*, *Love Me, Hate Me*, and several others – and the witch hunt intensified around the 2<sup>nd</sup> leading all-time home run hitter: Barry Lamar Bonds.

Bill Gifford opined in December 2004: "Denial is ever popular, even for those like Bonds whose drug use has been confirmed. [Referencing the leaked grand jury testimony.] 'Why

can't I just be good?' he [Bonds] asked, setting a new major-league record for disingenuousness. Still, he's more imaginative than Marion Jones, who counters the say-so of her ex-husband (banned shot-putter C.J. Hunter), the drug suspension of her boyfriend Tim Montgomery, and the testimony of BALCO head Victor Conte, who said he'd seen Jones get injections of EPO, with the lamest dooper's excuse of all: She's never tested positive." <sup>218</sup>

In *Game of Shadows*, from nearly the outset of the book, Victor Conte is tactfully demonized for his role in the athletes' usage of his nutritional supplements: "On a steamy May morning in 2001, at North Carolina State University, Victor Conte could see it all coming together. The years of scraping and scheming and networking finally were about to pay off. Playing multiple roles – benevolent pitchman, self-taught scientist, schmoozer extraordinaire – Conte had orchestrated the ultimate marketing moment. Fame and glory and riches were all now within reach."<sup>219</sup> *Shadow's* authors, Fainura-Wada and Lance Williams, continue on more derisively, "[The interview of Marion Jones by FLEX writer Jim Schmaltz] would get the message out. Conte needed to be part of the story, as much to gratify his own outsized ego as to sell ZMA. He wasn't satisfied simply with standing in the shadows while his athletes shattered records...wanted to be famous himself...the bold scientist...acknowledged by great athletes..."<sup>220</sup>

And later, "[Referring to his long jumping talents]...He also found a way to make a quick buck with his talents...[jumping] a pond...Conte and his pals would make modest wagers...[Regarding Conte's musical career]...trying to make it as a professional musician [in the 1970s], his father would introduce him by saying, 'This is my son Victor. He's never worked a day in his life.' In fact, Victor Conte Jr. was an operator in ways his father could not have imagined..."<sup>221</sup> The tone of the book from the outset spends a painstaking amount of time to paint a hugely negative portrait of Victor Conte Jr. as it is does to reveal the intervening and interwoven events that led to the major league steroids scandal, and specifically, Barry Bonds.

**(Book, Agenda, Jail:** The *Game of Shadows* statements about Conte are almost a direct product of Agenda Building as described by various mass media communications experts such as Dr. Denham, Dr. Kurt Lang, Dr. Gladys E. Lang, Dr. Maxwell McCombs, and Dr. Gaye Tuchman. However, this author strongly felt it abhorrent that Mr. Fainaru-Wada and Mr. Williams had to face any prison time over the leaked testimony written about in their book. As it turns out, their source of information was the attorney representing Barry Bonds, who did get prison.)

With the federal convictions of BALCO founder Victor Conte and Greg Anderson, a personal trainer and childhood friend of Barry Bonds, the focus of a federal investigation switched almost solely to Bonds, in light of his denials (under oath) of knowingly using steroids. As of this writing, a pending grand jury indictment for perjury and tax evasion hangs over Bonds's head.

(When written, on or about July 21, 2006, no indictment was handed down by a first grand jury. But a second grand jury was convened for the same charges. Greg Anderson was held in contempt and jailed for failure to testify against Barry Bonds in the first grand jury. And faced the same punishment for failure to comply in the second. Later, Bonds was indicted, and still awaits his final fate from a court.)

Reports then from MLB Commissioner's office in July 2006 reflected a propensity to suspend Bonds solely on the basis of any indictment. Which the objective then was to assure Bond's inability to reach Hank Aaron's record for lifetime home runs.

Whereas, the New York Yankees Jason Giambi, several times an All-Star and former AL MVP, had received substantially less of the same treatment from the media and/or investigators (as Bonds or Canseco has) in revealing to a BALCO grand jury that he [Giambi] took steroids. (Though Giambi never publicly admitting such use; which would have possibly voided the remainder of his huge \$120 million dollar contract in 2005. Since then, Mr. Giambi came back to form as an extremely potent offensive weapon after the institution of steroid testing. In the summer 2007, Giambi sat down with former Senator George Mitchell to discuss his involvement with the steroid use.)

This media circus continued daily. Pedro Gomez of *ESPN* reported on Barry Bonds as his only roving assignment. Sports talk radio was typically geared to the hot topics: athletes taking steroids, bad behavior of athletes, prodigious amounts of money made by athletes (while ignoring ownerships' windfall), a few meaningless trade rumors, and very little about the on-the-field performances. TV Sports shows report whether Bonds deserves, or requires, special dispensation in light of his actual performance during this, **The Steroid Era**. All HOF-worthy players fall under a suspicion of "juice or no juice?" criteria.

Meanwhile, little is ever actually done to players, managers, or ownerships (beside rather brief suspensions) that do things on or off the field that could be seen as considerably worse, morally. (Beating a spouse, throwing a bat at an umpire, calling a sportswriter a name derogatory to an entire classification of people, or putting a sombrero on a Mexican sausage in Milwaukee, etc.)

Yet, Bonds played on, surpassed a hallowed record while under scrutiny by an independent MLB investigation, headed by former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, and more importantly still, the U.S. government.

### The War on Drugs

Certainly, the harsh light of Bonds is tied to the 'War on Drugs' mentality which to date is deemed by many social commentators and elected officials as a costly failure. The number of persons imprisoned for drug-related crimes increased by 100s of percent since this unofficial war began. The economic drain on families, society, and the criminal justice system bears all burdens in ridding America of illegal drugs while keeping hundreds of thousands of low-level criminals in a state of perpetual hardship, and as 'recyclable resources' for overtaxed state budgetary concerns.

The wide latitude given to the United States judicial system to imprison users, and low-level pushers (utilizing mandatory minimums), led to huge outlays of taxpayer dollars to build more prisons, institute more courts, hire more DAs, more police officers, more correctional officials, and more after-prison programs (of dubious content) while becoming the most penal society on the face of the Earth.

As funding prisons is based on body count, new prisons come forthwith from said heads. More than 2.1 million people were incarcerated as of 2004. In 1980, only 500,000+ prisoners were jailed. The Census population of America was 230 million in 1980, meaning, of the added population (75-80 million as of 2004, 1.6 million were sitting in a cell block). One in thirty-seven citizens has the 'ex-con' label. One in three African-Americans males has experienced a lock up. And the budgetary bite continues to rise as more than 800 new jail facilities were built between 1980-2000, with more undoubtedly to come. (Stats from *The Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 2006.)

Much of this 'War on Drugs' came to a head in response to professional athlete's death.<sup>222</sup> Len Bias, the 1<sup>st</sup> round draft choice of the Boston Celtics in 1986, died due to an overdose of cocaine, the night of his draft selection. Then, as predictably happens, congressional outcry, due to constituency's calls and fears, leads to a haphazard and draconian lawmaking session. Soon after, in October 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is signed into law, and along with it, a media campaign started in earnest to get tough on illegal drug distribution that continues on to this very day. (How much for those ad buys over the years?)

From the impetus of harsh drug enforcement comes this knowledge listed at the Drug Enforcement Agency Website ([www.dea.gov](http://www.dea.gov)). The table reflects specific information about steroids:

**Table.** DEA Website Listing of Steroids (2006)

Anabolic Steroids	CSA Schedules	Trade Or Other Names	Medical Uses	Depend Physical	Psycho-logical	Tolerance	Duration (Hours)	Usual Method	Possible Effects	Effects of Overdose	Withdrawal Syndrome
Testosterone	Substance III	Depo Testosterone, Sustanon, Sten, Cypt	Hypogonadism	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	14-28 days	Injected	Virilization, edema, testicular atrophy,	<u>Unknown</u>	Possible depression
Other Anabolic Steroids	Substance III	Parabolan, Winstrol, Equipose, Anadrol, Dianabol, Primabolin-Depo, D-Ball	Anemia, Breast cancer	<u>Unknown</u>	Yes	<u>Unknown</u>	Variable	Oral, injected	gynecomastia, acne, aggressive behavior		

What is interesting to note is the lack of information (listed as Unknown) in several categories. Nearly all other drugs listed as Schedule III on this website have definitive information on Dependency, Tolerance, and Overdose effects. With that said, it seems complete scientific studies be done to alleviate this gap in knowledge (if it truly exists - Dr. W.N. Taylor suggests not), and state clearly, and without ambiguity, the overall effects this class of drug has. Otherwise, it leaves too much up to interpretation, not only by the potential users, but also by the community-at-large monitoring this drug so intently in recent years.

In another of its 'get tough on drugs' stances, even our Supreme Court seems to further interest in a "Say No to Drugs" policy. As Charles P. Piece, *Boston Globe Magazine* writer, opines:

"Consider, for example, Pottawatomie County v. Earls, in which the Supreme Court decided last year, by the predictable 5-to-4 margin, that high-school students could be tested for drugs if they decided to participate in virtually any extracurricular activity.

The case concerned a girl named Lindsay Earls, who'd refused a school-mandated drug test. Lindsay Earls wanted to join the choir.

Now, a society that truly valued its civil liberties would have laughed the Supreme Court majority that promulgated this foolishness right off the bench. But that was not, alas, the case. Now there's a new steroid and a new push to erect another new infrastructure of unworkable and draconian rules. That will last until another cagey scientist invents another steroid that the drug warriors haven't heard of, and then the whole process will start all over again, and we discover that we learned nothing from the tragic passing of Len Bias except how to be idiots with each other."<sup>223</sup>

In reference to the War on Drugs, Wayne M. Barrett, then Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of *USA Today*, states:

“Can't government stop snooping into what everyone is doing behind closed doors for even a second? More importantly, when is this ridiculous war on drugs going to end? Our prisons are overflowing with nonviolent offenders who have done nothing more than seek out their little piece of nirvana through drug use. (Same for ballplayers: if they want to risk shortened life spans in the hopes of hitting a base ball farther, well ... have at it, boys.) When government legislates morality, bad laws invariably are the result. Moreover, bad laws only create disrespect for the law as well as a nation of lawbreakers. (Witness the gay marriage phenomenon.) No set of laws, no matter how onerous, ever will prevent a junkie from sticking a needle in his arm; a cokehead from risking his job to snort up in the bathroom; some college kid from smoking a joint during a concert; or Mr. and Mrs. Middle Class from washing down a couple of painkillers with a glass of wine before watching a favorite show on HBO.”<sup>224</sup>

Yet the DEA, ATF, FBI and numerous, other government agencies are (supposedly) after Mr. and Mrs. Middle Class because they are using drugs of their choice, and not the drugs of the government's choice. Meanwhile, studies have been done that reflect many of the 'safe choices' have caused far more problems (and resulted in lawsuits settled out of court) than even steroids have.

Big pharmaceutical companies 'push' these legal pills via advertisements on television, radio spots, and pop-up ads on the Internet. Drugs such as: Propecia, Lipitor, Cialis, Viagra, Paxil, Ritalin, Rogaine, and many, many others have significant side effects that only a doctor can effectively speak about to his patient. Yet, these legal drug cartels do as much to hinder acquiring knowledge, in hiding trial results, or paying off doctors commensurate to the billions in forecasted revenues from the worldwide marketing of the drug.

But hypocrisy does not end at the counter of your local big box drug store.

As Joan Ryan of the San Francisco Chronicle stated in a 2004 article:

“The recent steroids stories are big news because baseball's greatest player has been branded a cheater. But he [Bonds] is considered a cheater in large part because we have turned steroids into some evil potion that threatens to destroy not only sports, but, if President Bush is to be believed, the well-being and moral fiber of our youth. I wonder how he and others reconcile this viewpoint with their



admiration for Arnold Schwarzenegger, whose chemically created body launched the storied career that has landed him in the California governor's office."

This past and easily perceived indiscretion (in using performance enhancers) of the current governor of California goes without any mentioning by the United States Congress in its 2005 Major League Baseball hearings. If he had been asked to testify, Schwarzenegger's views, truthfully given, are considerable and fairly creditable to this contentious subject. In an interview with George Stephanopolous, Schwarzenegger admits using steroids under a doctor's supervision. But as the former United States Fitness Advisor under the first Bush Administration, Schwarzenegger's using steroids in his early bodybuilding career should have tarnished his Hollywood image, and significantly damaged his furtherance of a long political career. Yet, that has not come to pass. In fact, quite the opposite has happened.

As stated before, the press, fans, and our government officials (for his alleged usage of steroids) vilify Barry Bonds. This is because of Bond's arrogance and bad image prior to the Steroid Era and unwillingness to admit to steroid usage, now. (In light of the revelations of *Game of Shadows*.) As Bill Gifford, a correspondent of *Outside*, states in one article for the *Washington Post*:

"Cycling<sup>225</sup> even has its own Barry Bonds, in the person of American star Tyler Hamilton, whose Athens gold medal carries a giant question mark thanks to a positive test for an illegal blood transfusion, an old-fashioned doping technique that seems to have come back into vogue, ironically, because of more sophisticated tests for EPO, the endurance athlete's drug of choice. Hamilton is keeping his gold medal, thanks to a botched testing protocol, but he faces sanctions for a second positive test during the Tour of Spain. Like Bonds, Hamilton insists that he's innocent despite a steaming mound of evidence to the contrary. (Unlike Bonds, however, Hamilton is widely regarded as a nice guy, which is why many in cycling continue to believe him.)"<sup>226</sup>

In concert with the pointing directly to Bonds, the War on Drugs now takes place on the ball diamond against all players, with very little compromise on the actual facts of the steroid usage as it relates to all persons, or to these elite athletes. As one freelance sportswriter, Dayn Perry, puts steroids into a unique perspective:

"A more objective survey of steroids' role in sports shows that their health risks, while real, have been grossly exaggerated; that the political response to steroids has been driven more by a moral panic over drug use than by the actual effects of the chemicals; and that the worst problems associated with steroids result from their black-market

status rather than their inherent qualities. As for baseball's competitive integrity, steroids pose no greater threat than did other historically contingent "enhancements," ranging from batting helmets to the color line. It is possible, in fact, that many players who use steroids are not noticeably improving their performance as a result.

There are more than 600 different types of steroids, but it's testosterone, the male sex hormone, that's most relevant to athletics. Testosterone has an androgenic, or masculinizing, function and an anabolic, or tissue-building, function. It's the second set of effects that attracts athletes, who take testosterone to increase their muscle mass and strength and decrease their body fat. When testosterone is combined with a rigorous weight-training regimen, spectacular gains in size and power can result. The allure is obvious, but there are risks as well...

...But there are problems with the research that undergirds many of these claims. The media give the impression that there's something inevitably Faustian about taking anabolics--that gains in the present will undoubtedly exact a price in the future. Christopher Caldwell, writing recently in *The Wall Street Journal*, proclaimed, 'Doctors are unanimous that [anabolic steroids] increase the risk of heart disease, and of liver, kidney, prostate and testicular cancer.'

This is false. 'We know steroids can be used with a reasonable measure of safety,' says Charles Yesalis, a Penn State epidemiologist, steroid researcher for more than 25 years, and author of the 1998 book *The Steroids Game*. 'We know this because they're used in medicine all the time, just not to enhance body image or improve athletic performance.' Yesalis notes that steroids were first used for medical purposes in the 1930s, some three decades before the current exacting standards of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) were in place."<sup>227</sup>

Another outspoken and sane voice is Dr. Norm Fost, pediatrics professor and medical-ethics expert at the University of Wisconsin Medical School, is confounded by the paroxysms over steroids in sports. "There's mass hysteria because of sheer misinformation," he says.<sup>228</sup> Dr. Fost has been near the forefront of analyzing the ramifications of steroid use and the ethical constructs that come from utilizing 'unnatural' methods. A primary example: In the 1988 Olympics, when Canadian 100-meter star Ben Johnson was found positive for steroids, Janet Evans was triumphant utilizing new swimsuit technology that was kept a secret from all other rivals. But no one in America blinked at this hypocritical analysis of utilizing any means necessary to win. "The hypocrisy is remarkable," Dr. Fost says.<sup>229</sup>

## Statistics: Commissioner Bud Selig, Mark McGwire, and Steroids

Meanwhile, in 1998, Mark McGwire's pursuit of the single-season home run record came under the cloud of using a steroid. Under this 'power' theory, Howard Bryant writes, "The bulging muscles now made sense. So did the home run numbers that had never been so pronounced for such an extended period. They now understood how Brady Anderson could look like a bodybuilder and hit 50 home runs and how the hulking McGwire, already imposing, could seem that much larger when he was no pipsqueak to begin with."<sup>230</sup> (This in speaking about Mark McGwire's confirmed usage of androstenedione, or Andro, for short.)

The current head of the baseball establishment put one face on for the public but was intensely interested in finding out information about Androstenedione. Howard Bryant further adds: "In regard to the ongoing fallout from 1998 Andro revelation, Bud Selig was quoted to say: 'The Cardinals are a disciplined organization...and I don't think that anything goes on over there that shouldn't.' Later, Bud Selig investigated the drug androstenedione on a morning walk and put Rob Manfred on the case to find out the drug's background."<sup>231</sup> Later, Selig would assert that baseball would enlist scientists for a study about the effects of performance enhancers but took zero action against McGwire.<sup>232</sup>

This though is not the first indication that Bud Selig, current and then Commissioner of Major League Baseball, had of drug usage being a real concern for baseball. On May 15, 1997, one year prior to the McGwire revelation, a 6-page memorandum was sent to all MLB clubs that outlined:

**The reasons for a drug policy** - "health and welfare of those who work in Baseball...need to maintain the integrity of the game...Illegal drug use can causes injuries on the field, diminished job performance and alienation of those on who the game's success depends – Baseball fans. Baseball players and personnel cannot be permitted to give even the slightest suggestion that illegal drug use is either acceptable or safe."<sup>233</sup>

**The punishments to be meted out** – "...subject to discipline by the Commissioner and risk permanent expulsion from the game...If any club covers up or otherwise fails to disclose...that club will be fined \$250,000..."<sup>234</sup>

**The procedures of said drug policy** – "Major League players are not subject to unannounced testing for illegal drugs. However, Major League player who have admitted to illegal drug use or have been detected...may be subject to mandatory testing..."<sup>235</sup>

Yet when Mark McGwire in 1998 was caught in plain sight with a steroid precursor<sup>236</sup>, nothing transpired to either McGwire, or the St. Louis Cardinals. On page two of this drug policy, Selig wrote: “This prohibition applies to all illegal drugs and controlled substances, including steroids or prescription drugs...does not have a prescription.” While the legality of the memorandum could be argued against by the MLBPA, then, the intent was clear: to stop, punish, and monitor drug use in baseball.

Even Jose Canseco’s March 17, 2005 Congressional testimony referenced the existing drug policy, stating, “MLB issued press releases years ago stating clearly the position that banned substances that enhanced performance were not a part of MLB. MLB set forth ‘for cause testing’ to support this position. However, during my entire career no player was ever tested for performance enhancing substances.”<sup>237</sup> Yet on the heels of a labor dispute, no World Series held in 1994, and a financial windfall due to the home run race of 1998 between McGwire and Sosa, Mr. Bud Selig refused to back up his policy enforcement, and chose (along with the owners) to bury his head in the money then being made again.

Jose Canseco supports this idea in his testimony: “They turned a blind eye to the clear evidence of steroid use in baseball. Why? Because it sold tickets and resurrected a game that had recently suffered a black eye from a player strike...[brought] back the fans, and answer[ed] the bottom line.”<sup>238</sup> To further Jose’s salient viewpoint, “...Many fans just stayed away. Attendance in 1995 was down 28 percent, nearly 20 million, from 1993, the last pre-strike season...but in 1997, attendance was still down 10 percent...from the pre-strike high. By some estimates the lockout had cost the owners \$500 million in lost revenues in 1994, and \$800 million more in 1995. More worrisome still were the many signs that interest in the game might have permanently ebbed.”<sup>239</sup> This loss of income and fans had to be stopped, regardless of the steroid usage, and as Dr. Taylor strongly states in his Afterword of *Macho Medicine*: “Why did they never support my proposal? [Regarding reclassifying steroids] Was it because they were uneducated to the issues? No. They heard my lectures...It was because their senses were blinded by macho things like money, power and professional ego.”

Then upon further review, ‘several’ seasons later, the primary focus of Mr. Selig’s administration turned back to the stoppage of drug usage, specifically steroids, now that it is well determined that baseball fans do not care about steroids as much as they do about home runs, good ballparks to watch the game in, and seeing their teams win. When the game was still considered in jeopardy in the late 1990s, Selig allowed the steroids, revamped the playoff system (to keep revenues coming much later in the season to borderline playoff teams), added inter-league play (which creates big city

rivalries and revenues), and somehow got revenue sharing passed by the ownerships (who saw the national TV contracts and local cable profits increasing significantly and could justify 'sharing it' amongst themselves).

As *Game of Shadows* authors Mark Fainura-Wada and Lance Williams relate in hindsight:

"McGwire's home run chase was 'a metaphor for the best in America,' a newspaper editor told an Iowa Professor who was studying the chase as a cultural phenomenon. It was more significant than 'the ascent on Mount Everest,' as San Francisco Giants marketing man Pat Gallagher proclaimed. And from [then] acting baseball commissioner Bud Selig down to its ordinary fans – anybody who cared about the game and worried about its future – all agreed that McGwire's pursuit of the home run record was hugely important. It had made watching the sport of baseball enjoyable again, for the first time in quite a while.

Baseball's fans are among the most forgiving in all sports, but the toxic relations between team owners and the players union had put the fans' patience to the test for a generation. From 1971 through 1990, seven baseball seasons had been interrupted...The eight interruption...lasted 234 days and led to the only cancellation of the World Series since World War I. It also nearly killed the game."<sup>240</sup>

As a possible excuse for not enforcing his stated intent in the 1997 memorandum, Commissioner Selig stated before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, "In 2002, Major League Baseball reached a new agreement with the Major league Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA") which, for the first time, provided for testing of Major League players for steroids. Under the agreement, an anonymous prevalence study was conducted in 2003...the 2003 testing was in the range of 5-7 percent."<sup>241</sup> The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) finally included the necessary language to test for steroids.

But why was it not possible to enforce his edict to MLB in the Mark McGwire situation? Or make more of the violation when it obviously affected the perception surrounding the purity of the sport?

Donald Fehr, the Executive Director of the MLBPA, stated before the same committee:

"The matter of drug treatment is not new to major league baseball...Two decades ago, in response to a growing concern about the alleged use of cocaine by players, the parties resulted in the first Joint Drug Agreement in major professional sports.

The emphasis of that agreement was on treatment and prevention...assist[ing] players to address any chemical use or misuse problems...

...suspicionless urine testing of players was advocated by the Clubs, and opposed by us. We thought then – and believe now – that the testing of an individual, not because of something he is suspected to have done, but simply because he is a member of a particular class, is at odds...[with] invad[ing] the privacy of someone without a substantial reason – that is, without cause – related to that individual. While the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not directly applicable to the private employment setting, we always believed that the important principles on which it is based should not be lightly put aside. The Clubs articulated a different view.”<sup>242</sup>

With that said, the primary reason the MLBPA did not agree to a strict enforcement policy with the heads of MLB, was due to the forfeiture of Civil Rights that all Americans speak of with respect. Though these rights were not violated by the employment laws already tested and established, the MLBPA director felt it better to fight until forced (as by the U.S. Congress not-so-veiled threats) to allow such testing on a random basis. This fighting for rights is not unusual given how recently players were virtually slaves to their owners before the 1976 arbitration ruling.

The 1997 memorandum written by Bud Selig though is really an updated carbon copy of June 7, 1991 policy<sup>243</sup> released by the Commissioner of Baseball written by Francis T. Vincent, Jr. (Fay Vincent.)

It seems that over the decade prior to the intense scrutiny, no enforcement existed on the policies laid down by two Commissioners of Major League Baseball in part due to the MLBPA resistance, and possibly of greater concern: the financials of all thirty major league ball clubs.

But the ultimate statement of the steroid ‘problem’ is: What percentage of steroid users in baseball actually improved statistically to cause huge rises in offense seen in this 10-plus year barrage of runs? Could not using better nutrition, maintaining off and in-season physical training, and utilizing video methods, be more important than the use of steroids? Or how about another, more logical, reason or reasons? Why has the offense seen not reduced back to pre–1993 levels since the outing of steroid usage in the MLB, and the enforcement of a steroid policy for several years? Is it possible hGH (human growth hormone) was far more significant (even given pitcher’s Jason Grimsley’s mediocre career), or is that too a fallacy? (Or is a prior weight-training program a prerequisite to improved performance on the ball diamond?)

As Dr. William N. Taylor in *Macho Medicine* determined in a study performed on those who were prior trained in weight lifting, and those who were not, the study reflected that gains in performance, muscle mass, and strength while using steroids could only be conclusive with prior weight trained subjects.<sup>244</sup> With that said, it is nearly a prerequisite to be properly trained in weightlifting techniques in order to gain the requisite enhancements for the sport of baseball – that which could affect bat speed, arm strength, and base running ability.

Several analyses of the recent years reflect changes far earlier than anyone currently reports which likely affected even the ‘pure’ ballplayers of the late 1970s and early 1980s. But these changes have little to do with steroids, but what could be the conspicuous causation of the changes?

### Power Surge II: SPC Chart of Power Ratio

Once again, we turn back to the idea that the baseball changed significantly prior to the 1994 season. That in a period of one off-season, the ratio of home runs and doubles per at bats for players jumped significantly, far out of bounds to any other period/year in Major League Baseball history. The reason for this selection of measuring of power hitting (doubles added) is that doubles do generally reflect a propensity to hit for home runs, and make up the majority of extra base hits for any team, and thus are significant to both runs scored, and slugging averages.

In looking at this theory, it was important to include only those players who generated significant at bats (equal or greater than 150) because:

- It reflects players that generally played the entire season

- It avoids injured players that missed most of the season, and therefore, were not 100%

- It avoids call-ups, pinch hitters, and pitchers. Call-ups that got a short time (due to injuries or on out-of-contention teams), pinch hitters that log few at bats, and pitchers because they are not producers of quality offensive numbers.

Table. Ratio of (Home Runs and Doubles) to At Bats (1950-2005)

Year	Avg. Ratio	AL	NL	Year	Avg. Ratio	AL	NL
1950	0.0741	0.0716	0.0767	1978	0.0681	0.0672	0.0690
1951	0.0687	0.0674	0.0700	1979	0.0716	0.0735	0.0697
1952	0.0655	0.0645	0.0666	1980	0.0680	0.0702	0.0658
1953	0.0713	0.0679	0.0747	1981	0.0646	0.0645	0.0647
1954	0.0686	0.0626	0.0746	1982	0.0699	0.0733	0.0666
1955	0.0700	0.0655	0.0745	1983	0.0707	0.0741	0.0673
1956	0.0726	0.0712	0.0740	1984	0.0688	0.0716	0.0660
1957	0.0710	0.0696	0.0724	1985	0.0733	0.0764	0.0701
1958	0.0725	0.0692	0.0758	1986	0.0752	0.0773	0.0730
1959	0.0736	0.0718	0.0754	1987	0.0819	0.0828	0.0809
1960	0.0722	0.0727	0.0716	1988	0.0703	0.0729	0.0676
1961	0.0748	0.0742	0.0755	1989	0.0683	0.0676	0.0691
1962	0.0715	0.0732	0.0698	1990	0.0723	0.0718	0.0728
1963	0.0670	0.0704	0.0635	1991	0.0724	0.0742	0.0705
1964	0.0689	0.0716	0.0661	1992	0.0704	0.0712	0.0697
1965	0.0680	0.0679	0.0681	1993	0.0771	0.0783	0.0758
1966	0.0678	0.0673	0.0682	1994	0.0861	0.0880	0.0842
1967	0.0632	0.0624	0.0641	1995	0.0838	0.0854	0.0822
1968	0.0579	0.0593	0.0565	1996	0.0862	0.0895	0.0829
1969	0.0655	0.0663	0.0647	1997	0.0852	0.0864	0.0840
1970	0.0713	0.0698	0.0728	1998	0.0863	0.0881	0.0845
1971	0.0640	0.0651	0.0629	1999	0.0897	0.0895	0.0900
1972	0.0623	0.0604	0.0641	2000	0.0920	0.0917	0.0923
1973	0.0662	0.0645	0.0679	2001	0.0904	0.0885	0.0924
1974	0.0628	0.0611	0.0644	2002	0.0868	0.0886	0.0850
1975	0.0653	0.0654	0.0652	2003	0.0881	0.0872	0.0889
1976	0.0599	0.0581	0.0617	2004	0.0902	0.0893	0.0911
1977	0.0734	0.0713	0.0755	2005	0.0871	0.0861	0.0881

Note: Includes all players that amass 150 At-bats in a season – or roughly 35 full games

$(HR+2B)/At\ bats$	AL	NL	Both
St. Dev. (1950-85)	0.00480	0.004842	
Average (1950-85)	0.06813	0.068796	0.068465
UCL	0.08286		
LCL	0.05407		

$(HR+2B)/At\ bats$	Both Leagues
Average (94-97)	0.08533
St dev (1994-97)	0.00253
UCL	0.09291
LCL	0.07774


1950-2005 Statistics	Percentages
AL/NL Correlation	88.98%
Homoscedastic	95.02%
t-test	



Barry Bonds:  
Taking a swing at immortality.



**Graph: SPC of Power Ratio of Players with 150 AB**




It is obvious that in 1994 a distinct and significant change happened in both leagues. The ratio of power statistics increased sharply, more than 3 standard deviations from the normal averages seen between 1950 and 1985, inclusively; the offensive outburst continued well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, more than 10 years.

That steroids could be seen as 'just a convenient excuse' and not an actual definitive causation of this outburst is fairly clear. Taking a shot, applying a cream, or popping a pill

does not suddenly result (in less than a year) in 2 or 3+ standard deviations of enhanced performance for all full-time ballplayers in MLB. (Once again, the players included were those that had 150 at-bats per season each year since 1950.) This continuing on to the present day (2006) with zero abatement, even after steroid policies were instituted, undermines ideas and theories put forth by the media and criminal investigators.


To fall outside the 6-sigma chart on a consistent basis means a process is out of control and is 99.75% unlikely to happen in a normal working process once without a concrete cause. But to continue to happen, reflects a process change that is attributable to unique factors.



This chart takes a decade and plots them with regard to the 'new' era of power surge analysis. The p-bar (.08533) is the average of 8 points (1994-1997, both leagues) and the 3 standard deviations (S.D. -.002529) above and below is reflected from those 8 data points. This calculation is just a rough analysis of an SPC since the data set is so small. However, a definite bias above the P-bar reflects a strong indication that something else is out-of-control. Steroids, then, is a plausible contributing agent to this trend, but no absolute certainty of this is available at this moment. (See the further analysis done.)

What has changed the offense of baseball must be seen in the context of the past as well as the present day. In the prior years, mound changes, strike zone adjustments, ball changes, ballpark changes and the addition of an entire classification of people (African

Americans), had their affects on the game. Why is it that these same culprits are not the same causes to the outbursts in offense?



Looking at this chart, comparing two eras – Coolidge (1919 –1932) to Clinton (1992–2005) – the similarities in the slopes of each line are evident. The first three seasons of each reflects the transition between the old offenses to the newly found power ratios seen in each. As discussed, Babe Ruth uppercut, cleaner and fresh balls, rules changes, and possibly internal changes to the ball yarn, caused the rise to the ‘modern day’ levels from the first twenty seasons of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. But a second offensive explosion was experienced in the 1990s, and continued on with zero regression back to the good old days of baseball.

In 1992 through 1994, little if any talk about steroids is tied to the explosion. The outburst came during the heels of labor disputes, a few ballpark changes, and likely (if unreported) baseball manipulations. Furthermore, after the strike, the impetus to rebuild fan bases, and pack the ballparks could only be done through offenses dominating, not pitchers’ duels. As stated before, it is not difficult to understand the marketing of the ‘long ball’ to sell baseball after losing the most important games of the 1994 season: the seven games of the World Series.

## Comparison of Two Eras and Two Analyses: Ballplayers from the Late Teens and Early Nineties

To further demonstrate the power explosion similarity, another small analysis was done of ballplayers that played during each of their respective offensive explosions over a period of seven years. The structure was as follows:

Players must have played before and after the offensive increase

Differential of at-bats must be under 1,000 At bats for both half of comparison

In the Taft/Coolidge era, 1918 – 1920 & 1922 – 1924 were used for comparison

In the Reagan/Clinton era, 1990 – 1992 & 1994 – 1996 were used for analysis

3 Performance Groups were determined:

Developing players – under or at 25 years of age as of the 1<sup>st</sup> year of study (1990)

Prime players – under 28 but over 25 of age in the 1<sup>st</sup> year of study (1990)

Declining players – over 28 years old in the 1<sup>st</sup> year of study (1990)

The reasoning for the selection of the age criterion came in part due to a recent study by Dr. Ray C. Fair of Yale University. In Fair's paper on *Estimated Age Effects in Baseball*, he states: "the peak-performance age is about 28..."<sup>245</sup> Altogether, fifty-eight players in the 1920s and sixty-seven players in the 1990s were identified as candidates for the analysis. The analysis of these players is presented in full in the Appendix. Steroid Study.

**Table.** List of Players studied


Taft/Coolidge ERA Players

Reagan/Clinton ERA Players

Developing	Prime	Declining	Developing	Prime	Declining
Babe Ruth	Baby Doll Jacobson	Bob Jones	Roberto Alomar	Dante Bichette	Harold Baines
Bill Wambsganss	Casey Stengel	Bobby Veach	Carlos Baerga	Barry Bonds	Wade Boggs
Carson Bigbee	Dave Bancroft	Cy Williams	Jeff Bagwell	Bobby Bonilla	Joe Carter
Charlie Hollocher	Everett Scott	Del Pratt	Albert Belle	Jay Buhner	Chili Davis
Cliff Heathcote	George Burns	Eddie Collins	Jay Bell	Ken Caminiti	Greg Gagne
Cy Perkins	Hank Severeid	George Burns	Craig Biggio	Jose Canseco	Andres Galarraga
Edd Roush	Howie Shanks	Harry Hooper	Steve Finley	Will Clark	Tony Gwynn
George Sisler	Jack Tobin	Heinie Groh	Travis Fryman	Mike Devereaux	Rickey Henderson
Harry Heilmann	Johnny Rawlings	Hy Myers	Juan Gonzalez	Cecil Fielder	Paul Molitor
Ira Flagstead	Max Carey	Ivy Olson	Ken Griffey Jr.	Mark Grace	Eddie Murray
Irish Meusel	Max Flack	Jake Daubert	Marquis Grissom	Ozzie Guillen	Terry Pendleton
Jack Smith	Nemo Leibold	Jimmy Johnston	Charlie Hayes	Lance Johnson	Tony Phillips
Joe Dugan	Rabbit Maranville	Ralph Young	Gregg Jefferies	Wally Joyner	Kirby Puckett
Joe Judge	Ray Schalk	Tilly Walker	Chuck Knoblauch	Barry Larkin	Tim Lincecum
Milt Stock	Roger Peckinpaugh	Tommy Griffith	Ray Lankford	Edgar Martinez	Cal Ripken Jr.
Rogers Hornsby	Sam Rice	Tris Speaker	Brian McRae	Fred McGriff	Mickey Tettleton
Ross Youngs	Steve O'Neill	Ty Cobb	Orlando Merced	Mark McGwire	
Wally Pipp	Stuffy McInnis	Wally Schang	Hal Morris	Paul O'Neill	
	Wally Gerber	Walter Schmidt	John Olerud	Rafael Palmeiro	
	Walter Holke	Zack Wheat	Benito Santiago	Jody Reed	
			Gary Sheffield	Terry Steinbach	
			Sammy Sosa	Walt Weiss	
			Greg Vaughn	Devon White	
			Robin Ventura		
			Omar Vizquel		
			Larry Walker		
			Matt Williams		
			Todd Zeile		

Graph. Ray Fair's Postulated Relationship Between Age and Performance<sup>246</sup>

### Postulated Relationship Between Performance and Age



Fair's model<sup>247</sup> for performance of a player ( $i$ ) in year ( $t$ ) for OBP, OPS or ERA is given by:

$$y_{it} = a_i + \beta_1 x_{it} + \gamma_1 x_{it}^2, x_{it} \leq \delta$$

$$y_{it} = a_i + \beta_2 x_{it} + \gamma_2 x_{it}^2, x_{it} > \delta$$

This relationship is further constrained to produce zero derivatives and peak at  $\delta$  (age of maximum production) to produce the graph above.

Fair's research placed restrictions somewhat similar in vein to this author's. In particular, he started with the 1921 season – due to the “live”<sup>248</sup> ball, excluded any player with less than 100 games played in season, eliminated any player with less than 10 full-time seasons and included the entire time range of 1921-2004. His research also utilized Sean Lahman's database at [www.baseball1.com](http://www.baseball1.com), a prominent resource for his analysis, and this book.

Similarly, Fair does not adjust for other significant changes:

“A similar issue exists for different ball parks. Some ballparks are more “hitter friendly” than others, which has a potential effect on both batters and pitchers, since players play half their games in their home ballpark. This is not a problem in the present context if a player never changes teams and his team does not change ballparks. Players do, however, change teams, and teams do build new ballparks. Again, there is no

straightforward way to adjust for this, and so any error from the different ballparks is assumed to be absorbed in the overall error term for each player year.”<sup>249</sup>

For the same reasons, this author did not attempt to include park factors into the mix of whether these ballplayers improved due to changing parks during the course of the seven-year analysis. Additionally, in the Coolidge Era, far from anyone’s memory, such an adjustment is nearly futile, in this author’s opinion, given the wide variation of ballpark dimensions from year to year – and the somewhat inaccurate data as it is currently constituted. (Though many do wonderful work in this area of baseball.)

Fair’s sound and technical discussion of his results is fairly complex for inclusion in this discussion, but a few points apply to players included in both studies:

“A real winner in the table is Henry Heilmann...Heilmann played 14 full-time years, 4 of them before 1921. It turns out that he did noticeably better beginning in 1921 (the live ball?). He is thus ranked higher using CNST than Lifetime since CNST counts only performances from 1921 on. Apparently he was a very nice person, possessing ‘many virtues, including loyalty, kindness, tolerance and generosity.’ [This in referencing Ira Smith, *Baseball’s Famous Outfielders*, as quoted in James (2003), p. 798.]”<sup>250</sup>

“There are large differences between the OPS rankings and the OBP rankings for both CNST [Constant] and Lifetime. Using CNST...Mark McGwire is 11 OPS and 41 OBP... Ken Griffey Jr. 20 OPS and 72 OBP...Albert Belle 25 OPS and 121 OBP, and so on. On the other side [Lifetime], Edgar Martinez is 9 OBP and 17 OPS...Arky Vaughan is 18 OBP and 67 OPS, Wade Boggs is 16 OBP and 82 OPS, and so on. Within OBP, the differences between CNST and Lifetime are similar to those within OPS.”

Fair’s quadratic approach to depicting the decline of ballplayers is solid in determining performance of most ballplayers before the beginning of the Clinton Era in using the first seventy years of his data (1921-1991). Since then, he found 14 Clinton Era players that did not fit the pattern and has only speculated to the cause attributable to his statistical outliers:

“if a player got better with age, contrary to the assumptions of the model, one would see... large positive residuals at the old ages... all residuals greater than one standard error (.0757) were recorded. Then a player was chosen if he had four or more of these residuals from age 28, the estimated peak-performance age, on. There were a total of 17 such players... Rafael Palmeiro...most remarkable performance by far...is... Barry Bonds.

Three of his last four residuals (ages 37–40) are the largest in the sample period, and the last one is 5.5 times the estimated standard error of the equation. Not counting Bonds, Sammy Sosa has the largest residual (age 33, 2001) and Luis Gonzalez has the second largest (age 34, 2001). Mark McGwire has three residuals that are larger than two standard errors (age 33, 1996; age 35, 1998; age 36, 1999). Larry Walker has two residuals that are larger than two standard errors (age 31, 1997; age 33, 1999) and one that is nearly two standard errors (age 35, 2001). Aside from the players just mentioned, 8 other players have one residual greater than two standard errors: Albert Belle (age 28, 1994), Ken Caminiti (age 33, 1996), Chili Davis (age 34, 1994), Dwight Evans (age 36, 1987), Julio Franco (age 46, 2004), Gary Gaetti (age 40, 1998), Andres Galarraga (age 37, 1998), and Paul Molitor (age 31, 1987)...An obvious question is whether performance-enhancing drugs had anything to do with this concentration.”<sup>251</sup>

As stated before, this rise in unusual performance by declining players is likely a positive residual of steroid usage on top of the initial power surge seen distinctly in 1993-1994 in graphs presented in the prior section. And as such, that further explains the positive bias in the late 1990s above what was determined as the SPC boundaries during the initial 1994-1997 Power Explosion.

Furthermore, in examination of each group of players in the Coolidge/Clinton analysis, an overall improvement was reflected across the board for even declining players, those after peak (age 28) and at the start of study in 1990. By age 32, in 1994, those players should experience a drop off as a group that was distinctly measurable.

But maybe more importantly to the discussion, this group includes greats such as Wade Boggs, Tony Gwynn, Eddie Murray, Kirby Puckett, Cal Ripkin Jr., and Paul Molitor, which all are considered unlikely for the accusation of any steroid usage. Of those particular Hall of Famers, only Gwynn (34), Molitor (38), and Puckett (33) improved drastically, or remained the same in the 1994-1996 period measured. Gwynn and Puckett did not change home ballparks; and do not usually fit the steroid image – if one can believe accurately in the side effects of prolonged/any usage, such as unusual increases muscle mass, swelling of head, erratic behavior, and other not-so-visible changes. (Roger Clemens was not fitted for this image either; until his outing by his former personal trainer, Brian McNamee.)

The biggest improvement experienced in the Coolidge/Clinton Study can be tied almost directly to the ballpark he played in: Andres Galarraga power stats (in decline) before 1992 are suspect (in improvement) unless it is placed in the context of Mile High/Coors Field. The ballpark effects were not considered, but are evidenced earlier in this book.

And Coors Field’s bump in offense is often due to the baseball modifications than the ballpark itself. As the baseball physics discussion later will show.

Again it is clear that even these ballplayers, talented enough to play during seven seasons in a row, benefited significantly from changes to the game. Usually, older ballplayers lose power in the later part of their careers, but both groups of declining players continued to amass good numbers well into the mid-thirties. This goes against the theory that most players decline drastically in their later years. Additionally, in the 1920s, biometric training and health care was far from advanced, if existent at all, in some areas. Thus, the modifications in 1919–1920 were monumental to the game in that older players hung on to their bats, and rode the coattails of the Babe Ruth’s phenomenon into his emergence as the foremost slugger in baseball history to that point. And the 1993–1994 surge of power was caused by something other than just steroids has to be seriously considered, if not confirmed by these various analyses.

Also noteworthy to address is that these players are among the best in the game during each timeframe, thus making for a skewed look at only the top end of the major league players. As great ballplayers, their performances are far from ordinary, and what made them great can be seen in keeping abilities to play at high levels for ten, fifteen, and even twenty seasons. But even amongst the better players in the game, decline is seen significantly by age forty.<sup>252</sup>

**Table.** Dr. Fair’s Research of Age Effects on Performance in Various Sports

Comparison of Aging Effects Across Events				
	% loss at age 40	Age at 9.8% loss	Age at 5.6% loss	Age at 14.9% loss
OPS	9.8	40		
OBP	5.6		40	
ERA	14.9			40
Sprint	3.0	51	45	59
Run	4.1	47	42	53
High Jump	4.5	46	42	51
M50	2.1	57	48	68
M100	2.5	54	46	63
M200+	1.8	59	50	64
Chess1	0.9	79	64	85
Chess2	0.8	71	63	78

**Notes:**

- Sprint = 100, 200, and 400 meter track.
- Run = all running except 100, 200, and 400 meter track.
- M50 = 50 meter and yard swimming events.
- M100 = 100 meter and yard swimming events.
- M200+ = all other swimming events.
- Chess1 = Chess, best rating.
- Chess2 = Chess, second best rating.

Non baseball results taken from Table 3 in Fair (2005).



As Dr. Fair stated, “Because of the way professional baseball works, it is not possible to get trustworthy estimates at ages much beyond 40... There is thus no way of estimating the rate of decline of professional baseball players beyond the age of about 40.”<sup>253</sup> (As Table above reflects.)

### **All The Other Factors**


In 1999, Nike creatively infused the catch phrase, “chicks dig the long ball,” into a commercial featuring Tom Glavine and Greg Maddux – future Hall of Famers – getting shown up by Mark McGwire hitting home runs. As Howard Byrant opines, “The sport that could never properly market itself had finally found a marketable star: the home run.”<sup>254</sup>

Not completely correct. The home run was ‘properly marketed’ back in the 1920s, and certainly used that initial impetus to further the game ever since with every home run star born from Babe Ruth, DiMaggio, Williams, Mantle to Mays, Banks, Aaron, Jackson, Schmidt, and Bonds, along with numerous others that predicated their careers on the big fly. Even a cursory glance at the past reflects the biggest contracts landed in the hands of home run hitters, and the marketing of those players is nearly always in relation to (and a reflection of) their careers as the big boppers, and ultimately, to the demise of their careers in a town if they did not hit the fastball in the stands.

Sammy Sosa’s lucrative career in Chicago is an interesting study in the rise and fall of a slugger’s popularity and marketability as the fortunes of his home run prowess and the Cubs team turned south together after 2003. “Yet going from 30-30 [HRs and SBs] to 64-0 in just six years was exactly the kind of statistic that spoke for an era in which power had trumped every nuance baseball had to offer.”<sup>255</sup>

Once again, this is not exactly correct. In looking at stolen bases, the numbers are significantly higher in the Clinton Era than say the IKE or FDR Era, on average. Which means it just wasn’t a home run show; yet even in that ‘jaded reality’, the analysis time and time again reflects that OBP % and SLG % translate into runs scored; and not necessarily stealing bases by the truckload.

### Graph. American League Stolen Bases by ERA



Stolen bases are hardly indicative of run scoring success to any large degree. Players on some MLB teams are conditioned not to risk outs for a stolen base (or even a sacrifice bunt) unless it is nearly assured. Speaking to this risk logic, former general manager J.P Ricciardi defined Toronto's philosophy (in 2005) when asked about sacrificing. "Give up outs to score runs? We don't do that here."<sup>256</sup> (But this does not mean a few base stealers will not or do not take such risks.)

And why is not steroids a factor in that portion of the game? To examine *Juiced*, Jose Canseco contended that steroids helped him "build strength, quickness, and, most importantly, stamina."<sup>257</sup> So why haven't more base stealers taken advantage of steroids, or have they? (Ben Johnson did it in becoming the fastest human on earth in 1988; and former 100-meter world record holder (9.77) Justin Gatlin was suspended for eight years from track and field competition for his usage of banned substances. Female star Marion Jones was forced to give back her 2000 Sydney Olympic medals for her usage.)

Yet, it shows the misinformation allowed to permeate the average fans psyche. By recent accounts, home runs are considered 'bad', by the current media, under the inauspicious cloud of steroids. Because they were hit by guys that are reported as 'steroid abusers', 'bulked up' or 'have suddenly found unusual power.' (With the implicit thought that the player has used PED.) Yet even that assessment is relative to the expert reasoning of the media when they conveniently overlook certain players (Albert Pujols, Ryan Howard, Jim Thome, Alfonso Soriano, and Derrek Lee for a few current examples) as being clean and free of any steroid implications, even when they are playing still under this dark cloud of the 'Steroid Era.'

'The Steroid Era' label says something about the players to the average fan. Unnatural. Fake. Cheating the game. Not like before. But the evidence of a vast steroid usage pandemic supporting solely the huge home run (and doubles) totals is almost without merit. Given that the offensive rises were precipitated long before the steroids alone could be attributable to such numbers.

If only because the time frame (1993-94 to 2006) and consistency (of the numbers, year to year) are too opportune across the board to be unnaturally enhanced by just steroids or hGH (human growth hormone). In the past, pitchers eventually adjusted to players. Why not now?

Why are just hitters getting the presumed power benefits from steroids, and not pitchers in their recovery and ability to gut out longer performances? (Even though Major League Baseball reported more pitchers caught for steroid usage than position players through 2005.) Or does it point to something else altogether, unreported, that is much more logical and possibly, measurable?

It is nonsense to predicate the entire decade of offensive outburst discussed on just steroids as the 'bad' guy. Given the countless changes to ballparks (20 new since 1991), baseballs, bats, strike zones (QuesTec monitoring of strike zones calls and instituting the UIS), on-field conditions, training regiments, video tapes, and a myriad of other realities, steroids are not the only fountains of power to be reviled by the sports media, upset fans, and governmental bodies from the President, the Congress, and on down.

**(Congress, Get to Work:** Who I think have better, more important things to consider daily: like obtaining better paying jobs for the underprivileged, fixing health care payments and options, developing real solutions to inner city realities, funding the discovery of cures and causes to diseases, re-codifying (properly) all criminal laws, improving environmental stances on suburban sprawl, restricting hazardous chemicals produced by manufacturers, ozone/global warming predicaments, and improving our 'standing' in the world's estimation, amongst a meager 'short' list of 'things to do.')

Amid the intense media backdrop of steroids, lays a variety of theories on the causation of the power outburst and the variety of changes seen in the game of baseball in the past fifteen years:

**Ballparks.** "That baseball encouraged the construction of hitter-friendly parks..."<sup>258</sup> The 'Ballpark Effect' can almost be directly tied to one firm: **HOK Sport**. "Helmuth, Obata & Kassabaum (HOK) Sports Facilities Group has been integral to ballpark renaissance that began in the 1990s. Formed in 1983<sup>259</sup>, the Kansas City-based company designed many of the sports new facilities...Comiskey Park (U.S. Cellular), Oriole Park at Camden Yards, Jacobs Field, Coors Field, Comerica Park, SBC Park, Minute Maid Park, PNC Park, Great American Ballpark, PETCO Park, and Citizens Bank Park."<sup>260</sup>

The almost yearly opening of a new stadium with 'an old-time feel' most likely utilized 'new CADD' and modeling of 'wind and carry' effects to the benefit of the offense. (Not always, but certainly the numbers from many of the parks reflect an impressive barrage of extra base hits.) "In the wake of Camden Yards fourteen teams moved into new parks in the decade between 1994 and 2004, including the expansion Arizona Diamondbacks, who had a new stadium built in Phoenix before their first season."<sup>261</sup>

Even one national writer, Jeff Passan of Yahoo! Sports, suggests that the lead architect of HOK Sport + Venue + Event, Joe Spear, should be considered for a special award: a Buck O'Neil award for meritorious service to baseball.<sup>262</sup> Though a very unique and deserving honor to bestow on an architect, it may overlook the possibility that Mr. Spear was partly instrumental to the rise of offenses in the 1990s and present day that has drawn such an outcry from the baseball purists and media pundits.

**Table. 15 HOK Sport Ballparks**

➤ U.S. Cellular Field	➤ Minute Maid Park	➤ Tropicana Field
➤ Oriole Park at Camden Yards	➤ AT&T Park (SBC)	➤ Great America Ballpark
➤ Jacobs Field	➤ PNC Park	➤ Dolphin Stadium
➤ Coors Field	➤ Citizens Bank Park	➤ PETCO Park
➤ Comerica Park	➤ Busch Stadium III	➤ Nationals Park

In an interview by Peter Handrinos for Scout.com, HOK Sport's Joe Spear reflects on his designing of Pilot Field in Buffalo that led to the Camden Yards project, "...You know, baseball doesn't have to be played in a concrete behemoth. It can be played in a smaller ballpark with better sight lines, better proximity to the game, and real intimacy for the fans."<sup>263</sup> These smaller ballparks would certainly allow players to hit more home runs and doubles while keeping fans happy at the park while also giving the fan the intimacy of being in the action.

Probably the most important aspect of each of these \$200-350 million dollar projects (now upwards \$750 million to \$1 Billion plus) were their approximating of an old downtown park like Boston's Fenway or Chicago's Wrigley to generate huge local revenues by allowing fans to saunter in from their cars to the ballgame and back out to neighborhood watering holes, or other fun places located nearby. As Spear continues on, "I'm personally thinking of the ballpark in terms of a fan's experience. The real success stories from our projects aren't in the architecture or engineering, but in the way the fans enjoy the ballpark...That's so crucial. I think that's why places like Wrigley and Fenway have stood the test of time - they embrace their surroundings in such an effective way. The question for my current plan, for instance, has to be, 'How can we make sure that this project is completely about Washington?'"<sup>264</sup>

But the in-the-field affects to these ballparks were also discussed. As one exchange offers:

**Peter Handrinos:** "In those early projects, you broke with past tradition in another way - for the first time in a long time, your ballparks had asymmetrical outfield and outfield wall features. Why did you go in that direction?"

**Joe Spear:** "Oriole Park at Camden Yards was the first real taste of that. The team, from day one, wanted that and rightly so. It makes it interesting; to debate whether Barry Bonds would have hit a home run in a particular playing field or some other particular play would have been an out in another field. That sort of thing can change the outcome of a game, so it adds a layer of richness.

The challenge was for us to find a genuine reason to [vary ball park dimensions], almost like making art out of a found object. In each project, we've looked for logical, genuine reasons to do that without just copying the Green Monster or B&O Warehouse or something else."<sup>265</sup>

This statement reflects that ballparks were intentionally designed for their variations and that these variations could change outcomes of games – and possibly home run records.

“They also knew that hitters were using harder bats made of maple and dipped in lacquer in the place of the untreated ash bats of old...”<sup>266</sup> New technology and chemicals are not unusual to find in competitive sports. The NFL, NHL, PGA, NASCAR, IRL, NTA and any other multi-billion-dollar operation have to advance safety and performance with state-of-the-art information and equipment.

Golf and Tennis sees numerous changes in the length and power of balls hit using oversize drivers and rackets, so much so that the courses in golf are regularly ‘lengthen’ to increase difficulty to score pars and birdies. The NFL instituted better helmet technology, takes advantage of medical breakthroughs, and certainly prescribes cortisone shots for pain relief. (Future HOF Quarterback Brett Favre was dependent on them at one time.)

NASCAR established better helmet technology, added restrictor plates to engines for reduced speeds, and constantly monitors the cars with on-board telemetry. IRL designs cars that absorb energy in crashes, and consistently improves the horsepower performances of their vehicles while maintaining very strict adherence to safety concerns.

And the NHL changed the rules to require all players to wear helmets, and uses video technology to reevaluate goals made. It is no surprise that baseballs and ball bats have undergone numerous changes, if only to keep up with their sporting brethren.

~

**Bats.** In the MLB, the use of maple and lacquered bats in place of ash is a primary cause of increased distances seen on current baseballs. As one 1994 article reflects, “To simulate hitting conditions, says [Scott] Smith, ‘we fire the balls out of an air cannon [at 58 mph] against a northern white-ash wooden wall, which is the same material that baseball bats are made of.’ Their objective: to measure how much energy the balls retain when they bounce off the wall.”<sup>267</sup> If the testing process does not mirror the current technology [the bats], it could be possible the values are higher than what is allowed via the testing process.

These lacquered baseball bats are predominately made by big outfits – Louisville Slugger, Rawlings, Mizuno, Sam Bat – but one maker, [www.maruccibats.com](http://www.maruccibats.com), located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana developed an impressive clientele of sluggers: Manny Ramirez, David Ortiz (50 Home Runs in 2006), Albert Pujols, Carlos Beltran, Vernon Wells, Miguel Tejada, Ryan Howard (58 Home Runs in 2006), Gary Sheffield, David Wright, and former stars Sammy Sosa and Rafael Palmeiro.<sup>268</sup> Founded in 2002, each bat is selected from a billet sent by Hogan Hardwoods of Ruston, LA<sup>269</sup>, hand made on a lathe to spec, boned with a cow femur, and sent out to the major leaguer.

The fact that a small outfit (one that turns out 1,000 bats per year in an 8' by 10' shop) can produce bats of the superior quality that sluggers of this caliber love, while adhering to the specifications MLB puts on the bats, likely means the specifications may not be all that tight on equipment being used, or is not overly inspected by officials. Or certainly not checked for tampering without incidence. (Such as the Sammy Sosa's corked bat fiasco. Ted Kluszewski's tenpenny-weighted bat. Norm Cash's cork and sawdust preparations. Graig Nettles super ball-loaded bat. HOF Manager Earl Weaver corking in the minors.<sup>270</sup> Albert Belle, with an assist from Mitchell investigation pitcher Jason Grimsley, also corked his weapon.)

From *The Big Bam*, Leigh Montville recounts the usage of a modified bat by none other than the 'Colossus of Clout', George Herman Ruth.

Going back nearly 80 years, "Wahoo" Sam Crawford developed a bat that was made of four pieces of wood that cost four times as much as a normal bat – it was also illegal as Ban Johnson would eventually rule. This was after Babe Ruth had used it for a period of about a month, hitting nearly .400 and leading the American League in dingers. But the Babe's manager, Miller Huggins, had this to add, "I can see no reason why [Ban] Johnson should bar the Crawford model bat. The rules simple state that the bat must be round, made entirely of hard wood and conform to certain dimensions. The new bat is made of hard wood and is perfectly round. The rules do not state that the bat be made of one piece of wood..." (What is forgotten is the glue used to hold the pieces together.) Interestingly enough, Babe Ruth's corked homers are not brought into light when in consideration of the current Steroid scandal.<sup>271</sup>

To further explain why an outfitter in Louisiana has cornered the market for sluggers, a study done by University of Massachusetts engineers on bats of various levels of the sport reflects that a higher moisture content provides additional pop in the bat. As one part of the report reflects, "Different baseball stadiums will, therefore, expose wooden

bats to different conditions at different times of the year. The Wood Handbook (1999)...identifies the equilibrium moisture content for Phoenix, Arizona in the month of June to be 4.6% on average, whereas Los Angeles, California is 15.1% in ...August...the bats which are stored in the environment for even a few days will show a change in moisture content. It is, therefore, important to determine the effects..."<sup>272</sup>

This study analyzed bats utilizing a setup that would mirror MLB players' typical usage of either:

- Using the same bat in various cities around the country (with moisture content modifying)
- Using a variety of bats based on feel at the time (bats that differ, though physically are the same in ordinary measures)

The results show that a slight, but unmistakable, increase in batted-ball velocity of nearly 1% held true across the board when moisture content was changed from 6.7% to 10.9%. This additional velocity does explain why Louisiana-made bats are lively, since the humidity is a well-known aspect of the climate. (**Side Note:** 1970s slugger Bobby Murcer used to store his bats in a sauna while in blustery and chilly San Francisco.<sup>273</sup>)

As Peter Handrinos writes on his website, [www.UnitedStatesofBaseball.com](http://www.UnitedStatesofBaseball.com), about this phenomenon in *Barry Bonds, Pt. II: 'Too Good'*: " And, with the one-year spike in 2001 accounted for, Bonds performance surge from 2002 and 2002 to 2004 is easily adjusted...just over 46 home runs per year...it's hardly an other-worldly mark in an era fueled by smaller ballparks, smaller strike zones, hard-lacquered bats, and body armor..."<sup>274</sup>

"Most significantly, two tools that pitchers most needed to be effective...the strike zone... and the freedom to intimidate hitters by throwing inside."<sup>275</sup>


With the implementation of video technology and consistent manipulation of *what* a strike is supposed to be, it is little wonder that pitchers, most effected by those changes, have found it harder to consistently get out hitters. As shown before, the expansion of the strike zone led to the worst offensive season (1968) in the modern era. Now, the contraction and monitoring of the strike zone, has assisted in the fattening the totals of MLB offenses.

No one is particularly immune to these changes. Power pitchers that throw in excess of 95 MPH are being combated by a shrinking strike zone, inability to pitch inside without getting tossed, and batters that have thinner-handled bats, better video tools to fix errors



in swings, and plenty of motivation to achieve totals. (Financial motivation, not necessarily winning games motives.)

Diagram. Strike Zone in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century compared to the 'Older' Strike Zone



“To Jim Palmer, the HOF Baltimore pitcher, the zone deserved more discussion than it received...the loss of the high strike contributed to skyrocketing offense as much as drug use or anything else...the beauty of the ‘old’ strike zone, thought Yankees pitching coach Mel Stottlemyre, was that there were pitches that were called strikes that could not be hit...since 1968, when Bob Gibson dominated the game, umpires had been systemically reinterpreting the strike zone on their own.”

Due to this, QuesTec, installed by new umpiring head Ralph Nelson into the game, is used to monitor (and evaluate) umpires calls behind the plate, starting in 2001. The technology was unreliable, by most reports – but has continued to be used in baseball parks. “Robert Adair were not completely dismissive of QuesTec, nor did Adair absolve the umpires. His conclusion was simply that the technology was not quite ready to be an evaluating tool.”<sup>276</sup> (Though it has been tweaked to greater usage in telecasts by broadcasters like Jim Palmer.)

**Baseball Changes.** "In May 2000 Bud Selig sent Sandy Alderson (former Oakland A's executive until 1999) to Costa Rica to investigate the baseball. Alderson left the Rawlings factory in Turrialba convinced that the ball was unchanged from the previous season. Still, Alderson believed the trip was in part fruitless; there were too many variables involved – from the actual cowhide which may have varied from year to year, to the personnel – to make an accurate assessment...pitchers and hitters alike, remained convinced the ball was tighter...The ball was too smooth, (David) Wells thought, estimating that only one and ten balls he used during a game had seams raised high enough for him...to give the ball some action....Ken Macha, the manager of the Oakland A's who had a collection of 1987 balls in his garage from his days as an Expos coach, was convinced that no part of the game had been juiced like the ball itself. "<sup>277</sup>

In early 2007, a report was released on the usage of a CT scan done by Universal Medical Systems, Inc., supplier of open-sided MRI and CT scans equipment for more than 20 years, that reflects that Mark McGwire 70<sup>th</sup> home run hit had a synthetic rubber ring around the 'pill' of the ball, against the MLB specifications. The following is a long excerpt of that article:

"Mark McGwire's 70th home run ball from his record-breaking 1998 season contains a synthetic rubber ring or spring ('the ring') -- a material not outlined in official Major League Baseball ('the League') specifications. The ring and enlarged rubberized core of the baseball are clearly visualized in a computed tomography (CT) scan of the baseball...

UMS, with assistance from Dr. Avrami S. Grader and Dr. Philip M. Halleck from The Center for Quantitative Imaging at Penn State University, utilized a CT scanner to study additional League baseballs from 1998 and found the baseballs have significantly enlarged cores in a variety of shapes and sizes.

The League Specifications vs. McGwire's 70th Home Run Ball According to the League's specifications, 'the pill of the baseball shall consist of a compressed cork sphere surrounded by one layer of black rubber and one layer of red rubber.' The League does not specify a synthetic rubber ring or any additional material.


'Examining the CT images of Mark McGwire's 70th home run ball one can clearly see the synthetic ring around the core -- or 'pill' -- of the baseball,' states David Zavagno, president of Universal Medical Systems. 'While Mark McGuire may or may not have used illegal steroids, the evidence shows his ball -- under the governing body of the League -- was juiced.'

In 2000, in response to concerns about an altered ball contributing to increased home runs, the League commissioned and paid [along with *Rawlings*, \$400,000 in 1998 to the Center]<sup>278</sup> for a study from the UMass-Lowell Baseball Research Center. The report found no change in the ball. However, photos within the report show the synthetic rubber ring and identify numerous other problems.

The league publicly announced the baseball was not a cause of increased home runs. However, the historical words 'cushioned cork center' were later removed from baseballs. In addition, computerized strike checkers were installed in the League's parks to expand the strike zone, and the League worked towards establishing drug testing standards. In fact, Commissioner Bud Selig named former Senator George Mitchell to lead an investigation into the use of illegal steroids by baseball players. Another interesting action, the Colorado Rockies utilized a humidifier for their balls.

'The League is as guilty as the individual players,' says Zavagno. 'Its desire to protect the image of the game, while recording huge revenues and setting new performance records, allowed scandalous problems to escalate. Only after Congress stepped in on the steroid problem did the League begrudgingly act. Now it may take similar scrutiny for the League to admit the modern-day baseball does not conform to its own specifications. Because of the scandals -- baseball material alterations, lax rule enforcement and rampant use of steroids -- the Hall of Fame voting process could be tainted for decades. Hall of Fame voters need to understand many historical statistical comparisons are no longer relevant.' <sup>279</sup>

## Diagram. CT Image of Mark McGwire's Home Run



Besides the revelation of a 'rubber ring' around the inside of the cushioned cork center area, the fact MLB paid an engineering research firm (initially \$400,000 for the study) to conclude a result it desperately wants, that the ball has not been affected, is suspicious. (As discussed, drug companies do the same for doctors in their trials.) The existence of this manipulation warrants a more thorough investigation, preferably from outside of MLB circles.

In addition to those thoughts, a telling assertion: "Sandy Alderson and Bill James had something else in common: Neither tended to think steroids were the primary reason for the explosion in offense."<sup>280</sup>

Bill James. At the very least, he is considered objective in his analysis of the sport – not tied financially to the 'old school' of baseball, until recently – and that differing opinion has made in the cases for many topics in the last thirty years. As Jeff Passan recently opined: "No matter what someone thinks of statistics and their place in baseball, James' influence is undeniable...James is the godfather of sabermetrics – he coined the term – and author of the groundbreaking Baseball Abstract books. 'Moneyball' does not exist without him. Neither does Baseball Prospectus...that help accent traditional analysis with concrete data."<sup>281</sup>

With that said, more sabermetric analysis is presented in the form of Visiting Teams Slugging averages for eight seasons at various ballparks in both the American and National League. They were selected for the following reasons:

- They existed during both eras, given the mass influx of new stadiums

- They remained relatively unchanged (and changes are noted in the footnotes)
- A consistent amount of at bats took place for both left hand and right-hand hitters
- The seasons were distinctly selected due to the prior analysis that the alleged ‘Steroid’ affect happened in 1993-1994, not later on.<sup>282</sup>

**Table.** Slugging Averages for Visiting Teams in 10 Parks over 8 Seasons

Slugging Averages in Ballparks		Left				Right			
Pre-Steroid	Park	1989	1990	1991	1992	1989	1990	1991	1992
AL	Anaheim Stadium <sup>5</sup>	0.3654	0.3657	0.3763	0.3524	0.3767	0.3828	0.3611	0.3789
NL	Busch Stadium II	0.3526	0.3998	0.3353	0.3635	0.3522	0.3821	0.3725	0.3446
NL	Dodger Stadium <sup>1</sup>	0.3118	0.3644	0.3313	0.3617	0.3205	0.3586	0.3242	0.3129
AL	Fenway Park	0.3958	0.3827	0.3742	0.3585	0.4019	0.3544	0.4245	0.3817
AL	Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome	0.4436	0.4097	0.3957	0.3905	0.3947	0.4213	0.4073	0.3834
NL	Jack Murphy Stadium	0.4004	0.3831	0.3652	0.3977	0.3737	0.4017	0.3661	0.3599
AL	Oakland-Alameda County Stadium <sup>3</sup>	0.3088	0.3214	0.3548	0.3671	0.3506	0.3376	0.3914	0.3733
NL	Riverfront Stadium <sup>4</sup>	0.4190	0.3583	0.3982	0.3981	0.3805	0.3895	0.3826	0.3482
AL	Royals Stadium <sup>2</sup>	0.3307	0.3875	0.3745	0.3413	0.3410	0.3509	0.3601	0.3834
NL	Shea Stadium	0.3068	0.3352	0.3741	0.3864	0.3374	0.3490	0.3848	0.3577
	<i>Steroid ERA</i>								
	Park	1999	2000	2001	2002	1999	2000	2001	2002
AL	Anaheim Stadium <sup>5</sup>	0.4531	0.4347	0.4019	0.3603	0.4319	0.4665	0.4340	0.3783
NL	Busch Stadium II	0.4392	0.4412	0.4189	0.3431	0.4065	0.4293	0.3871	0.3794
NL	Dodger Stadium <sup>1</sup>	0.4178	0.3623	0.4227	0.3449	0.3998	0.3885	0.3607	0.3835
AL	Fenway Park	0.3785	0.3955	0.3911	0.3664	0.4043	0.4179	0.3982	0.4141
AL	Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome	0.4924	0.4918	0.4847	0.4346	0.4529	0.4551	0.4056	0.3812
NL	Jack Murphy Stadium	0.3817	0.3786	0.4609	0.4018	0.4097	0.3900	0.3964	0.3976
AL	Oakland-Alameda County Stadium <sup>3</sup>	0.4064	0.3843	0.3538	0.3837	0.4028	0.4010	0.3725	0.3670
NL	Riverfront Stadium <sup>4</sup>	0.4247	0.4691	0.4637	0.4651	0.4330	0.4535	0.4541	0.4538
AL	Royals Stadium <sup>2</sup>	0.4738	0.4702	0.4829	0.4830	0.4259	0.4858	0.4623	0.4893
NL	Shea Stadium	0.4305	0.3517	0.4042	0.3970	0.3960	0.3786	0.4005	0.3836
1. CF Wall brought in 5 feet in 2001									
2. Was modified from Artificial Surface to Natural Grass - and walls and distances were slightly altered									
3. LCF to RCF wall moved back 3 feet in 1990									
4. Walls moved in 5-10 feet in 2001									
5. RF moved in significantly from 370 to 330, Power alley from 386 to 365									

An ANOVA Model is reflected by:

$$Y = X + S_i + P_{j(i)} + H_k + SH_{jk(i)} + T_l + E_{ijk(l)}$$

Where: S represents Steroids in the pre and post analysis. P equals the 10 Parks represented. H represents the left and right-handedness of players.

What should be realized, even without the Analysis of Variance is that:

- These Parks were relatively unchanged from year to year
- The Players were essentially the same in both Eras (separately and independent)
- The analysis points to the overall difference between the two eras (the means of each subgroup were greatly different, and reflects a distinct change in *something*)
- Aside from Fenway Park and Jack Murphy, the other ballparks had 10% or greater increases in Slugging % from the two eras studied. Fenway, the oldest ballpark, has seen only modest changes, in the upper box structure that reduced its mystique as a hitter-friendly park. (See Reagan ERA: Offense-Friendly Ballparks)
- But more indicative, the offense remained nearly the same even after steroid policies were instituted.

**Table. Before and After Slugging Averages in Ballparks**

<u>Pre-Steroid</u>	<u>Park</u>	<u>Left Avg</u>	<u>Right Avg</u>	<u>Overall</u>			
AL	Anaheim Stadium	0.3650	<b>0.3749</b>	0.3699			
NL	Busch Stadium II	0.3628	0.3629	0.3628			
NL	Dodger Stadium1	<b>0.3423</b>	0.3291	0.3357			
AL	Fenway Park	0.3778	<b>0.3906</b>	0.3842			
AL	Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome	0.4099	0.4017	0.4058			
NL	Jack Murphy Stadium	<b>0.3866</b>	0.3754	0.3810			
AL	Oakland-Alameda County Stadium	0.3380	<b>0.3632</b>	0.3506			
NL	Riverfront Stadium	<b>0.3934</b>	0.3752	0.3843			
AL	Royals Stadium	0.3585	0.3589	0.3587			
<u>NL</u>	<u>Shea Stadium</u>	<u>0.3506</u>	<u>0.3572</u>	<u>0.3539</u>			
	<b>Averages</b>	<b>0.3685</b>	<b>0.3689</b>	<b>0.3687</b>			
<u>Steroid ERA</u>	<u>Park</u>	<u>Left Avg</u>	<u>Right Avg</u>	<u>Overall</u>	<u>% Left</u>	<u>% Right</u>	<u>% Overall</u>
AL	Anaheim Stadium	0.4125	<b>0.4277</b>	0.4201	13.03%	14.08%	13.56%
NL	Busch Stadium II	<b>0.4106</b>	0.4006	0.4056	13.18%	10.40%	11.79%
NL	Dodger Stadium1	0.3869	0.3831	0.3850	13.04%	16.43%	14.70%
AL	Fenway Park	0.3829	<b>0.4086</b>	0.3958	<b>1.34%</b>	<b>4.61%</b>	<b>3.00%</b>
AL	Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome	<b>0.4759</b>	0.4237	0.4498	16.10%	5.48%	10.85%
NL	Jack Murphy Stadium	0.4058	0.3984	0.4021	<b>4.95%</b>	<b>6.15%</b>	<b>5.54%</b>
AL	Oakland-Alameda County Stadium	0.3821	0.3858	0.3839	13.02%	6.22%	9.50%
NL	Riverfront Stadium	0.4557	0.4486	0.4521	15.82%	19.56%	17.65%
AL	Royals Stadium	<b>0.4775</b>	0.4658	0.4717	<b>33.19%</b>	<b>29.81%</b>	<b>31.50%</b>
<u>NL</u>	<u>Shea Stadium</u>	<u>0.3959</u>	<u>0.3897</u>	<u>0.3928</u>	12.90%	9.08%	10.97%
	<b>Averages</b>	<b>0.4186</b>	<b>0.4132</b>	<b>0.4159</b>			

To further this viewpoint of the baseball manipulations, the analysis of a MLB hired physicist could add further evidence that the ball is not the same all the time.

## Understanding the Baseball: A Physicist interpretation

Amongst the more interesting topics to discuss, and least understood by the layman (including this author), is the physics of a pitched and batted ball. The forces and measurements at play are numerous: Drag Coefficient, Reynolds Number (Re), Coefficient of Restitution (COR), Spin Rate (in RPM), Muzzle Velocity (in MPH), Magnus Coefficient, Backspin (in RPM), Wind Velocity (in MPH), Altitude (in feet), Temperature and Launch Trajectory (in degrees) are amongst the ordinary banter that physicists use in describing what a baseball does in flight. For our discussion, the importance comes in determining what can change a baseball's flight from ordinary (a fly out to the warning track) to extraordinary (a towering homerun.)

Baseballs are certainly constructed by a set of rules; yet that is where it begins, not where it ends. The Official Baseball Rules (circa 2001) calls for the baseball to be made specifically:

Rule 1.09: "The ball should be a sphere formed by yarn wound around a small sphere of cork, rubber, or similar material covered with two stripes of white horsehide or cowhide, tightly stitched together. It shall weigh not less than 5 nor more than 5 ¼ ounces avoirdupois and measure no less than 9 nor 9 ¼ inches in circumference."<sup>283</sup>

From Dr. Adair's *The Physics of Baseball*, manufacturing of MLB Baseball moved around over the years. From Chicopee, Massachusetts (while A.G. Spalding was still the sole manufacturer)<sup>284</sup>, it moved to Haiti, then Taiwan, and now in Costa Rica.

The making of the ball consists of: A cork-rubber center of a baseball is wrapped by 121 yards of 4-ply, blue-gray wool yarn, 45 yards of 3-ply white wool yarn, 53 yards of 3-ply gray wool yarn and 150 yards of fine cotton then cemented together with the two strips of cowhide .05-.055 inches thick, which was horsehide before 1974, then hand-stitched with 216 red-cotton stitches.<sup>285</sup> But the storage, shipment and pre-game rituals are not so standard or clear cut. (HOF Manager John McGraw was known to freeze balls for several hours before the game, then "dry" them out so the umps would not notice.)

Just upon inspection of those limited criteria, a great deal is variable about the construction, and impending usage from baseball to baseball, year to year. Much has been neglected in determining the overall actuality of these changes (through the years) in how they apply to statistics generated by fielders, hitters, and pitchers. Even the testing grounds utilized to determine this might not accurately portray the conditions that will ultimately exist for the ball at the stadium.

A study done over several seasons in the mid-to-late 1990s by the University of Colorado at Denver states that a humidifier was used by the Colorado Rockies starting in 2002 (and has continued to be used by this team at the time of this writing). This device maintains the baseballs in a “controlled environment” to adhere to the weight and circumference requirements of Major League Baseball.<sup>286</sup> The humidifier settings were initially at 40% humidity and 90° Fahrenheit. This “altering” of the baseball is considered acceptable, yet the statistical outcomes were not yet in line with the desired change: a reduction of home runs and runs scored at Coors Field during the next few seasons. Yet, in looking at the 2006 season, run scoring was down, and pitchers began to cope with the park effects at Coors Field. (Seen in the first month ever the Rockies pitching staff amassed an ERA below 4.00 in May 2006.) This was due to adjusting the settings of the humidifier to create the optimal effects. (Namely, higher humidity, and lower temperatures – opposite of the initial settings.)

As *Baseball America* writer Tracy Ringolsby recently wrote in the December 2006 issue of *Baseball America*, Humidifiers Might Be Next Trend, the Rockies adjusted their settings to 50% humidity and 70° Fahrenheit, and noticed improved adherence to the Rawlings specifications of 5 oz. in weight and 9 in. in circumference. (Before, the ball weighed 4.6 oz. and shrunk to 8.5 in.) In the same article, Jimmie Lee Solomon, MLB executive VP of Baseball Operations states, “Baseballs are stored in all kinds of environments. They are subject to varying temperatures and levels of humidity.” As a result, the Colorado Rockies’ quality controls on baseballs put the balls back to their designed specifications.

Dr. Adair tests confirms this modest assertion, “...found that the weight of balls stored at 100% humidity for four weeks increase by 11 percent (ball weight) and the coefficient of restitution at an impact velocity of 25 MPH decreased by 10 percent – when dropped on concrete from a height of 20 feet, the humidified balls will bounce only about 80 percent as high...if that proportional decrease in elasticity would hold at greater-impact velocities, the swing of the bat that would drive a “dry” ball 380 feet would propel the ball stored at high humidity only 350 feet.”<sup>287</sup>

According to multiple sources<sup>288</sup>, the coefficient of restitution (COR), a measure of velocity after collision to the velocity before a collision must be between .514 and .578 of the initial velocity.<sup>289</sup> (In other spherical sports, this number is significantly higher...) In 1987, a testing lab in Plainfield, New Jersey (Haller Testing) did a scientific analysis of baseballs collected from all teams – only 116 balls were used – to determine if the balls were a causation of the odd outburst of home runs in the league that year. Meanwhile, scientists at University of Missouri conducted tests on balls from 1985 and 1987. The conclusions were that the 1987 balls were not livelier, but what may not be properly



accounted for is that age, temperature, and humidity (in storage and testing) can alter balls in ways not immediately testable since gathering them up, and transporting the balls for testing takes time. Thus the balls are not the same as when used at the park, initially.

Even though studies by R.C. Larsen and Dr. Adair confirm (COR) values nearly equal a decade apart (1988 and 1998), we cannot be completely confident that balls at the stadium are indeed similar unless the testing was done on sight, and with nearly identical game conditions in place. Dr. Adair furthers this specific case by suggesting, “The elasticity of balls stored under extremes of cold or heat can be affected also.”<sup>290</sup> Case studies done by Dr. Adair and R.C. Larsen reflect that deep freezing to  $-10^{\circ}$  Fahrenheit takes 25 feet away from a 375-foot fly ball and causes grounders to bound through the infield slower than before. Warming up to temperatures found in Death Valley puts enough juice in the ball to make fly balls find plenty of bleacher seats at ordinary ballparks.

Meanwhile, at significant altitude, like Coors Field, a pitcher will lose 20% of his break on his breaking pitches due to Magnus forces being less.<sup>291</sup> A fastball will get to home plate sooner relative to the initial velocity, and that also affects the breaking pitches.

The fact the ball underwent changes on multiple occasions (1910 – cork center, 1920 – yarn modification & pre-game preparation, 1931 – cushion corked center, 1943 – substandard materials used – “balata ball”<sup>292</sup>, 1974 – cowhide substitution, 1977 – Rawlings made sole manufacturer and moving production around which could effect humidity during processing) is not always indicative of variations in statistical measurements (home runs), but cannot be completely ignored in the grander scheme of measuring players, and their outputs. The following table reflects the studies of Dr. Adair and his measurements of a wide variety of conditions in relationship to baseballs struck.<sup>293</sup>

**Table.** Dr. Adair’s Distances and Probabilities for a 400-foot fly ball to Center Field

Condition	Change in Distance	Homerun %
1000 feet of Altitude	+7 feet	+12%
10 degrees air pressure	+4 feet	+7%
10 degrees ball pressure	+4 feet	+7%
1-inch drop in barometer <sup>2</sup>	+3 feet	+5%
1-mph following wind	+3 feet	+5%
Ball at 100% humidity	-30 feet	-50%
Pitch, +5 MPH <sup>1</sup>	+3.5 feet	+6%
Hit along a foul line	+11 feet	N/A
Aluminum Bat	+35 feet	+60%

1. For the study, 90 MPH is the normal pitch speed

2. For the study, assume 30.5 Inches of Mercury\*

An Example of the differences that could be seen:

**Chicago's Wrigley Field** – wind blowing out at 25 MPH, low barometer (29.5), 95 degree day, pitcher throwing 100 MPH gets a blast hit to deep center:  $400 + 75$  (Wind) + 3 (Barometer) + 8 (Air Pressure and Ball Pressure) + 7 (Pitcher's speed) = 493 feet.

Other Theories abound about the reasons players are hitting more home runs:

- Energetic Players (less substance abuse of alcohol/nights out, or prevalent Amphetamines cocktails<sup>294</sup>)
- Improved conditioning (workout regiments, better nutrition, with Steroid usage)
- Video taping and gaming (More information game-to-game on other players tendencies, playing hand-eye games improves baseball coordination)
- New hitter-friendly ballparks (Coors, Ballpark at Arlington, Minute Maid, Citizens Bank, Yankee Stadium)
- Altered production methods (change of processing of baseballs & ball bats)
- Climatic changes and favorable wind patterns (El Nino, La Nina)
- Watering down of leagues (Increased number of teams in ALL Professional Sports has introduced sub-par players that are overmatched by the elite players)

**Diagram.** The forces working on a baseball as Dr. Robert Adair defines them.<sup>295</sup>



Physics in Operation on a Baseball in Flight - copyright 2002  
University of Wisconsin, Board of Regents

Certainly, the baseball is at the heart of any discussion of why players are hitting more home runs. Given the nature of baseball physics, complex, additive, and variable from ballpark to ballpark, and even pitcher to pitcher, one should be inclined to attribute more to the nature of the specific equipment (including the shrinking handles on ball bats, which also increases bat velocity beyond 70 MPH and improves hitter's ability to hit prodigious home runs) to the change in the game than is currently being reflected.

But then again, as Mark Twain wonderfully stated, "There are lies, damn lies, and statistics."

## Public Policy

Of greatest concern and most relevant to the long-term health of society and this sport: keeping kids away from all drugs. The consequences of inadvertent and intentional drug usage are too great. Yet, as a culture obsessed with what ails (or is lacking) and the pills that cure (or enhance), such a goal is unattainable until the 'culture of me' evolves into a 'culture of we.' Or possibly, we accept and regulate this ongoing problem.

Baseball's recent missteps bring too clearly to light such obsessions and addictions while tragic deaths by teenagers on steroids spurred an outcry to clamped down (once more) on these drugs. While such intimate losses of a child are relevant and tragic, the public policy arena on drugs is wrought by continued failings; as law enforcement is overwhelmed and cannot prohibit effectively any drug usage. (Prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s increased crime rates and created all manner of illegality; while marijuana is now the largest cash crop in California due to recently allowed medicinal intake.)

Clearly indicative of today's war on drugs results, a statement by U.S. drug czar Gil Keilikowske,

"In the grand scheme, it has not been successful." (AP, May 14, 2010.) This conclusion after a trillion dollars plus of enforcement and interdiction occurred. At issue is how little control the U.S. has in swaying people to avoid all such drugs when they are readily available, and undoubtedly, given a 'populist' label of effective for their purposes. And given the nature of our American Culture that readily promotes and markets a myriad of drugs via the same airwaves that baseball broadcasts are seen on.

Even conservative firebrand Rush Limbaugh was caught up in a drug usage scandal while too many politicians from the Washington, D.C. Beltway on down have their pasts littered with dependency on substances, illegal and legitimately obtained. The fact the war on drugs failed is not due to law enforcement tactics or strategies, but it is due to sociological and psychological shortcomings in humanity beyond this book's scope.

**(New 'War on Drugs' strategy:** legalize all drugs, regulate content, educate via treatments centers, and remove the social stigmas. Catch 'problem usage' early, and use new taxes to build the constructive means to handle addictions. Prisons are not the cure. Only imprison bad behavior, not the usage. Gangs and dealers will lose their holds if the product is managed and sold over the counter. **See:** Switzerland.)

Meanwhile, the sports media purporting the added benefits to performance – of steroids and hGH – only acerbates, if unintentionally, the widely held thought of amazing short-

term gains to the youth athlete. And this picture clouds up even further with talk of 1,000,000 minors shooting needles filled with Winstrol, or popping Andro.

As Andrew Zimbalist notes in his recent work, *In the Best Interests of Baseball*:

“Indeed, the media never clearly correlated player performance with substance abuse. Nor was it ever clarified what share of a player’s power was attributable to his willingness to spend hours in the weight room and what share is attributable to steroids. After all, the same people who were using steroids were committed to bodybuilding and a rigorous training regimen. Finally, the state of the science on what substances were harmful and/or performance enhancing, as well as the ability to detect the presence of such substances in the body, was and is far from perfect...The prevailing view was that top offensive performance in baseball demanded quick reflexes, good hand-eye coordination, quick feet, flexibility and strong wrists – not bulky muscles.”<sup>296</sup>

The sports media’s agenda to stop usage in children would be better served by dismissing claims of great leaps in performance from steroids, instead, advocating better training and nutrition to reach one’s ends, which are measurable when applied and monitored correctly. Without such advocating, kids’ minds are made up by other means, too their detriments, too often.

As kids learnt early on – mimic your heroes to garner success. Yet, these heroes of the bat are often just obsessed junkies of juice. But the greater crime is – neither feels capable of a different choice. One’s maturity being the culprit – and the downfall of following the ‘culture of me.’

An example from *Juicing The Game*:

“‘For me, kids emulate their heroes. For me, it’s all about them. They won’t emulate the community heroes, or their academic heroes, or their parents,’ (Dr. Rich) Melloni said one day in his office. ‘That’s why athletes matter...I couldn’t care less how many balls a guy can hit over a fence. If Barry Bonds and these other athletes don’t want the responsibility that comes with being someone other people want to emulate, then he should work at Wal-Mart. There, they do whatever they want and no one will care. Otherwise, he should stay away from children. He should stay away from my children.’”<sup>297</sup>

Dr. Denham identifies too a shift of focus from the cheating in baseball to youth usage as apart of the agenda building process:

“...The frame thus shifted from performance enhancers as illegal cheating devices to illegal substances that could cause serious illness or even death. [Footnote omitted.] Consistent with step 5 of the agenda-building process, journalists then linked steroid use

to secondary symbols, such as the need to ensure fairness and the need to protect American youth. That anabolic steroids could turn a hulking sports hero into a gaunt, hopeless person sent a powerful message about using illegal short cuts to achieve success.”<sup>298</sup>

Yet the gaunt guy is not clearly visible to today’s youth; he is but a ghost story. As of yet, no steroid tale has gained the media hype to promote an informative and emotional film about the reckless superstar strung out on these drugs for years. Somehow, in our society’s craze to know all of these icons of sport and entertainment, such a depressing story of failure has not seen the appropriate Hollywood send up.

Add to that, the intended audience for such a tragedy ‘of now’ would unlikely get the message conveyed: that steroids and drugs will ruin everything you worked for in the end. As a culture ‘of now’, the long-term is never a real pressing concern, even if it needs to be.

As fate has it, the steroids problem is uniquely tied to a much larger socio-economic problem that too, is being overlooked, and whitewashed by both sides of the philosophical spectrum. But the bell tolls too for this nation thin on credit, and obese on debt. Films on these particular societal problems are available; but appeal is generally to the ideological espousers of their merits.

The integrity of the baseball too took its foul balls during the Clintonian years as bodies in the sport, outside the sport, and politicians lined up to make their views known on some *ESPN-like* program. In support of the integrity and “do something about the problem” argument, Denham writes:

“...journalists in the summer of 2002 cited baseball’s drug problem as a reference point in raising larger, idealistic points about values, fairness and integrity. ‘It would be nice to see baseball take a stand in favor of ethics and honesty and role-modeling’, wrote Scott Ostler in the 30 May 2002 edition of the *San Francisco Chronicle*.<sup>7</sup> ‘To halt baseball’s evolution from a game of average-sized men into a battle of bulked-up behemoths, and to save the players from their own shortsighted greed’, wrote the *Newsday* editorial board on 1 June 2002, ‘Major League Baseball must ban steroids’. In the abstract, one could certainly argue that if an issue proves salient to those with the clout to write opinion columns at large metropolitan dailies, it may become salient to those who read the columnists regularly. Public outcry builds, and those in policy-making positions feel the ‘heat’ to do something about the alleged problem.”<sup>299</sup>

Baseball in taking 'heat' is one for integrity just via the record books. Unless something effects the hallowed, or the bottom line, the ball establishment rarely moves too much – with all deliberate speed, as was the case on African-Americans in the game. Rarely was such heated disdain seen in Gaylord Perry using a spitball to dominate hitters in his Hall of Fame career. Other cheaters, aside from the gamblers, are forgotten, or easily forgiven. An old sports refrain: “If you ain’t cheatin’, you ain’t tryin’.”

In fact, only Roger Maris became an easy target of the game just because he was breaking a record people did not think he deserved to break. The result: an asterisk. This methodology is being applied to the game today – all known users, suspected users, and dislikeable characters are to be fitted with their own Scarlet Letter 'S' for steroids.

With that letter, Baseball should be pointed towards the reviewing all the records of players, steroids or not, in an era of technological wonders, and medical and statistical research advances. And to this point, no one has the measurable affects to *one's* performance in baseball – the realistic amount of improvement expected from steroid usage, if any does exist. (As the prior discussion on this power surge has revealed.)

Baseball's steroid problem is America's problem unsolved. Since the late 1960s, drug use is a battlefield where mothers, fathers, kids, drug kingpins, DEA agents, police, athletes, judges, politicians, and pharmaceutical CEOs wage a multi-trillion dollar conflict. The winners and losers are in the daily box score of the local crime reports. But this game is not pleasurable to watch; and talent is always wasted.

**The Final Score:** Children should NEVER be introduced to the dangers of steroid usage in their development – just like they should never be introduced alcohol, or other drugs, including even some FDA-approved medicines for behavioral problems, until we know more. Baseball should apply a preventative and educational approach, but followed the Law of the Land as laid down by the government. To be the sport it is, and to come, no one should be given a walk on the issue of dangerous drugs. We must unite on that point.

### Concluding Thoughts on the Steroid Era

At this point, why did Major League Baseball not do more to prevent athletes from turning to steroids? Because the financial concerns of baseball trumped the health awareness in the 1990s and ownership, general managers turned a blind eye to those realities. (Former Oakland GM Sandy Alderson had to be aware of Jose Canseco's usage and San Diego's GM Kevin Towers was knowledgeable enough to see Ken Caminiti's addiction to drugs of all sorts. Emails released by the Red Sox during the George Mitchell Report reflect their suspicions of various free agent targets.)

“To Murray Chass, the New York Times reporter, the problems with cleansing the game was the same as it had been during baseball’s cocaine scandal in the eighties. ‘You basically would have had owners in the position of exposing their own players, and no owner was prepared to do that,’ he said. ‘It was financial suicide.’”<sup>300</sup> But those financial suicides are now over (because players told on themselves), and the game is financially healthy (with 4 consecutive attendance breaking years as of 2008), and the players are now demonized for their usage, and ownership gets a free pass to all those millions without any concern paid to their underlying greed at all costs.

When Barry Bonds closed in on Henry Louis Aaron, Major League Baseball spent more time advertising the heroics of Henry Aaron via commercials (July 21, 2007) than any retrospective of Barry Bonds’ career highlights. Why? Steroids allegations (which are confirmed via *Game of Shadows*) made it difficult for Commissioner Selig to swallow the breaking of this most sacred record. Since Selig had no positive test in violation of the drug policy, he could not suspend Bonds and throw dirt on his name directly. While the record-breaking home run left the yard, Selig accepted Bonds at an arms distance. Meanwhile, MLB achieved another record-breaking year for attendance, and with that, more profits.

Additionally, The Players’ Union does not get a free pass. Its fierce protection of player’s rights in light of revelations of usage of steroids of all types is not the type of response we need to foster a healthy game, or a healthy society. The protection of ball players sometimes has to involve protecting them *from themselves* – where in the past players had more to worry about from management. Many careers were interrupted, or destroyed by management’s judgment that players must play hurt, or lose their jobs. But in today’s environment, the protection has to be as much off the field as on the field.

As Peter Handrino writes:

“For time out of mind, old-time baseball managers loved to trot out players with little or not thought to their possible physical status...If a player took anything less than the fullest possible workload, he’d be liable to be benched, demoted...traded...[or become] the next Wally Pipp...injury prevention leads to ‘coddled’ modern ball players, but we’ll never know how many players careers have been saved or extended by state-of-the-art biomechanical research...We do know that superstar pitchers like Kerry Wood, Mariano Rivera, John Smoltz, and Eric Gagne would have never survived in the Major Leagues without modern reconstructive surgeries...”<sup>301</sup>

Within this reality, the years prior to free agency were bereft with stories of young men tearing up arms, legs, and ankles to protect their jobs at all costs. Ownerships forced

managers to play the stars, without the help of modern conveniences we take for granted today. "...[A] number of factors determine the quality of play in the Major Leagues. Better weight training, year-round workout routines, precise nutrition, readily available coaching, medical miracles, vast computer databases...sophisticated understandings of the game's basic mechanics – all of these have a tremendous bearing on how well ball players do their job..."<sup>302</sup>

But now, under the wonders of medical advancements, the Players' Union has to protect the game and the players equally. The fans deserve to feel cheated if ownership, the players, the media or the United States Government in any way damage the oldest professional sport in North America. The objective is to pay heed to the past, live up to expectations in the present, and foster genuine prosperity for the future.

As the Commissioner of Major League Baseball, Bud Selig consistently fights for the owners' enhancement of their bottom lines, the wealth creation of players while confronting the problems facing baseball from almost solely an economic prospective. It is true this is a business – an interstate commerce of billions of dollars, \$5,200,000,000 'reported' revenues in 2006, over \$6 billion in 2007, to be exact – yet the game does not follow the exact same rules other businesses do.

Exempt from anti-trust regulation, the MLB has benefited from the non-abeyance to this century-old principle.

Meanwhile, the fans, though paying less in ballparks than in arenas and stadiums in NFL, NBA, or NHL, still are paying significant entertainment dollars to keep these players on the field and owners in the black. And gate and TV revenues, marketing dollars and public funds are funneled towards both owners and players alike with little regard placed on the stress to lower class and middle-class Americans. The ballparks get more elaborate and much more expensive, and the American public slowly shares less and less in the enjoyment while paying directly, or indirectly, for the erection of these showcases.

The studies of (Team Marketing Report) TMR show a significant cost is applied to each game seen. The cost for a family of four to enjoy a game is regularly in excess of \$250, if you consider the ticket cost, parking, drinking one drink (highly unlikely), and souvenirs. But as these costs are considered reasonable when compared to the NFL or NBA cost for the same night out, but they should not be the benchmark for pricing out the lowest social-economic class of society from attendance.

The murky cloud of steroids is a blanket for the owners' real motivation to fall gently under after initiating the investigation against the players. (Commissioner Bud Selig, a



former owner, contrary to reports, could not have acted alone.) The last forty years of baseball have been more about the ownerships versus the players with the labor union birth (1966), the Curt Flood battle (1970-72), the birth of free agency (1976), strikes (1981), collusion (1985-1987), World Series cancellation (1994) and the allegations of performance enhancers (1999-2007). Through the news media, far more coverage has been focused on the player's salaries, the behaviors engaged in, and the tearing down of people making the sport of baseball what it is.

Ownerships are retaliating for financial reasons – using a semi-legitimate reason and the powers of the United State Government – to reach their ends.

Their ends: to once again be seen as the father figures, the good people. That they were just as oblivious to the problems of their children, their ballplayers, as you, the fan, were during this, the steroid era.

But the game of baseball will always have elements of the clean cut, heroic, and sweet to awe the fans, but it has seen the stories of corrupt, double-dealing, and foulness that sportswriters will continue to present often biased by their personal connections to the sport and said ownerships.

We, as the fans of this sport, deserve better...but will we get that ever?



**Iron Man II, Cal Ripken Jr.** in 1993 hitting at the park. Soon, he would set the new endurance record once held by Lou Gehrig of 2,130 games in a row. Ripken was unlike many, many others of his time: he played hurt, and complained little (allegedly) about pay. In a time when a guaranteed investment in a player can go for nearly a decade, and reach \$150 million or more, playing everyday is honorable and respected, but also foolhardy and risky to a franchise's future if you are an owner. (Picture courtesy of Rick Dikeman.)

## The Circle of Steroid 'Friends'



**Red: Major connection/pusher** Sources: George Mitchell Report, 2007, Jose Canseco

Ambassador/Middle East Foreign Liaison George Mitchell put together an interesting grouping of players as one can find – but it does not solely explain the outbursts of home runs in the game.


## Bush Era (2006-2012)

- ◆ Continued Salary Escalation
- ◆ Competitive *Mediocrity*?
- ◆ Wildcard Winners
- ◆ PED/Steroids & the U.S. Congress
- ◆ George Mitchell Report
- ◆ Ballpark Building Continues

# Bush ERA: Reconciliation & Records or Legacies & Legalities?



Alex  
Rodriguez



**Sabermetric GMs:** Billy Beane, Brian Cashman, Theo Epstein, Andrew Friedman, J.P. Ricciardi, Jon Daniels, Tal Smith

**Best MLB Players:** Albert Pujols, Alex Rodriguez, Chase Utley, Josh Hamilton, David Wright, Jose Reyes, Miguel Cabrera, Hanley Ramirez, Carlos Beltran, Matt Holliday, Ryan Howard, Ryan Braun, David Ortiz, Tim Lincecum, Johan Santana, CC Sabathia, Roy Halladay, Felix Hernandez, Justin Verlander, Cliff Lee, Mariano Rivera, Heath Bell, Jonathan Papelbon

Failure isn't so bad if it doesn't attack the heart. Success is all right if it doesn't go to the head.

– Hall of Fame Sportswriter Grantland Rice

**Terrance Mann:** “The one constant through all the years, Ray – has been baseball. America has rolled by like an Army of steamrollers, it’s been erased like a blackboard, rebuilt, and erased again. But baseball, has marked the time. This field, this game, is apart of our past, Ray. It reminds us of all that once was good, and it could be again. Oh, people will come Ray. People will most definitely come.”

Actor James Earl Jones from *Field of Dreams*.

As our nation found out in the intervening years between the tragedy of **9/11**, and the continued struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, one’s legacy of leadership and power on any field of battle, be it political, social, or athletic, can be tarnished by a hint of, or hard

evidence pointing to, impropriety, illegality, or neglect. Lies and cover-ups are the daily on-line ritual; and the emperor's new clothes are just a mouse click away.

No greater example of how things unraveled than what transpired under a two-term president as the Great Recession of 2007-2009 led the United States to the brink of financial doom.

History repeated itself – as an under-regulated, low-interest rate, performance-enhanced mortgage market was speculated on by the Wall Street power brokers using unfathomable leverage ratios, and risky financial models to generate enormous profits, initially, only to see it crash horribly, causing worldwide financial losses in the trillions of dollars. An easy credit regime in America – without the lockstep rise in personal income – undermined millions of people personal balance sheets, resulting in bankruptcy, and foreclosures and 'reality checks.' Simplicity and saving switched on as gas guzzling vehicles, \$750,000 homes, and shameless spending on gadgets and clothes are no longer the cult to be lauded. The green revolution launched; but is years away from any of its ultimate goals.

By mid-to-late 2008, investment banks with hundreds of billions of dollars in risky assets teetered on the brink of destruction. Stalwarts, such as, Bear Stearnes, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch all go by the wayside – with Lehman's demise causing international financial shockwaves. Insurance giant AIG (American International Group) received \$180 Billion in bailout funds to keep it from failing while losing \$62 Billion in just one quarter of operations. Citigroup, the largest bank in the United States with over \$2.18 Trillion in assets<sup>303</sup>, traded below \$1 per share even after receiving billions to keep it afloat with guarantees topping \$200 Billion.

(And have its \$400 million deal for the naming rights to the new, New York Mets stadium, Citi Field, questioned, and possibly, pulled. The co-owner of the Mets, Fred Wilpon, fell prey to the largest Ponzi scheme ever, ran by Bernard Madoff, who swindled \$65 Billion out of thousands of investors. To top this misery cake, the Mets 2008 season ended in another disappointing showing, and their division rivals, the Phillies, won the World Series. This is not the first time a baseball field had problems with its name: Enron Field disappeared off the marquee of the 2000 Houston Astros new digs by 2001. Again, involving a large corporate swindle of mind-boggling proportions.)

The world financial markets, now intricately and ambiguously tied together, fell across the board, with the U.S. stock exchange losing half of its value between October 2007 and February 2009. Approximately \$12 Trillion in household wealth lost in first year of the

first major recession since 1981-1982, and likely, the worse collapse since 1929. (Baseball weathered well in the 2008 season, but 2009 did see drop offs in team revenues.)

This economic turmoil reached into the foundation of what America is in the broadest sense. The automotive sector, GM and Chrysler, were taken to bankruptcy by June 2009, closing thousands of dealerships, offering bond holders pennies on a dollar, and relinquishing 60% control to the U.S. government to order to stay alive, and relevant. 100s of thousands were laid off, or eliminated completely by these big employers, closing up plants for good. \$50 billion in capital was used to rescue two companies once lauded via the line: "What is good for GM, is good for America." Meanwhile, the Indy 500 celebrated the 100<sup>th</sup> year of running on the bricks – won by a racer just freed from legal hot water – with the classic model types of auto racing barely recognizable to average Americans. The heartland of America was once the pinnacle of auto power and ingenuity. Now, bereft of such manufacturing miracles and marvels.

Just prior to the Great Depression, William Durant and Walter Chrysler orchestrated investment pools in companies like RCA that pumped up stock, and then sold it to unsuspecting public. 105 of 550 stocks on the New York Stock Exchange had such pools of capital. The Roarin' Twenties were fueled by unbridled speculation in emerging markets. "Sunshine" Charlie Mitchell, operated National City bank (Citigroup's forefather) using shady investments in Peruvian bonds, and impossible loans to the Brazil state of Minas Gerais that were never going anywhere but default.

Not to be outdone in the repetitive scandal arena, Bernard Madoff mirrors Richard Whitney. Whitney was the president of the NYSE (Madoff chaired the NASDAQ), ran in top social circles with the Vanderbilts, had a Harvard pedigree, and 'Porcelain' finishing through this Harvard elite club. Bernie is no different. Whitney covered up failed investments for years (Madoff faked trades for years), and was soon off to Sing Sing prison like his great grandson in crime, Madoff.<sup>304</sup>

Newspapers, with direct competition from The Net, found advertising revenues from house listings, car ads, and box retailers shrink to the point that long-time voices went mute from coast to coast. *The Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, *Arizona Citizen*, *The Rocky Mountain News*, *The Detroit Free Press*, and *Christian Science Monitor* were all shuttered, or reduced to an online presence only. (*The San Francisco Chronicle*, *Chicago Sun-Times*, *Boston Globe*, *Miami Herald*, and *Chicago Tribune* all faced bankruptcy, or have made severe cutbacks.) Many more of these 20<sup>th</sup> century mass media icons are at the cusp of irrelevancy.

New and old retailers such as Woolworth's and Circuit City were sentenced to death during the recession. Thousands of retail stores in malls across America were shuttered; bank failures numbered in the hundreds; city governments trimmed to meet budgetary shortfalls; nearly every state is in deficit – California has a budgetary shortfall the size of a small nation's GDP – while the largest reinvestment and economic stimulus package in history was approved by the newly elected President and Congress.

While economists claim this is not the Great Depression, in some respects, it is worse. America in 1930 was still maturing. Manufacturing had not reached its full deployment; population density for the size and scope of the United States was still rising at a double-digit rate; national debt to national assets ratio was lower; natural resources were adequately stockpiled; and still underutilized, with discoveries yet on the horizon. We had yet to maximize the country's greatest potentials; and continued on building the right infrastructure and market mechanisms to support a country's needs to enhance the welfare of all citizens.

Via the war years, a great manufacturing might drove us to the suburbs, installed more can-do spirit, and created an economy abundant in innovation, inspiration, and sacrifice to a prosperous end.

But time changes all things.

That once powerful manufacturing might of America has shifted overseas – to China and India – who manufacture a majority of worlds' automotives parts, electronics, shoes, and furniture, while taking in our customer complaints. In December 2009, Japan's Suzuki and Germany's Volkswagon merged their powers to become the largest car company in the world by units sold, using their positions in China and India as a linchpin to their future dominance. America's GM, meanwhile, fired off their interim CEO after only 10 months on the job. (But paid back what they owed the government years ahead of schedule.)

The Japanese nation has exported much of their automotive industry to the southeastern United States, providing non-union jobs, but as a country, Japan still recovers from its own economic troubles, their lost decade of growth. Even as the second largest economy, with enormous assistance from the United States after WWII, Japan is finding globalization is creating winners and losers at a faster rate than they are able to deal with – and take little solace in that new world order. They too are stimulating again a stagnating economic recovery, and elected a different political party for the first time in over 50 years. (And Toyota's manufacturing name is being besmirched by a billion dollar accelerator problem.)

**(Far East International Expansion:** The Pittsburgh Pirates signed Rinku Singh and Dinesh Patel, both from India, as the first Indians to come into a major league organization in 2009. 21-year-old Cuban lefty Aroldis Chapman worked out for half the MLB and impressed with a 97 MPH fastball. Several teams also added Japanese players in 2008 and 2009 – the Chicago Cubs and Baltimore Orioles, their first, and Los Angeles Dodgers, one of many – as contracts to these professionals were logical given the successes of their predecessors. It is this author’s opinion, by 2020, every team will have at least two MLB players from non-traditional markets: China, India, Africa, the European Union, and the Middle East. Globalization is a competitive fact that all Americans were forced to accept, on and off the baseball fields. **Note:** In 2022, Globalizing forces are collapsing.)



That President George W. Bush, Wall Street, and baseball have a long-time acquaintanceship – and each have their own legacies and legalities to shore up – makes apt the situations existing in the early Bush Era of baseball, yet to be completely written. But a “new era” of politics was born in 2008, offering the start of a new record in an era of reconciliation tied to the history of the game.

In November 2008, America made history that was seven score and five years in the making by electing Barack Obama to the highest office in the land. As an African-American, born in Hawaii, raised by a Kansas mother, and transcendent in a wide array of endeavors, Obama bridged a long-standing divide in winning by a landslide over Senator John McCain.

As it turned out, in quick review, the 44<sup>th</sup> President was not much different on foreign policy than the 43<sup>rd</sup>, prolonging both Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and destabilizing the Middle East further in 2011. Domestically, Obama’s legacy was not one of renewal.

(**Above:** 43<sup>rd</sup> President George W. Bush taking part in a century old tradition: throwing out the first pitch at opening day celebration. (Courtesy of Paul Morse, White House Photographic Corps.)

President Obama weighed in quickly on professional baseball with a telling statement about Alex Rodriguez's steroid admission. In front of millions, Obama spoke to what fans lost, and the player's loss of integrity:

"I think it's depressing news on top of what's been a flurry of depressing items when it comes to major league baseball. And if you're a fan of major league baseball, I think it tarnishes an entire era, to some degree. And it's unfortunate, because I think there are a lot of ballplayers who played it straight. What I'm pleased about is major league baseball seems to finally be taking this seriously, to recognize how big a problem this is for the sport, and that our kids hopefully are watching and saying, 'You know what? There are no short cuts, that when you try to take short cuts, you may end up tarnishing your entire career, and that your integrity's not worth it.' That's the message I hope is communicated."<sup>305</sup>

Outside of the economics and politics, the dawning of a new 'electronic era' could be felt. The U.S. government after February 2009 required usage of digital TV. The days of analog were numbered; and rabbit ears on the boob tube no longer cuts it. (This date was pushed back to June 12, 2009 due, in part, to the Great Recession.)

3-D movies are revisited – with the technology able to create a fascinating experience, only better, this time. *Avatar* and *Titanic* director James Cameron owns the record book for movies, both 3-D and 2-D. *Star Trek* graces the big screen again in much the same vein as the *Star Wars* prequels did after a hiatus of many years. Rarely now does any action movie not see more of the "green screen" add-ins than actual set work by actors and the production companies. 'Talkies' have done well over the last four score and three.

The electronic era sees Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn connect the world. Sending "tweets" – 140-character updates to your friends – was the media craze in early 2009. Facebook let their subscribers decide via online vote on the content, and control of it, all 500,000,000, and growing, accounts. LinkedIn was another tool to connect potential employee/employers via networking as new jobless claims topped 750,000 per month early in 2009 while all social networking monopolized the time of 8 to 88-year olds.

As reality shows supplanted the 1-hour dramas and ½ hour sitcoms, the dynamics of society and celebrity shifted from people being unaware, or shy, of the camera and mike, to an era where people seek out the camera, and microphone like an addict does their



fix. *American Idol* contestants and *Dancing With the Stars* celebs had nothing on *Survivor*, *The Apprentice*, *The Hills*, or *Jon and Kate Plus Eight*. Warhol's fifteen minutes devolved even further to just fifteen microseconds as a nuclear family elaborately created a hoax to pitch a new show *about themselves*.

Oprah's media empire and book club is the staple of daytime domestics, and people searching for the best answers to their own issues. Yet, after an embarrassing book plug, *A Million Little Pieces* by James Frey, the undisputed Queen of daytime talk apologized to an author she had derided and destroyed on television. The power to give and the power to take away is that close for those plugged in to media veins. Famous blogger Perez Hilton is the word on Hollywood and infotainment – the digging in the dirt dailies.

*Google* begins an arduous process of digitizing all written works into a virtual library. While pushback against this task was inevitable, since copyright issues pervade digitizing various media, the end result will be the next dynamic success of humankind: a 21<sup>st</sup> century Gutenberg breakthrough. eBooks are big movers involving tech heavies *Apple*, *Google*, *Sony*, and *Amazon* in their cage match for turning books into new tech revenues.

All medical records will be entirely digitized as the Obama administration seeks out solutions to Medicare and Social Security financial catastrophes encroaching fast on the horizon. (America's unofficial National Debt encroaches by the billions on \$60 Trillion dollars. And Boomers' looming retirements will push these debts further skyward as Gen X and Millennials face zero hopes to see FDR & LBJ programs.)

The end of an era extended to the giants of 20<sup>th</sup> century individual industriousness, not just to the automobile, newspapers, and Wall Street. Michael Jackson died in an unusual and tragically comparable way to Elvis Presley. (Being married to Elvis's daughter for a short time.) Walter Kronkite, at 92, lived on vividly in the consciousness of those that grew up with him – from John F. Kennedy's death pronouncement to the Vietnam War, and until his last broadcast in 1980: that was, "the way it is." Senator Edward Kennedy passed away – and with him a legacy of liberal causes. Baseball lost announcing legend Harry Kalas who saw the Phillies win it all (again) in 2008. Kalas was also the voice of *NFL Films*.

### Final Thoughts on Baseball History

Much of the latter analysis reflected on the story of steroids, both the personal viewpoints of men in proximity to the athletes, and the doctors who are experts on the field alongside the money-driven nature of all professional sports, such as, the National Pastime. Within that, the addressing of what was the responses of the top men in baseball when the games' statistics, the hallowed numbers of Aaron, Maris, Ruth, and

various sluggers of bygone eras, were in jeopardy of being broken. It is clear to see that not all the responses were favorable to continuing the game *as it once was*. The changes were necessary to keep fans interested – more action via the home runs and scoring – and continuing to add revenues, and profits, to the ownerships and players' pockets.

### Money, Money, Money

The 2006 free agency period showed, money is not a significant barrier anymore to acquiring players. Seemingly mediocre players, such as Ted Lilly (59-58, 4.60ERA), Gil Meche (4.65ERA), Adam Eaton (2006:7-4, 5.12ERA), Gary Matthews Jr. (.249 Lifetime BA, before 2006), Juan Pierre (.328 OBP in the two seasons prior), and shaky closer Danys Baez, all signed lucrative enough deals that are unfathomable to many people in the real world. Even oft-injured starting pitcher Kerry Wood, who once struck out twenty batters in game back in 1998, resigned for \$1.75 million dollars, below the average salary (\$2,500,000) of all MLB players in 2005. Wood did not pitch until August of the 2006 year. (After rebounding well, Wood again was a free agent in late 2008, signing another deal: this time over \$10 million per year for the Indians.)

What this reflects is no longer does just talent drive the market completely. The lack of optimal talent led MLB executives to sign anyone that *once was*, not *who is* or *will be*. There are impetuses to do anything to appease fans, and more likely, the ability of owners to beat out 29 other teams for a particular player seems more likely and plausible. And teams will market *this team* as a winner, able to compete against the all-mighty Yankees – the standard for success in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Even the usually bargain-basement seeking Chicago Cubs doled out over \$300 million dollars in 2006 off season, for two everyday all-star caliber hitters, two mid-tier starters, a backup catcher, a mediocre middle infielder, and a former-starter-turned-bullpen helper. (Even though they have had large contracts before, this shopping-spree spending was unprecedented.)

To put that into a larger perspective, the Marlins' payroll was 1/20 of that grand total in 2006. And the Marlins won more games in that season while drawing only 39% of the attendance of the Cubs. Alex Rodriguez's contract is only slightly smaller than that total amassed by the Cubs, but larger seasonally than the entire payroll of the Marlins of 2006.

Not to be ever outdone, the 2009 New York Yankees started their season with three new acquisitions: Starting pitchers C.C. Sabathia and A.J. Burnett and 1B Mark Teixeira. Their contracts total \$423.5 million for 20 years of service, or \$21.175 million per season. 3B Alex Rodriguez is a contractual (and media headache) that added another \$275 million to the outlays. Baseball has indeed reached the billion-dollar mark. (As the \$1.5 Billion-

dollar new Yankee Stadium opened up with 20 home runs in its first four-game series, a record for any new park. The new Yankee Stadium led the league in 'big flies' allowed in 2009. See: **The House That A-Rod Financed.**)

As these amounts pile up, we wonder what barrier will be crossed that will cause some pause in the thinking of a players and owners alike. As CF Vernon Wells stated, upon receiving his 7-year, \$126 million dollar renewal, "How can you not be happy? My family comes first. Obviously, this gives me an opportunity to set my family up for a couple of generations."<sup>306</sup> This is a fine objective, *The American Dream* reached, to take care of one's family. But how many Americans (or Canadians) does it take to pay off his salary in the pursuit of hitting a baseball 400 feet, and setting up his family for a few generations?

Vernon Wells became another long-term contract failure (or victim) with injuries to his shoulder, back, and a broken wrist. Toronto fans watched in dismay as its richer, draft-savvy competitors in the AL East passed them by. What a difference from the early 1990s when they were the spendthrifts, and the champions, in back-to-back seasons.

### Cap & Trade and More What-Ifs

A salary cap is a logical step to reining in the immense contracts of players, and limits the owners' ability to wrangle more money out of the consumers. This alternative smacks of *anti-Capitalism*, but at the betterment of professional baseball. (Even Minor League operations could benefit from a better financial structure.)

Using a sliding percentage scale by position, U.S. inflation numbers, and the number of players up for free agency, and their last year's salary, a reasonable cap structure is achievable. This goal can be accomplished more logically by fans' avoidance of going to the parks, or paying for broadcasts, or buying souvenirs. But that is not conducive to maintaining a great American institution that survived world wars and other indelible changes to our society. But to rationally control salaries of players, and owners' accounting tricks, requires a significant change in this author's opinion. Again, the irrationality in many people's choices is fueling this binge – making entertainment a necessity in the face of harsher realities.

Even with its substantial past problems, and current indictment of steroids pumping up the numbers, baseball is still All-American. Its expansion to the far reaches of the globe came through the media's portrayal of players' feats being acknowledged as legendary. And the continuance of the game needs players to be seen as worthy of our admiration, and not unworthy due to money, cheating, or other actions. Yet the game, as seen now, has its health based in a false promise: money. At some point, the millions (and billions) will dry up as our humanity eventually catches up to the ideal that this is still only a sport;

not an occupation of extreme value; and should not be overemphasized in a world that still has real heroes, and real problems, that need even more real heroes to come to the forefront.

At first glance, baseball can seem disjointed by the records achieved in a particular age. That the game is a product of seasons gone by without any strong connection between 1920, the dusty past, and 2005, the technology and chemically apparent future. Not so. Even defining an era (fourteen years in most of this discussion) puts into sharper focus what is going on during that time, and how it affected the future.

How these eras intertwined with the prior generations, the graphical representation of what did go on, what continues to be prevalent, and how all that relates back to prior eras is the goal. And to bring up questions about what would have been if:

If Jackie Robinson does not play until 1951 or 1952, what happens to Willie Mays or Hank Aaron? Would they have amassed their records? Or what if Mays was the first black player, would he have succeeded under the abuse brought to Jackie as easily? Would that have set back the Integration of Baseball? What if baseball had been race tolerant in 1887 – what of America's history then?

What if amphetamines were not overlooked in dugouts as a normal part of the regiment to battle a grueling season as Jim Bouton's *Ball Four* first portrayed? Do players perform better in the 1960s and 1970s? And would steroids have gained the foothold they obviously did in the 1990s?

What of the baseball? Did changing the manufacturer in 1977 increase offense then? How about 1987? Or in the early 1990s to the hampering of records? As we have discussed, freezing, heating, humidifying the ball can and does have a distinct physical effect on the flight of the ball. What about the baseball bats and their development? Strike zone monitoring? Lack of left-hand pitching? And various other reasons for offensive explosions.

Did free agency ruin baseball? Depends on the responder to the question. Individual owners tend to deplore it because players are routinely overpaid for their skills. Company-led clubs say it is the price of good business – requires marketing and revenue matching the player's addition to the team. A free-market economy to be planned for; and taken advantage of. Often, rich owners go elsewhere for players, over-market them to the fans, and still turned profits from the new piece to their business models.

Fans are conflicted too. Because a player no longer is 'a lifer', and the team they love changes so rapidly that two years of hot stove league action can see an entire new team

fielded. (See the 1997 Marlins for a brutal example of wrecking a World Series winner in just one off-season.) An experienced fan of a perennial loser undoubtedly likes the opportunity to add better, and different ballplayers. Whereas, the oft-winning fans deplore losing essential pieces, but normally have more than one player to root for. Fans' personal outlays to go to the ballpark rise – again, to acquire the new Jacksonian bat, or a Gibsonian arm.

Players are at odds with themselves. They surely like the possibilities of moving on due to their performances earning that right instead of being held hostage by ownerships not willing to renegotiate contracts in a fair way. The fair market value given to their unique talents is something all Americans look to receive. Yet even under this new paradigm, they do find discomfort in moving to a different club, mid-season sometimes, thousands of miles from their prior spring assignment with their families being the short-term victims of their futures. And as discussed, are derided for their spoils obtained by fans and sportswriters. But players garner the chance to be on the next champion of baseball. The reason they put on the uniform, hopefully.

Has steroids been the totally destructive force (factor) discussed? Has a 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation of steroids made it plausible the positives outweigh the negative publicity, and long-term effects? Another question that with time gets a legitimate answer – off the field, then on to the next era.

How we further answer any question pertaining to baseball's future requires us to examine the constructs of the situation, what events transpired to encourage it, and the actual damages or benefits received from changing the circumstances. That is the noble end; and should be sought.

Many of the legacies of great players during the last 20 years of baseball are inevitably tarnished by the release of the George Mitchell report. In it, numerous players were named as users, pushers, or inquirers into performance-enhancing drugs. 104 players were outed in the random, confidential drug testing that occurred before a steroid policy was to be enforced. Reflecting again, the legitimate reasons players refused cooperation in the random, "confidential" testing. (Civil rights were violated – invasion of privacy – in the release of names, who gave samples in utmost confidence they would never be used against them. That is a shameful abuse of rights, if you are looking to garner player's assistance. It increases mistrust – a foregone aspect of the game. Yet, it may have been the right thing to do.)

Two players, in particular, came to light: **Roger Clemens** and **Barry Bonds**.

Symmetry holds true that arguably the best pitcher and best hitter of the past 20 seasons are linked together. The *Bringin' Gas* and *Dialin' 9* dichotomy of baseball plays out appropriately enough, with these players canceling each other out – the debunked idea that steroids led completely to the home run totals and power surge II – because if all players (or nearly all) were using these enhancers, then it is not so much a matter of cheating your opponents as it is cheating a fan that supposes a level of play to be free of sins seen most often in the wrestling profession.

Though, I do not condemn either man. (God alone should judge.) Both were players of note, and engaged in performances on the field that still took something raw. Steroids did not turn every player into a superstar. The Mitchell report reflects that; in the number of fringe players which never made a significant jump in their careers, but were just trying to stay on the field with their multi-million-dollar brethren in balls and bats.

It does take a great deal of dedication – batting practice, running laps around the field, watching video tape, swimming in a pool, eating appropriately, lifting weights and much, much more – just to be in that top 1% of 1% of athletes. Adding steroids undoubtedly assisted in recovery from the toils of 9-month yearly season – extended by more playoff tiers, and the World Baseball Classic. But wasn't this just an inevitable outcome of America's fast-paced, materialistic, and ethics-be-challenged society?

But no matter how we tried to examine them, define them, or support their deeds, we are only left wondering. And because of that, we concede that with time we can forgive them, as we must many, many others that have shaped the sport of baseball over these past 140 years since the birth of professionalism.

Just playing the sport, at any level, can allow us to appreciate something, anything, of what a man has done in his craft. Not all was done in the name of destruction of the game. No player that has put years of effort in attaining the title, "pro ballplayer," can be without any regard for the game. We hope.

### For the Love of the Game

The finest gesture on the field is a pat on the behind. Whether it's an opposing player or your own team, it means: "you're doing it, kid." It's the romantic love tap; the crazy stupid love fans live for; and dream it was theirs. (*Or ours* – as the team matters.)

The time after time when we show up at these dream cathedrals, and pull for our will-do-no-wrong-today star. The basket catches, the head-firsts into third, the cannon-shot throw that nabs the tying run at home plate delights us like a child on hookie. And the towering blast that hangs mid-space, as if ready for orbit, that brings 42,385 standing

room-only fans to the edge of sanity. These are the moments and treasures traditional to all sports.

But it all started with baseball.

As this analysis trekked from the ebbs in morality to the heights of statistical overkill that bounced across a hard and dusty sandlot called America, the purpose or the plea was to see another man's dream game. His picturesque view may not include a Cubs win, or a Cards win, or a trade by Kansas City, or a draft board at the Coliseum stacked by a stat package; or seats at Dodger Stadium, dog in hand and Scully in ear, or the playground in San Diego, or a slide in Milwaukee, or atop the Green Monster on a chilly October night. He'll wear a different ball cap from you. Maybe, his naval whites while off base – rooting for the lovable losers so far from his home at just eighteen. He might have packed the kids up to go to the park for their very first time. Or cut out on work; or fell on hard times, and this is his final solace before going home to break that depressing news like so many of us have done in our lives.

His goal was to see the game his way. In totality, he has a fifty-fifty shot. That keeps him coming.

Baseball is not numbers. It is not championships. It certainly is not a business. Instead, it is a marriage, a first date, a break-up, an obsession, a rekindling of love lost, a soulmate search, all rolled into one. And it is not to be forgotten in this short life we inhabit.

In the 140 years of duty to the title, "a professional game," baseball brought us seven generations of talent. From Harry Wright, Cy Young, Babe Ruth, Joe DiMaggio, Willie Mays, Reggie Jackson, to finally, Greg Maddux, is but one theorized path to cover that span. The connections to the past game are still strong, the men saying, "I can remember when..."

When we no longer can look up to these athletes with any fondness, or awe, the game will be lost. We will have deserted a vital piece of the *American Experience* – that of growing up playing the game, watching our heroes battle, dreaming their human flaws absent, their perfections transfixed via the ball yard, with the *Homeric* game-deciding call, and the flickering of a tube late into that August summer night.

Very few things have been done so right. Baseball, for all of its warts, is one of them.

That ultimately, many men yet to come will do better justice to the game via their play and their deeds glorious and inspiring. While yet another era is shaped via the words of the media and the romantic visions of the fans. And our American history is lively because of it all. And We, the People, will still, most definitely, *come*.

## Appendix

# Centerfielders IKE WS Players

Year	WS	Team	Centerfielder	G	Gcf	PO	A	E	FG%	TC/G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	SB	BB	HBP	SF	OBP	SLG
1950	Lost	Philadelphia Phillies	Richie Ashburn	151	147	405	8	5	0.988	2.77	594	84	180	25	14	2	41	14	63	2	0	0.372	0.402
1950	Won	New York Yankees	Joe DiMaggio	139	137	363	9	9	0.976	2.74	525	114	158	33	10	32	122	0	80	1	0	0.394	0.585
1951	Lost	New York Giants	Willie Mays	121	121	353	12	9	0.976	3.09	464	59	127	22	5	20	68	7	57	2	0	0.356	0.472
1951	Won	New York Yankees	Joe DiMaggio	116	113	288	11	3	0.990	2.60	415	72	109	22	4	12	71	0	61	6	0	0.365	0.422
1952	Lost	Brooklyn Dodgers	Duke Snider	144	141	341	13	3	0.992	2.48	534	80	162	25	7	21	92	7	55	0	0	0.368	0.494
1952	Won	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	142	121	347	15	12	0.968	2.63	549	94	171	37	7	23	87	4	75	0	0	0.394	0.530
1953	Lost	Brooklyn Dodgers	Duke Snider	153	151	370	7	5	0.987	2.50	590	132	198	38	4	42	126	16	82	3	0	0.419	0.627
1953	Won	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	127	116	322	10	6	0.982	2.66	461	105	136	24	3	21	92	8	79	0	0	0.398	0.497
1954	Lost	Cleveland Indians	Larry Doby	153	153	411	14	2	0.995	2.79	577	94	157	18	4	32	126	3	85	3	9	0.364	0.484
1954	Won	New York Giants	Willie Mays	151	151	448	13	7	0.985	3.10	565	119	195	33	13	41	110	8	66	2	7	0.411	0.667
1955	Lost	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	147	145	372	11	2	0.995	2.62	517	121	158	25	11	37	99	8	113	3	3	0.431	0.611
1955	Won	Brooklyn Dodgers	Duke Snider	148	146	348	9	4	0.989	2.44	538	126	166	34	6	42	136	9	104	1	6	0.418	0.628
1956	Lost	Brooklyn Dodgers	Duke Snider	151	150	358	11	6	0.984	2.48	542	112	158	33	2	43	101	3	99	1	4	0.399	0.598
1956	Won	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	150	144	370	10	4	0.990	2.56	533	132	188	22	5	52	130	10	112	2	4	0.464	0.705
1957	Lost	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	144	139	324	6	7	0.979	2.34	474	121	173	28	6	34	94	16	146	0	3	0.512	0.665
1957	Won	Milwaukee Braves	Bill Bruton	79	79	206	5	4	0.981	2.72	306	41	85	16	9	5	30	11	19	1	5	0.317	0.438
1958	Lost	Milwaukee Braves	Bill Bruton	100	96	203	6	5	0.977	2.14	325	47	91	11	3	3	28	4	27	2	3	0.336	0.360
1958	Won	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	150	150	331	5	8	0.977	2.29	519	127	158	21	1	42	97	18	129	2	2	0.443	0.592
1959	Lost	Chicago White Sox	Jim Landis	149	148	420	10	3	0.993	2.91	515	78	140	26	7	5	60	20	78	8	9	0.370	0.379
1959	Won	Los Angeles Dodgers	Don Demeter	139	124	223	5	4	0.983	1.67	371	55	95	11	1	18	70	5	16	6	5	0.294	0.437
1960	Lost	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	153	150	326	9	3	0.991	2.21	527	119	145	17	6	40	94	14	111	1	5	0.399	0.558
1960	Won	Pittsburgh Pirates	Bill Virdon	120	109	272	10	5	0.983	2.39	409	60	108	16	9	8	40	8	40	0	5	0.326	0.406
1961	Lost	Cincinnati Reds	Vada Pinson	154	153	391	19	10	0.976	2.73	607	101	208	34	8	16	87	23	39	1	8	0.379	0.504
1961	Won	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	153	150	351	6	6	0.983	2.37	514	132	163	16	6	54	128	12	126	0	5	0.448	0.687
1962	Lost	San Francisco Giants	Willie Mays	162	161	429	6	4	0.991	2.71	621	130	189	36	5	49	141	18	78	4	3	0.384	0.615
1962	Won	New York Yankees	Mickey Mantle	123	94	214	4	5	0.978	1.81	377	96	121	15	1	30	89	9	122	1	2	0.486	0.605
1963	Lost	New York Yankees	Tom Tresh	145	101	305	6	6	0.981	2.19	520	91	140	28	5	25	71	3	83	4	5	0.371	0.487
1963	Won	Los Angeles Dodgers	Willie Davis	156	153	337	16	8	0.978	2.31	515	60	126	19	8	9	60	25	25	3	6	0.281	0.365
Average Stats				140	134	337	10	6	0.984	2.51	500	97	150	24	6	27	89	10	78	2.1	4	0.389	0.529

# Ballparks by Decade

## Major League Ballparks by Era, Designs and Closings

MLB Ballparks		Closed by						Still Operating*	Examples	Styles by ERA
Built In What ERA	No. of Parks	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990-2000s	Present Day		
1908 - 1916 <sup>1</sup>	13	1	5	1	2	0	2	2	Wrigley, Fenway	Cavernous CF, High LF/RF Walls - short porches
1920 - 1938 <sup>2</sup>	4	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	Yankee Stadium	Avg. to Lg. CF, Low RF/LF walls, friendly ALLEYS
1953 - 1962 <sup>3</sup>	5	-	-	-	-	1	3	1	Dodger Stadium	Rounded Uniform OF; avg. to low walls, 325' Lines
1962 - 1968 <sup>4</sup>	7	-	-	-	-	-	3	4	Shea, RFK, Edison	Lg. Power alleys, Uniform walls, Avg. CF (402')
1969 - 1977 <sup>5</sup>	9	-	-	-	-	1	7	1	Kauffman	Astroturf, similar to 60's, 330' lines, 8'-10' walls
1982 - 1991 <sup>6</sup>	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	Skydome, HHH Dome	Friendly Alleys, 325' lines, 10' + walls
1991 - 2004 <sup>7</sup>	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	Camden, Miller, PETCO	Designed as smaller versions of Earliest (1910-1940)
Long -Term BPs	59	1	5	2	3	2	16	30	PNC, Jacobs Field	30-year parks
Temp BPs <sup>8</sup>	12	-	2	7	2	-	-	0	Jarry Parc	Defunct and used to house until permanent BP

- Wrigley has long Lines (350'+), but short CF that is wind-aided, especially to LF. Fenway represents the *typical design* (but for **430'+ CF**) of this era.
- Yankee Stadium was cavernous (461' CF) until remodel in the 1970's. Short RF porch (**296-314'**) has aided Lefthanders for 75+ years.
- Dodger stadium has predominately been a Pitcher's park due to location and night weather. Other parks built were smallish on the lines and alleys.
- The remaining parks are pitcher's parks. Power alleys at 380'+, wall height 8-10 feet, avg. CF distances
- Used Astrodome model, for outdoor use, alley hitting for 2B and 3Bs, HR down lines, weather effected HRs slightly.
- Fairly friendly to HR hitters, stale designs, indoor designs for outdoor play. Lack character.
- Added creative quirks to hitter friendly ballparks - poles, high walls, old buildings, narrow foul ground, but maintained **330' - 375' - 405'** paradigms to some degree
- Yankees temporary park (Polo Grounds IV) was exited in 1922.

\* All parks undergo modifications that are disputed in *distances, the exact configurations and lasting effects.*





**Top 50 Fantasy Seasons Since 1947 –Points System (Batters)**

Name	Year	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SB	CS	TB	Pts	BA	SLG	OBP*
Barry Bonds	2001	476	129	156	32	2	73	137	177	13	3	411	861	0.328	0.863	0.510
Sammy Sosa	2001	577	146	189	34	5	64	160	116	0	2	425	843	0.328	0.737	0.440
<b>Ted Williams</b>	1949	566	150	194	39	3	43	159	162	1	1	368	838	0.343	0.650	0.489
Mark McGwire	1998	509	130	152	21	0	70	147	162	1	0	383	823	0.299	0.752	0.468
Todd Helton	2000	580	138	216	59	2	42	147	103	5	3	405	792	0.372	0.698	0.467
Luis Gonzalez	2001	609	128	198	36	7	57	142	100	1	1	419	788	0.325	0.688	0.420
Sammy Sosa	1998	643	134	198	20	0	66	158	73	18	9	416	781	0.308	0.647	0.378
Larry Walker	1997	568	143	208	46	4	49	130	78	33	8	409	777	0.366	0.720	0.443
Todd Helton	2001	587	132	197	54	2	49	146	98	7	5	402	775	0.336	0.685	0.431
Barry Bonds	2004	373	129	135	27	3	45	101	232	6	1	303	769	0.362	0.812	0.607
Mark McGwire	1999	521	118	145	21	1	65	147	133	0	0	363	761	0.278	0.697	0.425
Jeff Bagwell	1999	562	143	171	35	0	42	126	149	30	11	332	758	0.304	0.591	0.450
<b>Mickey Mantle</b>	1956	533	132	188	22	5	52	130	112	10	1	376	758	0.353	0.705	0.465
Albert Belle	1996	602	124	187	38	3	48	148	99	11	0	375	757	0.311	0.623	0.408
Barry Bonds	2002	403	117	149	31	2	46	110	198	9	2	322	752	0.370	0.799	0.577
Jeff Bagwell	2000	590	152	183	37	1	47	132	107	9	6	363	751	0.310	0.615	0.416
Carlos Delgado	2000	569	115	196	57	1	41	137	123	0	1	378	751	0.344	0.664	0.461
<b>Mickey Mantle</b>	1961	514	132	163	16	6	54	128	126	12	1	353	749	0.317	0.687	0.452
Alex Rodriguez	2001	632	133	201	34	1	52	135	75	18	3	393	748	0.318	0.622	0.390
Barry Bonds	1993	539	129	181	38	4	46	123	126	29	12	365	748	0.336	0.677	0.462
Ken Griffey	1997	608	125	185	34	3	56	147	76	15	4	393	748	0.304	0.646	0.382
Barry Bonds	1996	517	122	159	27	3	42	129	151	40	7	318	746	0.308	0.615	0.464
<b>Willie Mays</b>	1962	621	130	189	36	5	49	141	78	18	2	382	745	0.304	0.615	0.382
Alex Rodriguez	2002	624	125	187	27	2	57	142	87	9	4	389	744	0.300	0.623	0.385
Ryan Howard	2006	581	104	182	25	1	58	149	108	0	0	383	744	0.313	0.659	0.421
Ellis Burks	1996	613	142	211	45	8	40	128	61	32	6	392	743	0.344	0.639	0.404
Albert Belle	1998	609	113	200	48	2	49	152	81	6	4	399	743	0.328	0.655	0.407
Ken Griffey	1998	633	120	180	33	3	56	146	76	20	5	387	739	0.284	0.611	0.361
Albert Pujols	2003	591	137	212	51	1	43	124	79	5	1	394	737	0.359	0.667	0.434
<b>Ted Williams</b>	1947	528	125	181	40	9	32	114	162	0	1	335	734	0.343	0.634	0.497
<b>Roger Maris</b>	1961	590	132	159	16	4	61	142	94	0	0	366	734	0.269	0.620	0.370
David Ortiz	2005	601	119	180	40	1	47	148	102	1	0	363	733	0.300	0.604	0.401
Manny Ramirez	1999	522	131	174	34	3	44	165	96	2	4	346	732	0.333	0.663	0.437
<b>Norm Cash</b>	1961	535	119	193	22	8	41	132	124	11	5	354	730	0.361	0.662	0.481
Chipper Jones	1999	567	116	181	41	1	45	110	126	25	3	359	730	0.319	0.633	0.443
Frank Thomas	2000	582	115	191	44	0	43	143	112	1	3	364	729	0.328	0.625	0.437
Mo Vaughn	1996	635	118	207	29	1	44	143	95	2	0	370	728	0.326	0.583	0.414
David Ortiz	2006	558	115	160	29	2	54	137	119	1	0	355	727	0.287	0.636	0.412
<b>Willie Mays</b>	1955	580	123	185	18	13	51	127	79	24	4	382	727	0.319	0.659	0.401
Frank Robinson	1962	609	134	208	51	2	39	136	76	18	9	380	726	0.342	0.624	0.415
Albert Pujols	2004	592	133	196	51	2	46	123	84	5	5	389	724	0.331	0.657	0.414
Alex Rodriguez	2005	605	124	194	29	1	48	130	91	21	6	369	723	0.321	0.610	0.409
Todd Helton	2003	583	135	209	49	5	33	117	111	0	4	367	722	0.358	0.630	0.461
<b>Jim Rice</b>	1978	677	121	213	25	15	46	139	58	7	5	406	721	0.315	0.600	0.369
Sammy Sosa	1999	625	114	180	24	2	63	141	78	7	8	397	721	0.288	0.635	0.367
<b>Hank Aaron</b>	1963	631	121	201	29	4	44	130	78	31	5	370	720	0.319	0.586	0.394
<b>George Foster</b>	1977	615	124	197	31	2	52	149	61	6	4	388	720	0.320	0.631	0.382
<b>Harmon Killebrew</b>	1969	555	106	153	20	2	49	140	145	8	2	324	719	0.276	0.584	0.426
Sammy Sosa	2000	604	106	193	38	1	50	138	91	7	4	383	717	0.320	0.634	0.409
Jeff Bagwell	1997	566	109	162	40	2	43	135	127	31	10	335	717	0.286	0.592	0.417
<b>Rocky Colavito</b>	1961	583	129	169	30	2	45	140	113	1	2	338	717	0.290	0.580	0.405
<b>Averages</b>		574	126	184	34	3	49	137	109	11	3.7	373	749	0.322	0.654	0.431

*Top 50 Fantasy Seasons Prior to 1947 –Point System (Batters)*

Name	Year	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SB	CS	TB	Pts	BA	SLG	OBP*
Babe Ruth	1921	540	177	204	44	16	59	171	145	17	13	457	941	0.378	0.846	0.509
Lou Gehrig	1927	584	149	218	52	18	47	175	109	10	8	447	874	0.373	0.765	0.472
Babe Ruth	1927	540	158	192	29	8	60	164	137	7	6	417	871	0.356	0.772	0.486
Lou Gehrig	1931	619	163	211	31	15	46	184	117	17	12	410	867	0.341	0.662	0.446
Jimmie Foxx	1932	585	151	213	33	9	58	169	116	3	7	438	863	0.364	0.749	0.469
Lou Gehrig	1936	579	167	205	37	7	49	152	130	3	4	403	847	0.354	0.696	0.472
Jimmie Foxx	1938	565	139	197	33	9	50	175	119	5	4	398	828	0.349	0.704	0.462
Babe Ruth	1923	522	151	205	45	13	41	131	170	17	21	399	826	0.393	0.764	0.542
Lou Gehrig	1930	581	143	220	42	17	41	174	101	12	14	419	821	0.379	0.721	0.471
Hank Greenberg	1937	594	137	200	49	14	40	183	102	8	3	397	821	0.337	0.668	0.434
Babe Ruth	1920	457	158	172	36	9	54	137	150	14	14	388	819	0.376	0.849	0.530
Babe Ruth	1928	536	163	173	29	8	54	142	137	4	5	380	816	0.323	0.709	0.461
Babe Ruth	1931	534	149	199	31	3	46	163	128	5	4	374	811	0.373	0.700	0.494
Lou Gehrig	1934	579	128	210	40	6	49	165	109	9	5	409	810	0.363	0.706	0.464
Babe Ruth	1930	518	150	186	28	9	49	153	136	10	10	379	808	0.359	0.732	0.492
Joe DiMaggio	1937	621	151	215	35	15	46	167	64	3	0	418	803	0.346	0.673	0.407
Rogers Hornsby	1922	623	141	250	46	14	42	152	65	17	12	450	801	0.401	0.722	0.458
Babe Ruth	1926	495	139	184	30	5	47	150	144	11	9	365	791	0.372	0.737	0.513
Lou Gehrig	1937	569	138	200	37	9	37	159	127	4	3	366	788	0.351	0.643	0.470
Hank Greenberg	1938	556	144	175	23	4	58	146	119	7	5	380	786	0.315	0.683	0.436
Jimmie Foxx	1933	573	125	204	37	9	48	163	96	2	2	403	785	0.356	0.703	0.448
Babe Ruth	1924	529	143	200	39	7	46	121	142	9	13	391	780	0.378	0.739	0.510
Hank Greenberg	1935	619	121	203	46	16	36	170	87	4	3	389	765	0.328	0.628	0.411
Ted Williams	1942	522	141	186	34	5	36	137	145	3	2	338	760	0.356	0.648	0.496
Hank Greenberg	1940	573	129	195	50	8	41	150	93	6	3	384	756	0.340	0.670	0.432
Al Simmons	1930	554	152	211	41	16	36	165	39	9	2	392	753	0.381	0.708	0.422
Jimmie Foxx	1936	585	130	198	32	8	41	143	105	13	4	369	752	0.338	0.631	0.439
Lou Gehrig	1932	596	138	208	42	9	34	151	108	4	11	370	749	0.349	0.621	0.449
Rogers Hornsby	1925	504	133	203	41	10	39	143	83	5	3	381	739	0.403	0.756	0.487
Ted Williams	1941	456	135	185	33	3	37	120	147	2	4	335	731	0.406	0.735	0.551
Jimmie Foxx	1930	562	127	188	33	13	37	156	93	7	7	358	727	0.335	0.637	0.429
Ted Williams	1939	565	131	185	44	11	31	145	107	2	1	344	727	0.327	0.609	0.435
Hal Trosky	1936	629	124	216	45	9	42	162	36	6	5	405	723	0.343	0.644	0.379
Lou Gehrig	1928	562	139	210	47	13	27	142	95	4	11	364	722	0.374	0.648	0.464
<b>Ken Williams</b>	1922	585	128	194	34	11	39	155	74	37	20	367	721	0.332	0.627	0.407
Jimmie Foxx	1934	539	120	180	28	6	44	130	111	11	2	352	720	0.334	0.653	0.448
<b>George Sisler</b>	1920	631	137	257	49	18	19	122	46	42	17	399	712	0.407	0.632	0.448
Lou Gehrig	1933	593	138	198	41	12	32	139	92	9	13	359	711	0.334	0.605	0.423
Earl Averill	1936	614	136	232	39	15	28	126	65	3	3	385	709	0.378	0.627	0.437
Al Simmons	1932	670	144	216	28	9	35	151	47	4	2	367	709	0.322	0.548	0.367
Earl Averill	1931	627	140	209	36	10	32	143	68	9	9	361	703	0.333	0.576	0.399
<b>Charlie Gehringer</b>	1936	641	144	227	60	12	15	116	83	4	1	356	701	0.354	0.555	0.428
<b>Tris Speaker</b>	1923	574	133	218	59	11	17	130	93	8	9	350	696	0.380	0.610	0.466
Lou Gehrig	1929	553	127	166	32	10	35	126	122	4	4	323	694	0.300	0.584	0.427
Babe Ruth	1929	499	121	172	26	6	46	154	72	5	3	348	694	0.345	0.697	0.427
Hal Trosky	1934	625	117	206	45	9	35	142	58	2	2	374	689	0.330	0.598	0.387
<b>Kiki Cuyler</b>	1925	617	144	220	43	26	18	102	58	41	13	369	688	0.357	0.598	0.412
Babe Ruth	1932	457	120	156	13	5	41	137	130	2	2	302	687	0.341	0.661	0.487
Jimmie Foxx	1935	535	118	185	33	7	36	115	114	6	4	340	685	0.346	0.636	0.461
Lou Gehrig	1935	535	125	176	26	10	30	119	132	8	7	312	682	0.329	0.583	0.462
Rogers Hornsby	1921	592	131	235	44	18	21	126	60	13	13	378	682	0.397	0.639	0.452
<b>Averages</b>		<b>567</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>764</b>	<b>0.356</b>	<b>0.673</b>	<b>0.454</b>

### 100 All-time Points Leaders, Average Points per AB and Lifetime Stats

Name	Years	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SB	CS	TB	Pts	Pts/AB	BA	SLG
Babe Ruth	22	8398	2174	2873	506	136	714	2217	2062	123	117	5793	12135	1.44	0.342	0.690
Ted Williams	19	7706	1798	2654	525	71	521	1839	2021	24	17	4884	10532	1.37	0.344	0.634
Barry Bonds	21	9507	2152	2841	587	77	734	1930	2426	509	141	5784	12519	1.32	0.299	0.608
Lou Gehrig	17	8001	1888	2721	534	163	493	1995	1508	102	101	5060	10351	1.29	0.340	0.632
Jimmie Foxx	21	8134	1751	2646	458	125	534	1922	1452	87	72	4956	10024	1.23	0.325	0.609
Mark McGwire	17	6187	1167	1626	252	6	583	1414	1317	12	8	3639	7533	1.22	0.283	0.588
Manny Ramirez	14	6575	1258	2086	438	16	470	1516	1054	34	31	3946	7746	1.18	0.314	0.600
Frank Thomas	17	7422	1404	2282	458	11	487	1579	1547	32	23	4203	8719	1.17	0.305	0.566
Jim Thome	16	6409	1259	1806	350	24	472	1302	1364	18	19	3620	7525	1.17	0.282	0.565
Mickey Mantle	18	8102	1677	2415	344	72	536	1509	1733	153	38	4511	9507	1.17	0.298	0.557
Joe DiMaggio	13	6821	1390	2214	389	131	381	1537	790	30	9	3948	7877	1.13	0.325	0.579
Jeff Bagwell	15	7797	1517	2314	488	32	449	1529	1401	202	78	4213	8706	1.12	0.297	0.540
Alex Rodriguez	13	6787	1358	2087	364	26	464	1347	820	241	60	3875	7521	1.11	0.305	0.573
Larry Walker	18	6907	1355	2160	471	62	383	1311	913	230	76	3904	7561	1.09	0.313	0.565
Rogers Hornsby	24	8173	1579	2930	541	169	301	1584	1038	135	64	4712	8920	1.09	0.358	0.577
Mike Schmidt	18	8352	1506	2234	408	59	548	1595	1507	174	92	4404	9002	1.08	0.287	0.527
Willie Mays	23	10881	2062	3283	523	140	660	1903	1464	338	103	6066	11627	1.07	0.302	0.557
Ken Griffey, Jr.	18	8298	1467	2412	449	36	563	1608	1077	178	67	4622	8818	1.06	0.291	0.557
Stan Musial	22	10972	1949	3630	725	177	475	1951	1599	78	31	6134	11649	1.06	0.331	0.559
Gary Sheffield	21	8037	1433	2390	418	24	455	1501	1293	220	96	4221	8476	1.05	0.297	0.525
Harmon Killebrew	22	8147	1283	2086	290	24	573	1584	1559	19	18	4143	8552	1.05	0.256	0.509
Frank Robinson	22	10006	1829	2943	528	72	586	1812	1420	204	77	5373	10484	1.05	0.294	0.537
Duke Snider	18	7161	1259	2116	358	85	407	1333	971	99	50	3865	7427	1.04	0.295	0.540
Hank Aaron	23	12364	2174	3771	624	98	755	2297	1402	240	73	6856	12823	1.04	0.305	0.555
Edgar Martinez	18	7213	1219	2247	514	15	309	1261	1283	49	30	3718	7470	1.04	0.312	0.515
Ty Cobb	24	11434	2246	4189	724	295	117	1937	1249	892	178	5854	11822	1.03	0.366	0.512
Eddie Mathews	18	8537	1509	2315	354	72	512	1453	1444	68	39	4349	8745	1.02	0.271	0.509
Bob Johnson	13	6920	1239	2051	396	95	288	1283	1075	96	64	3501	7066	1.02	0.296	0.506
Willie McCovey	23	8197	1229	2211	353	46	521	1555	1345	26	22	4219	8330	1.02	0.270	0.515
Jose Canseco	19	7057	1186	1877	340	14	462	1407	906	200	88	3631	7154	1.01	0.286	0.515
Sammy Sosa	18	8401	1422	2304	355	44	588	1575	895	234	107	4511	8423	1.00	0.274	0.537
Rickey Henderson	29	10961	2295	3055	510	66	297	1115	2190	1406	335	4588	10924	1.00	0.279	0.419
Harry Heilmann	17	7787	1291	2660	542	151	183	1539	856	113	64	4053	7724	0.99	0.342	0.520
Willie Stargell	21	7927	1195	2232	423	55	475	1540	937	17	16	4190	7847	0.99	0.282	0.529
Fred McGriff	21	8757	1349	2490	441	24	493	1550	1305	72	38	4458	8658	0.99	0.284	0.509
Tris Speaker	22	10195	1882	3514	792	222	117	1529	1381	432	129	5101	10067	0.99	0.345	0.500
Al Simmons	21	8759	1507	2927	539	149	307	1827	615	88	64	4685	8594	0.98	0.334	0.535
Rafael Palmeiro	20	10472	1663	3020	585	38	569	1835	1353	97	40	5388	10256	0.98	0.288	0.515
Charlie Gehringer	19	8860	1774	2839	574	146	184	1427	1186	181	89	4257	8647	0.98	0.320	0.480
Joe Morgan	22	9277	1650	2517	449	96	268	1133	1865	689	162	3962	8975	0.97	0.271	0.427
Goose Goslin	19	8656	1483	2735	500	173	248	1609	949	175	89	4325	8363	0.97	0.316	0.500
Cap Anson	27	10277	1996	3418	581	142	97	2076	983	276	16	4574	9873	0.96	0.333	0.445
Reggie Jackson	21	9864	1551	2584	463	49	563	1702	1375	228	115	4834	9460	0.96	0.282	0.490
Honus Wagner	21	10430	1736	3415	640	252	101	1732	963	722	15	4862	9985	0.96	0.327	0.466
Joe Cronin	20	7579	1233	2285	515	118	170	1424	1059	87	71	3546	7207	0.95	0.301	0.468
Bernie Williams	16	7889	1366	2336	449	55	287	1257	1069	147	87	3756	7421	0.94	0.297	0.477
John Olerud	18	7592	1139	2239	500	13	255	1230	1275	11	14	3530	7157	0.94	0.295	0.465
Jeff Kent	17	7564	1200	2189	501	45	345	1380	719	93	56	3815	7095	0.94	0.289	0.504
Dwight Evans	20	8996	1470	2446	483	73	385	1384	1391	78	59	4230	8435	0.94	0.272	0.470
Eddie Collins	25	9949	1821	3315	438	187	47	1300	1499	744	173	4268	9286	0.93	0.333	0.429

<u>Name</u>	<u>Years</u>	<u>AB</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>2B</u>	<u>3B</u>	<u>HR</u>	<u>RBI</u>	<u>BB</u>	<u>SB</u>	<u>CS</u>	<u>TB</u>	<u>Pts</u>	<u>Pts/AB</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>SLG</u>
Al Kaline	22	10116	1622	3007	498	75	399	1583	1277	137	65	4852	9341	0.92	0.297	0.480
<b>Luis Gonzalez</b>	18	8352	1312	2373	547	65	331	1324	1058	121	83	4043	7892	0.92	0.284	0.484
Tim Lincecum	24	8872	1571	2605	430	113	170	980	1330	808	146	3771	8168	0.92	0.294	0.425
Carl Yastrzemski	23	11988	1816	3419	646	59	452	1844	1845	168	116	5539	10980	0.92	0.285	0.462
Billy Williams	18	9350	1410	2711	434	88	426	1475	1045	90	49	4599	8521	0.91	0.280	0.492
Jim Rice	16	8225	1249	2452	373	79	382	1451	670	58	34	4129	7489	0.91	0.298	0.502
Paul Waner	22	9459	1627	3152	605	191	113	1309	1091	104	0	4478	8609	0.91	0.333	0.473
Eddie Murray	23	11336	1627	3255	560	35	504	1917	1333	110	43	5397	10298	0.91	0.287	0.476
Enos Slaughter	22	7946	1247	2383	413	148	169	1304	1018	71	15	3599	7209	0.91	0.300	0.453
Darrell Evans	22	8973	1344	2223	329	36	414	1354	1605	98	68	3866	8131	0.91	0.248	0.431
Dave Winfield	23	11003	1669	3110	540	88	465	1833	1216	223	96	5221	9970	0.91	0.283	0.475
Dale Murphy	19	7960	1197	2111	350	39	398	1266	986	161	68	3733	7207	0.91	0.265	0.469
George Brett	21	10349	1583	3154	665	137	317	1595	1096	201	97	5044	9325	0.90	0.305	0.487
Ron Santo	15	8143	1138	2254	365	67	342	1331	1108	35	41	3779	7309	0.90	0.277	0.464
Andres Galarraga	20	8096	1195	2333	444	32	399	1425	583	128	81	4038	7207	0.89	0.288	0.499
Ernie Banks	19	9421	1305	2583	407	90	512	1636	763	50	53	4706	8354	0.89	0.274	0.500
Chili Davis	19	8673	1240	2380	424	30	350	1372	1194	142	98	3914	7666	0.88	0.274	0.451
Nap Lajoie	22	9589	1504	3242	657	163	83	1599	516	380	21	4474	8431	0.88	0.338	0.467
Roberto Alomar	19	9073	1508	2724	504	80	210	1134	1032	474	114	4018	7938	0.87	0.300	0.443
Sam Crawford	19	9570	1391	2961	458	309	97	1525	760	366	30	4328	8310	0.87	0.309	0.452
Wade Boggs	18	9180	1513	3010	578	61	118	1014	1412	24	35	4064	7957	0.87	0.328	0.443
Harold Baines	27	9908	1299	2866	488	49	384	1628	1062	34	34	4604	8559	0.86	0.289	0.465
Paul Molitor	21	10835	1782	3319	605	114	234	1307	1094	504	131	4854	9279	0.86	0.306	0.448
Tony Perez	23	9778	1272	2732	505	79	379	1652	925	49	33	4532	8364	0.86	0.279	0.463
Lou Whitaker	19	8570	1366	2369	420	65	244	1084	1197	143	75	3651	7311	0.85	0.276	0.426
Carlton Fisk	24	8756	1276	2356	421	47	376	1330	849	128	58	3999	7466	0.85	0.269	0.457
Jim O'Rourke	23	8505	1729	2643	465	151	62	1203	510	224	8	3596	7246	0.85	0.311	0.423
Andre Dawson	21	9927	1373	2774	503	98	438	1591	589	314	109	4787	8436	0.85	0.279	0.482
Joe Carter	17	8422	1170	2184	432	53	396	1445	527	231	66	3910	7151	0.85	0.259	0.464
Frankie Frisch	19	9112	1532	2880	466	138	105	1244	728	419	74	3937	7712	0.85	0.316	0.432
<b>Craig Biggio</b>	19	10359	1776	2930	637	52	281	1125	1137	410	121	4514	8720	0.84	0.283	0.436
Dave Parker	20	9358	1272	2712	526	75	339	1493	683	154	113	4405	7781	0.83	0.290	0.471
Rusty Staub	24	9720	1189	2716	499	47	292	1466	1255	47	33	4185	8076	0.83	0.279	0.431
Cal Ripken	21	11551	1647	3184	603	44	431	1695	1129	36	39	5168	9597	0.83	0.276	0.447
Roberto Clemente	18	9454	1416	3000	440	166	240	1305	621	83	46	4492	7825	0.83	0.317	0.475
Steve Finley	19	9303	1434	2531	446	124	303	1165	836	320	118	4134	7653	0.82	0.272	0.444
Tony Gwynn	20	9288	1383	3141	543	85	135	1138	790	319	125	4259	7839	0.82	0.338	0.459
Mickey Vernon	21	8731	1196	2495	490	120	172	1311	955	137	90	3741	7160	0.82	0.286	0.428
Luke Appling	20	8856	1319	2749	440	102	45	1116	1302	179	108	3528	7228	0.82	0.310	0.398
Graig Nettles	22	8986	1193	2225	328	28	390	1314	1088	32	36	3779	7334	0.82	0.248	0.421
Ted Simmons	21	8680	1074	2472	483	47	248	1389	855	21	33	3793	7066	0.81	0.285	0.437
Zack Wheat	19	9106	1289	2884	476	172	132	1248	650	205	49	4100	7394	0.81	0.317	0.450
Max Carey	21	9363	1545	2665	419	159	70	800	1040	738	92	3612	7551	0.81	0.285	0.386
Robin Yount	20	11008	1632	3142	583	126	251	1406	966	271	105	4730	8795	0.80	0.285	0.430
Rod Carew	19	9315	1424	3053	445	112	92	1015	1018	353	187	3998	7434	0.80	0.328	0.429
Sam Rice	20	9269	1514	2987	498	184	34	1078	708	351	143	3955	7320	0.79	0.322	0.427
Al Oliver	20	9049	1189	2743	529	77	219	1326	535	84	64	4083	7089	0.78	0.303	0.451
Vada Pinson	18	9645	1366	2757	485	127	256	1170	574	305	122	4264	7435	0.77	0.286	0.442
Pete Rose	25	14053	2165	4256	746	135	160	1314	1566	198	149	5752	10697	0.76	0.303	0.409
Lou Brock	20	10332	1610	3023	486	141	149	900	761	938	307	4238	7833	0.76	0.293	0.410
Brooks Robinson	23	10654	1232	2848	482	68	268	1357	860	28	22	4270	7703	0.72	0.267	0.401

### Top 50 Fantasy Pitching Seasons since 1947 – Point System & Ratings

Name	Year	W	CG	SHO	SV	IP	ERA	WHIP	HRA	SO	BB	ER	H	Points	QR	Power	S Rating
Bob Gibson	1968	22	28	13	0	304.7	1.12	0.85	11	268	62	38	198	997.7	1.97	27.7	506
Sandy Koufax	1965	26	27	8	2	335.7	2.04	0.86	26	382	71	76	216	1162.7	2.90	12.9	402
Sandy Koufax	1966	27	27	5	0	323.0	1.73	0.98	19	317	77	62	241	1070.0	2.71	17.0	394
Denny McLain	1968	31	28	6	0	336.0	1.96	0.90	31	280	63	73	241	1096.0	2.86	10.8	383
Steve Carlton	1972	27	30	8	0	346.3	1.97	0.99	17	310	87	76	257	1116.3	2.96	20.4	377
Sandy Koufax	1963	25	20	11	0	311.0	1.88	0.87	18	306	58	65	214	1022.0	2.75	17.3	371
Vida Blue	1971	24	24	8	0	312.0	1.82	0.95	19	301	88	63	209	1013.0	2.77	16.4	365
Dwight Gooden	1985	24	16	8	0	276.7	1.53	0.97	13	268	69	47	198	904.7	2.50	21.3	363
Gaylord Perry	1972	24	29	5	1	342.7	1.92	0.98	17	234	82	73	253	991.7	2.90	20.2	342
Ron Guidry	1978	25	16	9	0	273.7	1.74	0.95	13	248	72	53	187	896.7	2.69	21.1	334
Tom Seaver	1971	20	21	4	0	286.3	1.76	0.95	18	289	61	56	210	900.3	2.71	15.9	333
Wilbur Wood	1971	22	22	7	1	334.0	1.91	1.00	21	210	62	71	272	914.0	2.91	15.9	314
Juan Marichal	1965	22	24	10	1	295.3	2.13	0.91	27	240	46	70	224	930.3	3.04	10.9	306
Juan Marichal	1966	25	25	4	0	307.3	2.23	0.86	32	222	36	76	228	924.3	3.09	9.6	299
Jim Palmer	1975	23	25	10	1	323.0	2.09	1.03	20	193	80	75	253	926.0	3.12	16.2	297
Bob Gibson	1969	20	28	4	0	314.0	2.18	1.10	12	269	95	76	251	943.0	3.28	26.2	287
Juan Marichal	1968	26	30	5	0	326.0	2.43	1.05	21	218	46	88	295	979.0	3.48	15.5	282
Nolan Ryan	1972	19	20	9	0	284.0	2.28	1.14	14	329	157	72	166	948.0	3.42	20.3	277
Juan Marichal	1963	25	18	5	0	321.3	2.41	1.00	27	248	61	86	259	934.3	3.41	11.9	274
Mickey Lolich	1971	25	29	4	0	376.0	2.92	1.14	36	308	92	122	336	1099.0	4.06	10.4	271
Randy Johnson	2002	24	8	4	0	260.0	2.32	1.03	26	334	71	67	197	894.0	3.35	10.0	267
Wilbur Wood	1972	24	20	8	0	376.7	2.51	1.06	28	193	74	105	325	949.7	3.57	13.5	266
Steve Carlton	1980	24	13	3	0	304.0	2.34	1.10	15	286	90	79	243	910.0	3.44	20.3	265
Nolan Ryan	1973	21	26	4	1	326.0	2.87	1.23	18	383	162	104	238	1074.0	4.10	18.1	262
Bert Blyleven	1973	20	25	9	0	325.0	2.52	1.12	16	258	67	91	296	953.0	3.64	20.3	262
Fergie Jenkins	1971	24	30	3	0	325.0	2.77	1.05	29	263	37	100	304	993.0	3.82	11.2	260
Mickey Lolich	1972	22	23	4	0	327.3	2.5	1.09	29	250	74	91	282	932.3	3.59	11.3	260
Robin Roberts	1952	28	30	3	2	330.0	2.59	1.02	22	148	45	95	292	933.0	3.61	15.0	258
Gaylord Perry	1974	21	28	4	0	322.3	2.51	1.02	25	216	99	90	230	908.3	3.53	12.9	257
Catfish Hunter	1975	23	30	7	0	328.0	2.58	1.01	25	177	83	94	248	920.0	3.59	13.1	256
Nolan Ryan	1974	22	26	3	0	332.7	2.89	1.27	18	367	202	107	221	1064.7	4.16	18.5	256
Fergie Jenkins	1974	25	29	6	0	328.3	2.82	1.01	27	225	45	103	286	978.3	3.83	12.2	256
Robin Roberts	1953	23	33	5	2	346.7	2.75	1.11	30	198	61	106	324	974.7	3.86	11.6	252
Gaylord Perry	1969	19	26	3	0	325.3	2.49	1.17	23	233	91	90	290	893.3	3.66	14.1	244
J.R. Richard	1979	18	19	4	0	292.3	2.71	1.09	13	313	98	88	220	900.3	3.80	22.5	237
Robin Roberts	1954	23	29	4	4	336.7	2.97	1.02	35	185	56	111	289	936.7	3.99	9.6	234
Nolan Ryan	1977	19	22	4	0	299.0	2.77	1.34	12	341	204	92	198	960.0	4.11	24.9	233
Denny McLain	1969	24	23	9	0	325.0	2.8	1.09	25	181	67	101	288	906.0	3.89	13.0	233
Don Drysdale	1962	25	19	2	1	314.3	2.83	1.11	21	232	78	99	272	906.3	3.94	15.0	230
Phil Niekro	1978	19	22	4	1	334.3	2.88	1.19	16	248	102	107	295	907.3	4.07	20.9	223
Steve Carlton	1982	23	19	6	0	295.7	3.1	1.15	17	286	86	102	253	936.7	4.25	17.4	221
Sam McDowell	1970	20	19	1	0	305.0	2.92	1.20	25	304	131	99	236	909.0	4.12	12.2	220
Fergie Jenkins	1969	21	23	7	1	311.3	3.21	1.14	27	273	71	111	284	949.3	4.35	11.5	218
Bob Gibson	1970	23	23	3	0	294.0	3.12	1.19	13	274	88	102	262	928.0	4.31	22.6	215
Bob Gibson	1965	20	20	6	1	299.0	3.07	1.16	34	270	103	102	243	904.0	4.23	8.8	214
Fergie Jenkins	1970	22	24	3	0	313.0	3.39	1.04	30	274	60	118	265	942.0	4.43	10.4	213
Gaylord Perry	1970	23	23	5	0	328.7	3.2	1.14	27	214	84	117	292	912.7	4.34	12.2	210
Gaylord Perry	1973	19	29	7	0	344.0	3.38	1.25	34	238	115	129	315	952.0	4.63	10.1	206
Nolan Ryan	1976	17	21	7	0	284.3	3.36	1.32	13	327	183	106	193	921.3	4.68	21.9	197
Wilbur Wood	1973	24	21	4	0	359.3	3.46	1.31	25	199	91	138	381	923.3	4.77	14.4	193
Average		22.8	23.8	5.7		318.4	2.51	1.07	22	263	86	89	255	958.8	3.58	15.7	278

***Top 50 Fantasy Pitching Seasons between 1908 and 1947 – Point System & Ratings***

Name	Year	W	CG	SHO	SV	IP	ERA	WHIP	HR	SO	BB	ER	H	Points	QR	Power	S Rating
Ed Walsh	1908	40	42	11	6	464.0	1.42	0.86	2	269	56	73	343	1428.0	2.28	232.0	626.3
Walter Johnson	1913	36	29	11	2	346.0	1.14	0.78	9	243	38	44	232	1159.0	1.92	38.4	603.5
Pete Alexander	1915	31	36	12	3	378.3	1.22	0.84	3	241	64	51	253	1182.3	2.06	125.4	573.3
Christy Mathewson	1908	37	34	11	5	390.7	1.43	0.84	5	259	42	62	285	1269.7	2.27	78.1	560.1
Walter Johnson	1912	33	34	7	2	369.0	1.39	0.91	2	303	76	57	259	1217.0	2.30	184.5	529.6
Walter Johnson	1910	25	38	8	1	370.0	1.36	0.91	1	313	76	56	262	1168.0	2.27	370.0	513.7
Ed Walsh	1910	18	33	7	5	369.7	1.27	0.82	5	258	61	52	242	1032.7	2.09	73.9	494.2
Jack Coombs	1910	31	35	13	1	353.0	1.3	1.03	0	224	115	51	248	1132.0	2.33		486.2
Mordecai Brown	1909	27	32	8	7	342.7	1.31	0.87	1	172	53	50	246	1019.7	2.18	342.7	467.2
Pete Alexander	1916	33	38	16	3	389.0	1.55	0.96	6	167	50	67	323	1171.0	2.51	64.8	466.7
Walter Johnson	1915	27	35	7	4	336.7	1.55	0.93	1	203	56	58	258	1039.7	2.48	336.7	418.8
Claude Hendrix	1914	29	34	6	5	362.0	1.69	0.94	6	189	77	68	262	1066.0	2.63	60.3	405.9
Walter Johnson	1914	28	33	9	1	371.7	1.72	0.97	3	225	74	71	287	1091.7	2.69	123.9	405.6
Mordecai Brown	1908	29	27	9	5	312.3	1.47	0.84	1	123	49	51	214	930.3	2.31	312.3	402.4
Joe Wood	1912	34	35	10	1	344.0	1.91	1.01	2	258	82	73	267	1172.0	2.92	172.0	400.7
Eddie Cicotte	1917	28	29	7	4	346.7	1.53	0.91	2	150	70	59	246	976.7	2.44	173.3	400.0
Pete Alexander	1917	30	34	8	0	388.0	1.83	1.01	4	200	56	79	336	1098.0	2.84	97.0	386.6
Russ Ford	1910	26	29	8	1	299.7	1.65	0.88	4	209	70	55	194	958.7	2.53	74.9	378.8
Frank Smith	1909	25	37	7	1	365.0	1.8	0.95	1	177	70	73	278	1017.0	2.75	365.0	369.4
Bob Feller	1946	26	36	10	4	371.3	2.18	1.16	11	348	153	90	277	1229.3	3.34	33.8	368.3
Walter Johnson	1916	25	36	3	1	369.7	1.9	1.01	0	228	82	78	290	1047.7	2.91		360.5
Ed Walsh	1912	27	32	6	10	393.0	2.15	1.08	6	254	94	94	332	1157.0	3.23	65.5	357.8
Pete Alexander	1920	27	33	7	5	363.3	1.91	1.11	8	173	69	77	335	1031.3	3.02	45.4	341.3
Hal Newhouser	1946	26	29	6	1	292.7	1.94	1.07	10	275	98	63	215	1007.7	3.01	29.3	334.8
Ed Walsh	1911	27	33	5	4	368.7	2.22	1.08	4	255	72	91	327	1103.7	3.30	92.2	334.2
Hal Newhouser	1945	25	29	8	2	313.3	1.81	1.11	5	212	110	63	239	970.3	2.92	62.7	331.9
Walter Johnson	1911	25	36	6	1	322.3	1.9	1.12	8	207	70	68	292	994.3	3.02	40.3	328.9
Cy Falkenberg	1914	25	33	9	3	377.3	2.22	1.12	5	236	89	93	332	1088.3	3.34	75.5	326.3
Dave Davenport	1915	22	30	10	1	392.7	2.2	1.01	5	229	96	96	300	1046.7	3.21	78.5	326.2
Dazzy Vance	1924	28	30	3	0	308.3	2.16	1.02	11	262	77	74	238	1015.3	3.18	28.0	319.1
Bill James	1914	26	30	4	2	332.3	1.9	1.14	7	156	118	70	261	928.3	3.04	47.5	305.3
Lefty Grove	1931	31	27	4	5	288.7	2.06	1.08	10	175	62	66	249	953.7	3.14	28.9	304.0
Dolf Luque	1923	27	28	6	2	322.0	1.93	1.14	2	151	88	69	279	923.0	3.07	161.0	300.7
Walter Johnson	1917	23	30	8	3	326.0	2.21	0.97	3	188	68	80	248	949.0	3.18	108.7	298.5
Dizzy Trout	1944	27	33	7	0	352.3	2.12	1.13	9	144	83	83	314	966.3	3.25	39.1	297.6
Pete Alexander	1914	27	32	6	1	355.0	2.38	1.14	8	214	76	94	327	1034.0	3.52	44.4	294.2
Pete Alexander	1911	28	31	7	3	367.0	2.57	1.13	5	227	129	105	285	1079.0	3.70	73.4	291.8
Hal Newhouser	1944	29	25	6	2	312.3	2.22	1.17	6	187	102	77	264	954.3	3.39	52.1	281.4
Bob Feller	1940	27	31	4	4	320.3	2.61	1.13	13	261	118	93	245	1046.3	3.74	24.6	279.5
Jeff Tesreau	1914	26	26	8	1	322.3	2.37	1.14	8	189	128	85	238	946.3	3.51	40.3	270.0
Dizzy Dean	1934	30	24	7	7	311.7	2.66	1.16	14	195	75	92	288	996.7	3.82	22.3	260.6
Lefty Grove	1930	28	22	2	9	291.0	2.54	1.14	8	209	60	82	273	945.0	3.68	38.4	256.5
Jack Quinn	1914	26	27	4	1	342.7	2.6	1.17	3	164	65	99	335	926.7	3.77	114.2	246.0
Dizzy Dean	1935	28	29	3	5	325.3	3.04	1.23	16	190	77	110	324	980.3	4.27	20.3	229.4
Lefty Grove	1932	25	27	4	7	291.7	2.84	1.19	13	188	79	92	269	919.7	4.03	22.4	228.0
Bob Feller	1941	25	28	6	2	343.0	3.15	1.39	15	260	194	120	284	1033.0	4.54	22.9	227.4
Bob Feller	1939	24	24	4	1	296.7	2.85	1.24	13	246	142	94	227	927.7	4.09	22.8	226.6
George Uhle	1926	27	32	3	1	318.3	2.83	1.31	7	159	118	100	300	927.3	4.14	45.5	223.8
Dizzy Dean	1936	24	28	2	11	315.0	3.17	1.15	21	195	53	111	310	955.0	4.32	15.0	220.9
Jack Coombs	1911	28	26	1	2	336.7	3.53	1.42	8	185	119	132	360	946.7	4.95	42.1	191.1
Average		30.4	34.0	9.4		367	1.48	0.908	3.1	223	64	60	268	1126.7	2.38	174.1	479

### 236 Top Fantasy Starting Pitchers (150 or more wins) – All Time (Since 1871)

Name	W	CG	SHO	SV	IP	ERA	WHIP	SO	BB	ER	H	HR	Power	SHO%	Points	QR	Rating
Ed Walsh	195	250	57	34	2964	1.82	1.00	1738	617	598	2348	23	129	29%	8355	2.82	100.1
Addie Joss	160	234	45	5	2327	1.89	0.97	920	364	488	1888	19	122	28%	6267	2.86	94.3
Rube Waddell	193	261	50	5	2961	2.16	1.10	2316	803	711	2460	37	80	26%	8787	3.26	90.9
Christy Mathewson	373	434	79	28	4781	2.13	1.06	2502	844	1133	4218	91	53	21%	13718	3.19	89.9
Mordecai Brown	239	271	55	49	3172	2.06	1.07	1375	673	725	2708	43	74	23%	8812	3.12	89.0
Walter Johnson	417	531	110	34	5915	2.17	1.06	3509	1363	1424	4913	97	61	26%	16969	3.23	88.9
John Ward	164	244	24	3	2462	2.10	1.04	920	253	575	2317	26	95	15%	6377	3.15	82.3
Sandy Koufax	165	137	40	9	2324	2.76	1.11	2396	817	713	1754	204	11	24%	7300	3.87	81.2
Larry Corcoran	177	256	22	2	2392	2.36	1.10	1103	496	626	2147	69	35	12%	6665	3.46	80.5
Eddie Plank	326	410	69	23	4496	2.35	1.12	2246	1072	1174	3958	41	110	21%	12512	3.47	80.2
Pedro Martinez	206	46	17	3	2648	2.81	1.03	2998	701	825	2013	213	12	8%	8034	3.83	79.2
Chief Bender	212	255	40	34	3017	2.46	1.11	1711	712	823	2645	40	75	19%	8493	3.57	78.9
Ed Reulbach	182	201	40	13	2632	2.28	1.14	1137	892	668	2117	33	80	22%	6859	3.43	76.0
Will White	229	394	36	0	3543	2.28	1.11	1041	496	896	3440	65	55	16%	9024	3.39	75.2
Al Spalding	253	281	24	11	2891	2.14	1.19	142	156	686	3271	15	193	9%	7143	3.32	74.4
Tim Lincecum	342	554	39	2	5048	2.62	1.12	2562	1220	1472	4439	81	62	11%	14005	3.75	74.1
Doc White	189	262	45	5	3041	2.39	1.12	1384	670	808	2743	33	92	24%	7875	3.51	73.7
Jim McCormick	265	466	33	1	4276	2.43	1.13	1704	749	1155	4092	84	51	12%	11130	3.56	73.0
Pete Alexander	373	437	90	32	5190	2.56	1.12	2198	951	1476	4868	164	32	24%	13913	3.68	72.8
Tommy Bond	234	386	42	0	3629	2.31	1.09	879	198	932	3767	51	71	18%	8988	3.40	72.8
Eddie Cicotte	208	249	35	25	3223	2.38	1.16	1374	827	853	2897	32	101	17%	8222	3.54	72.1
Sam Leever	194	241	39	13	2661	2.47	1.14	847	587	731	2449	29	92	20%	6913	3.61	71.9
Hippo Vaughn	178	215	41	5	2730	2.49	1.20	1416	817	754	2461	39	70	23%	7231	3.69	71.9
Randy Johnson	280	98	37	2	3799	3.22	1.16	4544	1409	1357	3013	361	11	13%	11828	4.38	71.1
Deacon Phillippe	189	242	27	12	2607	2.59	1.11	929	363	749	2518	41	64	14%	6831	3.69	71.0
Cy Young	511	749	76	17	7355	2.63	1.13	2803	1217	2147	7092	138	53	15%	19478	3.76	70.5
Charley Radbourn	309	489	35	2	4535	2.67	1.15	1830	875	1348	4335	117	39	11%	12085	3.82	69.7
Bob Gibson	251	255	56	6	3884	2.91	1.19	3117	1336	1258	3279	257	15	22%	11096	4.10	69.6
Juan Marichal	243	244	52	2	3507	2.89	1.10	2303	709	1126	3153	320	11	21%	9730	3.99	69.5
Bill Donovan	186	289	35	8	2965	2.69	1.24	1552	1059	896	2631	30	99	19%	8037	3.93	68.9
Ed Morris	171	297	29	1	2678	2.82	1.11	1217	498	838	2468	42	64	17%	7240	3.92	68.9
Jack Chesbro	198	260	35	5	2897	2.68	1.15	1265	690	864	2642	39	74	18%	7642	3.83	68.8
Dizzy Dean	150	154	26	30	1967	3.02	1.21	1163	453	661	1919	95	21	17%	5880	4.23	68.3
Tom Seaver	311	231	61	1	4783	2.86	1.12	3640	1390	1521	3971	380	13	20%	12996	3.98	68.2
John Clarkson	328	485	37	5	4536	2.81	1.21	1978	1191	1417	4295	161	28	11%	12429	4.02	68.1
Whitey Ford	236	156	45	10	3170	2.75	1.22	1956	1086	967	2766	228	14	19%	8541	3.96	68.0
Vic Willis	249	388	50	11	3996	2.63	1.21	1651	1212	1167	3621	66	61	20%	10382	3.84	67.7
George Bradley	171	302	32	1	2940	2.42	1.09	620	195	790	3007	45	65	19%	6945	3.51	67.3
Bob Caruthers	218	298	24	3	2829	2.83	1.16	900	597	891	2678	59	48	11%	7534	3.99	66.7
Roger Clemens	348	118	46	0	4818	3.10	1.17	4604	1549	1661	4086	354	14	13%	13722	4.27	66.7
Joe McGinnity	246	314	32	24	3441	2.66	1.19	1068	812	1016	3276	52	66	13%	8819	3.85	66.7
Dennis Eckersley	197	100	20	390	3286	3.50	1.16	2401	738	1278	3076	347	9	10%	10207	4.66	66.6
Mickey Welch	307	525	41	4	4802	2.71	1.23	1850	1297	1447	4587	106	45	13%	12572	3.94	66.5
Nolan Ryan	324	222	61	3	5386	3.19	1.25	5714	2795	1911	3923	321	17	19%	15770	4.44	65.9
Jesse Tannehill	197	263	34	7	2750	2.79	1.19	940	477	852	2787	40	69	17%	7180	3.97	65.7
Red Ames	183	209	26	36	3198	2.63	1.23	1702	1034	934	2896	42	76	14%	8085	3.86	65.5
Charlie Buffinton	233	351	30	3	3404	2.96	1.23	1700	856	1120	3344	87	39	13%	9354	4.20	65.5
Jack Coombs	158	187	35	8	2320	2.78	1.24	1052	841	717	2034	38	61	22%	6102	4.02	65.4
Lefty Grove	300	298	35	55	3941	3.06	1.28	2266	1187	1339	3849	162	24	12%	11147	4.34	65.2
Don Drysdale	209	167	49	6	3432	2.95	1.15	2486	855	1124	3084	280	12	23%	9118	4.10	64.9



**236 Top Fantasy Starting Pitchers (150 or more wins) – All Time (Since 1871) cont.**

Name	W	CG	SHO	SV	IP	ERA	WHIP	SO	BB	ER	H	HR	Power	SHO%	Points	QR	Rating
Kid Nichols	381	531	48	17	5056	2.95	1.22	1888	1268	1660	4912	156	32	13%	13514	4.18	64.0
John Smoltz	193	53	16	154	3161	3.27	1.17	2778	937	1150	2758	257	12	8%	8984	4.44	64.0
Jim Palmer	288	211	53	4	3948	2.86	1.18	2212	1311	1253	3349	303	13	20%	10180	4.04	63.9
Carl Hubbell	253	260	36	33	3590	2.98	1.17	1677	725	1188	3461	227	16	14%	9442	4.14	63.5
Earl Moore	162	230	34	7	2776	2.78	1.29	1403	1108	856	2474	57	49	21%	7154	4.07	63.4
Babe Adams	194	206	44	15	2995	2.76	1.09	1036	430	917	2841	68	44	23%	7296	3.85	63.3
Slim Sallee	174	189	25	38	2822	2.56	1.17	836	573	804	2729	68	41	14%	6648	3.73	63.1
Hal Newhouser	207	212	33	28	2993	3.06	1.31	1796	1249	1016	2674	137	22	16%	8214	4.37	62.9
Jack Taylor	152	278	19	5	2617	2.66	1.18	657	582	774	2502	41	64	13%	6304	3.84	62.7
Jim Whitney	191	377	26	2	3496	2.97	1.15	1571	411	1154	3598	79	44	14%	9002	4.12	62.5
Jeff Pfeffer	158	194	28	10	2407	2.77	1.21	836	592	742	2320	67	36	18%	5983	3.98	62.4
Dazzy Vance	197	216	29	11	2967	3.24	1.23	2045	840	1068	2809	132	22	15%	8262	4.47	62.3
George Mullin	228	353	35	8	3687	2.82	1.29	1482	1238	1156	3518	42	88	15%	9429	4.11	62.2
Curt Schilling	207	82	19	22	3110	3.44	1.13	3015	688	1188	2833	326	10	9%	8810	4.57	62.0
Guy Hecker	173	310	15	1	2906	2.92	1.17	1099	489	944	2905	50	58	9%	7365	4.09	61.9
Amos Rusie	245	392	30	5	3770	3.07	1.35	1934	1704	1287	3384	76	50	12%	10289	4.42	61.7
Bob Feller	266	279	44	21	3827	3.25	1.32	2581	1764	1384	3271	224	17	17%	10788	4.57	61.7
Warren Spahn	363	382	63	29	5244	3.09	1.19	2583	1434	1798	4830	434	12	17%	13827	4.28	61.6
Pud Galvin	364	646	57	2	6003	2.86	1.19	1806	745	1910	6405	122	49	16%	14974	4.05	61.5
Steve Carlton	329	254	55	2	5217	3.22	1.25	4136	1833	1864	4672	414	13	17%	14198	4.46	61.0
Greg Maddux	333	108	35	0	4616	3.07	1.14	3169	944	1574	4301	318	15	11%	11830	4.20	60.9
Ron Guidry	170	95	26	4	2392	3.29	1.18	1778	633	874	2198	226	11	15%	6495	4.47	60.7
Mike Cuellar	185	172	36	11	2808	3.14	1.20	1632	822	979	2538	222	13	19%	7385	4.33	60.7
Gaylord Perry	314	303	53	11	5350	3.11	1.18	3534	1379	1846	4938	399	13	17%	13859	4.29	60.4
Tony Mullane	284	468	30	15	4531	3.05	1.24	1803	1408	1537	4195	98	46	11%	11739	4.29	60.4
Fergie Jenkins	284	267	49	7	4501	3.34	1.14	3192	997	1669	4142	484	9	17%	12148	4.48	60.3
Luis Tiant	229	187	49	15	3486	3.30	1.20	2416	1104	1280	3075	346	10	21%	9447	4.50	60.2
Stan Coveleski	215	224	38	21	3082	2.89	1.25	981	802	990	3055	66	47	18%	7628	4.14	59.7
Wilbur Cooper	216	279	35	14	3480	2.89	1.23	1252	853	1119	3415	103	34	16%	8532	4.12	59.5
Carl Mays	207	231	29	31	3021	2.92	1.21	862	734	979	2912	73	41	14%	7408	4.12	59.5
Jack Powell	245	422	46	15	4389	2.97	1.22	1621	1021	1450	4319	110	40	19%	10875	4.19	59.1
Jim Bunning	224	151	40	16	3760	3.27	1.18	2855	1000	1366	3433	372	10	18%	9890	4.45	59.1
Bob Shawkey	196	197	33	28	2937	3.09	1.27	1360	1018	1008	2722	114	26	17%	7547	4.36	58.9
Bobby Mathews	297	525	19	3	4956	2.89	1.24	1366	533	1591	5591	69	72	6%	12027	4.12	58.8
Lefty Gomez	189	173	28	9	2503	3.34	1.35	1468	1095	930	2290	138	18	15%	6911	4.70	58.8
Allie Reynolds	182	137	36	49	2492	3.30	1.39	1423	1261	915	2193	133	19	20%	6845	4.69	58.6
Mel Stottlemyre	164	152	40	1	2661	2.97	1.22	1257	809	878	2435	171	16	24%	6523	4.19	58.5
Billy Pierce	211	193	38	32	3307	3.27	1.26	1999	1178	1201	2989	284	12	18%	8731	4.53	58.3
Catfish Hunter	224	181	42	1	3449	3.26	1.13	2012	954	1248	2958	374	9	19%	8821	4.39	58.2
Bert Blyleven	287	242	60	0	4970	3.31	1.20	3701	1322	1830	4632	430	12	21%	13051	4.51	58.2
Mickey Lolich	217	195	41	11	3638	3.44	1.23	2832	1099	1390	3366	347	10	19%	9875	4.67	58.2
Bill Dineen	170	306	23	7	3075	3.01	1.23	1127	829	1029	2957	78	39	14%	7582	4.24	58.1
Silver King	203	328	19	6	3191	3.18	1.28	1229	970	1126	3105	69	46	9%	8215	4.45	57.8
David Cone	194	56	22	1	2899	3.46	1.26	2668	1137	1115	2504	258	11	11%	7902	4.72	57.8
Urban Shocker	187	200	28	25	2682	3.17	1.26	983	657	945	2709	126	21	15%	6800	4.43	57.3
Don Sutton	324	178	58	5	5282	3.26	1.14	3574	1343	1914	4692	472	11	18%	13301	4.40	57.2
Rube Marquard	201	197	30	19	3307	3.08	1.24	1593	858	1130	3233	107	31	15%	8140	4.31	57.1
Lon Warneke	192	192	30	13	2782	3.18	1.25	1140	739	984	2726	175	16	16%	7017	4.43	57.0
Bob Lemon	207	188	31	22	2850	3.23	1.34	1277	1251	1024	2559	181	16	15%	7402	4.57	56.8
Vida Blue	209	143	37	2	3343	3.27	1.23	2175	1185	1213	2939	263	13	18%	8518	4.50	56.6

**236 Top Fantasy Starting Pitchers (150 or more wins) – All Time (Since 1871) cont.**

Name	W	CG	SHO	SV	IP	ERA	WHIP	SO	BB	ER	H	HR	Power	SHO%	Points	QR	Rating
John Candelaria	177	54	13	29	2528	3.33	1.18	1673	592	935	2399	245	10	7%	6449	4.52	56.5
Dave McNally	184	120	33	2	2730	3.24	1.21	1512	828	982	2488	230	12	18%	6857	4.45	56.4
Dwight Gooden	194	68	24	3	2801	3.51	1.26	2293	954	1091	2564	210	13	12%	7509	4.76	56.3
Kevin Brown	211	72	17	0	3258	3.28	1.22	2397	901	1185	3079	208	16	8%	8208	4.50	56.0
Wilbur Wood	184	114	24	57	2684	3.24	1.23	1411	724	965	2582	209	13	15%	6710	4.47	56.0
Bret Saberhagen	167	76	16	1	2563	3.34	1.14	1715	471	952	2452	218	12	10%	6413	4.48	55.8
Mike Mussina	239	57	23	0	3210	3.63	1.18	2572	719	1298	3058	345	9	10%	8572	4.81	55.5
Bill Doak	169	162	34	16	2783	2.98	1.27	1014	851	920	2676	71	39	20%	6547	4.24	55.4
Steve Rogers	158	129	37	2	2838	3.17	1.23	1621	876	1001	2619	151	19	23%	6879	4.41	55.0
Virgil Trucks	177	124	33	30	2682	3.39	1.31	1534	1088	1009	2416	188	14	19%	6921	4.69	55.0
Robin Roberts	286	305	45	25	4689	3.41	1.17	2357	902	1774	4582	505	9	16%	11781	4.57	54.9
Tommy Bridges	194	200	33	10	2826	3.57	1.37	1674	1192	1122	2675	181	16	17%	7655	4.94	54.8
Clark Griffith	237	337	22	6	3386	3.31	1.31	955	774	1246	3670	76	45	9%	8536	4.62	54.5
Dizzy Trout	170	158	28	35	2726	3.23	1.35	1256	1046	979	2841	112	24	16%	6787	4.59	54.3
Ed Lopat	166	164	27	3	2439	3.21	1.28	859	650	869	2464	179	14	16%	5928	4.48	54.2
Mark Baldwin	156	296	14	4	2811	3.36	1.42	1354	1307	1051	2699	82	34	9%	7295	4.79	54.2
Phil Niekro	318	245	45	29	5404	3.35	1.27	3342	1809	2012	5044	482	11	14%	13521	4.62	54.2
Art Nehf	184	182	28	13	2708	3.20	1.24	844	640	964	2715	107	25	15%	6507	4.44	54.1
Rube Benton	150	145	24	21	2517	3.09	1.26	950	712	863	2472	52	48	16%	5917	4.35	54.0
Jerry Koosman	222	140	33	17	3839	3.36	1.26	2556	1198	1433	3635	290	13	15%	9565	4.62	53.9
Camilo Pascual	174	132	36	10	2931	3.63	1.29	2167	1069	1183	2703	256	11	21%	7728	4.92	53.6
Red Faber	254	273	29	28	4087	3.15	1.30	1471	1213	1430	4106	111	37	11%	9748	4.45	53.6
Milt Pappas	209	129	43	4	3186	3.40	1.23	1728	858	1203	3046	298	11	21%	7884	4.62	53.5
Hooks Dauss	222	245	22	40	3391	3.30	1.32	1201	1067	1245	3407	87	39	10%	8347	4.62	53.2
Elton Chamberlain	159	265	16	1	2522	3.57	1.39	1133	1065	999	2445	63	40	10%	6655	4.96	53.2
Bucky Walters	198	242	42	4	3105	3.30	1.32	1107	1121	1139	2990	154	20	21%	7632	4.63	53.1
Rudy May	152	87	24	12	2622	3.46	1.25	1760	958	1007	2314	199	13	16%	6517	4.70	52.8
Sadie McMahon	173	279	14	4	2634	3.51	1.39	967	945	1026	2726	52	51	8%	6816	4.90	52.8
Dutch Leonard	191	192	30	44	3218	3.25	1.26	1170	737	1162	3304	158	20	16%	7628	4.51	52.6
Larry Jackson	194	149	37	20	3263	3.40	1.24	1709	824	1233	3206	259	13	19%	7942	4.64	52.5
Early Wynn	300	290	49	15	4564	3.54	1.33	2334	1775	1796	4291	338	14	16%	11668	4.87	52.5
Claude Passeau	162	188	26	21	2720	3.32	1.32	1104	728	1003	2856	105	26	16%	6619	4.64	52.5
Al Orth	204	324	31	6	3355	3.37	1.26	948	661	1256	3564	75	45	15%	8148	4.63	52.5
Fernando Valenzuela	173	113	31	2	2930	3.54	1.32	2074	1151	1154	2718	226	13	18%	7464	4.87	52.4
Bob Welch	211	61	28	8	3092	3.47	1.27	1969	1034	1191	2894	267	12	13%	7656	4.74	52.3
Jack Quinn	247	243	28	57	3920	3.29	1.30	1329	860	1433	4238	102	38	11%	9359	4.59	52.0
Dolf Luque	194	206	26	28	3220	3.24	1.29	1130	918	1161	3231	113	28	13%	7590	4.53	52.0
Paul Derringer	223	251	32	29	3645	3.46	1.28	1507	761	1401	3912	158	23	14%	8942	4.74	51.7
Orel Hershiser	204	68	25	5	3130	3.48	1.26	2014	1007	1211	2939	235	13	12%	7674	4.74	51.7
Dave Stieb	176	103	30	3	2895	3.44	1.25	1669	1034	1108	2572	225	13	17%	7004	4.68	51.7
Bill Hutchison	183	321	21	4	3078	3.59	1.38	1234	1132	1228	3123	104	30	11%	7872	4.97	51.4
Eppa Rixey	266	290	37	14	4495	3.15	1.27	1350	1082	1572	4633	92	49	14%	10210	4.42	51.4
Jim Kaat	283	180	31	18	4530	3.45	1.26	2461	1083	1738	4620	395	11	11%	10966	4.71	51.4
Joe Bush	195	225	35	20	3087	3.51	1.38	1319	1263	1205	2992	96	32	18%	7756	4.89	51.4
Jack Stivetts	203	278	14	4	2888	3.74	1.41	1223	1155	1199	2905	131	22	7%	7621	5.14	51.3
Curt Davis	158	141	24	33	2325	3.42	1.26	684	479	884	2459	142	16	15%	5579	4.69	51.2
Ken Holtzman	174	127	31	3	2867	3.49	1.29	1601	910	1111	2787	249	12	18%	7013	4.78	51.2
Jimmy Key	186	34	13	10	2592	3.51	1.23	1538	668	1010	2518	254	10	7%	6275	4.74	51.1
Burt Hooton	151	86	29	7	2652	3.38	1.24	1491	799	996	2497	193	14	19%	6263	4.62	51.1
Jesse Barnes	152	180	26	13	2570	3.22	1.25	653	515	918	2666	88	29	17%	5838	4.46	50.9

**236 Top Fantasy Starting Pitchers (150 or more wins) – All Time (Since 1871) cont.**

Name	W	CG	SHO	SV	IP	ERA	WHIP	SO	BB	ER	H	HR	Power	SHO%	Points	QR	Rating
Rick Reuschel	214	102	26	5	3548	3.37	1.27	2015	935	1330	3588	221	16	12%	8388	4.65	50.7
Nig Cuppy	162	224	9	5	2284	3.48	1.37	504	609	884	2520	62	37	6%	5598	4.85	50.5
Andy Pettitte	186	25	4	0	2312	3.81	1.35	1703	721	980	2398	195	12	2%	6020	5.16	50.4
Larry French	197	198	40	17	3152	3.44	1.33	1187	819	1206	3375	164	19	20%	7584	4.77	50.4
Charley Root	201	177	21	40	3197	3.59	1.30	1459	889	1274	3252	187	17	10%	7856	4.88	50.3
Jim Perry	215	109	32	10	3286	3.45	1.26	1576	998	1258	3127	308	11	15%	7767	4.70	50.3
Tom Glavine	290	55	24	0	4150	3.46	1.30	2481	1399	1596	4012	322	13	8%	9926	4.77	50.2
Claude Osteen	196	140	40	1	3460	3.30	1.27	1612	940	1268	3471	249	14	20%	7937	4.57	50.2
Adonis Terry	197	367	17	6	3514	3.74	1.37	1553	1298	1460	3525	76	46	9%	8987	5.11	50.0
Tommy John	288	162	46	4	4710	3.34	1.28	2245	1259	1749	4783	302	16	16%	10895	4.62	50.0
Burleigh Grimes	270	314	35	18	4180	3.53	1.37	1512	1295	1638	4412	148	28	13%	10227	4.89	50.0
Hal Schumacher	158	138	27	7	2482	3.36	1.34	906	902	926	2424	139	18	17%	5828	4.70	50.0
Kevin Appier	169	34	12	0	2595	3.74	1.29	1994	933	1078	2425	232	11	7%	6509	5.03	49.8
Frank Tanana	240	143	34	1	4188	3.66	1.27	2773	1255	1704	4063	448	9	14%	10251	4.93	49.6
Herb Pennock	240	247	35	32	3572	3.60	1.35	1227	916	1428	3900	128	28	15%	8769	4.95	49.6
Jack Morris	254	175	28	0	3824	3.90	1.30	2478	1390	1657	3567	389	10	11%	9857	5.20	49.6
Red Ruffing	273	335	45	16	4344	3.80	1.34	1987	1541	1833	4284	254	17	16%	11041	5.14	49.5
Lee Meadows	188	219	25	7	3161	3.37	1.34	1063	956	1185	3280	84	38	13%	7359	4.71	49.4
Al Leiter	162	16	10	2	2391	3.80	1.39	1974	1163	1010	2152	198	12	6%	6125	5.19	49.4
Curt Simmons	193	163	36	5	3348	3.54	1.31	1697	1063	1318	3313	255	13	19%	7995	4.85	49.2
Chuck Finley	200	63	15	0	3197	3.85	1.38	2610	1332	1366	3069	304	11	8%	8197	5.22	49.1
Mark Langston	179	81	18	0	2963	3.97	1.35	2464	1289	1306	2723	311	10	10%	7712	5.32	48.9
Bob Buhl	166	111	20	6	2587	3.55	1.37	1268	1105	1019	2446	238	11	12%	6200	4.92	48.7
Schoolboy Rowe	158	137	22	12	2219	3.87	1.30	913	558	955	2332	132	17	14%	5567	5.17	48.5
Lew Burdette	203	158	33	31	3067	3.66	1.24	1074	628	1246	3186	289	11	16%	7281	4.90	48.5
Frank Viola	176	74	16	0	2836	3.73	1.30	1844	864	1175	2827	294	10	9%	6890	5.03	48.3
Rick Wise	188	138	30	0	3127	3.69	1.29	1647	804	1281	3227	261	12	16%	7494	4.98	48.2
Charlie Hough	216	107	13	61	3801	3.75	1.30	2362	1665	1582	3283	383	10	6%	9228	5.05	48.1
Gus Weyhing	264	448	28	4	4324	3.89	1.42	1665	1566	1867	4562	120	36	11%	11029	5.30	48.1
Red Donahue	164	312	25	3	2966	3.61	1.37	787	689	1191	3376	61	49	15%	7093	4.98	48.0
Doug Drabek	155	53	21	0	2535	3.73	1.24	1594	704	1052	2448	246	10	14%	6049	4.98	47.9
Freddie Fitzsimmons	217	186	29	13	3224	3.51	1.30	870	846	1257	3335	186	17	13%	7404	4.81	47.8
Waite Hoyt	237	226	26	52	3762	3.59	1.34	1206	1003	1500	4037	154	24	11%	8858	4.93	47.8
Bill Lee	169	182	29	13	2864	3.54	1.34	998	893	1127	2953	138	21	17%	6672	4.88	47.7
Frank Killen	164	253	13	0	2511	3.78	1.41	725	822	1054	2730	55	46	8%	6206	5.19	47.6
Jim Lonborg	157	90	15	4	2464	3.86	1.31	1475	823	1056	2400	233	11	10%	6054	5.16	47.6
Jerry Reuss	220	127	39	11	3670	3.64	1.32	1907	1127	1483	3734	245	15	18%	8662	4.96	47.6
Bob Friend	197	163	36	11	3611	3.58	1.29	1734	894	1438	3772	286	13	18%	8365	4.88	47.5
Dennis Martinez	245	122	30	8	4000	3.70	1.27	2149	1165	1643	3897	372	11	12%	9399	4.96	47.4
Ted Lyons	260	356	27	23	4161	3.67	1.35	1073	1121	1696	4489	223	19	10%	9884	5.02	47.3
Joe Niekro	221	107	29	16	3584	3.59	1.32	1747	1262	1431	3466	276	13	13%	8301	4.91	47.1
Wes Ferrell	193	227	17	13	2623	4.04	1.48	985	1040	1177	2845	132	20	9%	6823	5.52	47.1
Chick Fraser	175	342	22	6	3356	3.68	1.43	1098	1332	1371	3460	69	49	13%	8054	5.10	47.0
Andy Benes	155	21	9	1	2505	3.97	1.31	2000	909	1108	2377	289	9	6%	6210	5.28	46.9
Jesse Haines	210	208	24	10	3209	3.64	1.35	981	871	1298	3460	165	19	11%	7500	4.99	46.8
Scott Sanderson	163	43	14	5	2562	3.84	1.26	1611	625	1093	2590	297	9	9%	6113	5.10	46.8
Rick Rhoden	151	69	17	1	2594	3.59	1.31	1419	801	1036	2606	198	13	11%	5958	4.91	46.8
Eddie Rommel	171	147	18	29	2556	3.54	1.35	599	724	1006	2729	138	19	11%	5835	4.89	46.7
Red Lucas	157	204	22	7	2542	3.72	1.26	602	455	1051	2736	136	19	14%	5879	4.98	46.5
Dave Stewart	168	55	9	19	2630	3.95	1.34	1741	1034	1154	2499	264	10	5%	6466	5.29	46.5

**236 Top Fantasy Starting Pitchers (150 or more wins) – All Time (Since 1871) cont.**

Name	W	CG	SHO	SV	IP	ERA	WHIP	SO	BB	ER	H	HR	Power	SHO%	Points	QR	Rating
Tom Candiotti	151	88	11	0	2725	3.73	1.30	1735	883	1130	2662	250	11	7%	6385	5.03	46.4
David Wells	230	54	12	13	3282	4.07	1.25	2119	677	1483	3434	385	9	5%	8096	5.32	46.4
Danny Darwin	171	53	9	32	3017	3.84	1.27	1942	874	1288	2951	321	9	5%	7139	5.10	46.4
Murry Dickson	172	149	27	23	3052	3.66	1.34	1281	1058	1240	3029	302	10	16%	7048	5.00	46.2
Bobo Newsom	211	246	31	21	3759	3.98	1.46	2082	1732	1664	3769	206	18	15%	9441	5.45	46.1
Howard Ehmke	166	199	20	14	2821	3.75	1.39	1030	1042	1174	2873	103	27	12%	6676	5.13	46.1
Vern Law	162	119	28	13	2672	3.77	1.28	1092	597	1118	2833	268	10	17%	6184	5.05	45.8
George Uhle	200	232	21	25	3120	3.99	1.40	1135	966	1384	3417	119	26	11%	7645	5.40	45.4
Mike Flanagan	167	101	19	4	2770	3.90	1.33	1491	890	1199	2806	251	11	11%	6551	5.23	45.2
Bill Sherdel	165	159	11	26	2709	3.72	1.36	839	661	1120	3018	149	18	7%	6178	5.08	44.9
Mel Harder	223	181	25	23	3426	3.80	1.41	1160	1118	1447	3706	161	21	11%	7981	5.21	44.6
Alvin Crowder	167	150	16	22	2344	4.12	1.39	799	800	1072	2453	136	17	10%	5753	5.50	44.6
Rick Sutcliffe	171	72	18	6	2698	4.08	1.39	1679	1081	1223	2662	236	11	11%	6567	5.47	44.5
Jouett Meekin	153	270	9	2	2603	4.07	1.49	900	1058	1177	2831	67	39	6%	6438	5.56	44.5
Guy Bush	176	151	16	34	2722	3.86	1.40	850	859	1166	2950	152	18	9%	6337	5.25	44.3
Brickyard Kennedy	187	293	13	9	3021	3.96	1.48	797	1201	1329	3276	93	32	7%	7263	5.44	44.2
Frank Dwyer	176	270	12	6	2810	3.85	1.45	563	764	1202	3301	109	26	7%	6573	5.30	44.2
Paul Splittorff	166	88	17	1	2555	3.81	1.34	1057	780	1082	2644	192	13	10%	5802	5.15	44.1
Sam Jones	229	250	36	31	3883	3.84	1.41	1223	1396	1656	4084	152	26	16%	8981	5.25	44.1
Pink Hawley	167	297	11	3	3013	3.96	1.43	888	974	1326	3334	62	49	7%	7106	5.39	43.7
Doyle Alexander	194	98	18	3	3368	3.76	1.29	1528	978	1406	3376	324	10	9%	7431	5.05	43.7
Bill Gullickson	162	54	11	0	2560	3.93	1.28	1279	622	1118	2659	282	9	7%	5784	5.21	43.3
Ted Breitenstein	160	300	12	3	2964	4.04	1.45	889	1203	1330	3091	79	38	8%	7028	5.49	43.2
Kenny Rogers	207	36	9	28	3066	4.19	1.39	1850	1079	1427	3180	309	10	4%	7351	5.58	43.0
Tim Wakefield	151	29	6	22	2432	4.30	1.36	1680	948	1162	2354	315	8	4%	5907	5.66	42.9
Bob Forsch	168	67	19	3	2795	3.76	1.29	1133	832	1169	2777	216	13	11%	6053	5.06	42.8
Tom Zachary	186	186	24	22	3126	3.73	1.44	720	914	1295	3580	119	26	13%	6886	5.17	42.5
Mike Torrez	185	117	15	0	3044	3.96	1.45	1404	1371	1340	3043	223	14	8%	6956	5.41	42.2
Jamie Moyer	216	30	9	0	3351	4.17	1.31	1992	946	1551	3455	414	8	4%	7698	5.48	41.9
Rube Walberg	155	140	15	32	2644	4.16	1.45	1085	1031	1223	2795	163	16	10%	6214	5.61	41.9
John Burkett	166	21	6	1	2648	4.31	1.35	1766	700	1268	2866	257	10	4%	6214	5.66	41.5
Jim Slaton	151	86	22	14	2684	4.03	1.41	1191	1004	1202	2773	277	10	15%	5995	5.44	41.1
Mike Moore	161	79	16	2	2832	4.39	1.42	1667	1156	1381	2858	291	10	10%	6594	5.81	40.1
Earl Whitehill	218	226	16	11	3565	4.36	1.50	1350	1431	1726	3917	192	19	7%	8380	5.86	40.0
Bump Hadley	161	135	14	25	2946	4.24	1.50	1318	1442	1389	2980	167	18	9%	6744	5.75	39.8
Willis Hudlin	158	155	11	31	2613	4.41	1.48	677	846	1281	3011	118	22	7%	5855	5.89	38.1

### *Top 35 Closers (200 or more saves) from 1871-2006*

<u>Name</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>CG</u>	<u>SHO</u>	<u>SV</u>	<u>IP</u>	<u>ERA</u>	<u>WHIP</u>	<u>SO</u>	<u>BB</u>	<u>ER</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>HR</u>	<u>Points</u>	<u>QR</u>	<u>Power</u>	<u>Rating</u>
Hoyt Wilhelm	143	20	5	227	2254	2.523	1.125	1610	778	632	1757	150	6554	3.65	15.03	1796.9
Rich Gossage	124	16	0	310	1809	3.009	1.232	1502	732	605	1497	119	6181	4.24	15.20	1457.4
Rollie Fingers	114	4	2	341	1701	2.904	1.156	1299	492	549	1474	123	5875	4.06	13.83	1447.2
Lee Smith	71	0	0	478	1289	3.029	1.256	1251	486	434	1133	89	5640	4.29	14.49	1316.2
Mariano Rivera	59	0	0	413	882	2.287	1.04	783	226	224	691	45	4320	3.33	19.59	1298.5
Trevor Hoffman	49	0	0	482	885	2.714	1.045	965	250	267	675	80	4750	3.76	11.07	1263.7
John Franco	90	0	0	424	1246	2.89	1.333	975	495	400	1166	81	5241	4.22	15.38	1240.9
Billy Wagner	37	0	0	324	703	2.382	1.005	934	238	186	468	66	3627	3.39	10.65	1070.7
Sparky Lyle	99	0	0	238	1390	2.881	1.275	873	481	445	1292	84	4443	4.16	16.55	1069.2
Jeff Reardon	73	0	0	367	1132	3.155	1.199	877	358	397	1000	109	4574	4.35	10.39	1050.4
Bruce Sutter	68	0	0	300	1042	2.832	1.14	861	309	328	879	77	4083	3.97	13.54	1028.1
Rick Aguilera	86	10	0	318	1291	3.568	1.227	1030	351	512	1233	138	4821	4.80	9.36	1005.5
Gene Garber	96	4	0	218	1510	3.338	1.264	940	445	560	1464	123	4520	4.60	12.28	982.2
Dave Righetti	82	13	2	252	1404	3.462	1.338	1112	591	540	1287	95	4671	4.80	14.78	973.0
Tom Henke	41	0	0	311	790	2.667	1.092	861	255	234	607	64	3616	3.76	12.34	962.0
Doug Jones	69	0	0	303	1128	3.302	1.243	909	247	414	1155	86	4242	4.54	13.12	933.5
John Wetteland	48	0	0	330	765	2.929	1.135	804	252	249	616	73	3699	4.06	10.48	910.2
Roberto Hernandez	64	0	0	326	1025	3.319	1.346	914	437	378	943	91	4209	4.67	11.26	902.2
Randy Myers	44	1	0	347	885	3.194	1.304	884	396	314	758	69	3949	4.50	12.82	877.7
Jose Mesa	78	6	2	320	1498	4.266	1.47	1009	626	710	1576	142	4927	5.74	10.55	859.0
Robb Nen	45	0	0	314	715	2.983	1.213	793	260	237	607	51	3528	4.20	14.02	840.8
Armando Benitez	38	0	0	280	722	2.953	1.196	880	372	237	492	84	3382	4.15	8.60	815.2
Dan Quisenberry	56	0	0	244	1043	2.76	1.175	379	162	320	1064	59	3202	3.94	17.68	813.7
Jeff Montgomery	46	0	0	304	869	3.274	1.244	733	296	316	785	81	3582	4.52	10.72	792.7
Troy Percival	30	0	0	324	612	3.105	1.105	700	264	211	412	70	3232	4.21	8.74	767.7
Dave Smith	53	0	0	216	809	2.669	1.215	548	283	240	700	34	2967	3.88	23.80	764.1
Bob Wickman	60	1	1	247	1009	3.569	1.396	748	411	400	997	76	3602	4.96	13.27	725.4
Rod Beck	38	0	0	286	768	3.305	1.164	644	191	282	703	97	3222	4.47	7.92	721.0
Todd Worrell	50	0	0	256	694	3.088	1.233	628	247	238	608	65	3102	4.32	10.67	717.9
Todd Jones	53	0	0	263	969	3.91	1.404	821	402	421	958	85	3635	5.31	11.40	684.1
Ugueth Urbina	44	0	0	237	697	3.446	1.213	814	307	267	539	86	3136	4.66	8.11	673.2
Jason Isringhausen	40	3	1	249	799	3.592	1.331	659	339	319	725	63	3123	4.92	12.69	634.5
Jeff Shaw	34	0	0	203	848	3.545	1.244	545	234	334	821	91	2748	4.79	9.32	573.8
Gregg Olson	40	0	0	217	672	3.455	1.381	588	330	258	598	46	2745	4.84	14.61	567.6
Bobby Thigpen	31	0	0	201	569	3.434	1.363	376	238	217	537	56	2260	4.80	10.15	471.0

### Appendix. Abuse of Pitchers (1949-1980)

#### Boston Braves (1949-50)

Pitching Staff	1949	1950	Avg IP
Johnny Sain	243.0	278.3	260.7
Vern Bickford	230.7	311.7	271.2
Warren Spahn	302.3	293.0	297.7
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>829.5</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>166</b>

#### Cleveland Indians (1951-54)

Pitching Staff	1951	1952	1953	1954	Avg IP
Bob Lemon	263.3	309.7	286.7	258.3	279.5
Early Wynn	274.3	285.7	251.7	270.7	270.6
Mike Garcia	254.0	292.3	271.7	258.7	269.2
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>819.3</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>202.5</b>

#### Milwaukee Braves (1959-60)

Pitching Staff	1959	1960	Avg IP
Bob Buhl	198.0	238.7	218.3
Lew Burdette	289.7	275.7	282.7
Warren Spahn	292.0	267.7	279.8
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>780.83</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>182</b>

#### LA Dodgers (1965-69)

Pitching Staff	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	Avg IP
Bill Singer				256.3	315.7	286.0
Claude Osteen	287.0	240.3	288.3	253.7	321.0	278.1
Don Drysdale	308.3	273.7	282.0	239.0		275.8
Don Sutton		225.7	232.7	208.0	293.3	239.9
Sandy Koufax	335.7	323.0				329.3
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>839.8</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>170.4</b>

#### Cincinnati Reds (1961-62)

Pitching Staff	1961	1962	Avg IP
Bob Purkey	246.3	288.3	267.3
Jim O'Toole	252.7	251.7	252.2
Joey Jay	247.3	273.0	260.2
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>779.67</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>195</b>

#### San Francisco Giants (1962-69)

Pitching Staff	1962	1963	1967	1968	1969	Avg IP
Billy O'Dell	280.7	222.0				251.3
Gaylord Perry			293.0	291.0	325.3	303.1
Jack Sanford	265.3	284.3				274.8
Juan Marichal	262.7	321.3	202.0	326.0	299.7	282.3
Mike McCormick			262.3	198.0	197.0	219.1
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>808.5</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>184</b>

#### Detroit Tigers (1960-61)

Pitching Staff	1960	1961	Avg IP
Don Mossi	158.0	240.3	199.2
Frank Lary	274.0	275.3	274.7
Jim Bunning	252.0	268.0	260.0
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>733.8</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>176</b>

#### Baltimore Orioles (1972-74)

Pitching Staff	1972	1973	1977	1978	1979	Avg IP
Dave McNally	241.0	266.0				253.5
Dennis Martinez				276.3	292.3	284.3
Jim Palmer	274.3	296.3	319.0	296.0	156	268.33
Mike Cuellar	248.3	267.0				257.7
Mike Flanagan			235.0	281.3	265.7	260.67
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>786.7</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>188</b>

#### Philadelphia Phillies (1966-67)

Pitching Staff	1966	1967	Avg IP
Chris Short	272.0	199.0	235.5
Jim Bunning	314.0	302.3	308.2
Larry Jackson	247.0	261.7	254.3
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>798</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>169</b>

#### Oakland A's (1972-74)

Pitching Staff	1972	1973	1974	Avg IP
Catfish Hunter	295.3	256.3	318.3	290.0
Ken Holtzman	265.3	297.3	255.3	272.7
Vida Blue	151.0	263.7	282.3	232.3
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>795.0</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>187.3</b>

#### St. Louis Cardinals (1968-69)

Pitching Staff	1968	1969	Avg IP
Bob Gibson	304.7	314.0	309.3
Nelson Briles	243.7	227.7	235.7
Steve Carlton	231.7	236.3	234.0
<b>Wins/Total IP</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>779.0</b>
<b>162g. (2yr avg)</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>184</b>

Summary Stats	No.
Pennants	10
WS Titles	6
HOF Pitchers	13
Avg. Yearly Wins	90.7

### 1990s Prime Players Statistics for Study

Name of Player	Age (90)	1990 -92 Statistics								1994 -1996 Statistics						% Increase
		Power factor	AB	HR	2B	OBP	SLG	BA	Power factor	AB	HR	2B	OBP	SLG	BA	
Dante Bichette	27	8.04%	1181	35	60	0.291	0.409	0.259	12.26%	1696	<b>98</b>	110	0.352	0.566	0.320	<b>4.22%</b>
<b>Barry Bonds</b>	26	12.52%	1502	<b>92</b>	96	0.426	0.566	0.301	13.22%	1414	<b>112</b>	75	0.441	0.610	0.304	0.71%
Bobby Bonilla	27	10.67%	1640	69	106	0.358	0.486	0.279	10.57%	1552	76	88	0.377	0.524	0.303	<b>-0.10%</b>
Jay Buhner	26	9.08%	1112	59	42	0.333	0.458	0.248	12.93%	1392	<b>105</b>	75	0.366	0.556	0.270	3.85%
Ken Caminiti	27	6.85%	1621	30	81	0.320	0.376	0.262	12.31%	1478	<b>84</b>	98	0.385	0.548	0.306	<b>5.47%</b>
Jose Canseco	26	11.26%	1492	<b>107</b>	61	0.354	0.522	0.262	12.57%	1185	<b>83</b>	66	0.383	0.565	0.292	1.31%
Will Clark	26	9.59%	1678	64	97	0.369	0.486	0.299	9.23%	1279	42	76	0.399	0.471	0.304	<b>-0.37%</b>
Mike Devereaux	27	7.92%	1628	55	74	0.312	0.436	0.262	7.02%	1012	28	43	0.305	0.383	0.248	<b>-0.91%</b>
Cecil Fielder	27	11.28%	1791	<b>130</b>	72	0.348	0.520	0.261	10.07%	1510	<b>98</b>	54	0.343	0.485	0.251	<b>-1.21%</b>
Mark Grace	26	6.79%	1811	26	97	0.366	0.405	0.296	9.59%	1502	31	113	0.391	0.467	0.320	2.80%
Ozzie Guillen	26	4.54%	1080	4	45	0.298	0.339	0.273	4.61%	1279	6	53	0.286	0.346	0.265	0.08%
Lance Johnson	27	3.01%	1696	4	47	0.316	0.354	0.279	4.82%	1701	22	60	0.345	0.439	0.310	1.81%
Wally Joyner	28	8.58%	1433	38	85	0.349	0.427	0.281	8.33%	1261	28	77	0.389	0.433	0.299	<b>-0.26%</b>
<b>Barry Larkin</b>	26	7.64%	1611	39	84	0.368	0.447	0.302	9.79%	1440	57	84	0.393	0.497	0.299	2.16%
<b>Edgar Martinez</b>	27	9.69%	1559	43	108	0.399	0.477	0.318	14.60%	1336	68	127	0.448	0.580	0.328	<b>4.91%</b>
Fred McGriff	27	10.58%	1616	<b>101</b>	70	0.398	0.527	0.288	11.34%	1569	<b>89</b>	89	0.370	0.527	0.296	0.76%
<b>Mark McGwire</b>	27	11.07%	1473	<b>103</b>	60	0.361	0.485	0.234	15.66%	<b>875</b>	<b>100</b>	37	0.443	0.674	0.289	<b>4.59%</b>
Paul O'Neill	27	9.21%	1531	58	83	0.344	0.427	0.257	11.06%	1374	62	90	0.420	0.526	0.317	1.85%
<b>Rafael Palmeiro</b>	26	9.42%	1837	62	111	0.365	0.479	0.303	12.56%	1616	<b>101</b>	102	0.385	0.560	0.304	3.14%
Jody Reed	28	7.19%	1766	13	114	0.347	0.364	0.274	5.08%	1339	8	60	0.342	0.320	0.256	<b>-2.11%</b>
Terry Steinbach	28	7.31%	1273	27	66	0.315	0.390	0.269	10.32%	1289	61	72	0.330	0.482	0.278	3.01%
Walt Weiss	27	3.36%	<b>894</b>	2	28	0.318	0.287	0.240	4.24%	1367	10	48	0.373	0.336	0.266	0.89%
Devon White	28	7.42%	1726	45	83	0.311	0.402	0.253	8.97%	1382	40	84	0.319	0.448	0.276	1.56%
Prime (23)	26.826	<b>8.51%</b>	<b>34951</b>	1206	1770	0.346	0.438	0.274	<b>10.02%</b>	31848	1409	1781	0.373	0.493	0.291	


Notes: Green Denotes "Home Run" Hitter, Bold HOF Player, Boxed in Steroid Allegations have been considered

### 1990s Developing Players Statistics for Study

Name of Player	Age (1990)	1990 -1992 Statistics								1994 - 1996 Statistics						% Increase
		Power factor	AB	HR	2B	OBP	SLG	BA	Power factor	AB	HR	2B	OBP	SLG	BA	
Roberto Alomar	22	6.58%	1794	23	95	0.365	0.415	0.297	9.02%	1497	43	92	0.389	0.480	0.313	2.44%
Carlos Baerga	22	7.36%	1562	38	77	0.335	0.421	0.293	8.90%	1506	46	88	0.324	0.450	0.294	1.54%
<b>Jeff Bagwell</b>	22	8.16%	1140	33	60	0.371	0.440	0.283	<b>14.12%</b>	1416	91	109	0.434	0.597	0.322	<b>5.97%</b>
Albert Belle	24	10.94%	1069	63	54	0.317	0.500	0.268	<b>16.60%</b>	1560	134	125	0.412	0.671	0.325	<b>5.66%</b>
Jay Bell	25	7.02%	1823	32	96	0.326	0.391	0.263	8.58%	1481	35	92	0.333	0.410	0.262	1.55%
<b>Craig Biggio</b>	25	5.43%	1714	14	79	0.357	0.363	0.282	8.84%	1595	43	98	0.385	0.457	0.301	3.41%
Steve Finley	25	5.34%	1667	16	73	0.332	0.385	0.280	8.49%	1590	51	84	0.351	0.469	0.292	3.15%
Travis Fryman	21	8.84%	1448	50	78	0.316	0.436	0.268	8.62%	1647	55	87	0.336	0.438	0.269	<b>-0.22%</b>
<b>Juan Gonzalez</b>	21	11.40%	1219	74	65	0.309	0.506	0.264	12.47%	1315	93	71	0.343	0.575	0.297	1.07%
<b>Ken Griffey Jr.</b>	21	10.53%	1710	71	109	0.376	0.513	0.311	13.17%	1238	106	57	0.392	0.613	0.300	2.64%
Marquis Grissom	23	6.60%	1499	23	76	0.316	0.388	0.269	7.42%	1697	46	80	0.337	0.435	0.286	0.82%
Charlie Hayes	25	6.67%	1530	40	62	0.283	0.373	0.250	7.44%	1478	33	77	0.327	0.403	0.271	0.78%
Gregg Jefferies	23	7.62%	1694	34	95	0.334	0.406	0.280	8.20%	1281	30	75	0.365	0.446	0.308	0.58%
Chuck Knoblauch	22	3.95%	1165	3	43	0.369	0.355	0.289	9.16%	1561	29	114	0.412	0.491	0.330	<b>5.21%</b>
Ray Lankford	23	8.14%	1290	32	73	0.338	0.439	0.274	11.15%	1444	65	96	0.362	0.496	0.274	3.01%
Brian McRae	23	5.49%	1330	14	59	0.289	0.350	0.249	7.62%	1640	33	92	0.348	0.418	0.279	2.13%
Orlando Merced	24	7.38%	<b>840</b>	16	46	0.350	0.388	0.260	8.67%	1326	41	74	0.358	0.448	0.287	1.29%
Hal Morris	25	8.71%	1182	27	76	0.368	0.453	0.308	9.37%	1323	37	87	0.365	0.475	0.311	0.66%
John Olerud	22	9.45%	1270	47	73	0.366	0.440	0.269	9.73%	1274	38	86	0.386	0.447	0.287	0.28%
Benito Santiago	25	6.79%	1310	38	51	0.301	0.402	0.263	9.87%	1084	52	55	0.332	0.474	0.272	3.08%
<b>Gary Sheffield</b>	22	9.93%	1219	45	76	0.355	0.479	0.296	13.47%	1054	85	57	0.437	0.604	0.305	3.55%
<b>Sammy Sosa</b>	22	6.85%	1110	33	43	0.274	0.382	0.231	10.48%	1488	101	55	0.331	0.534	0.279	3.64%
Greg Vaughn	25	9.47%	1425	67	68	0.307	0.433	0.232	10.88%	1278	77	62	0.344	0.481	0.247	1.40%
Robin Ventura	23	7.33%	1691	44	80	0.360	0.402	0.273	9.87%	1479	78	68	0.378	0.496	0.288	2.54%
Omar Vizquel	23	3.61%	1164	3	39	0.316	0.319	0.260	6.57%	1370	16	74	0.345	0.372	0.280	2.96%
Larry Walker	24	9.55%	1434	58	79	0.340	0.469	0.280	14.30%	1161	73	93	0.367	0.592	0.304	<b>4.74%</b>
<b>Matt Williams</b>	25	8.70%	1735	87	64	0.301	0.460	0.259	12.10%	1132	88	49	0.355	0.582	0.297	3.40%
Todd Zeile	25	7.47%	1499	33	79	0.347	0.394	0.262	9.40%	1458	58	79	0.336	0.434	0.259	1.92%
Develop (28)	23.2857	<b>7.65%</b>	39533	1058	1968	0.333	<b>0.418</b>	0.272	<b>10.04%</b>	39373	1677	2276	0.364	<b>0.492</b>	0.291	<b>2.39%</b>

Notes: Green Denotes "Home Run" Hitter, Bold HOF Player, Boxed in Steroid Allegations have been considered

## Home Run Ratios for 67 Players in the Early to Mid 1990's




### 1990s Declining Players Statistics for Study

Name of Player	Age (90)	1990-1992 Statistics								1994-1996 Statistics						% Increase
		Power factor	AB	HR	2B	OBP	SLG	BA	Power factor	AB	HR	2B	OBP	SLG	BA	
Harold Baines	31	7.97%	1381	52	58	0.368	0.435	0.277	10.12%	1206	<b>62</b>	60	0.390	0.510	0.303	<b>2.15%</b>
<b>Wade Boggs</b>	32	7.68%	1679	21	108	0.389	0.413	0.298	6.63%	1327	18	70	0.413	0.428	0.324	<b>-1.05%</b>
Joe Carter	30	10.03%	1894	<b>91</b>	99	0.305	0.464	0.256	10.20%	1618	<b>82</b>	83	0.307	0.472	0.258	0.17%
Chili Davis	30	9.42%	1390	53	78	0.379	0.453	0.277	10.33%	1346	74	65	0.413	0.521	0.306	0.90%
Greg Gagne	29	7.29%	1235	22	68	0.288	0.367	0.249	6.81%	1233	23	61	0.320	0.376	0.256	<b>-0.47%</b>
Andres Galarraga	29	7.43%	1279	39	56	0.283	0.383	0.242	12.40%	1597	<b>109</b>	89	0.337	0.567	0.299	<b>4.97%</b>
Tony Gwynn	30	5.98%	1623	14	83	0.363	0.421	0.314	8.47%	1405	24	95	0.421	0.495	0.371	<b>2.49%</b>
<b>Rickey Henderson</b>	32	9.52%	1355	<b>61</b>	68	0.418	0.489	0.293	7.28%	1168	24	61	0.404	0.385	0.266	<b>-2.24%</b>
Paul Molitor	34	8.04%	1692	41	95	0.382	0.473	0.313	8.54%	1639	38	102	0.383	0.467	0.318	0.50%
Eddie Murray	34	8.49%	1685	<b>61</b>	82	0.361	0.448	0.284	8.57%	1435	<b>60</b>	63	0.338	0.449	0.277	0.08%
Terry Pendleton	30	8.49%	1673	49	93	0.336	0.449	0.292	7.77%	1390	32	76	0.306	0.391	0.260	<b>-0.72%</b>
Tony Phillips	31	6.77%	1743	35	83	0.375	0.392	0.270	8.23%	1544	58	69	0.402	0.439	0.273	1.46%
<b>Kirby Puckett</b>	29	8.50%	1801	46	107	0.363	0.466	0.316	11.67%	<b>977</b>	43	71	0.369	0.526	0.315	<b>3.17%</b>
Tim Lincecum	31	4.58%	1617	21	53	0.373	0.378	0.282	7.45%	1087	31	50	0.373	0.426	0.278	<b>2.88%</b>
<b>Cal Ripken Jr.</b>	30	9.11%	1887	69	103	0.345	0.450	0.276	9.06%	1634	56	92	0.340	0.449	0.283	<b>-0.06%</b>
Mickey Tettleton	30	9.59%	1470	<b>78</b>	63	0.381	0.450	0.242	10.80%	1259	<b>73</b>	63	0.389	0.474	0.244	1.21%
Decline (16)	30.75	<b>8.07%</b>	25404	753	1297	0.357	0.433	0.280	<b>9.04%</b>	21865	807	1170	0.369	0.461	0.289	


Notes: Green Denotes "Home Run" Hitter, Bold HOF Player, Boxed in Steroid Allegations have been considered



## Slugging % for 67 Players in the Early to Mid 1990's



## Power Ratios for 67 Players in the Early to Mid 1990's



### Summary Statistics for 1990s Players

Groups	Age (90)	Power factor	AB	HR	2B	OBP	SLG	BA	BB	SO
Develop	23.29	7.65%	39533	1058	1968	0.3328	0.418	0.2718	3634	6341
Prime	26.83	8.51%	34951	1206	1770	0.3464	0.438	0.2739	3980	5658
Decline	30.75	8.07%	25404	753	1297	0.3567	0.433	0.2801	3053	3593

Groups	Age (94)	Power factor	AB	HR	2B	OBP	SLG	BA	BB	SO
Develop	27.29	10.04%	39373	1677	2276	0.3637	0.492	0.2907	4535	6261
Prime	30.83	10.02%	31848	1409	1781	0.3732	0.493	0.2913	4165	5018
Decline	34.75	9.04%	21865	807	1170	0.369	0.461	0.2895	2748	3455

<b>HR Ratio</b>	1990-92	1994-96	<b>% Imp.</b>
Developing (28)	2.68%	4.26%	59%
Prime (23)	3.45%	4.42%	28%
Declining (16)	2.96%	3.69%	25%
Average HR%	3.03%	4.12%	<b>36%</b>
<b>HR &amp; 2B %</b>	1990-92	1994-96	<b>% Imp.</b>
Developing (28)	7.65%	10.04%	31%
Prime (23)	8.51%	10.02%	18%
Declining (16)	8.07%	9.04%	12%
Power Ratio %	8.08%	9.70%	<b>20%</b>
<b>Slugging</b>	1990-92	1994-96	<b>% Imp.</b>
Developing (28)	0.418	0.492	18%
Prime (23)	0.438	0.493	13%
Declining (16)	0.433	0.461	6%
Average Slugging	<b>0.430</b>	<b>0.482</b>	<b>12%</b>

### Summary Statistics for 1920s Study and Overall Comparison

Group	Age (1918)	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	OBP	SLG	HR%	2B%
Develop (18)	23.3	23495	7087	1118	414	289	2114	1655	0.359	0.421	1.23%	4.76%
Prime (20)	27.0	23987	6751	990	313	129	2003	1391	0.337	0.365	0.54%	4.13%
Decline (20)	30.3	27966	8278	1296	484	206	2623	1586	0.356	0.399	0.74%	4.63%

Group	Age (1922)	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	OBP	SLG	HR%	2B%
Develop (18)	27.3	25650	8189	1419	457	455	2561	1495	0.381	0.463	1.77%	5.53%
Prime (20)	31.0	27108	7967	1283	380	211	2263	1371	0.348	0.393	0.78%	4.73%
Decline (20)	34.3	25223	7793	1314	363	361	2576	1165	0.372	0.434	1.43%	5.21%

<b>HR%</b>	<b>1918-20</b>	<b>1922-24</b>	<b>% Imp.</b>
Develop (18)	1.23%	1.77%	44%
Prime (20)	0.54%	0.78%	45%
Decline (20)	0.74%	1.43%	94%
Average HR%	0.83%	1.33%	<b>59.1%</b>
<b>2B%</b>	<b>1918-20</b>	<b>1922-24</b>	<b>% Imp.</b>
Develop (18)	4.76%	5.53%	16%
Prime (20)	4.13%	4.73%	15%
Decline (20)	4.63%	5.21%	12%
Average 2B%	4.51%	5.16%	<b>14.5%</b>
<b>Power Ratio</b>	<b>1918-20</b>	<b>1922-24</b>	<b>% Imp.</b>
Develop (18)	5.99%	7.31%	22%
Prime (20)	4.67%	5.51%	18%
Decline (20)	5.37%	6.64%	24%
Average Power Ratio	5.34%	6.49%	<b>21.4%</b>
<b>Slugging %</b>	<b>1918-20</b>	<b>1922-24</b>	<b>% Imp.</b>
Develop (18)	0.421	0.463	10%
Prime (20)	0.365	0.393	8%
Decline (20)	0.399	0.434	9%
Average Slugging	0.395	0.430	<b>8.8%</b>

<u>Power Ratio Increase</u>	<u>Coolidge</u>	<u>Clinton</u>
Developing	22.0%	31.2%
Prime	18.1%	17.6%
Decline	23.6%	12.0%
<b>Average Increase</b>	<b>21.26%</b>	<b>20.28%</b>

### Developing Players in 1920s Study

Name	Age (1918)	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	OBP	SLG	Age (1922)	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	OBP	SLG
<b>Babe Ruth</b>	23	1207	406	96	32	94	309	196	0.472	0.703	27	1457	533	108	28	122	396	254	0.501	0.730
Bill Wambsganss	24	1406	377	48	19	3	107	71	0.320	0.336	28	1515	415	83	15	1	157	74	0.342	0.350
Carson Bigbee	23	1338	365	41	22	7	124	64	0.334	0.352	27	1395	438	51	23	5	125	40	0.370	0.394
Charlie Hollocher	22	1240	373	54	13	5	132	64	0.368	0.377	26	1138	360	63	14	6	102	17	0.373	0.412
Cliff Heathcote	20	1238	341	43	15	8	65	112	0.312	0.354	24	785	219	33	10	1	53	50	0.325	0.350
Cy Perkins	22	797	205	36	13	7	55	57	0.305	0.361	26	1397	365	73	15	8	136	80	0.327	0.352
<b>Edd Roush</b>	25	1518	503	59	38	13	106	51	0.375	0.446	29	1010	353	64	39	9	68	27	0.391	0.517
<b>George Sisler</b>	25	1594	591	101	42	31	113	56	0.412	0.545	29	1222	440	69	28	17	80	43	0.399	0.504
<b>Harry Heilmann</b>	24	1366	419	68	26	22	111	83	0.359	0.443	28	1549	570	116	37	49	210	109	0.443	0.586
Ira Flagstead	25	598	168	35	8	8	72	66	0.358	0.406	29	942	291	58	11	13	114	67	0.384	0.435
Irish Meusel	25	1512	451	78	21	23	77	61	0.332	0.423	29	1761	551	76	40	41	106	67	0.352	0.471
Jack Smith	23	721	195	38	8	1	51	52	0.319	0.350	27	1376	414	57	24	15	110	77	0.353	0.410
Joe Dugan	21	1289	343	68	10	7	46	136	0.291	0.351	25	1847	536	92	18	16	78	123	0.319	0.385
Joe Judge	24	1516	445	75	34	8	195	101	0.374	0.404	28	1512	468	94	30	15	161	61	0.376	0.441
Milt Stock	25	1612	487	58	11	1	124	70	0.352	0.354	29	1745	487	80	16	9	108	82	0.321	0.359
<b>Rogers Hornsby</b>	22	1517	498	78	40	22	148	134	0.388	0.476	26	1583	640	121	38	84	209	111	0.474	0.688
<b>Ross Youngs</b>	21	1544	499	74	29	9	170	151	0.390	0.426	25	1681	572	100	34	20	205	117	0.412	0.476
<u>Wally Pipp</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>1482</u>	<u>421</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>130</u>	<u>0.333</u>	<u>0.415</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>1735</u>	<u>537</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>0.362</u>	<u>0.440</u>
<b>Developing (18)</b>	23.3	23495	7087	1118	414	289	2114	1655	<b>0.359</b>	<b>0.421</b>	27.3	25650	8189	1419	457	455	2561	1495	<b>0.381</b>	<b>0.463</b>

**Bold Denotes HOF Player**

### Prime Players in the 1920s Study

Name	Age 1918	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	OBP	SLG	Age 1922	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	OBP	SLG
Baby Doll Jacobson	28	1064	363	65	22	13	70	84	0.382	0.480	32	1726	543	92	34	36	110	108	0.356	0.470
Casey Stengel	28	766	224	35	16	13	73	70	0.354	0.431	32	711	221	28	16	12	66	56	0.369	0.446
<b>Dave Bancroft</b>	27	1276	355	61	18	0	118	98	0.339	0.354	31	1414	433	85	9	7	178	74	0.384	0.394
Everett Scott	26	1519	392	51	17	4	52	57	0.283	0.322	30	1638	418	51	15	13	57	56	0.280	0.328
George Burns	25	975	317	51	18	14	42	43	0.353	0.457	29	1571	495	116	15	23	94	88	0.354	0.452
Hank Severeid	27	773	204	26	7	2	54	24	0.312	0.323	31	1381	432	82	15	10	95	38	0.357	0.416
Howie Shanks	28	1371	353	43	18	6	85	112	0.301	0.328	32	736	195	29	14	4	44	62	0.306	0.359
Jack Tobin	26	1559	494	75	22	10	123	73	0.367	0.412	30	1831	579	96	31	28	148	47	0.367	0.448
Johnny Rawlings	26	1069	245	34	7	4	68	76	0.275	0.285	30	769	218	31	12	2	48	44	0.326	0.363
<b>Max Carey</b>	28	953	268	32	10	4	121	56	0.362	0.348	32	1838	573	90	40	24	211	71	0.383	0.443
Max Flack	28	1467	418	67	20	14	142	47	0.348	0.387	32	772	225	28	10	5	72	27	0.352	0.373
Nemo Leibold	26	1287	332	48	12	1	190	92	0.353	0.316	30	586	166	21	5	2	94	30	0.382	0.346
<b>Rabbit Maranville</b>	27	973	259	37	25	6	64	47	0.311	0.374	31	1847	517	78	44	3	138	130	0.330	0.375
<b>Ray Schalk</b>	26	1212	315	40	11	1	155	66	0.344	0.314	30	824	211	34	5	5	106	64	0.341	0.328
Roger Peckinpaugh	27	1433	385	61	11	15	174	125	0.348	0.358	31	1611	424	52	13	6	191	111	0.341	0.323
<b>Sam Rice</b>	28	1181	390	52	18	6	81	49	0.373	0.420	32	1874	591	111	45	10	151	49	0.366	0.439
Steve O'Neill	27	1246	359	82	19	6	165	82	0.371	0.399	31	1029	277	54	5	2	200	82	0.388	0.337
Stuffy McInnis	28	1422	415	44	13	3	60	40	0.321	0.347	32	1725	524	74	23	4	56	23	0.326	0.380
Wally Gerber	27	1046	268	40	8	3	107	68	0.325	0.318	31	1705	466	68	15	2	149	118	0.332	0.334
Walter Holke	26	1395	395	46	21	4	59	82	0.312	0.355	30	1520	459	63	14	13	55	93	0.326	0.388
Prime (20)	26.95	23987	6751	<b>990</b>	313	<b>129</b>	2003	1391	<b>0.337</b>	<b>0.365</b>	30.95	27108	7967	<b>1283</b>	380	<b>211</b>	2263	1371	<b>0.348</b>	<b>0.393</b>


**Bold Denotes HOF Player**

### Declining Players in the 1920s Study


Name	Age1918	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	OBP	SLG	Age	AB	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	OBP	SLG
Bob Jones	29	991	259	38	13	2	73	68	0.312	0.332	33	1220	317	52	14	4	85	51	0.308	0.335
Bobby Veach	30	1649	518	105	45	17	104	78	0.355	0.463	34	1430	449	82	25	16	118	66	0.366	0.440
Cy Williams	31	1376	410	71	12	30	89	118	0.341	0.432	35	1677	520	83	20	91	200	155	0.384	0.546
Del Pratt	30	1578	465	83	22	10	121	74	0.345	0.394	34	1333	405	94	13	7	109	39	0.356	0.410
<b>Eddie Collins</b>	31	1450	480	65	22	9	210	59	0.416	0.425	35	1659	570	69	24	12	246	40	0.428	0.436
George Burns	29	1630	478	87	24	12	201	122	0.371	0.398	33	1581	434	66	25	6	208	105	0.359	0.359
<b>Harry Hooper</b>	31	1501	435	81	36	11	242	80	0.388	0.414	35	1654	505	94	20	31	201	81	0.381	0.443
Heinie Groh	29	1491	461	73	26	6	170	79	0.380	0.405	33	1450	405	75	11	9	165	72	0.353	0.365
Hy Myers	29	1501	438	68	44	13	78	114	0.327	0.422	33	948	295	38	11	8	25	45	0.329	0.400
Ivy Olson	33	1733	447	43	24	3	77	49	0.290	0.316	37	843	226	37	7	2	39	20	0.300	0.336
Jake Daubert	34	1486	438	50	40	8	109	70	0.343	0.398	38	1515	465	56	41	15	124	58	0.359	0.428
Jimmy Johnston	29	1524	435	44	24	2	105	80	0.331	0.350	33	1507	478	60	20	10	118	42	0.367	0.403
Ralph Young	29	1348	325	41	12	1	192	79	0.336	0.292	33	470	105	19	2	1	55	21	0.305	0.279
Tilly Walker	31	1455	412	73	13	38	108	144	0.333	0.430	35	565	160	31	4	37	61	67	0.353	0.549
Tommy Griffith	29	1245	336	37	12	10	77	80	0.312	0.343	33	1292	366	57	22	15	107	48	0.338	0.396
<b>Tris Speaker</b>	30	1517	510	121	34	10	234	34	0.425	0.481	34	1486	546	143	28	37	242	39	0.456	0.576
<b>Ty Cobb</b>	32	1346	495	83	35	6	137	71	0.426	0.495	36	1707	611	120	33	14	206	56	0.427	0.492
Wally Schang	29	717	219	46	10	4	135	79	0.415	0.414	33	1036	309	48	16	8	128	96	0.375	0.399
Walter Schmidt	31	900	230	23	9	0	64	43	0.305	0.301	35	335	83	7	2	0	22	12	0.294	0.281
<b>Zack Wheat</b>	<u>30</u>	<u>1528</u>	<u>487</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>0.359</u>	<u>0.423</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>1515</u>	<u>544</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>0.405</u>	<u>0.522</u>
Decline (20)	30.3	27966	8278	1296	484	206	2623	1586	<b>0.356</b>	<b>0.399</b>	34.3	25223	7793	1314	363	361	2576	1165	<b>0.373</b>	<b>0.433</b>

**Bold Denotes HOF Player**


## Power Ratio for 58 Players between 1918-1924




## Slugging Averages for 58 Players - 1918-1924



### HR Ratio for 58 Players between 1918-1924



### Increase in Power Ratio (HR +2B/AB) Explosion Comparisons



## End Notes

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- Floyd Landis then appeared on *The Tonight Show* with Jay Leno on August 8, 2006 to speak about the allegations against him. He stated he would “fight the allegations” and was concerned about the way the investigation was initially done, and how the samples were collected. Saying their only conclusion was, “The only possibility was that he took something...” This even when he tested five times before stage 17 and two times after that positive test. These tests all were negative.
- On September 11, 2006, media reports about two of Lance Armstrong's teammates during his Tour de France winning streak came out that they used EPO, a performance enhancer, to improve in their conditioning for the race.
- Floyd Landis's appeal was ultimately denied, and the 2006 Tour de France title stripped away. He sought final appeals and lost.
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